The Statesman in Plutarch's Works

VOLUME II: THE STATESMAN IN PLUTARCH'S GREEK AND ROMAN *LIVES*

EDITED BY

LUKAS DE BLOIS, JEROEN BONS,
TON KESSELS & DIRK M. SCHENKEVELD

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VOLUME II

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VOLUME II

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LUKAS DE BLOIS, JEROEN BONS
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WITH THE AID OF JAN MAARTEN BREMER, CAROLYN DOYLE,
EDWIN VAN MEERKERK, AURELIO PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ, LUC VAN DER STOCKT
AND FRANCES TITCHENER

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PREFACE

This volume presents the second half of the *Acta* of the sixth international conference of the International Plutarch Society, which was held from May 1 to 5, 2002 in The Netherlands, at the University of Nijmegen (May 1) and Castle Hernen (May 2–5). The theme of the conference was "The Statesman in Plutarch's Works". The proceedings of the conference are published in two volumes, one on Plutarch's statesman and his aftermath (political, philosophical, and literary aspects), and another one on the statesman in Plutarch's Greek and Roman *Lives*.

The conference was funded by the Netherlands Organisation of Scientific Research (N.W.O.), the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (K.N.A.W.), the Cornelia de Vogel Foundation, the University of Nijmegen, the Free University of Amsterdam, and the A.A. Bredius Foundation for the promotion of Byzantine studies, which hosted the conference at its seat, Castle Hernen (May 2–5), which is situated just a few kilometers West from Nijmegen.

Lukas de Blois (Nijmegen), Jeroen Bons (Utrecht), and Gert-Jan van Dijk (Amsterdam/ Nijmegen) acted as organisers for the conference, with the aid of Victoria van Aalst (A.A. Bredius Foundation) and Jacqueline Berns (Congress Bureau of the University of Nijmegen). They wish to thank Mary Bluyssen (of the same congress bureau), Werner Gelderblom, Martijn van Helvert, Paul Peters, and Fedor van Rijn for their assistance.

Lukas de Blois, Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp (Bonn), Aurelio Pérez Jiménez (Málaga), Sven-Tage Teodorsson (Göteborg), Joseph Geiger (Jerusalem), Christopher Pelling (Oxford), Frances Titchener (Logan, Utah), Luc van der Stockt (Leuven), Frederick Brenk (Rome), André Lardinois (Nijmegen), Alexej Zadorojnyi, and Jeroen Bons chaired the sessions of the conference.

Lukas de Blois, Jeroen Bons, Ton Kessels, and Dirk M. Schenkeveld (Amsterdam, Free University) act as editors of the proceedings, with the aid of Jan Maarten Bremer (University of Amsterdam), Michiel Klein Swormink (Brill Academic Publishers), Edwin van Meerkerk (Nijmegen), Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, and Luc van der Stockt.

Carolyn Doyle and Frances Titchener (Logan, Utah, USA) kindly corrected the English of some of the contributions.

The editors

ABSTRACTS AND BIOGRAPHIES

SUZANNE SAÏD, *Plutarch and the People in the* Parallel Lives.

Masses appear only in the background of the Lives of Illustrious Men. Yet their portrait, which is surprisingly consistent, deserves the attention of the historian. This consistency is to be explained not only by Plutarch's use of political concepts drawn from the tradition of Greek political thought (mostly Plato), but also by Plutarch's perception of the contemporary *dêmos*, as demonstrated by a comparison with the *Political Precepts*.

Suzanne Saïd is Professor of Classics at Columbia University (New York). Her books include *La Faute tragique* (1978), *Approches de la mythologie grecque* (1993), *Histoire de la littérature grecque* (with M. Trédé and A. Le Boulluec, 1997) and *Homère et l'Odyssée* (1998).

THOMAS SPÄTH, *Das Politische und der Einzelne: Figurenkonstruktion in Biographie und Geschichtsschreibung [The Political and the Person: Character Construction in Biography and Historiography].*

The subject of this study is the representation of the "first triumvirate" between Caesar, Crassus and Pompeius in historiographic texts by Appian and Cassius Dio and in six *Lives* by Plutarch (*Caesar*, *Pompeius*, *Crassus*, *Lucullus*, *Cicero*, and *Cato Minor*). An analysis of these texts calls into question the clear distinction usually drawn between biography and historical writing. The focus of the chroniclers is also biographical: both Cassius Dio and Appian are interested in the moral personalities of their figures. The difference between the two genres appears to lie much more in the narrative function of the figures. Nevertheless, the characters constructed in the two kinds of text emerge as personalities whose image does not correspond with modern ideas of individuality. Character in these texts is composed by selection from a fixed repertoire of political and social norms and values. Examination of this mode of character formation can reveal the differences in an antique concept of individuality and contribute insights into how the person was understood by Graeco-Roman culture.

Thomas Späth works in the Department of Ancient History at the University of Basel. His main fields of research are gender history in antiquity, Graeco-Roman historiography, and the comparative study of biography and historiography. Publications: *Männlichkeit und Weiblichkeit bei Tacitus. Zur Konstruction der Geschlechter in der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Frankfurt/ New York 1994); as editor (with B. Wagner-Hasel): *Frauenwelten in der Antike. Geschlechterverhältnisse und weibliche Lebenspraxis* (Stuttgart 2000); (with M. Coudry): *L'invention des grands hommes de la Rome antique/Die Konstruction der grossen Männer Altroms* (Paris 2001).

David H.J. Larmour, *Statesman and Self in the* Parallel Lives.

Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* can be viewed as performances of the "technology of the self" as practiced by educated individuals in the imperial era, and which has been delineated by Michel Foucault in the third volume of his *History of Sexuality*, entitled *The Care of the Self.* Although Foucault does not discuss the *Parallel Lives*, they have much to tell us about the fragmentation of the imperial subject and the *technê tou biou*. The fragmented, tripartite narrative form which Plutarch develops in his *Parallel Lives* is indicative of, and a response to, the dissolution of a secure sense of identity which was the inevitable consequence of the rise of the imperial Roman state. The *Lives* enact a complex negotiation between the Greek and the Roman—between Greek and Roman narratives of history, cultural formations, and structures of identity—to construct a subject-position. Plutarch's images of mirrors, phantoms, and paintings all point to this process. The *synkrisis* functions not as a conclusive verdict on the two statesmen but as a starting-point for the reader's own self-constitution. Thus the *Parallel Lives* are a remarkable attempt to bring the self into a new relationship with history.

David H.J. Larmour is Professor of Classics and Comparative Literature at Texas Tech University. He has published on Lucian, Plutarch, Foucault, and Nabokov; his books include *Rethinking Sexuality: Foucault and Classical Antiquity* (Princeton 1997), *Stage and Stadium: Drama and Athletics in Ancient Greece* (London 1999), and *Discourse and Ideology in Nabokov's Prose* (London/ New York 2002).

George W.M. Harrison, *Plutarch the Dramaturg: Statecraft as Stagecraft in the* Lives.

This paper explores the influence of tragic diction and plot structure on the organisation of various *Lives* of Plutarch which in his judgement were inherently dramatic. It attempts to demonstrate its argument by placing Plutarch's *Lives* within the context of other prose writers of the first century AD whose works seem similarly influenced by drama. The paper thus contributes also to other recent scholarship which indicates that the early Roman Empire was an active period for drama.

George W.M. Harrison is Associate Professor of Classics at Xavier University (Cincinnati) and a Fellow of the Institute for the History of Ancient Civilisations, Northeast Normal University (China). His scholarship has focused almost exclusively on Plutarch and other writers, both Latin and Greek, of the early Empire as well as the archaeology and society of the same period. He has published a book of verse and adapted/written plays under the name George Mallory.

Frederick E. Brenk, *O Sweet Mystery of the* Lives*! The Eschatological Dimension of Plutarch's Biographies.*

Almost incredibly, "eschatological ethics" seem absent from Plutarch's *Lives*. Biography grew up in the philosophical tradition, and philosophers wrote treatises "*On Lives*". Several of Plutarch's *Lives*, too, have endings in the "*teletai*" genre ("memorable deaths of famous persons"), in part a philosophical cre-

ation. As a Platonist, Plutarch knew the importance of the soul's correct choice of a life before entering this world. Some eschatological interest appears in the mythological or semi-mythological *Lives*, or where a person receives hero or divine cult. But Plutarch remains the sceptical historian, while the heroes themselves nonchalantly ignore the world beyond. Cato reads Plato's *Phaidon* before committing suicide, but for any real trace of eschatological ethics we need *Dion—Brutus*. Nonetheless, Plutarch is not very enthusiastic here about a *daimon* interfering to prevent Brutus from being rewarded for his virtue in the next life. In the *Brutus*, Plutarch is rather non-commital about the suicides of Cato, of Cato's daughter and Brutus' wife, Porcia, and of Brutus. In the *Caesar*, however, the appearance of the *daimon* and Brutus' suicide is a clear sign of divine retribution for the tyrannicide. As far as eschatological ethics goes, biography and philosophy seem to be miles, or genres, apart.

Frederick E. Brenk is Professor Ordinarius for the Greek and Roman Background of the New Testament at the Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome. He has written on many aspects of Plutarch's thought and style, in particular on the philosophical and religious background.

Marlein van Raalte, More philosophico: *Political Virtue and Philosophy in Plutarch's* Lives.

In his speeches *On Alexander's Fortune or Virtue* Plutarch pictures Alexander the Great as a philosopher in action, who could have chosen a theoretical way of life just as well: φιλοσόφως and βασιλικῶς are in fact interchangeable. Owing to Plato's identification of the virtue of true manliness (ἀνδρεία) with self-restraint, Plutarch does not need to get out of his way to associate the fanaticism of the conqueror with the asceticism of the philosopher. This paper investigates what qualities are referred to as "philosophical" in the *Lives*, and how such qualities relate to fitness for political leadership and involvement in political practice. In fact, apart from the quality of self-restraint, which constitutes an important factor in both personal and political activities qualified as philosophical, there seems to be no straightforward connection between the competence of a philosopher and political qualifications. However, Plutarch does advance as valuable also less canonical virtues like humanity and communicative competence, which indicates that his conception of political virtue incorporates some aspects that would be designated as "philosophical" by Isocrates rather than by Plato. I submit that this does not indicate that Plutarch borrowed views from both schools, but that the genre of the *Lives* is meant to evoke an awareness that the display of personal virtue is paramount.

Marlein van Raalte is lecturer in Ancient Greek at Leiden University. She has published on Greek metre and Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*.

Alexei V. Zadorojnyi, *"Stabbed with Large Pens": Trajectories of Literacy in Plutarch's* Lives.

The paper explores the significance of episodes dealing with literacy-related activities, such as scenes of reading and writing as well as references to sta-

tionery, in Greco-Roman biographical and historical texts, with special focus on Plutarch's *Lives* of the Gracchi, Pompey, Cato, Eumenes, and Caesar. Greco-Roman biography and historiography represent the high-end of ancient literacy. It is argued that literacy-related scenes in these texts demonstrate reflection by the literati on the value of literary culture and its relations with ideals of statesmanship. Literacy is problematized from a variety of perspectives: as lowly, non-aristocratic occupation, as a tool of manipulative and tyrannical rulers, or as a mode of discourse inferior to experience and the living voice and generally inadequate in the face of reality. It is pointed out that ancient texts (notably, Plutarch) operate mostly on the level of discrete anecdotes and thus do not offer a consistent, systematic discussion of the nature and impact of literacy. Indeed, in some areas, such as libraries and book-collections, Plutarch conspicuously declines to problematize literacy.

Dr Alexei V. Zadorojnyi is a lecturer at the University of Liverpool. His work is mainly on Plutarch.

Luisa Prandi, *Singolare e plurale nelle* Vite *greche di Plutarco.*

The rôle of the single and of the mass, in constructing politics inside Greek *Parallel Lives* is the topic of this paper.

Greek *Lives* can be divided into two categories: 1, where a politician figures deciding almost alone in all cicumstances (*Lysander*, *Theseus*, *Alcibiades* etc.); 2, where a single individual has to persuade, or to overwhelm, the masses in order to realize his projects (Athenian leaders, *Timoleon*, *Aratus* etc.).

The second category has a "theorical" pattern in many passages of the *Lives*, where Plutarch says that the *dêmos* has not the skill to decide without a leader. In this category a recurring theme is important: the leader can decide only if he is able to persuade the mob. The best example to be analyzed is the *Life of Dion*, where one quarter of the text is devoted to the *agôn* between Dion and the Syracusans.

When Plutarch recognizes an autonomous space to the masses, it is not a positive one. Of course he can be influenced by the literary genre; however his use of historical traditions may suggest instead that Plutarch wrote biographies because he thought that the leader only, through an endless struggle with the people, can determine policies and make history.

Luisa Prandi is Professor of Greek History at University of Basilicata (Italy). She wrote about Athenian topics (citizenship, Plataea, Alcibiades) and historiographical traditions, particularly on Alexander the Great (Callisthenes, Clitarchus).

Timothy E. Duff, *The First Five Anecdotes of Plutarch's* Life of Alkibiades.

Anecdotes about childhood and early career feature in many of Plutarch's *Lives*. The *Life of Alkibiades* is especially noticeable in this respect. This paper explores the first five anecdotes of the *Alkibiades* (*Alk.* 2–3) in order to assess their function within the Life as a whole. The paper demonstrates that these

are carefully constructed to introduce the reader to the character of Alkibiades—refining and fleshing out the explicit statement of character in 2.1. They also signal and prefigure key themes and key images which will be central to the Life which follows: anecdote and imagery are central to Plutarch's technique in constructing character.

Timothy E. Duff is Lecturer in Classics at the University of Reading. He is the author of *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Oxford 1999) and *The Greek and Roman Historians* (London 2003).

Simon Verdegem, De Gloria Alcibiadis. *Alcibiades' Military Value and its Relation to his* doxa *in Plutarch's* Alcibiades.

The paper examines Alcibiades' military value and its relation to his glory among his contemporaries in Plutarch's *Alcibiades*. In the first part of the paper it is shown that Plutarch does not give a prominent place to Alcibiades' exploits as a private soldier. They do not bring him much prestige within the army nor explain his popularity with his fellow-citizens. Time and again, the contrast with Coriolanus is striking. The second part of the paper discusses Alcibiades' generalship. By carefully constructing his story and by focusing his narrative on the protagonist, Plutarch creates the impression that Alcibiades was an invaluable commander, who always bestowed victory upon his allies. The Athenian *dêmos* recognizes his merits but at times they attach more importance to his (alleged) private excesses. Both the emphasis on the harm Alcibiades did to his country during his first exile and the relation between his successes as a general and his *doxa* raise important moral issues. The reader is invited to compare Alcibiades' behaviour as an exile to that of Coriolanus and to wonder whether a politician's value for the public interest of his country is more important than his personal virtue.

Simon Verdegem studied Latin and Greek at the Catholic University of Leuven. As Research Assistant of the Organisation for Scientific Research F.W.O. (Flanders, Belgium), he is currently writing a doctoral dissertation on Plutarch's biographical strategy and ideology in the *Alcibiades*.

Maricruz Salcedo Parrondo, *Retórica visual y carácter politico,* Alc. 10: *un modelo negativo de* enargeia.

The opening anecdote of chapter 10 of the *Life of Alkibiades* is written in a fully descriptive style. Because of the comic atmosphere in it, Plutarch is suggesting that the debut of Alkibiades in the public and political sphere is very much like an Aristophanic comedy's scene.

Regarding the vivid and full description of the scene, Plutarch may have used a common rethorical figure, *enargeia*, in order to describe negatively much of the political, and above all public, character of the Athenian *stratêgos*. If this would have been the case, the Chaeroneian may have used the *enargeia* in a negative way, not positively as usual with this rethorical figure.

Maricruz Salcedo Parrondo is a Research Assistant of Greek at the University of Málaga, Spain. Her research covers different fields, from Plutarch's *Alkibi-*

ades to Philo of Alexandria. She is now preparing a translation of Plutarch's *Life of Alkibiades* into Spanish.

Francesca Alesse, *Fonti socratiche e stoiche nella* Vita Alcibiadis.

Plutarch's *Vita Alcibiadis* is undoubtedly influenced by the so-called Socratic literature as well as by the Stoic tradition. As is well-known, many Socratics indeed composed a dialogue entitled *Alcibiades*, or at least a moral essay about Alcibiades and his relationship with Socrates. Due to Polycrates's charge, Alcibiades, one of the most important and "disputed" figures of Athenian political life in the Vth century, was considered "the pupil of Socrates", that is, the ultimate proof for the detrimental effects of philosophical teaching. According to the Socratic literature, on the other hand, Alcibiades became a "paradigmatic" character, the example of a well-gifted young man who was eventually ruined by his ambition and lack of moral education. In the Hellenistic age, the Stoics aimed at defending the image of Socrates, harshly criticised by the Epicureans and the Peripatetic biographers, and paid special attention to the so-called Socratic dialogues of Plato as well as to those of Antisthenes and Aischines, where they could also find much about the young Alcibiades. Plutarch's biography, especially the section concerning childhood and education, in (chapters 4 and 6), contains facts and anecdotes derived from Antisthenes', Plato's, and Aischines' dialogues, directly or through Stoic sources.

Francesca Alesse is Research Fellow at the "Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e Storia delle Idee"—Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche' (Rome). Apart from articles and contributions in international journals and conference proceedings, she has published works on middle stoicism (*Panezio di Rodi e la tradizione stoica* (1994), and *Panezio di Rodi. Testimonianze*, translation and commentary (1997)), and on the relation between Stoicism and the Socratic schools (*La Stoa e la tradizione socratica* (2000)).

Federicomaria Muccioli, *Gli onori divini per Lisandro a Samo. A proposito di Plutarchus,* Lysander *18*.

The figure of Lysander is important to understand the deep changes in Spartan society and the tension between the old tradition and the yearning for innovations. In his biography, Plutarch notices this ambivalence and criticizes some defaults of his hero, above all the *philotimia*. According to this interpretation, the biographer is a severe judge of the divine honours, which Lysander received from the Samians. Chapter 18 of the *Life of Lysander,* which derives mostly from the *Annals of Samos* by Duris, is very important for the history of the cults for humans but also for our understanding of the mentality of Plutarch. Just like Duris, Plutarch is opposed to such a cult. Many passages in his works show it, with some exceptions (for instance, *Life of Dion* 29.2 and 46.1, where Plutarch deals with the protagonist in a rather benevolent way). Following Duris, Plutarch points out the importance of the cult for Lysander in Greek history, but he pays attention only to the *kolakeia* of the literates and the Samians, misunderstanding or leaving out the political situation in Samos in 404 B.C. We must also notice that this kind of cult is very far from the

Spartan tradition (despite the example of Brasidas); so chapter 18 sharpens the difference between Lysander and the cultural and religious world of Sparta. Although the Samian cult is only an episode in the biography of Lysander, it may have been connected with Lysander's project of reforming the Spartan constitution, which we know from Plutarch (*Life of Lysander* 20 and 26ff.) and other sources. Lysander may have intended this divine cult as a preliminary condition for imposing his *aretê* in Sparta.

Federicomaria Muccioli is *Ricercatore* of Greek History at the University of Bologna. His principal fields of research are Plutarch and his sources, Hellenistic titulature, Western Greek history and historiography (*Dionisio II. Storia e tradizione letteraria* (Bologna 1999)).

Sven-Tage Teodorsson, *Timoleon, the Fortunate General.*

The study aims at an understanding of the personality and career of Timoleon of Corinth who brought about a revival of Greek Sicily in 344–338 B.C. He appears as an unobtrusive, perhaps even shy person, not interested in power, a man of high moral principle, who inspires great admiration in Plutarch. This appears in his idealization of Timoleon and the emphasis of his remarkably good fortune. Plutarch is influenced by the Roman concept of *Fortuna*, regarded as the agent of the gods' will. He considers Timoleon's exceedingly good luck an indication of their approval of his person and the support of his mission.

Plutarch does not mention the program for Sicily outlined in the Platonic *Seventh Letter*, though this was almost exactly what Timoleon brought to effect. However, we have no indication that he should have known of the program. Plutarch's silence intimates that he regarded Timoleon, and not Plato, as the right man to rescue Sicily.

Sven-Tage Teodorsson is Professor of Greek at Göteborg University, Sweden. He has done reseach on the history of the Greek language (phonology), Anaxagoras' theory of matter, and on Plutarch, esp. a Commentary on his *Table Talks*.

Geert Roskam, *Plutarch's* Life of Agis, *or the Honourable Course of a Beginning Politician.*

This contribution examines many parallels, which can be drawn between Plutarch's *Political Precepts* and his *Life of Agis*. In the former treatise, much practical advice is given to a beginning politician, Menemachus of Sardis; in the latter work, Plutarch relates the short life of another young statesman, king Agis IV of Sparta. The political career of this Plutarchan hero aptly illustrates most aspects of the advice given in the *Political Precepts*. First of all, Agis combines a most honourable political project with a good ambition, based on personal virtue. Furthermore, he proceeds with a certain caution, surrounds himself with some powerful followers, and usually adopts an attitude of respect towards his colleagues. He knows to attract his subjects towards him by means of his rhetorical talents, by his voluntary donation and by sharing their life.

Agis' virtue is further illustrated by internal contrasts and comparisons. The king only made an important mistake by choosing and trusting wrong friends, and by being too tolerant for his enemies.

Geert Roskam is Postdoctoral Fellow of the Organisation for Scientific Research F.W.O. (Flanders, Belgium), and is working at the Catholic University of Leuven. He published on various aspects of Plutarch's œuvre, particularly on its philosophical and religious themes.

Bernard Boulet, *Is Numa the Genuine Philosopher King?*

In the *Lives of Lycurgus and Numa*, Plutarch constantly points to Plato's *Republic*, presenting the Spartan regime and Numa's reign as historical confirmation of the practicality of Plato's ideas: Numa is the genuine philosopher king and Sparta is the blueprint for Socrates' ideal republic. But in fact Numa rules in sharp contrast to Plato's philosopher king. More specifically, while Plato's philosopher king maintains discipline through public spiritedness, Numa turns swords into ploughshares, does away with Spartan-like discipline, and guides his subjects to the joys of domestic life. Is the *Numa* a critique of Plato's *Republic*? Plutarchan *synkrisis* affords a key to the answer: Plutarch has split Plato's ideal regime into two, implementing the irascible (or *thumotic*) elements in Lycurgus' regime and the concupiscible (or *erotic*) elements in Numa's regime. Moreover, these two regimes have a more realistic character than Plato's ideal republic. Indeed, in "transferring Plato's ideas into history", Plutarch departs from the too "forbidding character" of Platonic idealism to suggest a realistic marriage of Roman and Greek virtues. Plutarch's philosopher king, then, is a slight departure from Plato's.

Bernard Boulet is a Philosophy Professor at Sainte-Foy College in Quebec City, Canada. He specializes in political philosophy and French philosophers. He also enjoys reading groups on Homer, Greek plays, Plutarch, Montaigne, Shakespeare, and French classical plays.

Jan Maarten Bremer, *Plutarch and the "Liberation of Greece".*

This paper starts from the question why Plutarch admired Flamininus and Aemilius to such a degree: after all it was they who had prepared the way for the complete domination of Greece by the Romans. To this question four answers are given. The first three answers can be found in the text of these two *Lives*. The fourth, which has not been put forward so far, can be documented from the historical context and from Plutarch's own writings as a whole. The four reasons do not exclude but indeed reinforce each other: 1. Plutarch considered them to be men of high moral standing, 2. he appreciated their philhellenism, 3. he emphasized that they had freed the Greeks from oppressive Macedonian kings, 4. they had liberated the Greek elite from social unrest.

Jan Maarten Bremer is emeritus Professor of Greek at the University of Amsterdam. His publications concern mainly but not exclusively Greek drama; his latest contribution to scholarship is *Greek Hymns* vol. I and II (Tübingen 2002), a co-production of William D. Furley and himself.

LORA HOLLAND, *Plutarch's* Aemilius Paullus *and the Model of the Philosopher Statesman.*

Plutarch draws Aemilius Paullus into the philosophical tradition both by assigning to him Pythagoras as an ancestor, and by his portrayal of the man as a type of Socrates through metaphorical imagery and anecdote. Especially pertinent are Aemilius' roles as helmsman, religious leader, and charioteer in his conduct of the Battle of Pydna, the narration of which comprises the bulk of the Life. His depiction of Paullus as a philosopher statesman corresponds to Cicero's portrait of the man in the *Somnium Scipionis* in several important respects: his self-control, his religiosity, and his interest in instructing the youth. The subtlety of Plutarch's portrait reflects his own notion of *paideia*, and adds to the larger picture of his acknowledged interest in Socrates and Greek philosophy in general.

Lora Louise Holland is Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of North Carolina at Asheville. Her main area of interest is Roman religion; she has also published on Greek tragedy, "*Pas domos erroi*: Myth and Plot in Euripides' *Medea*" (*TAPA* 133.2 [2003] 255–279).

BRADLEY BUSZARD, *The Decline of the Roman Republic in* Pyrrhus-Marius.

Both *Lives* in Plutarch's *Pyrrhus-Marius* depict the political operation of the Roman Republic: *Pyrrhus* shows the Republic in its heyday, with all elements of the state working in harmony toward a common goal; *Marius* shows the Republic in sharp decline, torn apart by factions and demagogy. The portrayal of Rome in the pair is interwoven with complementary portrayals of Tarentum and the Greek cities of Sicily, decadent states which have become so dysfunctional that they cannot be restored to order except by the imposition of tyranny. These cities serve both as foils for the healthy middle Republic depicted in *Pyrrhus* and as precursors for the debased late Republic depicted in *Marius*. Indeed, the late Republic in *Marius* has much more in common with the Greek cities in *Pyrrhus* than with its earlier self. *Pyrrhus* and *Marius* thus combine to suggest that the late Republic cannot be returned to order except through revolutionary means, and that the tyranny eventually imposed upon the Republic was necessary if the Roman state was to survive.

Bradley Buszard, PhD in Classics from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, is Visiting Assistant Professor at Michigan State University.

ARTHUR KEAVENEY, *Sulla the Warlord and Other Mythical Beasts.*

This paper is primarily concerned with Plutarch's *Life of Sulla* 12. The chapter forms part of the narrative of the First Mithridatic War and specifically deals with the financial exactions Sulla made on Greece. These exactions aroused Plutarch's ire and he characterised Sulla, and other generals of the period, as lawless adventurers and warlords who were in thrall to their troops. We demonstrate, however, that this is a completely false picture. Whatever its origins it can be shown that it closely resembles Appian's description (*Civil Wars* 5.17) of the Triumvirs. Whatever the origin of this error it would at least

lead us to question if our own view of the republican Roman army is correct. Perhaps more attention should be paid to the differences between generations. The paper closes with some examples of such differences and a recognition of the need for more research.

Arthur Keaveney is a Senior Lecturer in Classics in the University of Kent at Canterbury. He has published in the fields of Roman, Greek and Persian history. His latest book, on the exile of Themistocles, will appear shortly.

Manuel Tröster, *Hellenism and* Tryphê *in Plutarch's* Life of Lucullus.

In the *Lucullus*, Plutarch keeps praising his hero's Hellenic education and benefactions to Greeks but also censures the protagonist's extravagance during his supposed retirement. On one level, both of these themes correspond to the biographer's general interest in *paideia*, *praotês*, and personal conduct. On another level, the focus on Hellenism is plainly intertwined with Plutarch's gratitude on account of Lucullus' rôle as a benefactor of Chaironeia. However, this connexion should not be taken to imply that the biographer wilfully distorted the evidence in order to eulogize his hero.

In fact, Lucullus' philhellenic disposition is confirmed by various literary sources and a fair number of honorific inscriptions. Plutarch's emphasis on Hellenism can ultimately be traced to the image disseminated by the proconsul's own entourage, whereas the stress on *tryphê* apparently originates from contemporary propaganda orchestrated by Lucullus' political adversaries in order to contrast his *luxuria* with their own *temperantia*. Traces of this image can be discerned in plenty of ancient authors, suggesting that the biographer built on a widespread yet fragmentary tradition.

In effect, Plutarch does to some extent overplay the theme of Hellenism while perhaps also underplaying that of *tryphê*. However, the biographer's adaptation of his sources is essentially confined to accentuating the material at his disposal.

Manuel Tröster studied history and politics at Trier, London, and Cambridge. He is currently preparing a doctoral thesis on *Themes, Character, and Politics in Plutarch's Life of Lucullus* at the University of Trier.

Jeffrey Beneker, *Thematic Correspondences in Plutarch's* Lives *of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus.*

This article explores the literary relationships between the *Lives* of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus. It argues that Plutarch not only shared source material among these biographies but also employed a set of themes, which he made common to all three works. These themes allow Plutarch to develop a composite view of the heroes' interactions with one another, and to maintain this view throughout all three *Lives*. Plutarch, although he emphasizes the best qualities of the heroes where he can, maintains the dominance of Caesar in all three *Lives* and pointedly describes the weaknesses that hindered Pompey and especially Crassus. In the course of the analysis, the article also examines several anecdotes that are presented in the three *Lives*, arguing that they are

interrelated and that the *Lives* must be read together in order for them to be fully appreciated. The intertextuality extends to the *Alexander*, creating a strong tie between the *Pompey* and the *Alexander-Caesar* pair. The article suggests that Plutarch was demonstrating how Pompey tried but failed to become a new Alexander.

Jeffrey Beneker received his PhD from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. He is currently a Visiting Assistant Professor in Classics at the University of Wisconsin in Madison.

Michael Hoff, *Athens honors Pompey the Great*

In 67 B.C. Pompey set out to rid the Mediterranean of pirates. After squeezing the pirates back to their bases along the Cilician coasts, Pompey sailed towards Asia Minor to preside over the final victory. En route Pompey made a stop at Athens, where, according to Plutarch, he performed sacrifices and addressed the people. Plutarch further mentions that Pompey was offered divine honors in gratitude for ridding the sea of piracy. In 62, Pompey returned to Athens from his success in the Mithradatic wars. While in Athens Plutarch records that he provided funds to help repair the city's infrastructure, which had been devastated years earlier. Epigraphic evidence suggests that at least part of the donation was spent in repairing a market area in Peiraeus. Pompey's purpose in this civic endowment, according to Plutarch, was to enhance his reputation. Caesar later reacted to Pompey's generosity to Athens by his own funding of civic building projects. In fact, Caesar exactly matched funds donated by Pompey with the hope that he would gain political capital for his generosity to the Athenians. These two major political figures use the city for their own political agendas and set the stage, as Plutarch recognizes, for civil war.

Michael Hoff is Associate Professor of Art History at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln, Nebraska. He has published widely on the history and topography of Roman Athens, including co-editing with Susan Rotroff *The Romanization of Athens* (Oxford 1997). He is currently involved in an archaeological survey of western Rough Cilicia.

Rosa M^{a}. Aguilar, *Matrimonios politicos en Roma.*

This paper deals with the role of women in the Roman Republic. Their marriages were a product of political alliances among the most noble families. Through them, the parents—and the families in general—could enhance their participation in Rome's highest politics. Rome's most noble women thus played a strategic part in the power play of Roman politics. Generally, the marriages of women pertaining to Rome's noble class were arranged by their fathers, but sometimes it was the mothers themselves who promoted these unions, making their daughters repeat their own history. The aim of the author is to study political marriages during the Roman Republic, as Plutarch's references on the subject pertain primarily to that period. As almost all marriages at the time of the Republic were politically motivated, we will

focus on the marriages of three great figures of the late Roman Republic: Pompey, Caesar and Cato.

Rosa Mª.Aguilar is Professor of Greek Philology at Complutense University of Madrid. She has published studies on Plutarch, has translated several essays from *Moralia* (numbers 27–45 =439A–612E), and has also worked on other themes, particularly on women in Antiquity.

Maria Teresa Schettino, *I Soggetti politici e i conflitti civili del 68/69 d.C. in Plutarco.*

This paper aims to describe and analyse Plutarch's interpretation of the history of his time, particularly of the civil wars of A.D. 68/69. The analysis of Plutarch's biographies of Galba and Otho shows that two peculiarities distinguish them from the main parallel sources, first of all Tacitus. They are: 1) The primary role in the events is played by the "bad advisers". They are not considered individually, but as a sort of category characterized by a negative mark. 2) The civil wars of 68/69 A.D. are not compared with those of the Republican Age.

These two features of Plutarch's reconstruction of the events of 68/69 A.D., along with his instroduction to *Galba*, imply an Hellenistic interpretation of the history of the Roman Empire, which was consistent with the culture of the Greek élite. The contemporaneity between Galba's and Otho's biographies and those of Aratus and Artaxerxes, in which Plutarch underlines the adviser's influence on the *basileus*, explains the transposition of Hellenistic themes to Roman Imperial history.

Maria Teresa Schettino teaches Roman History and Ancient Historiography at the University of Parma. She has published extensively on Greek Historiography of the Imperial Age including an *Introduzione a Polieno* (Pisa 1998).

INTRODUCTION

Plutarch arrived at the genre of biography from a philosophical background with the intention to give examples of the deeds of important men in public and private life. He wished to reform himself and others and provide a better founded public behaviour (*Timol.—Aem. praef.* 1ff.) by showing himself and others the *bios* and *êthos* of great men. He did not consider himself a historian. In his *Life of Alexander* 1.2–3 Plutarch says:

> For it is not histories that I am writing, but *Lives;* and in the most illustrious deeds there is not always a manifestation of virtue or vice, nay a slight thing like a phrase or a jest often makes greater revelation of character than battles where thousands fall, or the greatest armaments, or sieges of cities. Accordingly, just as painters get the likenesses in their portraits from the face and the expression of the eyes, wherein the character shows itself, but take very little account of the other parts of the body, so I must be permitted to devote myself rather to the signs of the soul in men, and by means of these portray the life of each, leaving to others the description of their great contests.

In this respect Plutarch's biographies do not differ that much, however, from ancient historiography. Besides, in his biographies Plutarch borrowed a great deal from the works of earlier historians.

In Plutarch's view politics is an essential human activity (*An seni* 791C), which forms part of ethics. In his opinion political *aretê*, based on correct philosophical insights, occupies a central place in public life (*An seni* 796CD) and philosophy, as a law implanted in the ruler, neutralizes the moral risks involved in the exercise of power (*Ad princ.* 779F; 780C; *Max. c. princ.* 779B).

Plutarch was a creative writer, who stood in an age-old tradition of literary craftsmanship, and tried to influence his audiences by all kinds of literary devices, the study of which is indispensable in any enquiry into the Plutarchan corpus. He was a great erudite with particular knowledge of classical Greek literature, but also of the literary output of Hellenistic and Roman authors.[1]

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[1] K. Ziegler counted 500 quotes from 111 Greek authors or authors writing in Greek and 130 quotes from 40 different Latin works. See Ziegler (1964) 273. Cf. Russell (1973) 42–62, esp. 46ff.; Aalders (1982) 61f.; De Blois (1992) 4569.

This volume covers a great deal of Plutarch's biographical output. The first section of volume II contains contributions on Plutarch's *Lives* in general. In the opening article of the volume Suzanne Saïd studies the remarkably consistent portrait of the people, the *dêmos*, which Plutarch gives in his Greek and Roman *Lives*. In the next contribution Thomas Späth analyses the representation of the first triumvirate between Caesar, Crassus and Pompey in historiographic texts by Appian and Cassius Dio and in six Plutarchan *Lives*. In Plutarch's *Lives* Crassus consistently has an inferior position. Important literary aspects are treated in David Larmour's article on the "Statesman and Self in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*" and George Harrison's contribution on the influence of drama and stagecraft on Plutarch's biographies. A completely different aspect is treated by Frederick Brenk, who concentrates on the eschatological dimension of Plutarch's *Lives*. His conclusion is that the author shaped his biographical works so that they respond to historical, biographical and ethical considerations, never drawing back a curtain beyond terrestrial events. Apparently Plutarch had little taste for "eschatological ethics." In her paper on political virtue and philosophy in Plutarch's *Lives* Marlein van Raalte focuses on five interrelated topics: self-restraint as a common basis for the quality of both politician and philosopher, the contrast between philosophy and the active life of a politician, philosophers engaged in political action, the question in how far a politician is supposed to be a "better" politician if he is also engaged in philosophy, and, finally, the power of speech as an indispensable quality. In the last paper of this section, starting from the use of large pens as weapons in Late Republican Roman civil strife, Alexei Zadorojnyi gives a survey of literacy-related anecdotes, which demonstrates that Greco-Roman historians and biographers were actively reflecting on the value of literary culture for individuals, politics and society. In his view Plutarch is exemplary in this respect. He problematizes literacy and its relationship with politics sporadically, ever *ad hoc* and *ad hominem*, switching between stereotypes and approaches as it suits him. Apparently there was a vague connection between the use of written messages in administration, and tyrannical behaviour.

The second section of the volume contains a series of contributions to the study of the statesman in Plutarch's Greek *Lives*. Like Suzanne Saïd Luisa Prandi focuses on the role of the *dêmos*. Particularly in the *Lives* of Athenian leaders the people looms large as an important, dangerous political actor. A handful of contributions concentrate upon the *Life* of Alcibiades, a dramatic and anecdotal biography of a colour-

ful, almost tyrannical politician. Timothy Duff discusses five childhood anecdotes, which betray important aspects of Alcibiades' character, Simon Verdegem studies Alcibiades' military value and its relation to his *doxa*, Maricruz Salcedo Parrondo concentrates on the concept of *enargeia* in *Alc.* 10, and Francesca Alesse discovers Socratic and Stoic traces in the *Vita Alcibiadis*. In the paper that follows those four *Alcibiades*-studies Federicomaria Muccioli pays attention to Plutarch's *Life* of a Spartan contemporary, Lysander. He concludes that the author—criticizing defaults of this hero, esp. his *philotimia*—noticed the ambivalence and tension between old Spartan traditions and the yearning for innovations. According to Sven-Tage Teodorsson, Plutarch admired Timoleon of Corinth, who brought about a revival of Greek Sicily in 344–338 B.C. Probably Plutarch regarded him, and not Plato or his friend Dion, as the right man to rescue Sicily. In the last paper of this section Geert Roskam analyses parallels that can be drawn between Plutarch's *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae* and his *Life of Agis*, the Spartan reformer-king.

The third section of this volume concentrates on the statesman in Plutarch's Roman *Lives*. Plutarch certainly viewed Roman history through Greek glasses. He reduced the Roman civil wars to a type of *dêmos-oligoi* conflict that could equally have taken place in a Greek *polis* and he described various Roman customs and concepts in terms of Greek equivalents and analogies. In spite of this, he does not put his readers off the track; the original Roman meanings are still recognizable and that is not surprising. Plutarch had a thorough knowledge of Roman history and institutions, which he broadened—probably later in life—by learning Latin and using Latin works. He also had numerous Roman friends who could explain Roman practices to him and provide him with the contents of texts that were inaccessible to him. This circle of friends included senators who had inside knowledge of Roman political culture. Presumably Plutarch's knowledge of Roman history never reached the level of his erudition of everything Greek, but we may assume that he was capable of giving his readers a good impression of Roman public life.[2]

The first paper of this section focuses on king Numa. The author, Bernard Boulet, maintains that Numa was not an exact Roman equivalent to Plato's philosopher-king, but a slight departure from it, a

[2] See Pelling (1986) 175ff.; De Blois (1992) 4570f.

prince of peace who turned swords into ploughshares. In his article on Plutarch and the "liberation of Greece" Jan Maarten Bremer argues that Plutarch admired Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus—conquerors of Greece!—because they were men of high moral standing, philhellenes, and liberators from Macedonian domination, but also because they liberated Greek elites from social unrest. According to Lora Holland, the author of the third contribution in this section, Plutarch draws Aemilius Paullus into the philosophical tradition both by assigning to him Pythagoras as an ancestor, and by his portrayal of the man as a type of Socrates through metaphorical imagery and anecdote. In the fourth paper of this section Bradley Buszard tells us that both *Lives* in Plutarch's *Pyrrhus-Marius* depict the political operation of the Roman Republic: *Pyrrhus* shows the Republic in its heyday, with all elements of the state working in harmony toward a common goal; *Marius* shows the Republic in sharp decline, torn apart by factions and demagogy. The portrayal of Rome in the pair is interwoven with complementary portrayals of Tarentum and the Greek cities of Sicily, decadent states which have become so dysfunctional that they cannot be restored to order except by the imposition of tyranny. Indeed, the Late Republic in *Marius* has much more in common with the Greek cities in *Pyrrhus* than with its earlier self. In the next paper Arthur Keaveney argues that Sulla 12, on the greed and rapacity of Sulla's soldiery in Greece, gives us an anachronistic picture that became valid in the times of the triumvirates. Manuel Tröster pays attention to Hellenism and *tryphê* in Plutarch's *Life of Lucullus*. He thinks that in this *Life* Plutarch overplayed the theme of Hellenism while underplaying that of Lucullus' extravagance. This paper is followed by two contributions on *Lives* of Late Republican Roman heroes. Jeffrey Beneker explores literary relationships between the *Lives* of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, whereas Michael Hoff treats civic endowments and other benefactions of Pompey and Caesar towards the Athenians as a kind of political competition. Rosa Aguilar's article deals with women and their political marriages in Plutarch's Late Roman Republic. The last paper of this section, by Maria-Teresa Schettino, analyses Plutarch's interpretation of the history of the year of the four emperors, A.D. 69.

Lukas de Blois

PART ONE

THE STATESMAN IN PLUTARCH'S GREEK AND ROMAN *LIVES:* GENERAL ISSUES

PLUTARCH AND THE PEOPLE IN THE *PARALLEL LIVES*

Suzanne Saïd

From the sixties, with the paper of P.A. Brunt on "The Roman Mob",[1] the chapter devoted by R. Mac Mullen to "Urban Unrest" in his *Enemies of the Roman Order*,[2] and Zvi Yavetz' *Plebs and Princeps*,[3] much attention has been paid by historians to "plebs", "mass","crowd", or "mob" and their relation to the elite, the Patricians, or the Princeps in democratic Athens,[4] archaic Rome,[5] the late Roman Republic,[6] or the days of the Flavians.[7]

These works have compelled us to reevaluate the ancient sources. Far from providing an objective portrayal of the masses and giving us plain "facts", our texts reflect the prejudices of their authors who were all "men of learning belonging to the upper classes and addressing their social and cultural equals."[8] As a rule, these members of the elite refrain from awarding the common people any significant place in their writings and, when they did bother to mention them, it was mostly with disdain.[9] Plutarch, who gave the pride of place to individuals and chose to write biographies of famous statesmen, is no exception.

However, though they appear only in the background of the *Lives*, Plutarch's masses deserve the attention of the historian. Not because their portraits are historically accurate. Actually, these are surprisingly uniform, given the differences in time (from the mythical period to Caesar and Brutus) and place (Greece and Rome). But for anyone interested in the ideology of the Greek elite under the Flavians, these portraits offer perhaps the best opportunity for an accurate assessment of Plutarch's concern with the past, a concern that was not "academic",

[1] Brunt (1966/1974).
[2] Mac Mullen (1966) 163–191.
[3] Yavetz (1969).
[4] Ober (1989).
[5] Raaflaub (1986).
[6] Nicolet (1976), Millar (1998).
[7] Veyne (1976), (2000), Breebaart (1987).
[8] Cf Schultze (1986) 123.
[9] Yavetz (1969) 6.

but "relevant" for the conditions in which he lived.[10] For Plutarch "was writing about the men of the past in order to be useful to the contemporary πολιτικός, who would use the examples of such men as inspiring models of what to imitate and what to avoid".[11] So, he had to harness his paradigms to the present needs, that is, more bluntly put, to subject them to a process of systematic anachronism.

Plutarch's portrayal of Roman *dêmos* is a case in point. As C. Pelling says in his paper on "Plutarch and Roman politics": "*Life* after *Life* in much the same way in every period we have the urban δῆμος against the Senate."[12] This judgment has been endorsed by and large by Lukas de Blois in his paper on "The Perception of Roman Politics in Plutarch's *Lives*" (1992). Yet De Blois draws attention to some inconsistencies with this simplified portrayal of the Roman people as a uniform *dêmos*, basically unchanged between 220 and 30 BC, whereas M. Mazza—in a paper on "Plutarco e la politica Romana" (1995)—gave a supplementary argument in support of Pelling's thesis by pointing out the surprising and deliberate elimination of the *equites* and *publicani* from the *Lives* belonging to the Late Republic.

By comparison, the portrait of the *dêmos* in the Greek *Lives* has been a rather neglected topic before this conference and the paper of Luisa Prandi on "Singolare e Plurale nelle Vite di Plutarco". In my paper, which, like hers, will concern both Greek and Roman *Lives*, I propose to illuminate the remarkable consistency of Plutarch's definition and portrayal of the people, a phenomenon to be explained not only by his use of Greek concepts drawn from classical Greek history and political thought, particularly from Plato (in fact, it would be easy to transform the chapter devoted by T. Duff to "The Soul of a Plutarchan Hero"[13] into a chapter on "The Plutarchan Statesman and the Masses" by systematically substituting ὁ πολιτικός for τὸ λογιστικόν and ὁ δῆμος for τὸ παθητικόν), but also by his perception of the contemporary *dêmos*, as demonstrated by a comparison with the *Political Precepts* and some other more or less contemporary texts.

First I shall examine the vocabulary and the definition of the people (as opposed to the elite). Second Plutarch's analysis of the psychology of the masses. Third, according the iron rule of French rhetoric, his indi-

[10] Wardman (1974) 100.
[11] Duff (1999) 51.
[12] Pelling (1986/2002) 212.
[13] Duff (1999) 72–98.

rect characterization of the people through a series of similes. I'll conclude with some remarks on the policy that is the logical consequence of such a portrait.

1.Defining the people

In Plutarch's *Lives* the "people" is described with objective or pejorative terms. Οἱ πολλοί and τὸ πλῆθος put emphasis on number. Δῆμος in itself is neutral, but it is also ambiguous, since it may be synonymous with πόλις in expressions such as ὁ Ἀθηναίων δῆμος[14] or ὁ Ῥωμαίων δῆμος.[15] Ὄχλος,[16] the "mob" or the "rabble", is clearly pejorative. This rather limited vocabulary strikingly contrasts with the wealth of words that designate the "notables", γνώριμοι, defined, as in Aristotle's *Politics*,[17] by their wealth (εὔποροι, πλουσίοι, εὐδαίμονες), their birth (εὐγενεῖς), their culture (χαρίεντες), but also by their rank (πρῶτοι), their power (κράτιστοι, δύνατοι, δυνατώτατοι), their reputation (γνώριμοι, ἔνδοξοι, δοκιμώτατοι, ἀξιόλογοι) and, more generally, their excellence (χρηστοί, καλοί καὶ ἀγαθοί, ἄριστοι).[18]

As a distinct social class, *dêmos* includes the "humbles" (ταπεινοί),[19] that is the thetes (ὁ θητικὸς ὄχλος[20]), the wage earners (ὁ μισθαρνῶν ὄχλος[21]), the sailors and the workers (ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος καὶ βάναυσος[22]), the "unskilled" workers (τὸν θητικὸν ὄχλον καὶ ἰδιώτην[23]). They are characterized by their poverty (πένητες[24]), their lack of resources (ἄπο-

[14] Six examples. in the *Parallel Lives.*

[15] 28 examples in the *Parallel Lives.*

[16] 10 occurrences in *Pompey*, 6 in *Cato minor* and *Gracchi*, 5 in *Solon*, *Pericles, Coriolanus, Aemilius Paullus, Nicias*, 4 in *Agis and Cleomenes*, *Dion*, 3 in *Romulus*, *Fabius Maximus*, *Sulla*, *Eumenes*, *Antonius*, 2 in *Theseus, Publicola, Camillus, Crassus, Sertorius, Agesilaus, Caesar, Demetrius*, 1 in *Alcibiades, Timoleon, Pelopidas, Pyrrhus, Marius, Cimon, Lucullus, Phocion, Brutus.*

[17] *Politics* IV 4.22, 1291b28–30.

[18] Pelling (1986/2002) 218.

[19] *Romul.* 13.5.

[20] *Solon* 29.2; *Per.* 12.6.

[21] *Cato Min.* 44.4.

[22] *Dion* 48.5 and *Per.* 12.5 βάναυσος.

[23] *Per.* 12.6; *Thes.* 24.2.

[24] *Per.* 7.3, *Agis and Cleomenes*, 14.2, *Coriolan* 5.4, *Alc.* 35.7.

ροι[25]), of property (τὸν ἄπορον καὶ ἀνέμητον ὄχλον[26]), and of consideration (ὁ δ' ἄλλος ὄχλος ἄπορος καὶ ἄτιμος[27]). They have no house, hearth, or place to stay (ἀοίκων καὶ ἀνεστίων,[28] ἄοικοι καὶ ἀνίδρυτοι[29]). This comes as no surprise: already in Xenophon[30] and in Aristotle,[31] the δῆμος was identified with the poor.

As a consequence, the masses are more often than not characterized in a very negative way. As opposed to the members of the elite, the masses are said to be lazy (ἀργός,[32] σχολαστής[33]), ignorant (ἀμαθεῖς[34]), and uneducated (τοὺς …φορτικοὺς καὶ πένητας[35]) or—worse—prone to over-confidence (θρασύτης, θρασύνεσθαι[36]), insolence (ὕβρις and ὑβρίζειν[37]), and violence (βία[38]). They are associated with disorder (κόσμον οὐκ ἐχούσης,[39] ἀσύντακτον[40]), uproar (πλῆθος ἄπορον καὶ θορυβοποιόν[41]), meddling (πολυπραγμοσύνη[42]), and sedition.[43] Without any regard for the good (τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζοντα μήδεν[44]), they are useless (ἄχρηστος[45]) and valueless (ὄχλον …σύμμεικτον οὐκ ἀξίων σπουδῆς ἀνθρώπων[46]). This portrait does not differ from the picture of the contemporary mob to be found elsewhere in Plutarch, or in his contemporaries, Dio Cassius and Tacitus. In his *Political Precepts* Plutarch harshly

[25] *Caesar* 8.6, *Agis and Cleomenes*. 5.7, *Cato Min.* 26.1, *Coriolan* 20.3., *Marius* 28.7, *Camill.* 36.3.
[26] *Cato Minor* 26.1.
[27] *Agis and Cleomenes* 5.7.
[28] *Comp Thes. and Romul.* 4.3.
[29] *Gracch.* 9.5.
[30] *Mem.* 4.2.37 see Ober (1989) 192–196 on the division of society along class lines and wealth in democratic Athens.
[31] *Politics* 1279b19–20: δημοκρατία δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι. See also 1309b38–1310a2.
[32] *Per.* 11.6, *Solon* 22.3.
[33] *Solon* 22.3.
[34] *Solon* 5.6.
[35] *Alc.* 34.7.
[36] *Lyc.* 2.3, *Solon* 19.1, *Coriolan.* 5.4.
[37] *Camill.* 12.2, *Coriolan* 5.4, 23.6, *Lyc.* 5.1.
[38] *Camill.* 39.4.
[39] *Pyrrh.* 13. 7.
[40] *Per.* 12.5.
[41] *Marius* 28.7.
[42] *Coriolan* 20.3: τὸν ἄπορον καὶ πολυπάγμονα καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζοντα μηδὲν ὄχλον.
[43] *Marius* 45.4 στασιώδους ὄχλου.
[44] *Coriolan* 20.3.
[45] τὸν ἄχρηστον ὄχλον, *Sertorius* 13.10 and *Pomp.* 28.1.
[46] *Crassus* 28.3.

criticizes "the arrogance and violence of the people" (τῶν δήμων τὸ αὔθαδες καὶ βίαιον[47]). Addressing the Alexandrians, Dion contrasts the exception, that is, the "good" δῆμος, with the rule, that is, the 'bold and 'arrogant' (οἱ δὲ πλείους [καὶ οἱ] θρασεῖς καὶ ὑπερήφανοι) crowd,[48] disorderly and uproarious.[49] He quotes approvingly Homer and the poets, who, in their songs, portrayed the mob as "difficult, disobedient and prone to insolence" (χαλεπόν τε καὶ ἀπειθῆ καὶ πρὸς ὕβριν ἕτοιμον).[50] And Tacitus often lashes at a *plebs sordida*[51] or a *vulgus credulum*,[52] *ignavum*[53] and *imperitum*.[54]

At first glance, Plutarch seems to give a rather uniform portrayal of the masses and rarely divides them into various categories. His Roman *Lives* never mirror the distinctions between *assidui* and *proletarii, plebs media* and *plebs humilis, ingenui* and *liberti*.[55] In the Greek *Lives*, he ignores some of the various divisions of the people to be found in Greek classical thought, such as the Solonian division of the Athenians into four property classes[56] or the more complex division introduced by Aristotle, who, in his *Politics*,[57] arranges the people in seven "classes" (εἴδη) according to their profession (farmers, craftsmen etc.).

Yet there are few passages in the Greek as well as in the Roman *Lives* where the masses are differentiated. First the Greek *Lives*. In *Theseus* Plutarch twice substitutes to the usual binary antithesis rich/poor a tripartite division which may be paralleled to the Euripidean division between "the rich" (οἱ μὲν ὄλβιοι), "those who have not and live in want" (οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες) and the middle class (οἱ ἐν μέσῳ),[58] but does not exactly duplicate it. First in 24.2, he distinguishes between "the unskilled and poor, the powerful and the rest" (τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ πενήτων… τοῖς δὲ δυνατοῖς…, τῶν δ' ἄλλων), but, significantly enough, the content of the third part is kept rather vague.

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47 801E.
48 *Dio* 32.28.
49 *Dio* 32.29: θορύβῳ συνεχεῖ καὶ ἀτάκτῳ τεταραγμένον.
50 *Dio* 32.22.
51 *Hist.*1.4; 3.74.
52 *Hist.* 2.72.
53 *Hist.* 3.58.
54 *Ann.* 2.77, *Dial.*7.16. For more instances of derogatory expressions for the masses in Roman writers, see Yavetz (1969) 141–155.
55 Pelling (1986/2002) 221, De Blois (1992) 4578–4580.
56 Aristotle, *A.P.* 7.3.
57 1291b17–27.
58 Euripides, *Suppliants* 237–245.

Second, in 25.2, Theseus is praised for having introduced order into his democratic regime, by dividing the people into three classes, "the well born, the farmers and the craftsmen" (Εὐπατρίδας καὶ Γεωμόρους καὶ Δημιουργούς).[59] But this distinction does not seem to matter much, since "the well born" are to be given all the powers. In *Solon* Plutarch echoes Herodotus' and Aristotle's division of the people at the time of Peisistratus into three locally based "parts" (μέρη)[60] with distinct political ideologies: "The men of the hills who were the most democratic party, the men of the plain who were the most oligarchic and thirdly the men of the coast, who favoured an intermediate, mixed kind of regime" (13.1). In 29.1, relying again on the *Constitution of the Athenians* (13.5), he specifies the social composition of the first faction, which included "the common rabble of hired hands, with their bitter enmity towards the rich" (ὁ θητικὸς ὄχλος καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς πλουσίοις ἀχθόμενος). In *Pericles* 12.5, the δῆμος is divided into two categories, according the way they earn the money distributed by the State, on the one hand "those of the right age and degree of physical fitness" (τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἡλικίαν ἔχουσι καὶ ῥώμην), who were paid for campaigning, and "the crowd of disorganized artisans" (τὸν δ' ἀσύντακτον καὶ βάναυσον ὄχλον) employed for constructions. In *Nicias* 11.3 the division between "the young and bellicose" (νέων ἦν καὶ πολεμοποιῶν ἅμιλλα) and "the old and pacifists" (εἰρηνοποιοὺς καὶ πρεσβυτέρους) at the time of the Sicilian expedition comes straight from Thucydides VI. But in 9.5, those inclined for the peace are not only "the elderly", but also "the rich and the majority of the farmers" (τοὺς μὲν οὖν εὐπόρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ τῶν γεωργῶν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτόθεν εἰρηνικὸν εἶχεν). By setting apart the farmers, Plutarch may again echo Euripides and his praise of the *autourgos* in the *Suppliant Women*.

Second, the Roman *Lives*. There Plutarch seems to implicitly acknowledge the distinction between urban and rural δῆμος. Twice in *Antony* (26.4 τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ὄχλου) and *Sulla* (7.6 τὸν ἀστικὸν ὄχλον καὶ ἀγοραῖον), he mentions the *plebs urbana*, whereas in the *Lives* of the Gracchi there is one clear allusion to the *plebs rustica*, the peasants who lived in Italy and "flooded into the city" to vote for Gaius Gracchus (*Caius Gracchus* 3.2 ὄχλου … συρρέοντος… ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας). In *Numa* 17.1, as Lukas de Blois pointed out,[61] Plutarch praises Numa for his

[59] Εὐπατρίδαι (13.2) and maybe also Γεωμόροι (frg. 2) appear in *A.P.*
[60] Hdt 1.59.3 and *A.P.* 13.4.
[61] De Blois (1992) 4582.

having distributed the people into groups according to their trade and arts, a surprising allusion to the Roman *collegia* (Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αὐτοῦ πολιτευμάτων ἡ κατὰ τέχνας διανομὴ τοῦ πλήθους μάλιστα θαυμάζεται). In *Crassus* there is also a tripartition, significantly spelled out in moral terms. Rome is divided into three “powers” (δυνάμεις): “the wise and sound part” favouring Pompey (ἡ μὲν ἔμφρων καὶ καθεστῶσα μερὶς ἐν τῇ πόλει Πομπήιον ἐθεράπευε), the impulsive and reckless who sides with Caesar (τὸ δὲ ὀξὺ καὶ φερόμενον μετ' εὐχερείας ταῖς Καίσαρος ἐλπίσιν ἐπηκολούθει) and Crassus who stood in the middle. But this does not imply the existence of a third party, since the middle position of Crassus is explained by his exploitation of both sides (Κράσσος δὲ μέσος ὢν ἀμφοτέραις ἐχρῆτο).[62] Usually, when Plutarch alludes to the heterogeneity of the Roman people, he remains vague, as in *Cato Minor* where he uses the expression “the major part of the people” (τοῦ δήμου μέρος οὐκ ὀλίγον, 27.1 and πολὺ δὲ τοῦ δήμου μέρος, 39.1). The only distinction that really matters is a moral one. In *Pompey* 16.2 and 52.1 Plutarch clearly sets apart “the pure and healthy part of the people” (τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ὑγιαῖνον μάλιστα … τοῦ δήμου, 16.2).[63] Each time, this healthy part happens to side with the Senate, which no doubt explains why it is considered “healthy”. It is tempting here to draw a parallel with Tacitus' *Histories* 1.4.3, where the historian opposes to the *plebs sordida* the healthy part of the people, who happen to side with the upper class (*pars populi integra et magnis domibus adnexa*). The same distinction reappears in Plutarch, *Caesar* 8.6, when the author, using Cato as spokesman, singles out, among the poor, “those who were the firebrand of the mass” (οἱ τοῦ παντὸς ὑπέκκαυμα πλήθους ἦσαν). It is tempting to identify them with the mass of sycophants fostered (litterally “grown”) by the people waxing wanton, after Themistocles' exile (μετὰ γὰρ τὴν Θεμιστοκλέους φυγήν φησιν ὥσπερ ἐξυβρίσαντα τὸν δῆμον ἀναφῦσαι πλῆθος συκοφαντῶν) in *Aristides* 26.2.

2.*Portraying the people*

Plutarch's portrayal of the masses, which shares with other sources a distinctively derogatory vocabulary, is also clearly influenced by Plato, as I shall now attempt to demonstrate. In *Republic* IV, Plato, who draws

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[62] Cf Pelling (1986/2002) 209.

[63] 16.2. See also 52.1: τοῦ δήμου τὸ ὑγιαῖνον.

a close parallel between the three parts of the soul, that is, the rational part, the spirited part and the irrational appetitive part, and the three classes in the city, "the money-making, the auxiliary and the deliberative" (440b), clearly identifies the *dêmos* with the ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, "the irrational appetitive part" (439d), "which is the largest in each person's soul and is by nature most insatiable of money" (ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἐστὶ καὶ χρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον, 442a). Accordingly, the "huge strong beast" (θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ), which represents the people in book VI, is only given "violent emotions and desires" (τὰς ὀργάς ... καὶ ἐπιθυμίας, 493b). Similarly in *Laws* III the people is assimilated to the part of the soul which feels pain and pleasure (τὸ γὰρ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον αὐτῆς [τῆς ψυχῆς] ὅπερ δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστιν, 689b).

Plutarch's *Lives* also portray the masses—Greek and Roman alike—as led almost exclusively by their desires. In the *Life of Pericles* the people is systematically identified with the ἐπιθυμητικόν: it has only "desires" (ἐπιθυμίαι),[64] "impulses" (ὁρμαί),[65] "passions" (πάθη),[66] or "desire" (ἔρως).[67] The emphasis on its "anger" (ὀργή[68]) or θυμός[69]) and the allusions to its foolishness (ἀγνωμοσύνη[70] or παραφρονεῖν[71]) point to the same direction. Conversely, Pericles plays the part of the λογιστικόν. He is not any more criticized, as he was in Plato's *Gorgias*, for having "gratified the desires" (τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, 503c) of the people and "corrupted (διαφθαρῆναι) it" (515e), but is praised for his capacity to resist the desires of the masses. In fact, after Thucydides' ostracism, Pericles, according to Plutarch "stopped being as submissive to the people as he had been or as ready to yield to and go along with the desires of the common people, which shift like winds" (οὐκέθ' ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν οὐδ' ὁμοίως χειροήθης τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥᾴδιος ὑπείκειν καὶ συνενδιδόναι ταῖς ἐπι-

[64] *Per.* 15.1.

[65] *Per.* 20.3: τἆλλα δ' οὐ συνεχώρει ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲ συνεξέπιπτεν.

[66] *Per.*15.2: παντοδαπῶν γὰρ ὡς εἰκὸς παθῶν ἐν ὄχλῳ τοσαύτην τὸ μέγεθος ἀρχὴν ἔχοντι φυομένων, "a wide variety of passions grew inside them, as was only to be expected in a rabble with such an enormous empire."

[67] *Per.*20.4: πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ Σικελίας ὁ δύσερως ἐκεῖνος ἤδη καὶ δύσποτμος ἔρως εἶχεν, "quite a number of Athenians were already in the grip of that unfortunate and ill-fated lust for Sicily" and *Alc.* 17.2. Cf. Thuc. 6.13.1.

[68] *Per.* 33.8; 35.4. Cf Thuc. 2.21.3, 22.1, 59.3, 60.1, 65.1 and 3. On ὀργή as a characteristic of the people in Thucydides see Huart (1968) 159–161.

[69] *Per.* 36.1.

[70] *Per.* 2.5; 37.2.

[71] *Per.* 34.5.

θυμίαις ὥσπερ πνοαῖς τῶν πολλῶν, 15.1). It cannot be denied that this identification of Pericles with the νοῦς is clearly influenced by Thucydides and the fact that "the concept of γνώμη (reason) proves to be the basis of Pericles" policy in this author's *History of the Peloponnesian War*.[72] But the wording and, as we shall see, the metaphor that assimilates the statesman to the charioteer of the *Phaedrus*[73] are distinctly Platonic. Similarly, in *Fabius*, which is significantly paired with *Pericles*, Plutarch puts emphasis on the masses' lack of reason, and acknowledges, together with Polybius,[74] the steadfastness of a leader who, like Pericles, never departs from a rational behavior. First, when he describes the reaction of the *dêmos* after the report of the defeat at the Trebia: "the news, falling upon the people like a wind upon the sea threw the city into confusion and their λογισμοί (a word to be translated by "plans", but which always carries with it connotations of reason and rational behavior[75]) could not stand firm or endure in the face of such a great shock" (3.7). Second, when he portrays "the army filled with mad impulses and empty hopes" (5.5 τὸ στράτευμα μανικῆς φορᾶς καὶ κενῶν ἐλπίδων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πεπληρωμένον) by Minucius, the master of the horses and echoes Fabius' criticisms of their "lack of reason".[76] This is precisely this capacity to endure (φέρειν) the foolishness of the people (and of their colleagues) that made Pericles and Fabius of particular value to their countries according to the preface of *Pericles*.[77]

The same emphasis on the ὀργή of the people is to be found in *Alcibiades*, first when the Athenians discover the mutilation of the Herms,[78] second, when they believe that Alcibiades is involved in the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries,[79] third, when they stripped him of his command after the defeat of one of his subordinates.[80] Here also, the hero is praised when he opposes a people led by its impulses and

[72] Cf. Edmunds (1975) 7–14 on the contrast between the γνώμη of Pericles and the passions of the Athenians.

[73] *Per.* 15.1, and Plato, *Phaedr.* 246a–b. See infra p. 17.

[74] Polybius 3.87.6: φρονήσει διαφέροντα, 89.3 τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντας ἠνάγκασε παρομολογῆσαι καὶ συγχωρεῖν ὡς οὔτε νουνεχέστερον οὔτε φρονιμώτερον οὐδένα δυνατὸν ἦν χρῆσθαι, 105.9 τοῖς δ' ἐν τῇ 'Ρώμῃ τότ' ἐγένετο φανερὸν ὁμολογουμένως τί διαφέρει στρατιωτικῆς προπετείας καὶ κενοδοξίας στρατηγικὴ πρόνοια καὶ λογισμὸς ἑστὼς καὶ νουνεχής.

[75] Duff (1999) 80.

[76] *Fabius* 10.1: ἄνοια and 10.3: ἀβουλία.

[77] *Per.*2.5.

[78] *Alc.*18.8: ὀργῇ δ' ἅμα καὶ φόβῳ τὸ γεγονὸς λαμβάνοντες.

[79] *Alc.* 20.6; 21.6.7.

[80] *Alc.* 36.5; 38.1.

prevents it from making a grave mistake.[81] In the same way, in *Nicias* and *Demosthenes*, the Athenian δῆμος is characterized by its "desires" (ἐπιθυμίαι), which the two heroes "resist" (ἀντιτείνειν).[82]

Then it comes as no surprise to find, in the preface of the *Lives* of Agis and Cleomenes, a general condemnation of "the desires and impulses of the masses" (ἐπιθυμίας ὄχλων καὶ ὁρμάς) and of the politicians who, led astray by an excessive love of glory, follow them and become the servants of the many.[83] Antony, who "was shaken from his reasonings by the glory he got from the masses" (14.5), is a case in point.

According to Plutarch, the good statesman has not only to oppose the impulses of the masses. He has also to manipulate them, given that the mob is inaccessible to rational arguments. The way in which Plutarch adapts Thucydides 2.65.9:

> "Whenever he [Pericles] saw them out of reason insolently bold, he would, by his speeeches, breed fear in them; and again, when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise brace their spirits and embolden them" (ὁπότε γοῦν αἴσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησσεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὖ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν).

in *Pericles* 15.2:

> "he mostly used as rudders, so to speak, hope and fear, restraining them when they were too bold or relieving and encouraging them when they were dispirited" (μάλιστα δ' ἐλπίσι καὶ φόβοις ὥσπερ οἴαξι συστέλλων τὸ θρασυνόμενον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ δύσθυμον ἀνιεὶς καὶ παραμυθούμενος)

is illuminating. These two passages have been already compared by J. de Romilly in her paper on "Plutarch and Thucydides", in order to demonstrate the importance of small differences of formulation. But I am not sure she is right in contrasting, *ad majorem Thucydidis gloriam*, "a profound interpretation of the psychology of the people and of the problems of democracy" with "an analysis whose superficiality is hardly compensated by the addition of a simile."[84] The image borrowed from navigation is here, as often in Plutarch, the vehicle of the meaning. Precisely because the people (= the ship) are inaccessible to rational arguments, the *politikos* has to use emotions as instrument (the rudder)

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[81] *Alc.* 26.4: ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἦν ἄρχοντι μεγάλῳ προσῆκον, ἀνθίστασθαι φερομένοις ὑπ' ὀργῆς, κωλύσας ἐξαμαρτεῖν.

[82] *Nicias* 11.2; *Demosth.* 14.3.

[83] *Agis and Cleomenes* 1.2–4.

[84] De Romilly (1988) 24.

in order to manipulate them. This emphasis on manipulation, which was absent in Thucydides is characteristic of an imperial elite for whom "the people can only be the subject of politics through its leader."[85]

The *politikos* may also attempt to shape the feelings of the people in his own image by adopting, in the middle of a disaster, a physical appearance that displays much confidence, hoping that his behavior will be contagious. After the defeat of Cannae, when all of the other Romans were overwhelmed by grief and confusion, Fabius, who used to look cautious and despondent (εὐλαβὴς φαινόμενος καὶ δυσέλπιστος) when there was no obvious reason for fear, was the only one to "walk calmly with a composed countenance and friendly greeting (πρᾴῳ βαδίσματι καὶ προσώπῳ καθεστῶτι καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ προσαγορεύσει)."[86]

Last but not least, the statesman may resort to irrational tricks: as there was no way for him to win the masses over by human arguments (ἀπορῶν τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος), Themistocles, who was, for Plutarch like for Thucydides, the incarnation of γνώμη,[87] acted like a tragic poet: hoisting up his stage machinery he introduced supernatural portents and oracles (10.1).

To conclude this outline of the psychology of the masses in the *Lives* and before looking at Plutarch's use of the similes, I would like to emphasize Plutarch's tendency to minimize the role of the masses in the *Lives* and portray a people urged to action from the outside, with verbs such as (προ-) ἀνασείειν (stir up),[88] ἀναφλέγειν (inflame),[89] (ἐξ-) ἐρεθίζειν (rouse),[90] (συν-)ἐφέλκειν (drag),[91] κινεῖν (set in motion),[92] παροξύνειν (spur on),[93] or (ἐκ-) τραχύνειν (exasperate).[94] The same conclusion can be reached by looking at the way in which Plutarch manipulates his fifth century sources and minimizes the role of the masses in the making of history by systematically substituting an individual to a collective agent. It is well known that, in writing the biography of statesmen who happened to live and be active during the Pentekontaetia, Plutarch borrowed whole sentences from Thucydides, merely replacing the collec-

[85] Breebaart (1987) 56 on Tacitus' view of the people.
[86] *Fabius* 17.7.
[87] *Them.* 15.4.
[88] *Gracch.* 25,1.
[89] *Alc.*17.2.
[90] *Cim.* 15.3, *Aem.*30.6.
[91] *Cic.* 33.2.
[92] *Fab.* 8.4.
[93] *Solon* 30.1, 6; *Per.* 29.8; *Fabius* 7.5; *Alc.* 19.3, 36.2; *Coriolanus* 39.5 etc.
[94] *Alc.* 14.4.

tive οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι by a third person singular which happen to refer to either Themistocles, Aristides or Pericles. Ph. Stadter in his commentary of *Pericles* has given to these changes the attention they deserve. I would like here to point out another small, but quite revealing detail. In Thucydides 2. 22.1, Pericles did not convene the assembly, "for fear that being together they might upon passion rather than judgement commit some error" (τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν). It is clear that here it is the popular assembly that pass the decision by its vote. In Plutarch, it becomes: "Pericles refused to convene the assembly, for fear that he might be forced against his better judgement" (δεδιὼς βιασθῆναι παρὰ γνώμην, 33.6). So, the one who is supposed to decide is not any more the assembly, but the leader. The assembly can only put a pressure on him.

3.Some Plutarchean Similes

A close reading of the similes,—usually neglected by the historians— is perhaps the best way of demonstrating how Plutarch's account of the δῆμος is dependent on an ideology which justifies the status and the power of the elite by consistently emphasizing the inferiority of the masses. A comparison with the similes to be found in the *Political Precepts*, a treatise explicitly dealing with contemporary political life and teaching to an aspiring politician how to address and manipulate the masses will also, I hope, demonstrate the imposition of a contemporary and anachronistic perspective onto the past.

I begin with two animal similes which most clearly spell out the natural inferiority of the mass, and the superiority of those who are born to rule, that is the apologue of the serpent told by Plutarch in the preface of *Agis and Cleomenes* (2.5) and the comparison of the πολιτικός with the queen bee in the *Political Precepts*. Whereas the "leadership" (ἡγεμονία) of the people, assimilated to a tail "deaf and blind,"[95] "moving itself at random" (ὄχλων εἰκῇ φερομένων, 2.6) is clearly "against the natural order" (παρὰ φύσιν, 2.5), the πολιτικός, assimilated to the queen bee,

[95] ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει γε καὶ οὕτως τὸ τοῦ δράκοντος, οὗ φησιν ὁ μῦθος τὴν οὐρὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ στασιάσασαν ἀξιοῦν ἡγεῖσθαι παρὰ μέρος καὶ μὴ διὰ παντὸς ἀκολουθεῖν ἐκείνῃ, λαβοῦσαν δὲ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν αὐτήν τε κακῶς ἀπαλλάττειν ἀνοδίαις πορευομένην, καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καταξαίνειν, τυφλοῖς καὶ κωφοῖς μέρεσιν ἀναγκαζομένην παρὰ φύσιν ἕπεσθαι.

is of course pictured as a leader "by nature" (Φύσει μὲν οὖν ἄρχων ἀεὶ πόλεως ὁ πολιτικὸς ὥσπερ ἡγεμὼν ἐν μελίτταις, 813C).

Many among the other similes used to describe the relations between the πολιτικός and the people teach the same lesson. Most of them come straight from Plato who in *Laws* 905e–906a compares the rulers (here the gods who are the rulers of the world) successively to charioteers, pilots, generals, doctors, shepherds or gardeners, reducing the masses to animals, ships, sick men or wild plants.

In a well known passage of *Republic* 493a–b, Plato compared the people to an animal huge and strong (θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ) that is only given "temper and appetites" (τὰς ὀργάς… καὶ ἐπιθυμίας). In the same way, Plutarch, in *Demosthenes* (26.7) quotes approvingly a bon mot of his hero, who associates the "people" (δῆμος) of Athens to two other animals beloved by Athena, the owl and the serpent and assimilates the three of them to "the most intractable beasts" (τοῖς χαλεπωτάτοις… θηρίοις).[96] Similarly in the *Political Precepts* 800C, he compares the "mob" (ὄχλος) that is not easy to cope with (οὐ… εὐμεταχείριστον) to "a suspicious and multifarious beast" (ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕποπτον καὶ ποικίλον), often caught by the belly, that is by means of banquets, like an animal deprived of reason (802D), adding however that it may also be held by the ears and led by persuasive speech. Similarly Dio, in his speech to the Alexandrians (32.28) portrays a *dêmos* similar to a "multifarious and dreadful beast" (ὥστε πάνυ ποικίλον τε καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι θηρίον) or a "monster" (τέρας).

The well-known simile of the leader as shepherd of the people only appears once in the preface of *Agis and Cleomenes* (1.3), in order to criticize a world upside down, where the leaders have become the slaves of their flocks.

The simile of the charioteer and his horses which was used in the *Phaedrus* to portray the human soul and the relation between its three parts, rational (charioteer), spirited and appetitive (horses) often appears in Plutarch to describe the relation between the *politikos*/charioteer and the people.[97] According to Plutarch, kingship and horsemanship are parallel activities "Just as the object of horsemanship is to produce an

[96] The images of the passions as a beast, which is also a common one in Plutarch (cf Duff [1999] 79 n.25) indirectly reinforces the analogy between the people and the *pathêtikon*.

[97] *An seni* 795C: the teaching of leadership is assimilated to the teaching of riding; *Political Precepts* 801C: the leader as "horseman" versus the city as horse.

even-tempered, tractable horse, so the function of kingship is to instill obedience in men."[98] Thus, the emphasis is always on the responsibility of the leader. He may be bad, like Ephialtes, or too weak, like Nicias. In *Pericles* 7.8 Plutarch portrays a *dêmos* that was given too much undiluted freedom by its bad cupbearer Ephialtes (a simile clearly inspired by Plato's *Republic*[99]). As a result, it "behaved like an unruly horse, according to the comic poets, and stopped being prepared to obey orders, but nipped Euboea and mounted the islands."[100] The same simile appears in the *Political Precepts* 802D to describe what happened to Nicias: unable to curb his horse, that is, the people by a bit which was not sharp enough, he was carried away and broke his neck.[101] In these two similes, even if Plutarch chooses to emphasize the "violence" (ἐξυβρίσαντα, βίᾳ) of the horse, that is, of the people, it is at least suggested that the tight control of the horse implies also some kind of constraint exerted by the rider. Actually, the good leader, like Pericles, is always portrayed as someone who knows not only how to "relax the reins"[102] and let the people have their head, but also how to "rein them in and bring them over," when they are recalcitrant.[103] As a consequence, it would be wrong to conclude from *Fabius Maximus* 20.4[104] that Plutarch only favours gentle taming. The μᾶλλον ἤ is not to be discarded.

[98] *Lyc.* 30.4: καὶ καθάπερ ἱππικῆς τέχνης ἀποτέλεσμα πρᾶον ἵππον καὶ πειθήνιον παρασχεῖν, οὕτω βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔργον ἀνθρώποις εὐπείθειαν ἐνεργάσασθαι.

[99] *Rep.* VIII 562c.

[100] *Per.* 7.8. ἄκρατον τοῖς πολίταις ἐλευθερίαν οἰνοχοῶν, ὑφ' ἧς ὥσπερ ἵππον ἐξυβρίσαντα τὸν δῆμον οἱ κωμῳδοποιοὶ λέγουσι (adesp. 41 CAF III 406). *Cimon* 15.2: it is also under the leadership of Ephialtes that the people are said to have lost all restraint (τελέως ἀνεθέντες οἱ πολλοὶ), obviously because he had slackened the reins. The same simile applied to an army is to be found in *Galba* 6.4: the armies of Verginius and Vindex, "in spite of their commanders who behaved like charioteers unable to curb them with the bit" were dashed into a great battle (ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ Οὐεργινίου καὶ Οὐίνδικος στρατεύματα τρόπον τινὰ βίᾳ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, ὥσπερ ἡνιόχους κρατῆσαι χαλινῶν μὴ δυνηθέντας, εἰς μάχην ἐξενεγκόντα μεγάλην συνέρραξαν).

[101] Νικίας δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν προαίρεσιν ἔχων, πειθοῦς δὲ τοιαύτης ἐνδεὴς ὢν καὶ καθάπερ ἀμβλεῖ χαλινῷ τῷ λόγῳ πειρώμενος ἀποστρέφειν τὸν δῆμον, οὐ κατέσχεν οὐδ' ἐκράτησεν, ἀλλ' ᾤχετο βίᾳ φερόμενος εἰς Σικελίαν καὶ συνεκτραχηλιζόμενος.

[102] *Per.* 11.4: τῷ δήμῳ τὰς ἡνίας ἀνείς.

[103] *Per.* 15.1: καὶ μάλα δυσχεραίνοντα κατατείνων καὶ προσβιβάζων.

[104] *Fabius* 20.4: δεινὸν γὰρ ἡγεῖτο τοὺς μὲν ἱππικοὺς καὶ κυνηγετικοὺς ἐπιμελείᾳ καὶ συνηθείᾳ καὶ τροφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ μάστιξι καὶ κλοιοῖς τὴν χαλεπότητα τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὸ θυμούμενον καὶ τὸ δυσκολαῖνον ἐξαιρεῖν, τὸν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄρχοντα μὴ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν χάριτι καὶ πρᾳότητι τῆς ἐπανορθώσεως τίθεσθαι, σκληρότερον δὲ προσφέρεσθαι καὶ βιαιότερον.

> Like those who know how to breed horses and dogs, those who lead men *better* succeed in suppressing their skittishness and intractability by care, habituation and good rearing *than* by horse-whips and dog-collars.

The reins and the bit-that is physical constraint- are not to be totally excluded in order to inculcate the people with a fitting obedience. It is true that in the *Political Precepts* 821D, Plutarch opposes the ways of leading men to the ways of leading animals: whereas men "lead unruly horses and runaway dogs by force of bits and dog-collars, nothing makes a man willingly tractable and gentle to another man except trust in his goodwill and belief in his nobility and justice."[105] But this trust is but another way of catching the people, for "that part of the soul with which we trust is most easily caught."[106] And his gentle treatment is possible only if the people are "good". Once more Plutarch and Dio converge. In his speech to the Alexandrians, Dio opposes to the bad *dêmos* a good *dêmos* "reasonable and gentle and truly mild …, … fair, magnanimous, that is—to put it plainly—a *dêmos*, which does not want to be pampered, but is disposed to accept an outspoken speech (from its leaders), respects good men and good advice, and is grateful to those who admonish and instruct it."[107] Whereas the one is assimilated to a beast, the other is compared to a "noble steed that is directed by means of simple reins, since it does not need the curb."[108]

The simile of the gardener, which appears in *Fabius* 20.4,[109] and the use of τιθασεύω in *Numa* 8.3 and *Demosthenes* 5.5 are also significant. They suggest that the masses are by nature "wild" and that their ἦθος, which is by nature spirited and aggressive (τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ φιλοπόλεμον) has to be "domesticated" (τιθασεύειν) and "civilized" (ἐξημεροῦν) by the *politikos*. Like "wild fig trees, wild pear-trees, wild olive-trees", they have to be treated by grafting in order to bear edible fruits.

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[105] *Political Precepts* 821B: ἵππους δ' ὑβριστὰς καὶ κύνας ἀποστάτας κλοιοῖς καὶ χαλινοῖς ἄγουσιν ἠναγκασμένους· ἄνθρωπον δ' ἀνθρώπῳ χειροήθη καὶ πρᾷον ἑκουσίως οὐδὲν ἀλλ'ἢ πίστις εὐνοίας καὶ καλοκαγαθίας δόξα καὶ δικαιοσύνης παρίστησιν.

[106] *Political Precepts* 821B: τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος, ᾧ πιστεύομεν, ἁλώσιμόν ἐστιν.

[107] 32. 27: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δῆμος ὁ μέν τις εὐγνώμων καὶ πρᾷος καὶ γαληνὸς ὄντως, οἷος γεύσασθαι παρρησίας καὶ μὴ πάντα ἐθέλειν τρυφᾶν, ἐπιεικής, μεγαλόφρων, αἰδούμενος τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ λόγους, τοῖς νουθετοῦσι καὶ διδάσκουσι χάριν εἰδώς.

[108] 32. 27 καθάπερ ἵππον γενναῖον ἐξ ἡνίας εὐτελοῦς πρᾴως ἄγοντα, οὐδὲν δεόμενον ψαλίων.

[109] οἱ γεωργοῦντες ἐρινεοῖς καὶ ἀχράσι καὶ κοτίνοις προσφέρονται, τὰ μὲν εἰς ἐλαίας, τὰ δ' εἰς ἀπίους, τὰ δ' εἰς συκᾶς ἐξημεροῦντες καὶ τιθασεύοντες.

Medical metaphors are often used to describe the relations between the *dêmos* and the *politikos*.[110] Here also the influence of Plato[111] is obvious. In the *Gorgias*[112] and in the *Republic*[113] the philosopher/statesman is like a doctor, whereas the citizens are assimilated either to sick children (*Gorgias*) or to the disease itself (*Republic*). In both cases the cure is a harsh one: surgery, cauterisation, or at least starving and bitter potions in the *Gorgias*, amputation of the sick part as quickly as possible in the *Republic*.[114] According to the *Laws*, in politics like in medicine, there is no painless treatment: it is "as if doctors would be enjoined to treat and cure bodies in a pleasant way" (684c). But the good statesman, like the doctor in charge of free men, has first to teach his patient and persuade him to undergo such a cure.[115]

Similarly, in *Pericles* (15.1–2) the masses are compared to a person suffering from a complicated and chronic illness to be cured by the statesman /doctor Pericles.[116] More often, their "corruption" is said to be the cause of the "sickness" of the regime:[117] they are the illness itself, as demonstrated by the metaphors assimilating them to "a swelling tumour,"[118] to "the sick and corrupt elements of the State"[119] or to the "wounded and ulcerated parts of the body."[120] The same use of a medical metaphor is to be found in the *Political Precepts*.[121] Assimilating the State to a body afflicted with disease (σώματι νοσοῦντι), Plutarch opposes "the diseased parts" (τῶν συννοσούντων μερῶν), that is, the masses, to "the sane and reasonable" (τῶν σωφρωνούντων) ones, that is, the elite, whose health becomes contagious: it flows from the sane part to the diseased one and permeates it (ἐπιρρεῖ γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκ τῶν σωφρονούντων καὶ δίεισι διὰ τοῦ νενοσηκότος). The comparison with Plato is illuminating. In the *Republic* the disease was identified only

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110 Cf. Fuhrmann (1964) 238–240.

111 On medical metaphors in Plato, see Wehrli (1951), Vegetti (1966), (1967), (1968), (1969) and Jouanna (1977).

112 521e–522a.

113 VIII 564b–c.

114 *Rep.* VIII 564c, 567c.

115 *Laws* 727d.

116 See also *Per.* 34.5: "the masses did their best to injure Pericles just as insane people try to hurt their doctor."

117 *Synkrisis Lys.-Sull.* 1.2: ὥσπερ ἐν 'Ρώμῃ τότε διεφθαρμένου τοῦ δήμου καὶ νοσοῦντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολιτεύματος.

118 *Synkrisis. Per.Fab.* 1.4: σπαργῶντι [τῷ] δήμῳ.

119 *Cato Min.* 26.11: τὰ πολλὰ νοσοῦντα καὶ διεφθαρμένα τῆς πολιτείας μέρη.

120 *Phocion* 2.3: τὰ τετρωμένα καὶ ἡλκωμένα μέρη τοῦ σώματος.

121 824A.

with a part of the people, that is, "the class of idle and extravagant men". Plutarch, who locates the illness in the whole *dêmos* as opposed to the elite, is more negative.

Like his Platonic counterpart, the Plutarchan statesman/doctor does not hesitate sometimes to prescribe painful treatments. In the *synkrisis Cimon-Lucullus* (2.7), where the masses are compared to a man with a dislocated limb, the only possible cure is a forceful intervention in order to straighten what was bent. Purgatives are also put to use. In *Coriolanus* (12.5), the wise among the Romans agree that the only way of preventing a civil war was to eliminate the turbulent element carried away by the demagogues, as one eliminates a superfluous secretion that causes illness and disorder for the state. And in *Camillus* (9.3), Plutarch reminds his readers that Roman statesmen often achieved such a result by launching a military campaign and turning to the outside the disorderly element in the state here again assimilated to the passions in the soul (τὰ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τῆς πολιτείας).[122] But usually Plutarch's *politikoi*, as opposed to Plato's legislators, prefer less invasive methods than "burning and cutting" and behave as "gentle doctors".[123] To cure an "inflamed State" and a harsh *dêmos*, Numa prescribes "sacrifices, processions and choruses pleasant and humane."[124] Among the remedies available, Cato the Younger chooses "the most moderate."[125] Even Cleomenes, who is criticized for his violent behavior and his lack of medical expertise,[126] would have liked to cure his fatherland "without pain."[127] Again Pericles, who was the best horseman, appears as the best doctor combining the two types of medicine and prescribing, when appropriate, either "harmless pleasures", or "biting but healing drugs."[128]

To conclude this far from complete survey of the similes that describe the people, I would like to point out a significant difference between Plato's and Plutarch's use of the famous allegory of the ship of the state, which had a long and successful history in Greek literature starting from Archilochus and Alcaeus. In *Republic* VI, the *dêmos*, though it is

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122 *Cam.*9.3.

123 *Synkrisis Dio-Brut.* 2.2: πρᾳότατος ἰατρὸς. See also *Caes.* 31.7. On the importance of gentleness ("douceur") in Plutarch's *Lives*, see De Romilly (1979) 275–292.

124 *Num.*8.2.

125 *Cato Min.* 47.2: τῷ μετριωτάτῳ …ἰάματι. See also 20.1.

126 *Synkrisis Ag./Cleom.-Gracch.* 4.3.

127 *Ag./Cleom.* 31.8: ἀνωδύνως.

128 *Per.* 15.1.

"hard of hearing, a bit short-sighted and without any knowledge of seafaring", is after all the shipowner, "bigger and stronger than everyone else on board" (488b). But in *Pericles*, it becomes either a ship steered by a pilot who knows how to use hope and fear as "rudders" to restrain their (excessive) audacity or to relieve and encourage their despondency,[129] or a sea-sick and terrified passenger whose tears and entreaties are wisely discarded by the skilful helmsman.[130] If it is promoted to the status of pilot, as in *Agis*,[131] it is only because the *politikos*, turned into demagogue because of excessive ambition, failed in his duty and became a mere lookout, eager to please the people and taking his orders from it.

Conclusion

The portrait of the people is remarkably consistent in the Greek and Roman *Lives*. As a consequence, there is but one way of being a good leader. Given that the people, according to Plutarch, can only listen to pleasure and pain, since it has only impulses and passions, it is obvious that the *politikos* has to please it. But as opposed to the demagogue, for whom the pleasure of the masses is an end in itself,[132] the true *politikos* does not govern only πρὸς ἡδονήν or πρὸς χάριν. When he does yield to the desires of the people, it is only to get in exchange what is expedient.[133] Like Pericles, he uses pleasure as a means to lead the people, first to win over the control of the city and then to keep it. For Pericles provided to the masses "a series of not entirely tasteless pleasures" (οὐκ ἀμούσοις ἡδοναῖς) that include not only "spectacles for general consumption" and public feasts, but also ways of alleviating the poverty of the people by wages earned by rowing the

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[129] *Per.* 15.2: μάλιστα δ' ἐλπίσι καὶ φόβοις ὥσπερ οἴαξι συστέλλων τὸ θρασυνόμενον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ δύσθυμον ἀνιεὶς καὶ παραμυθούμενος.

[130] *Per.* 33.6: ὥσπερ νεὼς κυβερνήτης ἀνέμου κατιόντος ἐν πελάγει θέμενος εὖ πάντα καὶ κατατείνας τὰ ὅπλα χρῆται τῇ τέχνῃ, δάκρυα καὶ δεήσεις ἐπιβατῶν ναυτιώντων καὶ φυλακαῖς πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν, ἐχρῆτο τοῖς αὑτοῦ λογισμοῖς, βραχέα φροντίζων τῶν κατα βοώντων καὶ δυσχεραινόντων.

[131] *Ag-Cleom.* 1.4 καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ πρωρεῖς, τὰ ἔμπροσθεν προορώμενοι τῶν κυβερνητῶν, ἀφορῶσι πρὸς ἐκείνους καὶ τὸ προστασσόμενον ὑπ' ἐκείνων ποιοῦσιν, οὕτως οἱ πολιτευόμενοι καὶ πρὸς δόξαν ὁρῶντες ὑπηρέται μὲν τῶν πολλῶν εἰσιν, ὄνομα δ' ἀρχόντων ἔχουσιν.

[132] E.g *Nicias* 3.2 (Cleon), *Cato Min.* 32.2 (Caesar).

[133] *Phocion* 3.1.

fleet and settlements in the allies' territories.[134] Even the austere Cato the Younger is ready to persuade the Senate to sell corn for cheap to the mob in order to prevent them from siding with Caesar, a measure, which is praised as "humane and generous" (26.1: τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ ταύτῃ καὶ χάριτι). This "moderate" euergetism is in perfect agreement with the advice given by Plutarch to the contemporary *politikos* in *Political Precepts* 821F–822C: while condemning those who give theatrical performances, make distribution of money or offer gladiatorial shows and by their bribes make the multitude strong and bold, he praises moderate expenditures that serve a good or necessary purpose.

[134] *Per.* 11.4–5.

DAS POLITISCHE UND DER EINZELNE: FIGURENKONSTRUKTION IN BIOGRAPHIE UND GESCHICHTSSCHREIBUNG

Thomas Späth

„Nun sag', wie hältst du es mit der Geschichte?"—das ist die Gretchenfrage der Historiker, die sie seit der Erfindung der „wissenschaftlichen Geschichtsschreibung" im 19. Jh. an die Biographie der Antike stellen. Die Antwort ist oft eine kritische; moniert werden chronologische Ungenauigkeiten, Irrtümer in Ereignisfolgen, die „Kondensierung" verschiedener Ereignisse zu einer einzigen Erzählsequenz oder die Verwechslung von Personennamen.[1] Wie auch immer das Urteil über die „Zuverlässigkeit" der biographischen Texte als historische Quellen ausfiel, die Sichtweise blieb konstant: die Geschichtsschreibung galt und gilt als Darstellungsnorm, das Kriterium der Beurteilung ist die „Wirklichkeitsnähe" der Erzählungen; dabei fanden und finden die historiographischen Massstäbe des 19. und 20. Jh. Anwendung, die zuweilen der antiken Geschichtsschreibung übergestülpt wurden ohne Rücksicht auf die unterschiedlichen Begriffe historischer Wahrheit.[2] Im Vergleich zu dieser nach vermeintlich einheitlichen Bedingungen gefassten Historiographie erscheint die Biographie als gleichsam abgeleitete literarische Gattung, deren Wert sich aufgrund ihres „Wahrheitsgehaltes" zu beweisen hat.[3]

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[1] Als ein Beispiel unter vielen sei auf La Penna (1987) 235 verwiesen, der feststellt, „nella narrazione non solo mancano dettagli rilevanti, ma talvolta mancano anche distinzioni fra avvenimenti e persone che nuocciono alla verità storica". Bemerkungen wie „in fact…", „en vérité…", „in realtà…", gefolgt von korrigierenden Hinweisen auf den „richtigen" chronologischen Ablauf und die etablierten Namen der tatsächlichen historischen Figuren finden sich in allen kommentierenden Anmerkungen der Ausgaben der *Parallelbiographien*. Zum Umgang Plutarchs mit historiographischer Überlieferung vgl. Pelling (1980); Pelling (1990); Françoise Frazier widmet ein ganzes Kapitel der Frage von Plutarchs „traitement des données historiques" (Frazier [1996] 17–69),—was John Moles auf drei Seiten unter dem Titel „The truth problem" als unterschiedliche Formen von „factual distortion" zusammenfasst (Moles [1988] 36–39); spezifisch zu Fragen der Chronologie Duff (1999), „Appendix Two: Plutarch and Chronology", 311–314.

[2] Dazu grundsätzlich Veyne (1983); vgl. auch die Beiträge in Gill/Wiseman (1993) und den Synthese-Versuch von Marincola (1998).

[3] Auch wenn Momigliano durchaus der Fiktionalität auch von Geschichtsschreibung Rechnung trägt, dringt diese Beurteilung gleichwohl durch: „la linea divisoria tra

Im vorliegenden Beitrag schlage ich vor, die Frage für einmal umzudrehen und die Ausgestaltung der Geschichtsschreibung auf der Grundlage der Eigenarten der Biographie zu untersuchen. Plutarch selbst lädt allerdings keineswegs dazu ein: In den vielzitierten Passagen aus dem Proöm zu *Alexander / Caesar* (1.1–3), in den Bemerkungen in *Galba* (2.5), *Nikias* (1.5) und vor allem auch in *Cato Minor* (24.1, 37.10)[4] setzt er sein biographisches Schreiben von der Geschichtsschreibung ab. Damit anerkennt er die Historiographie als Norm des Sprechens über Vergangenheit und ordnet ihr die Biographie unter. Aus den genannten expliziten Passagen geht das bekannte Unterscheidungsmerkmal zur historischen Erzählung hervor: Die Charakterbeschreibung stellt die plutarchsche Biographie als ihre entscheidende Differenz zur Historiographie heraus—das ἦθος des Helden und dessen Wertung als gut oder schlecht sowie die exemplarische Funktion der *Bioi* für das Publikum zeichnen die *Parallelbiographien* aus.[5]

Diese wohlbegründete Erkenntnis der Charakterbeschreibung als zentrales Merkmal der plutarchschen Biographie werde ich nicht in Zweifel ziehen, sondern vielmehr die Frage stellen, ob die historiographischen Texte tatsächlich—im Unterschied zur Biographie—auf die Charakterbeschreibungen von Einzelpersonen verzichten. Gegenstand der Untersuchung sind die Figuren des letzten Jahrhunderts der römischen Republik; ich vergleiche ihre Darstellung in Plutarchs *Bioi* mit jener in den entsprechenden historiographischen Texten bei Appian und Cassius Dio. Zwei Thesen bestimmen diese vergleichende Textanalyse:

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immaginazione e realtà era più esile nelle biografia che nella storiografia commune" (Momigliano [1974] 59).

[4] Vgl. dazu generell das Kapitel 1, „Programmatic Statements in the *Lives*" in Duff (1999) 13–51, im Besonderen auch seine Warnung (S. 17 sowie 20f.), die Aussagen im *Alex.*-Proöm als programmatische Erklärung für alle *Bioi* zu verstehen, statt ausschliesslich auf den *Bios* Alexanders bezogen, wo sich Plutarch von den zahlreichen Alexandergeschichten abgrenzen musste. Das Argument hat manches für sich, zu fragen wäre allerdings, weshalb Plutarch im Plural schreibt οὔτε […] ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους („wir schreiben keine Geschichtswerke, sondern Lebensbeschreibungen") und nicht etwa οὔτε […] ἱστορίαν, ἀλλὰ βίον [Ἀλέξανδρος] γράφομεν („wir schreiben nicht die Geschichte [Alexanders], sondern seine Lebensbeschreibung"). Vgl. jetzt auch—obwohl Duffs Warnung nicht berücksichtigt wird!—die Überlegungen von Lamberton (2001) 70ff., zu den Unterschieden von Biographie und Geschichtsschreibung vor dem Hintergrund der Unterschiede zwischen antiker und moderner Geschichtsschreibung.

[5] So formuliert Tim Duff diese Wesensbestimmung der plutarchschen Biographie im Gegensatz zur Geschichtsschreibung, die als *communis opinio* gelten kann (Duff [1999] 49f.).

1. Die Differenz der Geschichtsschreibung im Vergleich zur Biographie besteht nicht darin, dass die Historiographie sich nicht für den Charakter der Akteure interessiert, der in der Biographie im Zentrum der Darstellung steht. Die historiographischen Texte der Kaiserzeit erklären Ereignisse nicht mit einer Analyse der politisch-gesellschaftlichen und militärischen Strukturen, sie suchen die Begründung des Handelns in den persönlichen Motiven der Akteure. Unterschiede zwischen Biographie und Historiographie sind deshalb in der Zentrierung der Erzählung auf eine Einzelperson (oder eine Einzelperson und ihren Gegenspieler) einerseits, auf das Handeln in einem Figurengeflecht andererseits zu untersuchen.

2. Sowohl Geschichtsschreibung wie Biographie setzen Einzelpersonen in Szene, können sich aber nicht für deren Individualität interessieren, denn *Individualität* ist ein Begriff der Moderne: die Antike hat nicht einen Begriff für den Menschen in seiner nur ihm spezifischen Eigenart, für den Mensch als selbst-reflektierendes Wesen, das im Rahmen seiner gesellschaftlichen Vernetzung autonom denkt, entscheidet und handelt.[6] Ein gattungsspezifischer Unterschied der Konzeptualisie-

[6] Im Unterschied zu Bernd Seidensticker, der postuliert, „dass die zentralen Elemente unserer modernen Vorstellung von personaler Individualität (Besonderheit und Einheit der Person, Spontaneität des Geistes und Autonomie des Handelns) sich bereits in den homerischen Epen feststellen lassen" (Seidensticker [2001] 406)—womit er die Thesen von Bruno Snell zum „Erwachen der Persönlichkeit in der frühgriechischen Lyrik" (so das vierte Kapitel in Snell [1986]) in Frage stellen will—neige ich eher zu einer Einschätzung, wie sie Richard van Dülmen skizziert: „[…] muss bemerkt werden, dass natürlich Individualität, Individuum und Individualisierung seit der Antike als Vorstellungen bekannt waren. Es verband sich mit ihnen jedoch noch keine moderne Begrifflichkeit. Das was die Antike, die Renaissance und die Moderne unter Individuum bzw. Individualität verstanden und verstehen, unterscheidet sich ganz grundlegend voneinander" (Van Dülmen [2001] 2; zum Begriff des „modernen Individuums" vgl. Van Dülmen [1997]). Kritisch stellt jedoch Jean-Claude Schmitt fest: „déjà l'individu ‹naît›, ‹s'affirme› ou ‹se découvre› dans l'Antiquité; mais tout semble recommencer au XIIe siècle, et encore à la Renaissaince, et sous les Lumières, et au XIXe siècle…"—aufgrund der bemerkenswerten Koinzidenz dieser Momente der „Entdeckung des Individuums" mit den grossen Wendepunkten der universitären Einteilung der historischen Zeit wirft er die Frage auf, ob die „Entdeckung des Individuums" nicht als ein exemplarischer Fall der „historiographischen Fiktionen" zu betrachten sei, die die historische Forschung zur Strukturierung ihrer Fragestellungen brauche (Schmitt [2001] 241); vgl. die folgenden wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Überlegungen („L'individu dans la sphère ‹theologico-politique›", 242–249), die von Jacob Burckhardts Erörterungen zur „Entwicklung des Individuums" in *Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860) ausgehen—die ebenso als ein Muster der Individualitätsfiktionen gelesen werden können: der gleiche Burckhardt begründet seine Demokratie-Kritik in den mehr als zwan-

rung der Einzelperson lässt sich für die Antike nicht ausmachen: biographische und historiographische Texte konstruieren Figuren, die an einem allgemeinen, feststehenden und relativ eng begrenzten Kanon moralisch-politischer Grundsätze gemessen werden. Hier hat die Frage nach dem antiken Verständnis der Einzelperson anzusetzen, nicht bei der Suche nach einem modernen Individualitäts-Konzept in der griechisch-römischen Kultur.

Das Beispiel, das ich zur Überprüfung dieser Thesen wähle, ist einer der zahlreichen Erzählkomplexe, die zum Vergleich der plutarchschen Konstruktion der zentralen Figuren einladen. Zu diesen Erzählkomplexen gehören beispielsweise die Catilina-Affäre,[7] der Beginn des Bürgerkriegs[8] oder die Ermordung Caesars;[9] hier soll die Darstellung der Entstehung des sogenannten „ersten Triumvirats" zwischen Caesar, Crassus und Pompeius zur Diskussion gestellt werden.

Einzelfiguren in der historiographischen Darstellung des „ersten Triumvirats"

In Buch 37 seiner *Römischen Geschichte* beschreibt Cassius Dio die Ankunft des Pompeius in Italien (37.20.1–6): nach seinen erfolgreich abgeschlossenen Feldzügen gegen Mithridates reist er vom Pontos über Asia und Griechenland und landet in Brundisium. Aufgezählt werden die Erfolge des Feldherrn mit der Unterwerfung zahlreicher Herrscher und Könige, der Erschliessung von Einnahmequellen für Rom und der Ordnung der Völker in Asien. Diese Taten sind laut Dio „seinem persönlichen Glück", aber „auch seinen Mitstreitern zuzuschreiben" (καὶ

zig Jahre später gehaltenen Vorlesungen zur *Griechischen Culturgeschichte* mit der Unterdrückung des (nach seinem eigenen Werk in der Renaissance „entwickelten") Individuums durch die *polis* im klassischen Griechenland (Burckhardt [2002] 165–191).

[7] Vgl. den Kommentar zu den drei *Bioi Pomp.*, *Caes.* und *Cic.* von M.J. Edwards in: Edwards (1991); ebenso den Kommentar von John L. Moles zu *Cic.* (Moles [1988]). Spezifisch zu Plutarchs Darstellung der Catilina-Affäre vgl. Pelling (1985), Steidle (1983) 411–418; die Figurenkonstruktion in Sallust untersuche ich in Späth (1998b); allgemeiner zu den Ereignissen um Catilina Nippel (1988), Drummond (1995) und Ungern-Sternberg (1997b); neuere Literatur auch in Ungern-Sternberg (1997a).

[8] Literatur zum Thema findet sich in De Wet (1981); Pelling (1984); Raaflaub (1974); Raaflaub (1975); Sirianni (1979); Tucker (1988).

[9] Zum Thema vgl. Dubuisson (1980); Fraschetti (1985); La Penna (1987); Moles (1985); Ottmer (1979); Pelling (1984); Pelling (1997).

τῇ τύχῃ καὶ τοῖς συστρατευσαμένοις, 37.20.3). Im Unterschied dazu war die wirklich persönliche Grosstat des Pompeius, dass er sein Heer, ohne Aufforderung durch Senat und Volk, gleich nach der Ankunft in Brundisium entlassen habe—obwohl er ganz Italien hätte erobern können: Er wusste, dass den Menschen die Taten von Marius und Sulla verhasst waren und wollte sie keinen Augenblick in irgendwelcher Furcht lassen.[10] Entsprechend verzichtete Pompeius auch darauf, einen zusätzlichen Ehrennamen anzunehmen; er begnügte sich mit dem schon früher erworbenen Μάγνος.[11] Ausser dem grossartigen Triumph, der ihm bewilligt worden war (37.21.1–2), wies er alle Ehrungen zurück mit Ausnahme des Lorbeerkranzes, des Feldherrnmantels bei Spielen und des Triumphgewandes bei Pferderennen; diese Ehrungen hatte er „durch die Unterstützung Caesars und gegen den Antrag des Marcus Cato" zugesprochen erhalten (37.21.3–4). Die Nennung der zwei Namen ist Anlass, Caesar als Schmeichler der Volksmassen zu umschreiben (τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐθεράπευε); er habe die Machtstellung des Pompeius untergraben und ihn gleichzeitig zum Freund machen wollen in Dingen, die dem Volk und seiner Macht von Nutzen waren;[12] Cato hingegen wird als Nachkomme des „berühmten Cato" eingeführt (jedoch mit grösserer παιδεία Ἑλληνικά als sein Vorfahre, 37.22.1), als ein wahrer Freund des Volkes und der Schwachen, der jegliche überragende Machtstellung hasste und freimütig für die Freiheit und das Althergebrachte (τὰ πάτρια) eintrat.[13]

[10] Dio 37.20.4–6; zur Vermeidung, Angst zu erregen, vgl. 37.20.6: ἐπειδὴ ⟨γὰρ⟩ τά τε τοῦ Μαρίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ Σύλλου ἐν μίσει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο ὄντα, οὐκ ἠθέλησε φόβον τινὰ αὐτοῖς οὐδ' ἐπ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας, ὅτι ⟨τι⟩ τῶν ὁμοίων πείσονται, παρασχεῖν.

[11] Dio 37.21.1, 37.21.3: zweifach wird auf diesen Verzicht verwiesen.

[12] Dio 37.22.1; mit Verweis auf eine frühere Stelle, 36.43.3–4, wo Caesars (und Ciceros) Unterstützung der Übertragung des *imperium* gegen Tigranes und Mithridates an Pompeius damit begründet wird, dass Caesar nicht nur der Masse schmeicheln (τὸν […] ὄχλον […] ἐθεράπευσεν), sondern sich selbst den Weg für einen ähnlichen Beschluss ebnen und zudem durch eine Anhäufung der Machtfülle des Pompeius diesen schneller dem Volk verhasst machen wollte; Cicero hingegen habe die Führung im Staat angestrebt und eine Doppelrolle gespielt, um von beiden Seiten, den βέλτιοι und den συρφετώδεις, den Optimaten und dem Pöbel, umworben zu werden (36.43.4–5).

[13] Dio 37.22.2–4. Es läge nahe, τὰ πάτρια mit *mos maiorum* zu übersetzen—ob allerdings die griechischen „väterlichen Bräuche" die gleiche *auctoritas* konnotierten wie der römische *mos* würde eine spezielle Untersuchung verlangen (ich verdanke Eliane Stoffel den Hinweis auf die Schwierigkeit einer allzu einfachen Übertragung der Begriffe).

Cassius Dio kommt etwas später auf die Rückkehr des Pompeius zurück[14] und berichtet den Misserfolg seiner Anträge auf Anerkennung seiner Ordnung des Ostens und auf Ansiedlung der Veteranen: die Mächtigen seien ihm schon früher nicht geneigt gewesen, οἵ τε γὰρ δυνατοί, μηδὲ ἐκ τοῦ πρὶν αὐτῷ ἀρεσκόμενοι (37.49.2). Und Pompeius muss einsehen, dass er nur noch den ruhmvollen Namen und zugleich den φθόνος, den Neid seiner Gegner, aber nicht mehr die frühere Macht besass (37.50.5–6).

Drei Aspekte von Dios Darstellung scheinen mir bemerkenswert: Erstens werden Ereignisse wie die Rückkehr des Pompeius aus dem Osten als Handlung eines Einzelnen beschrieben—allerdings mit der Präzisierung, die militärischen Erfolge seien nicht nur dem persönlichen Glück, sondern ebenso den Mitkämpfern zu verdanken; die wirkliche persönliche Ruhmestat, die Entlassung des Heeres, wird dann auf die Sorge des Pompeius zurückgeführt, „die Menschen" in Italien nicht in Furcht zu versetzen. Zweitens hält die Erzählung der Ereignisse gleichsam inne und wendet sich der Beschreibung der Figuren zu: einerseits dem Verhalten des Pompeius und seinen Überlegungen zu den Ehrungen, andererseits einer Charakterisierung von Caesar als verschlagenem Schmeichler des Volkes und von Cato, der sich durch παιδεία auszeichnet und ein wahrer Freund des Volkes ist. Festzuhalten ist schliesslich, dass als Grund für politisches Handeln massgeblich persönliche Gefühle angeführt sind: die δυνατοί sind Pompeius nicht „gewogen" ([οὐκ] ἀρεσκόμενοι), ihr Verhalten ist durch Neid, φθόνος und Hass, μῖσος, geprägt; genau aus diesem Grund verzichtet Pompeius auf zusätzliche Ehrungen.

Diese drei Beobachtungen zur Bedeutung der Einzelfigur bestätigen sich in der weiteren Darstellung des „Ersten Triumvirats" in der *Römischen Geschichte* von Cassius Dio. Geschichtserzählung als Handeln von Einzelpersonen zeigt sich etwa in den Kapiteln über Caesars Taten als Proprätor in Spanien: Dio leitet die Darstellung ein mit dem Hinweis auf das Ruhmesstreben Caesars (δόξης ἐπιθυμῶν, 37.52.1), das ihn dazu gebracht habe, nicht nur das Land von den Räubern zu säubern, sondern Pompeius und den andern Mächtigen nachzustreben,

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[14] Dio 37.49.1 geht ohne jeglichen Hinweis auf 37.20–23 nochmals auf diese Rückkehr ein mit der Feststellung, Πομπήιος δὲ ἦλθε μὲν ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, „Pompeius kam in dieser Zeit nach Italien zurück" und fährt dann mit den Auseinandersetzungen um die Anerkennung von Pompeius' Ordnung und um die Veteranenversorgung weiter.

um das Konsulat erreichen und dann ganz ausserordentliche grosse Taten (ὑπερφυᾶ ἔργα, 37.52.2) vollbringen zu können. Hier fügt sich im Text der Traum Caesars als Quaestor in Gades ein—er träumt von Geschlechtsverkehr mit der Mutter[15]—, und die Anekdote, vor einem Bildnis Alexanders habe Caesar über fehlende eigene Grosstaten geklagt (37.52.2). Darauf werden die Feldzüge Caesars und die Unterwerfung der ganzen Iberischen Halbinsel geschildert (37.52.3–53.4) und auf die Feststellung hin geführt, Caesar sei überzeugt gewesen, sich damit eine gute Ausgangslage für die Bewerbung um das Konsulat geschaffen zu haben (37.54.1). In Caesars Erfolg, die zwei verfeindeten mächtigen Herren Crassus und Pompeius zu versöhnen und ihre Unterstützung für die Konsulatswahl zu gewinnen (37.54.3) sieht Cassius Dio einen Beweis der ausserordentlichen Klugheit Caesars (τοῦτο τὴν σοφίαν ἐς τὰ μάλιστα αὐτοῦ τεκμηριοῖ, 37.54.4).

Hier unterbricht Dio gewissermassen wiederum seine Erzählung und fügt eine Erzählpause[16] ein: wir treffen den zweiten der oben genannten Aspekte, eine Erörterung der Motive der drei Beteiligten gleichsam als Beitrag zur Personenbeschreibung: Caesar habe die beiden mächtigsten Männer versöhnt, da er zum Ausbau seiner eigenen Machtstellung zwingend beide als Freunde gewinnen wollte, um nicht einen der beiden als Gegner zu haben (37.55.1). Caesars Überlegungen werden bei Dio eingehend erläutert: es geht dabei um grundlegende Gedanken über Bedeutung und Verhältnis von Feindschaft und Freundschaft, und um seine Überzeugung, mit der Unterstützung von Crassus und Pompeius alle anderen, bald aber auch diese Verbündeten selbst beherrschen zu können (37.55.2–56.1). Für Pompeius wiederholt Dio, er habe seine gefährdete Stellung erkannt, die Macht des Crassus und den Aufstieg Caesars gefürchtet, mit ihrer Hilfe aber gehofft, die alte Macht, ἀρχαίαν ἐξουσίαν, wiederzugewinnen.[17] Crassus hingegen wird hingestellt als überzeugt, den beiden anderen aufgrund von Geburt und Reichtum überlegen zu sein—seine Absicht sei es gewesen, die beiden gegeneinander auszuspielen und selbst zu höheren Ehren gelangen als jeder von ihnen (37.56.4). Generell hält Dio fest, Crassus habe grund-

[15] Dio 37.52.2, hier nur mit der Deutung „grosser Macht", ähnlich auch Dio 41.24.2; einen erklärender Verweis legt Sueton, *Caes.* 7.2 vor; vgl. Artemidoros 1.79. Plutarch situiert den Traum in der Nacht vor dem Übergang über den Rubicon (*Caes.* 32.9), ohne ihn explizit zu deuten, vgl. aber Brenk (1975) 346.

[16] Ich übernehme den Begriff von Genette (1972), vgl. das Kapitel „Durée", 122–144, im Speziellen das Schema 129 und den Abschnitt „Pause" 133–138.

[17] Dio 37.56.3; vgl. schon 37.50.5.

sätzlich weder das Volk noch den Senat unterstützt, sondern sei nur an der eigenen Macht interessiert gewesen (37.56.5).

Nach dieser Erläuterung der Absichten eines jeden kehrt die Geschichtserzählung wieder zum Erzählstrang zurück: darin findet sich unter anderem auch eine Charakterisierung Catos, welche den dritten Aspekt der historiographischen Behandlung von Einzelpersonen illustriert: das politische Handeln aufgrund persönlicher Motive. Cassius Dio stellt fest, die „Schwurgemeinschaft" (συνωμοσία, 37.58.1) unter den drei Mächtigen habe dazu geführt, dass in Rom kaum noch massvoll-vernünftig (σωφρονοῦν) gehandelt worden sei—Cato sei die einzige Ausnahme gewesen (37.57.2). Als einziger habe er sich um politische Angelegenheiten καθαρῶς, „mit reinen Absichten", gekümmert und nicht aus Gründen des persönlichen Vorteils (ἰδία πλεονεξία): auch wenn einige ihn zuweilen nachahmten, taten sie es nicht aus „angeborener Tugend" (ἀρετὴ ἔμφυτος, 37.57.3).

Die hier vorgelegten Passagen aus Cassius Dios Werk machen die überragende Bedeutung der Charakterzüge von Einzelpersonen für die historiographische Darstellung deutlich: Caesar wird mit seinem „Ruhmesstreben" und seiner „Weisheit" charakterisiert; Furcht um die eigene Macht und Neid auf die anderer motivieren das Handeln von Pompeius und Crassus; es fehlen der Darstellung nicht die Hinweise auf Träume und Vorzeichen; für Cato werden „reine Absichten" als „angeborene Tugend", im Gegensatz zum Bemühen um eigenen Gewinn aller anderen angeführt.

Appian pflegt im Vergleich dazu eine kürzere und nüchternere Darstellungsweise—die sich weitgehend mit einer Aufzählung von „Fakten" begnügt. Doch in den wenigen Fällen, wo sich Motive für das politische Handeln erwähnt finden, geht es ausschliesslich um persönliche Gründe. Zu Caesars Taten in Spanien stellt der Geschichtsschreiber fest, er habe die Verwaltung und Rechtssprechung vernachlässigt, hingegen ein Heer ausgehoben und alle noch unabhängigen Iberer unterworfen. Viel Geld habe er an die Staatskasse in Rom gesandt (2.8 [27]), und in der Folge den Triumph zugestanden erhalten; darauf erklärt Appian das Dilemma der Wahl zwischen Triumph und Kandidatur für das Konsulat, das Caesar „drängend begehrte" (τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐς πολλὰ […] ἐπειγόμενος, 2.8 [29]); schliesslich erwähnt der Text, Cato habe die Abstimmung über Caesars Antrag auf Bewerbung in Abwesenheit verhindert, und Caesar habe auf den Triumph verzichtet (2.8 [28–30]). Unmittelbar folgt der Hinweis auf Pompeius, der, „berühmt und mächtig" geworden durch den mithridatischen Krieg, sich den-

noch aufgrund der Missgunst, φθόνος, des Senats und insbesondere von Lucullus, nicht durchsetzen konnte (2.9 [31–32]). Schliesslich ist es der „Zorn" des Pompeius über diese Opposition (zu der auch Crassus gehörte), der ihn dazu brachte, mit Caesar Freundschaft zu schliessen (ἀγανακτῶν οὖν ὁ Πομπήιος προσεταιρίζεται Καίσαρα, 2.9 [33]). Während es hier interessanterweise nicht Caesar ist, der die Initiative ergriff, schreibt ihm aber auch Appian die Verantwortung für die Herstellung guter Beziehungen zwischen Pompeius und Crassus zu (2.9 [33]). Mit dem Kommentar, die drei mächtigsten Männer hätten auf diese Weise ihre Interessen zusammengefügt, was Varro unter dem Titel *Trikaranos*, „Monster mit drei Köpfen", dargestellt habe, findet die Darstellung des „Triumvirats" im Text Appians seinen Abschluss.

Das „heisse Begehren" Caesar nach dem Konsulat, die Missgunst des Senats gegen Pompeius und schliesslich dessen Zorn: dies sind die wenigen Handlungsmotive, die Appian anführt. Auch im Text dieses Autors scheint sich—soweit die Untersuchung einer kurzen Episode Folgerungen zulässt—zu bestätigen, dass persönliche Motive und Charakterzüge in der Geschichtsschreibung das Handeln der Figuren bestimmen. Allerdings kreisen diese bisher leichthin als „persönlich" charakterisierten Aspekte genauso wie bei Cassius Dio um Überlegungen und Gefühle, die sich auf Macht und Ruhm beziehen: Historiographische Texte lassen kaum ein Bild *komplexer Personen* erkennen. Ist im Unterschied dazu die biographische Gattung der Ort, wo die Einzelperson und ihr Charakter in ihrer Vielfalt literarisch konstruiert werden?

Figuren des „ersten Triumvirats" in biographischer Darstellung

In sechs *Bioi* Plutarchs findet die Episode des „Triumvirats" Erwähnung: im *Caesar*, *Pompeius*, *Crassus*, *Lucullus*, *Cicero* und *Cato Minor*. Die drei Figuren des Cato Minor, des Pompeius und Caesars sollen in diesen Texten auf ihre Darstellung als Einzelpersonen, im Hinblick auf ihre Charakterzüge untersucht werden.

Die Konstruktion der Figur des Cato Minor wird zunächst durch seine unablässige Tätigkeit im Senat in Opposition gegen Pompeius und Caesar bestimmt: er verhindert eine Verschiebung der Konsularkomitien, die Pompeius beantragte, und er weiss die Abstimmung über Caesars Antrag zu verhindern, durch Freunde seine Kandidatur für das Konsulat präsentieren zu lassen; in beiden Fällen setzt er sich gegen

die Meinung der Senatsmehrheit durch.[18] Pompeius bewundert in der ihm gewidmeten Biographie (*Pomp.* 44.2) Catos freimütige Rede und die Kraft, womit allein er offen für gerechte Anliegen eintrete, und er sucht ihn sich zu versöhnen.

Interessanterweise wird dieses Anliegen des Pompeius im *Cato Minor* (30.3) erwähnt, nicht aber seine Bewunderung für Catos Verteidigung der Gerechtigkeit; diese Auslassung kann eine Erklärung finden in der Kohärenz der plutarchschen Erzählung, die wenige Sätze später zu einer klaren Verurteilung von Catos Haltung hinführt: Im *Bios* Catos schliesst sich unmittelbar die Anekdote des Ersuchens von Pompeius an, Cato möge ihm und seinem Sohn seine zwei Nichten—oder, nach anderen Quellen, seine Töchter—verheiraten (*Cat.Mi.* 30.3[19]). Gegen die Meinung der Frauen seiner *domus* weist Cato das Ersuchen schroff zurück und lässt Pompeius ausrichten: „Cato ist nicht leichthin zu besiegen über das Frauengemach,“[20] und er fügt belehrend hinzu, „wenn Pompeius sich an die Gerechtigkeit hält, wird ihm Cato eine sicherere Freundschaft zukommen lassen als jede Verwandtschaft; aber er wird nie Geiseln für den Ruhm des Pompeius gegen die Interessen des Vaterlandes stellen“ (*Cat.Mi.* 30.4–5). Obwohl sich Catos Haltung aufgrund einer Bestechungsaffäre, worin Pompeius verwickelt ist, im Text gerechtfertigt findet (*Cat.Mi.* 7–8), folgt eine selten deutliche Einschätzung: Plutarch bezeichnet die schroffe Zurückweisung des Angebots von Pompeius vor dem Hintergrund der späteren Ereignisse als schweren Irrtum, da Cato auf diese Weise Pompeius veranlasst habe, sich Caesar zuzuwenden, eine Heirat einzugehen, welche die Kräfte dieser beiden Männer vereinte, beinahe den Untergang des Reiches bewirkte und die Republik stürzte (*Cat.Mi.* 30.9–10). Der Biograph

[18] Zu Pompeius' Antrag auf Verschiebung der Konsulatswahlen im Sommer 62 vgl. *Pomp.* 44.1, *Cat.Mi.* 30.1–2; im *Luc.* wird ganz allgemein festgestellt, Lucullus habe auf den ersten Platz verzichtet und es Crassus und Cato überlassen, den Senat gegen die Dominanz des Pompeius zu verteidigen (*Luc.* 42.5); im weiteren wird *Luc.* 42.6 berichtet, gemeinsam hätten Cato und Lucullus die Anerkennung der Neuordnung im Osten und die Versorgung der Veteranen des Pompeius verhindert. Vgl. auch *Cat.Mi.* 29.5–8, wo Plutarch die Verheiratung der Schwester (es müsste heissen: Nichte) Catos mit Lucullus erwähnt (29.6, dazu schon 24.4–5). Zur Episode von Caesars Antrag auf indirekte Bewerbung um das Konsulat für 59 vgl. *Caes.* 13.2, *Cat.Mi.* 31.5.

[19] Allein hier—und nicht im *Pompeius*—findet sich die Vermittlung durch Munacius und die Möglichkeit, es habe sich um Nichten oder Töchter gehandelt, erwähnt.

[20] Vgl. dazu auch den Protest Catos (*Caes.* 14.8) gegen Heiraten zur Absicherung der Allianz zwischen Pompeius und Caesar: das Reich werde durch diese Heiraten prostituiert und schwache Frauen würden benutzt, um sich Provinzen, Armeen und *imperia* weiterzureichen.

nimmt damit eine Argumentationslinie auf, die er im Proöm der Doppelbiographie *Phocion-Cato Minor* einführt: Plutarch vergleicht Cato mit einer jener Früchte, die ausserhalb der Erntezeit wachsen und bewundert, aber nicht gepflückt werden, denn seine althergebrachte Sittlichkeit (ἀρχαιοτροπία) brachte ihm Bewunderung, aber war nicht den Bedürfnissen seiner Zeit angemessen, denn die Tiefe und Grösse seiner Tugenden entsprachen nicht der Epoche, in der er lebte (*Phoc.* 3.3).[21]

Eine solche Einschätzung fehlt im *Pompeius*, wo allein das Heiratsersuchen gegenüber Catos Nichten (*Pomp.* 44.2) genannt ist, die Zurückweisung durch Cato (*Pomp.* 44.3) sowie die Wahlbestechung des Pompeius, hier präzisiert als Unterstützung für L. Afranius für das Konsulat von 60 (*Pomp.* 44.4–6). Im Unterschied zum *Cato Minor* führt diese Rechtfertigung aber hier zu einem positiven Urteil über Catos Weitsicht: In *Pomp.* 47.4 wird Catos Antwort auf die Frage nach der Ursache des Bürgerkriegs zitiert, wonach nicht der Zwist zwischen Pompeius und Caesar, sondern deren Eintracht das erste und grösste Übel für die Stadt gewesen seien. Das gleiche Urteil findet sich in *Caes.* 13.3: Caesar vermag mit seinem πολίτευμα, der Versöhnung von Crassus und Pompeius, alle zu täuschen ausser Cato;[22] Cato habe alles Kommende vorausgesagt, er sei jedoch damals als verbitterter Mensch betrachtet worden, später als weiser Ratgeber, aber ohne Erfolg (*Caes.* 13.5–6).[23]

Die Figur des Pompeius erhält in den sechs *Bioi* eine sehr zwiespältige Darstellung: Seine Bewunderung für die Gerechtigkeit Catos zeichnet ihn selbst als Bewunderer von Gerechtigkeit aus—doch gleich darauf wird, wie erwähnt, seine Verwicklung in Wahlbestechungen genannt,[24] und diesen widersprüchlichen Beurteilungen steht die Betonung seiner grossen Macht entgegen, ganz explizit in *Pomp.* 45 mit der Beschreibung seines dritten Triumphs. Daran schliesst sich die Beur-

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[21] Der Stelle voraus geht das Zitat Ciceros, Cato habe sich wie in der Republik Platos und nicht wie im Bodensatz des Romulus aufgeführt, vgl. Cic. *Att.* 2.1.8: *dicit enim tamquam in Platonis πολιτείᾳ, non tamquam in Romuli faece sententiam.*

[22] Vgl. auch *Caes.* 13.5: die selbe Begründung wird angeführt, ohne dass Cato als Autor genannt ist.

[23] Ähnlich fürchtet Cato auch in seinem eigenen *Bios* „nicht die Landverteilung", die Pompeius und Caesar vornahmen, sondern „den Lohn, den diese verlangen werden, die auf diese Weise der Menge schmeichelten" (*Cat.Mi.* 32.2); vor der Übertragung der gallischen Provinzen an Caesar habe Cato die Bürger gewarnt, weil sie mit ihren eigenen Stimmen εἰς ἀκρόπολιν τὸν τύραννον, „den Tyrannen auf der Burg" einsetzten (*Cat.Mi.* 33.5).

[24] *Pomp.* 44.4–6, *Cat.Mi.* 30.7–8.

teilung Plutarchs an, es wäre für Pompeius von Vorteil gewesen, das Schicksal eines frühen Todes wie Alexander zu erleiden: seine ehrbare Macht in der Stadt habe er andern ungerecht zur Verfügung gestellt, die ihn aufgrund dieses Ruhms ins Verderben geführt hätten (*Pomp.* 46.1–4). Diese zwei Pole bestimmen das Bild der Figur in der hier untersuchten Episode: gerechte Macht und ihre ungerechte Nutzung durch schlechte Freundschaften.

Eine „legitime Macht" des Pompeius ist allerdings eher im ersten Teil seines *Bios* zu suchen—oder dann in der *Synkrisis* (*Pomp.* 81[1].2–4); in der hier untersuchten Episode sind Hinweise auf diese Macht nach dem Kapitel zum Triumph immer negativ konnotiert: Plutarch weist im *Crassus* auf die Zuweisung des militärischen Kommandos der Provinz Gallien an Caesar hin, wohin Crassus und Pompeius diesen „wie in eine Festung platzierten" in der Erwartung, sie könnten sich den Rest unter sich aufteilen (*Crass.* 14.4).[25] Und er fügt ein, Pompeius habe dies alles aufgrund seiner masslosen Machtgier, φιλαρχία ἄμετρος, getan; bei Crassus habe sich zur „alten Krankheit", seiner φιλοπλουτία, der Geldgier, als neue Leidenschaft die Lust auf Trophäen und Triumphe gesellt, aus Neid auf Caesar, dem er sich nur darin unterlegen fühlte (*Crass.* 14.5).

Die unglücklichen Allianzen des Pompeius durchziehen seine Darstellung in allen Biographien: im *Pompeius* ist es die feindliche Haltung des Senats und des Lucullus, die Pompeius in die Hände der Volkstribunen und insbesondere von Clodius treibt, der ihn entwürdigend ausnützt;[26] Caesars πολίτευμα der Versöhnung von Crassus und Pompeius habe ihm grosse Macht eingebracht, Pompeius jedoch und der Stadt grossen Schaden.[27] Im *Crassus* weist Plutarch auf die unbesiegbare Kraft der drei hin, die den Senat und das Volk der Römer zerstörte; Crassus und Pompeius hätten nichts an Grösse gewonnen, Caesar aber habe sich durch sie gross gemacht.[28] Dies führt in Plutarchs Darstellung zu

[25] Vgl. dazu die supra (Anm. 23) genannte Stelle *Cat.Mi.* 33.5.

[26] *Pomp.* 46.7–9: Ciceros Tod ist der Höhepunkt des verderblichen Einflusses von Clodius.

[27] *Pomp.* 47.1; vgl. auch die supra erwähnte Bezeichung der Allianz als „Verschwörung", συνωμοσία, in *Luc.* 42.6. In ähnlichem Sinn argumentiert schon die oben genannte Passage *Pomp.* 47.4, eingeleitet durch die Staatsschiff-Metapher, wonach in der *polis* die Macht genauso wie auf einem Schiff das Gewicht gleichmässig verteilt sein müsse und ihre Konzentration auf einem Punkt zum Untergang führe (*Pomp.* 47.3).

[28] *Crass.* 14.3; ebenso findet sich die Allianz von Pompeius und Caesar im *Cat.Mi.* (31.6)—wie immer in diesem *Bios*: ohne Nennung von Crassus—als eine Übereinkunft gegen die Stadt bezeichnet: συστάντες ἤδη μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν. Vgl. auch *Cic.*

einer Charakterisierung des Pompeius, die sich vor dem Hintergrund der antiken Definitionen von Männlichkeit[29] als eigentliche Entmännlichung ausnimmt: Er sei völlig dem Willen Caesars unterworfen gewesen (*Pomp.* 47.9)—und es kann dann auch nicht überraschen, dass der Vorwurf der Verweichlichung durch die Liebe zu seiner jungen Gattin nicht fehlt.[30]

Für die Figur Caesars finden wir gleich zu Beginn der hier zur Diskussion stehenden Episode zwei der μικρὰ τῶν ἤθων σημεῖα, welche nach Plutarch die Eigenart seines biographischen Schreibens ausmachen—und noch heute als ‹geflügelte Worte› gelten[31] –: auf dem Weg nach Spanien, in einem kleinen Dorf in den Alpen, antwortet Caesar auf die spöttische Bemerkung eines Freundes, selbst in diesem Dorf gebe es wohl Konkurrenz um Macht: „Ich würde lieber unter diesen der Erste als der Zweite unter den Römern sein" (*Caes.* 11.4). Und bei der Lektüre eines Buches über Alexander—bei Cassius Dio (37.52.2) war es vor einer Statue Alexanders—vergiesst Caesar Tränen, und antwortet auf die Frage nach deren Grund: „Im Alter, in dem Alexander schon zahlreiche Völker beherrschte, habe ich noch nichts Glänzendes vollbracht!" (*Caes.* 11.5–6).

Die beiden Anekdoten machen deutlich, dass Machtstreben das zentrale Moment der Figur Caesars ist. Das bestätigt sich in den sechs *Bioi* und wird zugleich differenziert: ein Aspekt dieses Machtstrebens ist die Verschlagenheit und Hinterlist: Im *Caesar* täuscht er alle ausser Cato mit dem πολίτευμα der Versöhnung von Crassus und Pompeius (*Caes.* 13.3), und er gibt seinem politischen Spiel den *Anschein* eines ἔργον φιλάνθρωπον, hinter dem sich jedoch eine Umgestaltung der politischen Ordnung verberge (*Caes.* 13.4). Ähnlich argumentiert auch *Pompeius*, wo dem πρᾶγμα καλὸν καὶ πολιτικόν die böse Absicht, αἰτία φαύλη, und die perfide List entgegengesetzt wird.[32] Allerdings klingt in

30.3: Pompeius habe sich zugleich von Crassus und Caesar umwerben lassen.

[29] Zu antiken und spezifisch römischen Männlichkeitsdefinitionen vgl. etwa Foxhall/Salmon (1998); Parker (1997); Späth (1998a); Späth (2000a); Walters (1997); Williams (1999).

[30] *Pomp.* 48.8: Pompeius wird „weich gemacht" (ἐμαλάσσετο), die Bemerkung folgt unmittelbar einer Apostrophierung des Luxus des Lucullus durch Pompeius (*Pomp.* 47.7).

[31] In keiner Biographie von John F. Kennedy fehlt der Hinweis auf „Come in first! Second place is failure", angeblicher Wahlspruch des Grossvaters Patrick J. Kennedy.

[32] Dass eine solche Bemerkung sich im *Pomp.* findet, nicht aber im *Caes.*, könnte *mutatis mutandis* das Argument von Stadter (1965) 136 unterstützen, der als Hauptkritik Plutarchs an Herodot in der Schrift *De Herodoti malignitate* den Vorwurf der Darstellung

der Erwähnung von List und Verschlagenheit zugleich auch die Anerkennung geschickten politischen Handelns an, deutlich wird das etwa in den Überlegungen zur Notwendigkeit der Versöhnung der beiden mächtigsten Männer, die sich sowohl im *Pompeius* (47.2) wie im *Crassus* (14.1) findet, wie auch in den Hinweisen auf Caesars Fähigkeit, die Unterstützung des Volkes zu gewinnen.[33]

Zentrales Merkmal der Charakterisierung der hier kurz analysierten drei Protagonisten ist politische Macht—für die Cato-Figur ein Objekt des Widerstandes, für jene des Pompeius Objekt der Begierde, das ihm jedoch nach seiner ἀκμή abhanden kommt, für die Figur Caesars ebenso gleichsam ein magisches Objekt, dem er in der hier analysierten Episode entscheidend näher kommt. Die weiteren Aspekte der Figurenkonstruktion sind letztlich Verdeutlichungen dieses zentralen Merkmals: althergebrachte, unzeitgemässe und strikte Prinzipien für Cato, ein Versagen des Pompeius, seine Macht aktiv zu behalten, und hinterlistige Klugheit eines Caesar.

Einzelpersonen in Biographie und Geschichtsschreibung

Erinnern wir uns an Darstellung des „ersten Triumvirats" bei Cassius Dio und Appian, so lassen sich in ihrer Charakterisierung keine wesentlichen Unterschiede feststellen: das Streben nach politischer Macht respektive der Neid auf grosse Taten geben die wichtigsten Handlungsmotive der erzählten Figuren ab. Fassen wir die Ergebnisse der Untersuchungen biographischer und historiographischer Texte zusammen, führen sie zu drei Folgerungen:

1. Die vermeintliche Evidenz der Unterscheidung von Historiographie und Biographie, die im allgemeinen in der biographischen Ausgestaltung der Figuren-Charaktere und dem entsprechenden Desinteresse der Geschichtsschreibung für die ἤθη gesehen wird, ist—wie in meiner ersten These einleitend postuliert—in Frage zu stellen.[34]

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des Schlechten herausarbeitet („critizises Herodotus for belittling the Greeks"): Wo immer möglich scheint Plutarch es zu vermeiden, die Hauptperson einer Biographie in schlechtem Licht darzustellen.

[33] Negativ konnotiert als „Schmeichelei gegenüber dem Volk" in *Cat.Mi.* 32.2; positiv jedoch in der ebenso geschickten Regelung der Friedensangelegenheiten wie der Kriegsführung in Spanien (*Caes.* 12.2).

[34] Vgl. jetzt Kuhn-Chen (2002), die in ihrer Dissertation über die *Antriebskräfte mensch-*

Die entscheidende Differenz scheint mir vielmehr in der Erzählfunktion der Einzelfiguren zu liegen: Die Geschichtserzählung behandelt die Figuren *metonymisch*, indem sie sehr wohl deren Charakter narrativ ausgestaltet, aber damit eine Situierung der Figuren im Figurengeflecht der Akteure und in deren Handlungszusammenhang anstrebt, das ihr eigentliches Erzählthema ist. Die Biographie abstrahiert keineswegs von diesem Figuren- und Handlungsgeflecht, aber sie fokalisiert die Einzelfigur innerhalb des Geflechts und macht deren Charakter zu ihrem Thema und schreibt damit den Figuren der biographischen Erzählung eine *metaphorische* Bedeutung zu;[35] sie schafft sich damit Raum, um auf allgemein-philosophische Überlegungen—wie *politische Macht*—einzugehen, die in und mit der Hauptperson illustriert werden.

2. Dem Geschichtsschreiber und dem Biographen steht offenbar ein begrenztes, für beide gleiches Repertoire von Charakteristika zur Verfügung, um politisch tätige Aristokraten und Feldherren literarisch darzustellen. Diese Auswahl von Bewertungskriterien und Attributen ist bestimmt durch die politisch-militärischen Normen und Werte dieser Aristokratie. Daraus schöpfte der Schreibende, um mit einer bestimmten Kombination von Werten seine Figuren zu konstruieren.

3. Die Behauptung der eingangs vorgelegte zweite These, antike Autoren interessierten sich nicht für Individualität, muss modifiziert werden: Geschichtsschreibung und Biographie konstruieren sehr wohl individuelle Figuren im Sinne einer „Unverwechselbarkeit" der dargestellten Personen. Dieser Individualitätsbegriff ist aber ein ganz anderer als das Konzept des Individuums, das unser Denken prägt: In die aktuellen Vorstellungen fliessen einerseits die psychologisierenden Ansätze des 20. Jahrhunderts ein, andererseits die Begriffe des Subjekts, das—seit der Aufklärung—seine Identität mittels Selbstreflexion und Selbstbewusstsein konstituiert. Im Unterschied dazu legen die antiken Texte Figuren vor, die ihre Unverwechselbarkeit aus dem gesellschaftlichen Ort gewinnen, in den sie situiert sind: Ihre Darstellung lässt sie in

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lichen Handelns bei Cassius Dio und Appian (und Herodian) eine detaillierte Zusammenstellung von „Tugenden" und „Lastern" vorlegt, die in diesen historiographischen Werken als Handlungsmotive angeführt werden

[35] Hier muss auf eine vertieftere Erörterung dieser Untersuchungsansätze verzichtet werden—ich habe mich andernorts schon dazu geäussert: vgl. Späth (2000b) und ausführlicher Späth (2001), wo ich am Beispiel der Figur des Camillus die These historiographischer Metonymie und biographischer Metapher der Figuren entwickelte.

bestimmter Weise die dieser gesellschaftlichen Position entsprechenden politisch-moralischen Werte verkörpern und zeigt, wie sie sich mehr oder weniger erfolgreich in das Figuren- und Handlungsgeflecht, das Biographie und Geschichtsschreibung zeichnen, integrieren. Wenn die Untersuchung der Frage nach „Individualität" in der Antike in diese Richtung weitergeführt wird, kann sie nicht nur feststellen, dass es eine moderne Individualität in der griechisch-römischen Kultur nicht gibt, sondern die spezifischen Differenzen eines antiken Konzepts der Einzelperson erarbeiten.

STATESMAN AND SELF IN THE *PARALLEL LIVES*

David H.J. Larmour

There has been considerable interest lately in how subjectivity is constructed in the first two centuries of the Roman imperial era, with particular emphasis on the ways that the subject, inherently "split" in and by language, attempts to reconstitute its already always lost "wholeness" by reference to the master signifiers within its cultural matrix.[1] This paper offers some suggestions as to how we can relate these issues to the encounter between the Statesman and the Self in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*, by studying these narratives as an instance of the performance of the exercise known as the "technology of the self". The increasing concern with technologies of the self during the era in which Plutarch writes has been delineated by Michel Foucault, most notably in the third volume of *The History of Sexuality*, entitled *The Care of the Self*, and in a number of articles and interviews dating from the final years of his life.[2] The *Parallel Lives*, I shall argue, speak especially to the dialectic between the self and the other, or, to put it another way, to the tension between the individual's *techne* of self-fashioning and his ties to the wider community.

The technology of the self is a complex phenomenon, but one of Foucault's more succinct definitions of it runs as follows:

> Technologies of the self permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.[3]

It is perhaps somewhat surprising that although the *Parallel Lives* date from the period which Foucault designates as the heyday of the culture of the self, namely the first two centuries of the imperial era, they are barely mentioned in *The Care of the Self*;[4] material from several other works by Plutarch does, however, figure prominently in part 3 of that

[1] See, for instance, Janan (2001); Goldhill (2001).
[2] See Martin et al. (1988); Bernauer (1991).
[3] Bernauer (1991) 44.
[4] Only the *Life of Solon* is mentioned (207–208).

volume, entitled "Self and Others". Many of Plutarch's treatises in the *Moralia* have their origins in the *hypomnêmata*, or notebooks, in which Foucault became greatly interested as he was working on the care of the self:

> Into them one entered quotations, fragments of works, examples, and actions to which one had been witness or of which one had heard the account, reflections or reasonings which one had heard or which had come to mind … they also formed a raw material for the writing of more systematic treatises in which were given arguments and means by which to struggle against some defect (such as anger, envy, gossip, flattery) or to overcome some difficult circumstance (a mourning, an exile, downfall, disgrace).[5]

The *Lives* exhibit a similar provenance and should be seen as part of the same project of self-cultivation "through reading, through the precepts and examples that will provide inspiration" and "by contemplating a life reduced to its essentials".[6] Although frequently mined for historical and biographical material, it is important to recognize that these *bioi* are primarily "books of life" and may be regarded as much as a collection of *hypomnêmata* for moral edification as history or biography in anything like the modern sense. Indeed, Foucault's ethical projects and Plutarch's avowedly ethopoietic *Lives* exhibit many intriguing moments of correspondence: in their under-emphasis on specificities of sources and chronology, and their focus on provision of a basic structure for practices of self-constitution, for example, the *Lives* are themselves rather reminiscent of the broader Foucauldian project of the ethical life, especially as it took shape in his later writings and interviews. The *Lives* can be viewed as a series of fragments which can only be experienced as a narrative by labour—primarily philosophical and ethical—on the part of the reader. For Plutarch, the individual *bios*—like the traditional historical narrative—is a work of art, only recognizable once it has been brought into being in the space between the authorial self and that of the reader.[7] Yet, it is important to remember that this technology of the self was far from a retreat into the self or isolation: it constituted a broader social practice, and actually involved, as Foucault puts it, "an intensification of social relations".[8]

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[5] Foucault (1984) 364.

[6] Foucault (1988) 50–51.

[7] In *Alexander* 1.2, Plutarch speaks of writing lives in terms of painting a portrait, cf. *Cato* 24.1.

[8] Foucault (1988) 53.

We may begin with some comments Plutarch makes in the opening of his pairing of the orator-politicians Demosthenes and Cicero on the art (*techne*) of virtue, in connection with the size of the polis in which an individual participates: some say, he says,

> that the first requisite for a man's happiness is birth in a famous city, but, in my opinion, for a man who would enjoy true happiness—which depends for the most part on character and disposition—it is no disadvantage to belong to an obscure and mean city ... for, while the other arts—since their object is to bring business or fame—naturally pine away in small cities, virtue, like a strong and hardy plant, takes root in any place if it finds there a generous nature and a spirit that does not shun hard work. Thus, if we fail to live and think as we ought, we will justly attribute this, not to the smallness of our native city, but to ourselves (*Demosthenes* 1).[9]

Plutarch follows this with the statement that he is a Greek who lives in a small city and actually prefers to live there "so that it doesn't become smaller still" and he later concludes, "but really it is possible that, if *Know Yourself* were an easy thing for every man, it would not be considered a divine injunction" (3.2). This passage is suggestive in a number of ways with regard to the construction of subjectivity in the Roman empire, and, in particular, educated Greeks living in its eastern regions. The remarks about dwelling in the small city, by preference, gesture to, among other things, a problematic relationship between the self and one's surroundings and more broadly the gap and the tension between the self and the other, whether that other is constituted by one's fellow-citizens in the polis or by the centre of actual political power, Rome. The narratives of the *Parallel Lives* enact a complex negotiation between the Greek and the Roman—between Greek and Roman narratives of history, cultural formations, and structures of identity—to construct a subject-position; in this negotiation, the reality of lived experience under Roman rule is assimilated to the remembered Greek past, through the re-constructed figure of the Statesman. If, as some have argued, focus on outstanding individuals represents the importation of a defining feature of Roman historiography into the Greek tradition, then there is also a parallel negotiation between two genres of history.[10]

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[9] Translations are generally from the Loeb edition.

[10] See Fornara (1983) 114, speaking of Polybius, who is Plutarch's predecessor in this regard: "Polybius' inspiration must be sought in Rome ...the Romans fully recognized, indeed, instinctively felt, the interconnection of present and past; not only the deeds

Another issue this passage raises is the relationship between the life of the particular statesman under discussion and the life of the individual Plutarchan reader, and, beyond that, the life of Plutarch himself. Here we may consider another passage, this time from the beginning of the *Lives of Aemilius Paulus and Timoleon*, where Plutarch notes that the relevance of the composition of the *Lives* to his own self-formation has turned out to be an additional benefit, a supplement to the ethical inspiration they provide to others:

> I began writing my *Lives* for the sake of others, but I find that I am continuing the work and enjoying my stay now for my own sake also, using history as a mirror and trying in some way to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues of those men. For the result is like nothing else than spending time and associating together, whenever I receive each of these men in turn as a guest, so to speak … and select from his deeds the things that are most important and most beautiful to know (1.1–2).

He likens these visiting figures to phantoms (*eidola*) (1.4), citing a theory of Democritus that men are visited by both good and bad spirits, and goes on to comment as follows:

> in my case, the study of history and the familiarity with it that writing produces enables me, since I always cherish in my soul the records of the noblest and most estimable characters, to put aside whatever base, malicious or ignoble impulses my enforced associations may intrude upon me, calmly and dispassionately turning my thoughts away from them to the fairest of my examples (*paradeigmata*) (1.5).

In the first part of this passage, we encounter the all-important slippage between the two meanings of *bios*, upon which so much of the impact of the *Parallel Lives* rests: everyday life and the life as material for a work of art.[11] The mirror and the phantom both point to the presence that is at the same time absence. Plutarch, who here stands as a representative instance of the construction of the imperial subject, tries to fashion his own *bios*, and his self, "in the mirror of history"; in the mirror, in other words, he sees not his own self, but an other, the *bios* of a self long since vanished. The concept of the self as autonomous and whole is thus split between a site of perception and a site of reflection, as, in

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but especially the lives of exemplary men … continued immanent through constant recollection."

[11] See Duff (1999) 17, 33–34; on "writing the self", see Foucault (1997).

Lacanian terminology, the subject is precipitated into desire, rivalry, and (mis)recognition.[12]

In this regard, it is worth remembering that the *Lives* Plutarch writes are chronotopically displaced: it is notable that nearly all of the statesmen reconstructed in these *bioi* are figures from the distant past, many from Classical Athens or the Roman Republic where, it could be argued, individual political action was less constrained in the absence of the hegemonic authority of the imperial state. Yet these *Lives* are offered to their readers as a guide to self-formation in the present. The manner in which Plutarch traces the link between the past and the present draws attention to the gap that separates them, while simultaneously attempting to close it. This disjunction is both indicative of, and a response to, the disintegration of an ideologically secure sense of self which was an inevitable result of the rise of the imperial Roman state. Along with the political upheaval that went along with its creation came the dissolution of an apparently stable sense of selfhood, not only for Romans, but also for those educated Greeks who found themselves quilted into the signifying chain of imperial ideology. This dissolution is reflected in the fracturing of historiographical narrative which the *Parallel Lives* display: they present us with two "lives", two "selves" which we are encouraged to read on both the metonymic and the metaphorical planes.[13] The *synkrisis* attempts to bring them together through making explicit the comparative tendencies that remain largely implicit within the two narratives themselves, but does so by focussing more on the differences between the two statesmen in question. Narrative always repeats or re-enacts the splitting of the subject and here the split in identity between Greek and Roman is given special prominence. The two *Lives* mirror each other and the reader and the author are each mirrored in turn in them. The same relationship, which anticipates the Hegelian master/slave dialectic, characterizes the author and the reader and the statesman and the self. The fragmentation of subjectivity is captured in a new fragmented, tripartite narrative, which Plutarch develops in his *Parallel Lives*, making them a remarkable attempt to place the imperial subject in a new relationship with history. Indeed, we can say that Plutarch develops a new sub-genre of historiography in his *Parallel Lives*, one which calls attention to its deviation

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[12] See Lacan (1977); Janan (1994) 16–21; on the mirror, see Duff (1999) 32–34 and, more generally, McCarty (1989).

[13] On reading the *Lives* metonymically and metaphorically, see Larmour (2000).

from the chronologically- or geographically-focussed grand narrative through its most idiosyncratic features: the elaboration of an individual *bios* through anecdote, the pairing of a Greek *bios* with a Roman, and the concluding *synkrisis* which begins the process of comparison between the two. It is, above all, notable for the fragmentation of the traditional narrative form.

Plutarch's *Lives* may be said to dramatize the intersection of a famous Statesman and his environment, in a chronotopical space far removed from that of both author and reader. This dramatization is, in many ways, analogous to the account of a hero's deeds in a myth cycle or to the unfolding of action in a tragedy, with the reader occupying the position of spectator, or, to pick up on Plutarch's own image, gazer into the mirror. The appropriation of mythical patterns and the theatrical elements of this dramatization are not as of much interest to us here as the way it foregrounds the encounter between the Self and the Other. The *Lives* resemble *hypomnêmata* and function in the same way—they are not narratives of the self, but collections of the "already said" to be used for constituting the self. As Foucault puts it in a late interview:

> The point is not to pursue the indescribable, not to reveal the hidden, not to say the non-said, but, on the contrary, to collect the already-said, to reassemble that which one could hear or read, and this to an end which is nothing less than the constitution of the self.[14]

Each *Life* is a collection of material from diverse sources, brought together to make a *bios*, which can then be examined, or re-read, in Plutarch's own words in the *Cimon-Lucullus* synkrisis, like a poem (*epos*) or a painting (*graphê*). In other words, for Plutarch the *bios* is recognizable only after it has been brought into being, and the *Lives* lead the reader from the *bios* of the Statesman as art to the fashioning of one's own *bios* as an art. The writer—and in a different way—the reader work to construct an identity through the recollection of things that have been said: unity develops in each case as a result of the assemblage of items in the *Life*, similar to the way it develops in the *hypomnêmata*. Foucault elaborates on the significance of the latter as follows:

> The *hypomnêmata* are to be resituated in the context of a very sensitive tension of that period. Within a culture very affected by traditionality, by the recognized value of the already-said, by the recurrence of discourse,

[14] Foucault (1984) 365

> by the "citational" practice under the seal of age and authority, an ethic was developing which was very explicitly oriented to the care of oneself, toward definite objectives such as retiring into oneself, reaching oneself, living with oneself, being sufficient to oneself, profiting by and enjoying oneself. Such is the object of the *hypomnêmata*: to make of the recollection of the fragmentary *logos* transmitted by teaching, listening, or reading, a means to establish as adequate and as perfect a relationship of oneself to oneself as possible.[15]

In the *Parallel Lives*, the culturally-loaded signifiers of statesman and virtue (*aretê*) function as *points de capiton*, quilting-points, which promise to locate the subject and make him whole.[16] The desired union is, of course, impossible: virtue cannot be coherent and the statesman can never be the perfect subject. The desire remains unfulfilled: hence the "open-ended" nature of the *synkrisis*, the accumulation of moral *exempla*, and the repetition of the parallel form in numerous pairs of *Lives*. Moreover, if we look closely at each *Life*, we see that the statesman and the self exist only as fragile unities, as "phantoms". In all of the *Lives*, the narrative pays more attention to the *tactics* of the interaction between Self, Other, and Situation, than it does to the complex depths of the particular statesman involved. This focus on the *process* of interaction threatens to reveal that there is no solid core underneath the roles, masks, and characters presented on the social stage. A new mask or role is donned as the interaction shifts from one scene or situation to the next. Thus the self proves elusive; it is little more than the *persona* portrayed in the moment's performance. This elusiveness is particularly apparent in, for example, the *Life of Alcibiades*, where we hear more about his interactions with others and the opinions they held regarding him,[17] than a systematic delineation of the "inconsistencies" in his personality. The same tendency is apparent in the *Life of Themistocles*, of which Philip Stadter says in his *Oxford World Classics* Introduction: "In the *Life*, despite the major events which Themistocles helped determine, much of the portrait is conveyed by the anecdotes which he reports in clusters at the turning points of his

[15] Foucault (1984) 365.

[16] Janan (2001) 12: "The subject dissimulates this division by identifying with some master signifier that guarantees his place in the interconnected symbols and meanings generated by his culture's institutions. He reconciles or opposes himself to what constitutes, e.g., a 'good man,' 'good lover,' 'model citizen,' and the like. The divided psychoanalytic subject can thus function as a coherent whole (as 'I')."

[17] Duff (1999) 235: "In many ways, then, this Life is not about Alkibiades himself, but about his *doxa*—that is, his reputation and other people's opinion about him."

life".[18] In such cases, we can see just how much the *bios* owes to the *hypomnêmata* out of which it has been constructed.

It is this deficiency in authenticity, the absence of a core, which the *synkrisis* attempts to correct. Although it is often dismissed by modern interpreters as *pro forma* rhetoric, or as a vaguely annoying excrescence on what should be "pure" history or biography, many recent contributions have demonstrated the importance of the *synkrisis* for understanding the *Lives*, especially in literary and ethical terms.[19] The act of comparison strives to bring the two *Lives*—and hence also the *bios* of the reader—into a closer connection with the master signifier Virtue (*aretê*) by presenting each as a unified whole in which the various parts of the Statesman's being are brought together in what appears to be a natural fashion. It is in the *synkrisis* above all that the *bios* is treated as an aesthetic object. In one of his treatises, Plutarch explicitly connects lives (*bioi*) and actions (*praxeis*) with works of great art (*erga megalês technês*): "the similarities and differences of virtue are best learned by putting lives beside lives, and actions beside actions, like great works of art, and looking at them side by side" (*Mul. Virt.* 243C). The synkrisis is the key to understanding how history is reformulated in the *Lives*. From the perspective of expectations generated by traditional narrative structures, the comparison appears to be tacked on at the end, the last item on the metonymic plane, offering an unsatisfying closure, and frequently at odds with the complexities of the preceding narrative. But it carries immense significance on the metaphoric level: it should not be seen as an exhaustive evaluation; it functions rather as a starting-point or incentive for the reader interested in the *technê* of his own *bios*. Comparison by its very nature implies wholeness, tries to put a halt to disintegration. In the *Cimon-Lucullus synkrisis*, we have a manifestation of the lure of the narrative of the lost whole, pointing to a happiness of which the fissured subject has always been already robbed, yet to which it longs to return, when Plutarch concludes as follows:

> Therefore, one who takes everything into consideration finds it hard to make a decision, since the divinity seems to have been kindly disposed to both, directing the one as to what he should do, the other as to what he should avoid. Both, therefore, may be said to have received the vote of the gods as having good and god-like natures (3.6).

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[18] Stadter (1998) 79.

[19] Summarized in Duff (1999) 243–286, with bibliography.

None of the other *synkriseis*, of course, are so "successful" in this sense; the exercise is repeated, again and again, at the end of most pairs, with various results. The attempt at correction by the *synkrisis* of the deficiency of the narrative—or, perhaps we should say, the filling of the lack—does not then take the form of supplying that which cannot be recovered (a fully defined self); rather, it takes the form of an attempt to begin the construction of an ethical core within the reader. The *synkrisis* invites performance, and this performativity functions as a disciplinary apparatus through repetition: the process is repeated, with all sorts of variations, in each set of *Parallel Lives*.

In this form of "Statesman Biography", then, as we move from narrative to *synkrisis*, we move from the *bios* of the Statesman to the *bios* of the reader. The focus shifts from the *bioi* of the two Statesmen as aesthetic objects to the *bios* of the individual Self, to the *technê tou biou* as described by Foucault. Plutarch's *Lives* are *ethopoietic* in the broad sense: they show that there is no single *technê tou biou*, only *bioi* themselves; they enable individuals to question their own conduct in order to build their own selves. The *Lives* emphasize that the technology of the self is predicated on the act of comparison. Comparing one's *bios* with others'—which means interaction and exchange on various levels—is a necessary element in the process of self-formation. The self, in other words, exists only in a web of relations and citations, not in some essential form. With their complex mirroring effects—of self and other, individual and polis, Greek and Roman, even history and biography—, their oscillation between past and present, between fort und da, and their innovative "split" narrative form, the *Parallel Lives* have much to tell about the fragmentation of the imperial subject in general and technologies of self-constitution in particular. Plutarch thus establishes his sub-genre of history on the shifting sands of the encounter between the self and the other and of imperial subjectivity. It is this which enables the creation of mini- or meta-narratives within the "grand narratives" of history which are, at the same time, outside them.

PLUTARCH THE DRAMATURG: STATECRAFT AS STAGECRAFT IN THE *LIVES*

George W.M. Harrison

> Whoever loved, that lov'd not at first sight?
>
> —Shakespeare, *As You Like It III.v.85*

Thomas Jefferson always brings Plutarch to mind. Third President of the United States, Jefferson arguably may have been its best, and yet his gravestone[1] does not record his Presidency. By his specific direction it recalls him as "Author of the Declaration of Independence, Founder of the University of Virginia, and Architect of Monticello". The office that defines him most for us and which in a real sense enfolds, envelops, and intertwines all of his achievements is not mentioned at all.

The connection with Plutarch is not hard to find. What is now read and appreciated most from Plutarch and the part of his work on which his reputation rests are his *Lives*. Yet it would seem clear that the *Parallêloi Bioi* were not the most important part of his professional career to him, or even the writings of his he considered the most important. Thus the preface to his *Life of Aemilius Paullus* begins:[2]

> ἐμοὶ [μὲν] τῆς τῶν βίων ἅψασθαι μὲν γραφῆς συνέβη, δι' ἑτέρους ἐπιμένειν δὲ καὶ φιλοχωρεῖν ἤδη καὶ δι' ἐμαύτον, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἁμῶς γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον.
>
> Although I originally took up the writing of Lives for others, I find that the task has grown on me and I continue with it for my own sake, too, in the sense that I treat the narrative as a kind of mirror and try to find a way to arrange my life and assimilate it to the virtues of my subjects.

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[1] His tombstone is now on the campus of the University of Missouri near the entrance to the art museum. I should wish to acknowledge my two student assistants, Rebecca Muich and Emily Pierce, as well as my colleague, José Maria Mantero, and as always Jane Francis. This paper forms part of the research of a chapter on Plutarch for a book on epitheatre. The title comes from a book on American politics by Schmuhl (1992).

[2] Translation by Waterfield (1999); for an exegesis of this passage in Plutarch, see Stadter (2000). All other translations are those of the author; Greek text cited from the Teubner.

The opening sections of the *Life of Demetrios Poliorctetes* contain Plutarch's disclaimer that

> … οὐ χεῖρων ἴσως ἐστὶ συζυγίαν μίαν ἢ δύο παρεμβαλεῖν εἰς τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν βίων, οὐκ ἐφ' ἡδονῆ, μὰ Δία, καὶ διαγωγῆ τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ποικίλλοντας τὴν γράφην.
>
> it is perhaps not unsuitable to toss in (*parembalein*) one or two pairs [of bad ones] among the exemplary (*paradeigmata*) lives, [but] not so that there may be some real (*ma Dia*) pleasure and diversion varying the design of my writing.

Plutarch was very chary in his use of emphatic expressions and so the μὰ Δία actually emphasises the writing and reading of his *Lives* as pleasant diversion, not serious endeavour even as he denies it to be its purpose.[3] This begs the question of what Plutarch loved foremost from first sight, to paraphrase Shakespeare,[4] and what, like Jefferson, stitched together each and every segment of his thought and writing. I am prepared to assert that it was the theatre, even more than *sophrosynê* or his stewardship of the Delphic sanctuary to Apollo.

Plutarch's use of mirror imagery in the Aemilius Paullus preface is more complex than just a reference to the soul. When applied to literature, as here, it invites his reader to group the several divisions of literature together as all working, each in its own way, toward the realisation of virtue.[5] Drama and biography, philosophy and epic, thus, are reflected, cross-images of one another, no one of which on its own is sufficient or suitable to instruct the *polis*.[6] The ancient tradition of historical drama and *fabula praetexta* is now one largely lost of which Aeschylus' *Persae* and the anonymous *Octavia* are two reminders of a sub-genre of drama which drew its plots from the recent past. One should, therefore, collapse the distance between the various genres of literature since each have produced works of a length and performability which made them staples for declamation at *symposia*.[7] Plutarch

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[3] In regard to not writing for ἥδονη ἀκουῆς Plutarch protested far too much; cp. Van der Stockt (1996) 265–272, where he adds his views to those he summarises of Ziegler and Stadter on Plutarch's self awareness of the *suavitas* of his exposition.

[4] Among other indications that *Lives* were not viewed by Plutarch himself as his primary work is the statement at the beginning of the *Aratus* that the life was written for instruction of descendants of Aratus.

[5] The mirror also occurs in numerous poems of Cavafy, one of Plutarch's most intuitive and intelligent readers.

[6] Mossman (1995) 214, for example, cites passages in Aristotle's *Poetics*, which recognize the intimate connection between epic and tragedy.

[7] One could also cite the number of *Lives*, which have been turned into plays such

himself described historians as "actors of the achievements of others" (345E) and noted that people listened to philosophers in the way one listened to tragedians (*De Aud.* 43F).[8]

This inter-relationship of oral, gestured dissemination, pedagogical goal, *amoenitas*,[9] and often even mythological material, sheds considerable light on Plutarch's method of composition and perhaps helps explain why quotations from the theatre are so ubiquitous,[10] and lends insight into the mutually inclusive multiple layers of Plutarch's compositional methodology.[11] Stadter, for example, has found patterns of interconnected nodes of *Lives* that evince an overarching organisation.[12] Titchener has identified a theory of composition by which some lives are negative and others positive, each one illustrating a different virtue or vice. One might add that these are not ones of abstract philosophical *êthos* but of pragmatic political morality, or what might be called "statesmanship", a subject recently explored in detail by Duff (1999). Similarly, time as an organisational device has been detected by Brenk (1996) in the *Daimonion of Sokrates*, and probably can be demonstrated elsewhere.

It would, however, seem possible to peel open yet another layer of richness which builds most directly upon principally the work of Mossman.[13] In a series of contributions to collections of essays on Plutarch, she has perceived that Plutarch's use of theatrical imagery is more pervasive and more profound than the presence of *tragikos*, *theatrikos*, and other similar terms in his text, and she has discussed individual episodes

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as Addison's Cato.

[8] Van der Stockt (1992) 146 notes Plutarch's great sense of freedom in considering genres. Samuel Johnson himself wrote an essay on the distinctions among tragedy, history, and biography, which recognizes the points of contact among the genres.

[9] Plutarch at several points accepts Aristotle's view of both *mimêsis* and *hêdonê*; cp. Van der Stockt (1992) 48–56.

[10] It is, I think, significant that he has fewer lapses in memory when citing drama than philosophy and history.

[11] How Plutarch wrote is perhaps the most compelling question in Plutarch and the one which I has drawn me back most repeatedly to his work; cp. Harrison (1987), (1995), (1996), and (2000).

[12] Stadter (1996) examined a group of Lives which orbit around Pericles. Harrison (1995) proposes a second "galaxy" of Hellenistic lives; cp. Pelling (1979) whose seminal work greatly informed Stadter's thought.

[13] *Inter alia*, see J.M. Mossman (1995) 209–228. One might also note that many of the papers of this congress devoted to the statesman have dealt with poetry, of which tragedy is a sub-species.

in some of the *Lives*, which she sees as inherently dramatic.[14] Clustering, and placement in general, is important: Beck[15] and Stadter[16] have noticed that anecdotes in Plutarch tend to be more frequent at critical junctures within a life, and the same can be said of dialogue as well as fictive speeches.[17] That theatrical imagery similarly occurs more frequently at climactic moments in the life or at places which Plutarch thought revealed character has not received the attention it deserves,[18] yet it is a characteristic Plutarch shares with several prose authors, both Latin and Greek.

It has been possible, for example, to demonstrate that Philo's two political essays, the *In Flaccum* and *Ad Gaium*, are heavily "scripted" revenge dramas of a type prevalent throughout the Near East. Termed "epitheatre", this phenomenon is a habit of mind by which prose writers reflexively organised their works according to the canons of the stage. It presumes that writers steeped in classic Attic and contemporary drama intuitively and inescapably "orchestrated" their works into prologue, acts, and epilogue, sometimes with sections which parallel the function of a chorus,[19] even if not its form, as well as asides.

The discovery of this principle of composition in Plutarch was the by product of research aimed at refuting statements routinely repeated in hand books that drama declined during the Roman Empire.[20] If that statement applied solely to the commissioning of new works which still survive it might possibly be comparatively accurate, if meaningless. The physical evidence for new theatre construction, repair, and remodeling in the first centuries AD is overwhelming. Mosaics and frescoes with content from the theatre are extremely popular, and burials, especially those of children, often include terracotta masks. The only surviving work on masks, that of Pollux, belongs to the second century AD,

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[14] Brenk (1996).

[15] Beck (2000) 15–32.

[16] In his introduction (xxi and xxii with note 21) to Waterfield (1999) and in more detail in 1996.

[17] Brenk (1996) 40.

[18] Mossman (1995) 217 does note that Plutarch used tragic imagery to describe Alexander's best qualities (*Life of Alexander* 19): trust in friends, fondness for the grand gesture, and physical courage.

[19] The *exodos* of the Dionysiac *thiasos* in the *Life of Antony*, for example, indicates that his life was about to close.

[20] Plutarch was keenly aware of the decline of the Delphic oracle (*De defectu oraculorum*) and may well have noted a similar decline in drama had such occurred. For recent scholarship on drama during Plutarch's lifetime, see Harrison (2001).

and even Ammianus Marcellinus (XIV.vi.18) at the end of the fourth century AD excoriates the substitution of singing for philosophy, the replacement of a professor in oratory by a professor of stagecraft, among other egregious dilutions of the school curriculum.[21] Perhaps the most disarming anecdote about the young Marcus Aurelius was that he found plays so boring that he often brought homework assignments to the theatre. Even if it does not put contemporary drama in its best light, it does prove it was there and enough of a social force that members of the imperial family felt the need to make appearances. In regard to Plutarch, while his essays on poetry tend to be read now for how close they adhere to Plato's views, Plutarch himself had his contemporary audience in mind, not his precursors: his *de Republicae gerendae* similarly advises local dignitaries to be like actors.[22]

Far from being irrelevant, theatre was such a prevalent and pervasive force during the first centuries AD that orators and historians[23] unconsciously but illuctably turned their works into little dramas. As a result, for example, it would be very easy to see Stadter's nodes as tragic cycles, with clusters of lives very much imitating groups of plays on a single topic, such as the Trojan War or Theban cycle. In such a scheme, Titchner's discovery of one moral quality which dominates and motivates an entire life easily translates itself into a "tragic flaw". Alcibiades, for example, is described at the beginning of the life devoted to him as *philonikon* and *philoproton*, which Russell considers key to understanding him.[24] Stadter[25] writes that "Marius' ambition and passion demanded that he succeed constantly." One can add, among many others, that Antony and Demetrios are derided as bibulous and willful.

In this light it might be possible to see Plutarch's prefaces as a kind of prologue in which the situation of the biographical drama is established which ultimately plays itself out. Thus, as Mossman has noted,[26] *Alexander* 4.5–8, an important passage early in the life, notes the tension between *sophrosynê* and *thumos* which is the great source

[21] For Ammianus Marcellinus on education, see Hooper (1979), 513.

[22] In this regard, Plutarch's observation (10.1) that Themistocles behaved like a tragic poet becomes more interesting.

[23] This is significant since it may be presumed that orators and historians reached a wide public audience and not just a literate one. References to the theatre thus presume that drama continued to enjoy a mass appeal.

[24] D.A. Russell (1995) 193.

[25] Stadter (2000) 119.

[26] Mossman (1995) 213.

of achievement and disaster in his life. Similarly, Sulla's embarrassed rage over his impoverished upbringing (2) and vanity (4) indicate the inevitability of all that followed. The prologue to the *Gracchi* is especially instructive. Its opening sentence indicates to the reader that it is meant to be understood in the context of the opening section of the parallel life of Agis and Cleomenes:

> Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἱστορίαν ἀποδεδωκότες ἔχομεν οὐκ ἐλάττονα πάθη τούτων ἐν τῇ Ῥωμαϊκῇ συζυγίᾳ θεωρῆσαι, τὸν Τιβερίου καὶ Γαΐου βίον ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες.
>
> Having published (*apodedokotes*) the first history (*historian*), we consider the suffering of those in the Roman companion to be no less.[27]

Such a statement is unusual in Plutarch, and after a long disquisition on *doxa*, he concludes (2. 4) his prologue to Agis and Cleomenes with another direct reference to the Gracchi:

> ταῦτα δὲ ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἐπῆλθεν εἰπεῖν ἐννοήσασιν ἡλίκην ἔχει δύναμιν ἐκ τῶν Τιβερίῳ καὶ Γαΐῳ τοῖς Γράκχοις συμπεσόντων.
>
> It dawned upon me to say these things about a reputation (*doxa*) tied to popularity because it played such a major role in the downfall of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus.

Both sets of lives also begin with metaphors drawn from mythology, again unusual: Agis and Cleomenes are compared to Ixion, whose embrace of a cloud instead of Hera is likened to those who seek to establish a reputation (*doxa*) which Plutarch dismissed as a poor facsimile (*eidolon*) of virtue incapable of yielding lasting results. The Gracchi were compared to the Dioscuri, whose statues and frescoes[28] always preserve a family resemblance yet equally strive to indicate their differences in demeanour. The choice of myths as metaphors indicate immediately the difference Plutarch saw between the two pairs, but also why the two within a pair failed similarly.[29]

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[27] One forebears to mention that once again Plutarch, as in the Lysander and elsewhere, used *historia* not *bios*, and that significantly he used the singular, not plural.

[28] The precise implications of Plutarch's word choices are not without problems: *plassomenon* is most often used of terracotta busts or plaques, but can be used of statuary, while *graphomenon* usually describes frescoes but can be used of inscribed *stêlai* with depictions (for which *anagraphê*) is better.

[29] References within a play to another is not unusual, although more often a feature of comedy than tragedy. When such does occur, as in Aristophanes, Plautus, and Terence, it is most often in the prologue.

Plutarch himself at several points acknowledges that he viewed a particular life as dramatic, or perhaps more properly melodramatic, such as the end to the *Crassus* while Pharsalus is viewed as the theatre of the defeat of Pompey. Perhaps the best known example is the *Life of Antony* which has a bi-cameral composition very much like Seneca's *Troas* or the anonymous *Octavia.* At the mid-point of the life Plutarch stated "here ends the comedy, now begins the tragedy". The similarity of the second half of the life of Antony with the *Ajax* is considerable, and images particularly at crucial junctures in the second half of the life, such as Antony being deserted by the god, the part of the life which most impressed Cavafy, are strongly visual.[30]

With the departure of Dionysus,[31] Antony lost his *fortuna.* Plutarch placed a great emphasis on *Tychê,* and he seems very aware of reversal of fortune and omens as theatrical devices. Aside from Antony, the decline of Marius (26) begins when fortune deserts him. Omens of death for the Gracchi, as well as for Caesar, and others, indicate that the final act is about to begin and soon the curtain is to fall. *Tychê* is the subject of several essays of Plutarch,[32] and the fall of those who thought to avoid Nemesis and the Furies is a standard of tragedy and the subject of *de Sera numinis vindicta.*

It should thus be obvious that to Plutarch statecraft was stagecraft. Played small it is the dramatic fluourishes of the orator or the choreagraphed vignettes orchestrated by an office seeker and his claque. Many are the politicians in Plutarch and emperors in Suetonius and the *Historia Augusta* who surrounded themselves with actors, surprisingly even Sulla among them. That their lives and acts should thus fit well within the strictures of the stage should not surprise. That Plutarch would recognize this and make it the embroidered frame of his layered fabric, or perhaps the chased edge of a seven layered shield whose pictured design looked to a future the hero could not know,[33] is something worth noting and appreciating.

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[30] Cp., Harrison (1992). Ghosts in Plutarch like ghosts in Seneca and the *Octavia* are also harbingers of death and disaster.

[31] The Lamprias catalogue preserves the title of an essay on Dionysos; Pelling has written several articles on Dionysos in Plutarch.

[32] See, especially, Cammarota (2000) 61–68 and Prandi, (2000) 375–386.

[33] These images are not accidental. Tableaux from plays and mythology would have occurred on a wide range of media which could include textile, decorative shields and armour, among others. The shields of Achilles and Aeneas can be taken as narratives closely similar to the action of plays.

O SWEET MYSTERY OF THE *LIVES!* THE ESCHATOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF PLUTARCH'S BIOGRAPHIES

Frederick E. Brenk

πάνθ' ὑπολανθάνετ⟨αι⟩ τὰ βίου μυστήρια σεμνά.

Well concealed from us, lie all life's solemn mysteries.

—(Epitaph for a boy priest at Rome)[1]

Why is Plutarch so oblivious to what might happen in the next life to his heroes?[2] That is, why does he leave out what some scholars today call "eschatological ethics"?[3] From the very beginning of Greek and Roman biography, in the loose sense, down to the end of the Roman Empire, a substantial number of authors kept one eye on this life and one eye on the next. For many readers perhaps Plutarch's eschatological (afterlife) scenes are the most memorable in the *Moralia*. So why this paradox?

Probably what happens *after* death should be nobody's business, much less the business of a scientific biographer writing in a sub-branch of history.[4] But Plutarch began as a philosopher, always considered himself a philosopher, and may well have entered the study of "lives" as a philosopher. Dihle has discussed the philosophical tradition, noting how the technique developed for philosophical lives was used for

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[1] See Moretti (1979) nr. 1169; Bousquet (1988) 305–306; Burkert (1987) 28–29, 89, 144, note 90; and Brenk (1989) 290.

[2] Many thanks are due to the generosity of Tim Duff for looking over the article and making a number of suggestions, to Donald Russell for his comments on the vision to Brutus, to Michael Roberts for his help on late antiquity, to Matthias Baltes for a note on Plato, to Federico Muccioli for one on *Themistokles*, and to an anonymous reader who noticed several mistakes and offered helpful suggestions. After a long and heroic battle against cancer, Matthias Baltes died on January 21st, 2003. His enormous scholarly production was matched by his unstinting generosity toward fellow scholars wishing to profit from his expertise.

[3] The original study was Merk (1968), esp. 231–248. See also Münchow (1981) esp. 176–177.

[4] For the primarily ethical direction of Plutarch's *Lives*, see, e.g., Russell (1973) 103, Pelling (1995/2002) esp. 206; Frazier (1996) esp. 10–93; Swain (1997b) esp. 9–14; Stadter (1999) esp. 666–670; and Duff (1999b) esp. 52–71. Stadter alludes to the influence of Roman ethical-political writing such as Cicero, *De officiis*, and Seneca, *Epistle* 94.

other types, and observing Plutarch's own role in this development. He also pointed, however, to an ethical interest in the non-philosophical hero, beginning in the late phase of archaic epic, in Xenophon, and in *enkomion* literature.[5] Stadter, in fact, finds Plutarch working at cross purposes. He has chosen his heroes because of their stature in history, but then, using a model devised for philosophical biography, he proceeds to make moral evaluations on the basis of their character and actions.[6] Biography certainly belonged to the philosophical tradition, at least in the concept of typical or preferable lives.[7] Plutarch professed to writing biography as a study of ethics in action. The first philosophical autobiography in a sense, that of Empedokles, is a model demonstration of the importance of eschatological ethics.[8] His various transformations from boy to girl to bush to bird to travelling-fish (if that is what the text really had)—including his intermittent life as a *daimon*, were the direct result of his actions both here and above. Only by keeping an eye on the future ramifications of his terrestrial deeds did he succeed in becoming a god walking on earth.[9]

In the dialogues of Plato's middle period, we find that souls entering the world are faced with the difficult choice of the right kind of life (βίος), the same word used for a biography. In these Platonic dialogues, punishment or reward after death, as well as reincarnation, corresponds to the way life was lived previously on earth. In Book Ten of the *Politeia* (*Republic*) (618–619), Plato is not very specific about the best life. The criterion, however, is one which will make the soul "more just" (δικαιοτέρα) (618e). The soul must be careful not to be bedazzled by "wealth" (ἀνέκπληκτος ὑπὸ πλούτων), power ("falling into tyrannies" [μὴ ἐμπεσὼν εἰς τυραννίδας]), and in general must avoid "excess" (φεύγειν τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα) "in either direction" (619a). This pretty well excludes most of Plutarch's heroes. We also learn that through misfortunes in life, the soul of Odysseus has learned to renounce ambi-

[5] Dihle (1997) esp. 122–123, 130–136, 139–140.

[6] Stadter (1999) 66–67. For a similar discussion, especially regarding Seneca, see Ioppolo (2000) esp. 35–36.

[7] E.g., Chrysippos in Diogenes Laertios 7.130.

[8] In response to Edwards (1999), I have penitently reinstated Empedokles' *daimones* here.

[9] … ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός (Inwood 1/112 [= DK 31 B 112] line 4) (I am in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal.); ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε\θάμνος τ'οἰωνός τε καὶ †ἐξ ἁλὸς ἔμπορος† ἰχθύς (Inwood 111/117 [=DK 31 B 117]) (For I have already become a boy and a girl/ and a bush and a bird and a fish [corrupt text] from the sea.) Inwood (1992) 202, 255.

tion (*philotimia*) (620c), another famous trait of Plutarch's heroes. After Plato, the Stoic Chrysippos and undoubtedly many others wrote tractates called *On Lives*. Apparently they discussed the possibilities and relative merits of various lifestyles. Chrysippos' *On Lives* settled for three kinds of preferred lives, only the last having much appeal for Plato. These were kingship—or being a member of the court—the political life, and the scholarly or philosophical life. Schofield speculates that though Chrysippos disparaged the life of leisure, he was reluctant to create a dichotomy between the active and philosophical life.[10]

The most successful book in Plutarch's lifetime, judging by all-time readers, was the *New Testament*. About eschatological ethics there can be no doubt.[11] Whether it is biography is another matter. In particular, the final parts of the *Gospels* have been compared to the philosophical and "noble death" endings of Graeco-Roman literature.[12] In the Third Century B.C., for example, the Aristotelian philosopher Hermippos of Smyrna compiled a collection of these called Τελευταί, literally "ends," but what we probably would call "exemplary deaths of famous persons".[13] Evidently these *Teleutai* were not eschatological in the Platonic sense but mainly concerned with recreating the scene in which the hero faces an unjust death calmly and with tranquillity.[14]

By the Christian period, as can be seen from Eusebios' *Life of Constantine* 4.48, ancient authors have no scruples about protracting their biography into the next life.[15] It has been claimed that with Christian-

[10] Diogenes Laertios, 7.130. See Schofield (1999) 761–763. Dihle (1991) 370, like others, notes the prominence of "Lives" (βίος, βίοι, or περὶ βίων) in the Peripatetic tradition. Oddly, he does not note the eschatological element in the Gospels as distinguishing them from Greek biography. See also Burridge (1992), with Brenk (1994), and Swain (1997) 27–28.

[11] See Hägg (2001) in particular, "Gospel and Biography", 197–198, and "Three Philosophical Lives: Plotinus, Proclus, Isidore", 198–200. Frickenschmidt (1997), cited by Hägg, finds relatively few cases of ascension or divinization at the end of a biography. Exceptions appear in Philo's *Life of Moses* II.291; Suetonius, *Caesar* 88, *Augustus* 100, *Claudius* 45 (probably ironic); Plutarch, *Romulus* 27, *Theseus* 35, and *Kimon* 19. For encounters with the living after death, Frickenschmidt cites, besides *Romulus*, only *Theseus* 35 (which is, however, only a reported vision of the hero fighting at Marathon).

[12] For bibliography, see Sterling (2001) with reference, e.g., to *Acts of the Apostles*, Plutarch, and Tacitus.

[13] Sterling (2001) 385.

[14] Sterling (2001) 400–401. For non-philosophers representing themselves as such, see Zanker (1995) "The Cult of Learning Transfigured", 267–331, esp., 268–284; and Ewald (1999) esp. pl. 8, 25 1–3 (c. 8, c. 13, c. 32), and pl. 27 1–3 (c 9, c 14, c 33).

[15] Dihle (1987) 77 ignores the eschatological dimension of Eusebios' *Life*; but see Cameron & Hall (1999) 172, 348 to #71, and especially fig. 11; Davies (2000) esp. 78,

ity, a sea change occurred in the concept of biography.[16] Persons having safely weathered the transition from life to death can reach out from the hereafter to aid those yet confronting this dread passage.[17] But Plutarch in *The* Daimonion *of Sokrates* already had professed a similar doctrine. *Daimones* (that is, disincarnate souls) assist the living, like swimmers who having reached the shore, stretch out a hand to those still struggling in the surf. Or like former athletes, they run along the track cheering on those competing in the race (593D–F). Oddly enough, Late Antiquity seems to return to one of the origins and main sources of biography, the lives of philosophers and "holy men".[18]

I. *Plutarch's Mythical and Semi-Mythical* Lives

The plan here is to begin with the least problematic *Lives* from an eschatological standpoint and work toward the most problematic, the *Dion—Brutus*.[19] In the first two *Lives* of the traditional arrangement, *Theseus–Romulus*, one of the heroes ascends to heaven (at least in one account). Amazingly, this type of ending is unique in the *Parallel Lives*. In *Theseus* 6, the hero passes sleepless nights, thinking about his inferiority to Herakles. But Theseus is only considering terrestrial deeds, without any apparent thought of a celestial reward (36). We then learn of a hero cult for Theseus at Athens. Still, Plutarch attributes this to Theseus' divine parentage not to virtue demonstrated while on earth. The eschatology of the *Romulus* is more forceful. In the major version related, the hero ascends to heaven without dying. He then returns to earth to communicate how the Romans can conquer the world (through "self-restraint combined with valor") (*Romulus* 28).[20] The scene would resemble the *New Testament* description of Christ on the road to Emmaus, were it not for Romulus' suit of shining armor. The scepti-

106, 148–156; and MacCormack (1990) 93–144. Cameron (1997) omits this element. For Domitian, see Muscettola (2000) 79–108.

[16] See for example Hägg, Rousseau, and Høgel (2000), esp. Hägg, "Introduction", 1–28; and in the same volume, Clark (2000); Edwards (2000); and Cox Miller (2000).

[17] Hägg (2001) notes a scarcity of work on the subject but refers to articles by H. Lavagne, M. Ducot, and C. Moreschini (24, note 41).

[18] See Edwards (1997) esp. 230.

[19] For the *Dion-Brutus* as an innovation, introducing eschatological biography, see Brenk (1987) 314.

[20] On Plutarch's *Romulus*, see Preston (2001) 102–103.

cal, scientific side of Plutarch, however, rejects this account as contrary to nature. He does concede, though, the possibility of divinization in the next life as a reward for exercising virtue in this. He goes on to describe the various stages—hero, then *daimon*, and finally, after "purification and sanctification as in a religious rite (τελετή)", divinization. The scheme appears elsewhere in the *Moralia*.[21] The *Romulus* passage, nonetheless, is exceptional in linking the *Lives* with an eschatological theory. Plutarch's declaration in the *Romulus* possibly serves as a programmatic hint to the reader that eschatology is important in reading the *Lives*.

No one knows for sure the sequence in which Plutarch expected his *Lives* to be read. Chronological studies omit *Theseus—Romulus* from the first group of *Parallel Lives*. As analyzed by C.P. Jones, Plutarch would actually have begun the corpus of *Parallel Lives* with the couple *Epameinondas—Scipio*. *Demosthenes—Cicero* was in fifth place. *Lykourgos—Numa* would be sixth. This leaves three pairs of *Lives* in positions seven to nine, among which are *Theseus—Romulus*. The indications are that *Themistokles* immediately followed *Romulus*.[22] In the opening paragraph to *Theseus*, Plutarch leaves the impression of finding it a bit illogical to treat heroes first from well-documented historical periods, to jump back to the rather mythical *Numa*, and then leapfrog even farther back into the *Lives* of Theseus and Romulus. In any case, the prologue implies something of a new beginning. Pelling notes that *Lykourgos—Numa*, *Themistokles—Camillus*, and *Theseus—Romulus* must have been written in close proximity and have occupied a relatively early position in the chronology. *Romulus* seems to have been written shortly after the *Numa*.[23] Plutarch, however, considers Themistokles and Camillus to be historical figures, unlike Romulus, Numa, and Theseus who belong at least in part—in the prologue to *Theseus—Romulus*—to "the outer edges of the maps" described by cartographers as desert, marsh, ice, or freezing seas—the unexplored regions of the earth. In Jones' scheme, though, *Theseus—Romulus* was followed *by Themistokles—Camillus*. There are no more mythical *Lives*.

[21] E.g., *On the Obsolescence of the Oracles* 415B, where Kleombrotos after mentioning foreign beliefs about *daimones*, then Homer and Hesiod, claims this is the theory of "others" (Plutarch himself?). It is the basis of the myths in *The Daimonion of Socrates* (590A–592E, esp., 591E–591F) and *The Face on the Moon* (942D–945D, esp., 944E–F). See, Brenk (1977) 93, 99; (1986) 1226–1227; (1987) 279, 282–283, 286.

[22] Jones (1966) 66–68.

[23] Pelling (1979; rpt. Pelling 2002) 8, note 50 (2002).

The *Lives Lykourgos—Numa* in this respect are close to *Theseus—Romulus*. At the end of *Lykourgos* (31), we learn of the erection of a hero or divine cult to Lykourgos at Sparta, including a temple, where "sacrifices were offered to him each year, as to a god". But Plutarch makes no explicit connection between this cult, or divine honors, and Lykourgos' conduct or motivation in life.[24] Nothing similar appears in the *Life of Numa*. The heroes of these first *Lives* are treated with respect and presumably would in Plutarch's mind have merited a blessed afterlife, if not divinization. But he does not explicitly make the connection. At Kition in Cyprus, the Athenian general Kimon is also honored after his death with a cult (*Kimon* 19). The cult supposedly originated in an oracle which identified Lykourgos as a "greater being" (κρείττων), a term elsewhere identifiable in Plutarch with a *daimon* (e.g. *The Obsolescence of the Oracles* 419F).[25] Not only these protagonists but also Kleomenes of Sparta is honored with a hero cult. After his death at Alexandria, the local population saw a huge serpent coiling round his head and warding off carnivorous birds. They believed he was of divine parentage, "beloved of the gods" and, again, a "greater being" (θεοφιλὴς καὶ κρείττων). But any possible enthusiasm for a cult of Kleomenes seems dampened again by Plutarch's reference to a "scientific" explanation. The "wiser ones" among them cooled their fervor by explaining that serpents come forward from human corpses just as bees come from the rotten remains of oxen, wasps from horses, and beetles from asses (*Kleomenes* 39).

II. *The Problematic Historical Lives*

Cato Minor, the life of a person minor in the historical and biographical sense, astoundingly receives an exceptionally major biographical treatment. Cato was hardly a Julius Caesar or Alexander the Great, not

[24] Cf. Herodotos, 1.65–66. Aristotle (fr. 534 Rose) in *Lykourgos* 31, claims the hero deserved more than worship as a god. See Parker (2002) 161, note 1.

[25] For κρείττων see Rescigno (1995) 156–157, 332–333; and on possible Xenokratic influence, Dillon (1999) 310–311. Plutarch (*Lysandros* 18) and *Demetrios* (23–24) mentions divine honors but only to ridicule them. He does note the tomb (τάφος) of Themistokles at Magnesia *Themistokles* (32), recorded by Thucydides (using μνημεῖον), 1.138.5. If Plutarch were aware of a *cult* for Themistokles there (see Malkin [1987] 223–228, esp. 226–228), he evidently ignored it.

even a Marcus Antonius, the other subjects of exceptionally long *Lives*.[26] Probably the reason for such length was not internal but external. One of Plutarch's principal sources was a laudatory biography of Cato by Clodius Thrasea Paetus, suffect consul in A.D. 56, a Stoic renowned for his belief in senatorial freedom. Thrasea's *Life* of Cato Minor was based on that of Minutius Rufus (First Century B.C.), a source possibly used by Plutarch as well (*Cato Minor* 25, 37). This Roman senator of Stoic leanings was forced to commit suicide under Nero. His memory was cherished by a group Plutarch was close to and who eventually would pay for their hostility to Domitian.[27] In the closing chapters of the *Life* (67–70), Cato decides to commit suicide after almost pathologically defending the Stoic proposition that "only the good man is free" and after reading Plato's *Phaidon*.[28]

Even though Plutarch had connections with the pro-Thrasea Paetus, pro-Cato circle, his own Cato has touches of Sokrates gone mad.[29] If one searches through the *Life*, one cannot find a hint of approval for the suicide, though presumably some of his sources glorified or excused the suicide.[30] Plutarch is usually quite effusive and moving when describing his hero's burials, as though to compensate with a glorious funeral for a miserable or degrading end, or for his own critical words previously. But in chapter 71 of the *Cato*, he only very briefly mentions Cato's funeral and the statue erected for him at Utica. That Cato was misguided in taking his life is suggested by Plutarch's opinion that Caesar

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[26] On Antony, see Brenk (1992b) esp. 165–173, and (1992a) esp. 4413–4426, and Duff (1999a) 326–327.

[27] See, e.g., Jones (1971) 24, 51–53, Griffin (1984) 171–176, and Geiger (1979) esp. 49.

[28] For a brief overview of Roman suicide, see Griffin (1996) 1453; and of Stoic suicide, Donini (1999) 735–736, who argues that the glorification of suicide begins with Seneca. See also Grisé (1982) (on Cato, 201–205, on Seneca, 206–217); Van Hooff (1990) 130–131; and Griffin (1986) esp. 194–199. Geiger (1979) 49, sees Cato's death as a very detailed *Teleute*. For contemporaries of Plutarch who wrote *Teleutai*, see Geiger 61–65. Griffin (1976), "*Mors diu meditata*", 367–388, citing Seneca, *Letter* 58.34, notes that old age might justify suicide, but Cato, who appeals for respect for his old age, was all of 48 (Griffin, 373)! On Plutarch's misrepresentation of Cato's motives, see Griffin, 380–381: more than escape, Seneca extolled contempt for death and exalted martyrdom (384–387). See also Duff (1999b) 142–143. On the parallelism with the death of Phokion, see Duff, 142–145, who finds an apparent criticism of Stoicism in Plutarch's portrayal of Cato's rigidity. See also his excellent comments in "Cato and Stoicism", 155–158.

[29] Trapp (1999) sees Plutarch's Cato, though treated nobly, as a kind of Sophoclean Ajax (498). See also Swain (1990) esp. 200–201. He remarks that after Cato Maior, Cato of Utica is the most cited Roman in the *Moralia* (201).

[30] For an inscription, apparently on the shaft of a double herm with busts of Socrates and Cato, see Geiger (1999) 358–364.

would have forgiven him. He cites Caesar's words to this effect and notes that later on Cato's son remained unharmed.[31] How different Plutarch from Seneca! Isnardi Parente, though noting the importance of *libertas* in Seneca's treatment of Cato, underscores his break with the Older Stoics on suicide. In his 71st *Letter*, according to Isnardi Parente, Seneca attempts to give profound significance to suicide and the suicide of Cato, considering the act in itself and stressing its internal coherence.[32] Supreme wisdom is achieved at death. By choosing death, the politician becomes a philosopher.[33]

Ironically, Cato uses Plato's *Phaidon* to justify his suicide, but he was not alone. After reading Plato, possibly the *Phaidon*, Kleombrotos of Ambrakia committed suicide for no apparent reason.[34] In a recent article, Warren expresses his belief that while the Stoics used the *Phaidon* to justify suicide, in reality for Plato it is neither lawful (θεμιτόν) nor holy (ὅσιον) (61C–D, 62A). He thinks, however, that a perfect philosopher following a divine command might be justified in taking his life. Stoic reasons for committing suicide (country, friends, intolerable pain, and the like) can be found in Diogenes Laertios, 7.130, but as stated by Diogenes they do not apply to Cato. Warren, who has recently analyzed Plato's dialogue precisely on this point, firmly believes that not only is a justification for suicide lacking but in fact we find a strong condemnation of almost all suicide. Suicide would prevent all but the perfect philosopher from achieving his destiny. For others, taking one's life would probably lead to reincarnation.[35] Thus, if Cato's suicide were motivated by eschatological ethics, he has strayed far from Plato. Plutarch, as an acknowledged interpreter of Plato, had good reason to render Cato's death very problematic. The physical uncertainty of the act intimates a lack of intellectual clarity. Importantly, though, the introduction of the *Phaidon* into the *Life* at just this moment suggests an eschatological dimension going far beyond the immediate politics and history of the

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[31] Sosius Senecio, to whom Plutarch addressed his *Lives* is explicitly marked as his intended reader in *Theseus* 1, *Demosthenes* 1, and *Dion* 1. The last case may be significant because Plato's Academy had its effect on both Dion and Brutus, and Plutarch advised Sosius to pass from Stoicism to Platonism. In Swain's view, (1997a) 187, the *Cato Minor* is a cautionary tale pointing to the dangers of Stoic inflexibility.

[32] Isnardi Parente (2000) 219–220.

[33] Isnardi Parente (2000) 223.

[34] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.84, citing an epigram of Kallimachos; told also by Augustine, *City of God* 1.22, who specifies that the book was the *Phaidon*. See Warren (2001) 93–94, citing Williams (1995).

[35] Warren (2001) 94. See also Long and Sedley (1987) 428–429.

Late Republic to include the survival of the soul and its destiny in the next life.

Finally, there is *Dion-Brutus*. At first sight it does evidently say something about eschatological ethics. A circumstantial connection between *Dion-Brutus* and *Cato Minor* is that Brutus by marrying Cato's daughter Porcia entered into the ideological group Cato belonged to. According to the opening comparison in the first *Life (Dion* 2), the apparitions to Dion and Brutus were proof that the belief in evil demons (or spirits [*daimonia*]) is not just superstition (*deisidaimonia*).[36] Rather it is based on a very strange, very ancient belief (τῶν πάνυ παλαιῶν τὸν ἀτοπώτατον … λόγον) that the *daimonia* try to keep persons from the path of virtue so they do not get a "better portion" (or "destiny", "lot" [βελτίων μοῖρα]) in the next life, than the *daimonia* themselves.[37]

But the passage is filled with anomalies. The description of a precise common event in the two *Lives* in a kind of mini-*synkrisis* seems to be unique in the *Lives*.[38] Elsewhere, the rare, opening comparison is along more general lines.[39] Moreover, the term used for the spirits (*daimonia*) appears elsewhere by Plutarch only when citing Chrysippos.[40] Then, according to what we learn from Plutarch's *Moralia*, the *daimones* (rather than *daimonia*) would not really accomplish much with their terror tactics. Rather, they would themselves be punished further for their misdeeds, getting an even worse portion, not a better one than the victim, in the next life. Besides, later on in the *Brutus* (48), Plutarch suggests that the vision never happened at all.[41]

One possibility is Christian interference with the text, something that seems to have occurred elsewhere where "daimonology" is concerned, in *The Obsolescence of the Oracles*.[42] The passage would, then, sup-

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[36] The *Brutus* seems more problematic than Swain (1990) represents it (201–203).

[37] *Moira* suggests the similar but more archaic term αἶσα, "destiny", "lot", "portion", such as in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 481–482, to describe the rewards of the Eleusinian mysteries (… οὔ ποθ' ὁμοίων / αἶσαν …). See also Duff (1999) 138.

[38] In the openings of *Demosthenes—Cicero* (3) and *Demetrios—Antonius* (1), the comparisons are based on generalities about their characters and careers.

[39] See Stadter (1988); and Swain (1992). Both, discussing the introduction to *Dion-Brutus* and the *synkrisis*, express surprise at the circumstantial aspects of the introduction (107–108).

[40] On the sources for the *Brutus*, one of whom was the Stoic philosopher, Poseidonios, see Flacelière and Chambry (1978) 84–88.

[41] On this, see Brenk (1977) 108–112, (1986) 2128–2129, (1987) 314.

[42] In a corrupt text, 438A–C, "a dumb spirit" (ἄλαλον πνεῦμα) probably was taken over from *Mark* 9.17 and 25. See Rescigno (1995) 289–291; and Brenk (2000) 14, who argues for the older ms. reading σάλου.

port a belief, consistent with Christian doctrine, about the motives of evil demons. But the style of the passage and the concepts used seem thoroughly Plutarchan. Perhaps, then, only the Christian term *daimonia* has been substituted in *Dion—Brutus* for Plutarch's own term, *daimones*. But even such a conjecture is not necessary. Elsewhere, when citing Chrysippos, he employs the term *daimonia*. In *Brutus*, the belief in daimonic or demonic interference is described as "a very strange theory", which if the vision is true we might be forced to accept.[43] What does he mean?

The opinion expressed here possibly belongs to Chrysippos' theory designed to cover apparent lapses in divine providence, as cited in Plutarch's *On Common Conceptions* 1051C.[44] It is a bit strange, however, to call a theory of Chrysippos "extremely ancient" (τῶν πάνυ παλαιῶν, *Dion-Brutus* 2). Moreover, it would be surprising for a Stoic to speak about rewards and punishments in the next life. Generally Plutarch is not too warm about Stoic philosophy, and in fact in the *Common Conceptions* he immediately sets out to attack Chrysippos' theory of evil *daimonia* or *daimones* attacking virtuous men. Is this not making a farce of divine providence? How can we talk about providence when virtuous men are neglected and abused so outrageously (1051D)? Incidentally, Plutarch changes the Chrysippean term *daimonia* to his own term, *daimones*, immediately after the citation. A biographer favorable to Brutus and out of the Stoic circle of Thrasea Paetus might have found Chrysippos' theory very much to his liking. He, too, might have used the Stoic term *daimonia* rather than the Platonic term *daimones*.[45] The theory would explain the threats faced by the noble Brutus, putting him in the same class as Socrates, Pythagoras, Zeno, and Antiphon unjustly afflicted by evil *daimonia* in Chrysippos' theory. It would also have underscored Brutus' virtue (*arete*) and calm in the face of death.[46] Probably if the theory had appeared in a Stoic influenced biographical source, it would have omitted the remarks about the next life, leaving it up to Plutarch to make a typical expanded editorial comment.

At the end of the *Caesar*, the same story is used as proof that Brutus' murder of Caesar was not pleasing to the divine (*to daimonion*). The term

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43 See Babut (1969) 393–397 for the Stoic background. Since Plutarch calls the theory "extremely strange" (ἀτοπώτατος), he leaves it to the reader to accept it.

44 See Cherniss (1976) 556–561.

45 At the end of *Caesar*, the vision of the *daimon* (τὸ δαιμόνιον), appeared again. The term here, however, probably means "the supernatural phenomenon" not "the *daimon*".

46 On the Stoic attitude toward Brutus and Cassius, see Griffin (1984) 173–174.

ta daimonia is absent but this is not surprising, since Plutarch's account here is brief and he is interested in divine retribution.[47] One suspects, then, that the apparition and the words of the *daimon* originally were applied negatively to Brutus by a pro-Caesarean source as a sign of divine punishment, and later turned positively to Brutus' advantage, possibly a source using Stoic theory and terminology. If the apparition of the *daimon* appeared originally in a pro-Caesarean source, it would not be surprising to find the *daimon* appearing elsewhere in a pro-Caesarean source. The vision, again in a retribution context, is related by one of Plutarch's sources for the Roman *Lives*, Valerius Maximus (1.7.7). This time it concerns Cassius of Parma, an enemy of Octavius, the future Augustus, after the Battle of Actium, while Cassius is at Athens. In the account (put under the rubric "dreams") the words "evil *daimon*" (κακὸν δαίμονα) are left in Greek.[48] In the *daimon's* first sentence, the words directed to Brutus are identical to those in *Caesar* 59, while the second sentence varies a bit in its choice of prepositions and verb forms. One gets the impression that in Brutus Plutarch is "spinning things out".

The vision to Brutus, of course, could be historical. But if it actually did happen, we may be forced to concede that the *daimon* or *daimonion* won. A circumstantial link with the *Cato Minor* is that Brutus, though his own words are rather ambiguous, used the suicide of Cato to justify, by anticipation, his own suicide. As a "young man", he relates, he had condemned Cato's action.[49] He had considered it neither holy (ὅσιον) nor manly to surrender to the *daimon* (here probably meaning fortune [*tychê*]). But now, if God decides the matter against them, he will not make trial "of other hopes and preparations", but rather will take his leave, praising fortune for what he has already accomplished in life. Cassius seems rightly to understand Brutus' enigmatic words as suicide. Under such circumstances, he says, they need not fear the victors (40).

In fact, after Brutus takes his life, Plutarch has little praise for him in death. He ends the *Life*, moreover, with the suicide of Porcia (53). In both versions of her death her suicide is pitiable, lamented by Brutus himself. In the first version moreover it is not only clumsy like her

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[47] Pelling (1997/2002) sees the *synkriseis* tending to open up moral issues seemingly terminated at the end of the *Life*, (2002) 376–377. Here, the moral issue is opened again without the *synkrisis*.

[48] See Briscoe (1998) I, 58, with reference to Appian, *Civil Wars* 4.134.

[49] Plutarch seems to be exaggerating for effect, since at the time of Cato's death, Brutus was already around forty years old.

father's, but is also bizarre.[50] In the *Caesar*, as we have seen, the vision of the *daimon* apparently is part of divine retribution, a proof that the tyrannicide was not sanctioned by the divine. Brutus did not always fare well, either, in his *Nachleben*. In Dante's *Inferno*, he hangs miserably from a mouth of Lucifer (34.65). But even granting that the text of *Dion and Brutus* is sound, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that in Plutarch's *Lives* the only ones who really seem to care about eschatological ethics are the *daimones* or *daimonia*.

III. *Conclusion*

Plutarch seems to have shaped his *Lives* so that they respond to historical, biographical, and ethical considerations. He virtually never draws back a curtain beyond terrestrial events, to reveal the consequences of his hero's actions in another more grandiose, spectacular, and luminous universe. Paradoxically, the author who in his *Ethika* (*Moralia*) delighted in splendid descriptions of the horrendous tortures in the next life, had little taste for "eschatological ethics" in his *Lives*. He, and particularly his characters, concentrate, usually with ferocious abandon, on the present life. Even when they read Plato before dying, it is to gain courage in committing suicide, while seemingly oblivious to the more important considerations of future rewards or punishments, of escaping the dismal cycle of reincarnation, or of reaching out toward the dazzling vision of the Good. Where eschatological ethics are involved, it is by indirection. Plutarch is magnificent in death, often dignifying the passing of questionable performers with splendidly poignant funerals and teary recollections of the honors paid to their memory. He minimizes, however, hero or divine cult, not even bothering to mention those of Caesar and Alexander. Not only do none of Plutarch's heroes receive unconditional praise. Most deteriorate mentally and morally at the end of their lives and *Lives*. There is a long and dismal string of degeneration and miserable deaths.[51] Were his readers to conclude—like those of Plato and of his own *Moralia*, who were explicitly informed

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[50] She stuffed coals into her mouth. Frazier (1996) 167–168, presumes that Plutarch would have approved of the suicide of Brutus, but this does not seem warranted.

[51] E.g., clearly Alkibiades, Lysandros, Demetrios, Marius, Flamininus, Sulla, Antonius, and Galba, to name a few. Plutarch mentions a version of alcoholism for Alexander's death, but prefers sickness. See, e.g. Whitmarsh (2002) 189–190.

by visionaries—that his heroes chose wrong? Are we to believe that these magnificent personages represent more the worst than the best, that in spite of flashes of virtue, they are failures and their *Lives* cautionary tales? Or, in the words of the problematizing Duff, does Plutarch leave us hanging between positive and negative answers to such important questions?[52] Only once, in the introduction to *Dion-Brutus*, did Plutarch really tell us what his *Lives* were all about. But then the voice of the biographer, like that of Achilleus' horse, Xanthos, who also comprehended the future and the supernatural—fell silent forever after.

> Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσαντος Ἐρινύες ἔσχεθον αὐδήν.
>
> No sooner had he spoken than the Erinyes checked his voice.
>
> (*Iliad* 19.418)

[52] See Duff (1999) esp. 154–158 (Cato) and 308–309; and my review (2002). There are, naturally, numerous comments by Plutarch on the vanity of ambition, glory, riches, etc.

MORE PHILOSOPHICO: POLITICAL VIRTUE AND PHILOSOPHY IN PLUTARCH'S *LIVES*[1]

Marlein van Raalte

Introduction: φιλοσόφως and βασιλικῶς: Alexander's Case

In his speeches *On Alexander's Fortune or Virtue* Plutarch portrays Alexander as virtue incorporated. Challenging Fortune's claims to Alexander's supremacy, the author pleads the case of Alexander, who owes his success to his own personal merits,[2] *i.e.*, to his εὐβουλία (soundness of counsel), ἀνδρεία (manly virtue), καρτερία (perseverance) and σωφροσύνη (self-control). Notably, the author is speaking on behalf of philosophy—or rather, on behalf of Alexander.[3] If Fortune *did* play a role, it was merely to be defeated by Alexander in her efforts to obstruct him. Whereas other kings, like Darius, were εὐτυχεῖς (had good fortune), Alexander's body actually bears the scars of Fortune's opposition.[4] In fact, the struggle between Greeks and Barbarians may be described

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[1] I want to express my gratitude for various kinds of help to Gabi Heukemes, Casper de Jonge, Jan van Ophuijsen, Adriaan Rademaker, and Carla Risseeuw. Unless indicated otherwise, translations of Plutarch's writings are from the Loeb-edition (more or less modified). In the case of the *Lives*, see Bibliography *sub* Perrin; for the *Moralia*, *ibid.*, *sub* Babbit, Clement, Fowler and Hembold.

[2] *De Alexandri (Magni) fortuna aut virtute* (henceforth: *AF*) 1.1, 326D–E. For the question whether this is actually the second of a pair of speeches, see e.g. Hamilton (1969) xxx, Schröder (1991) 151–152, *contra* Wardman (1955) 99–100, who argues that in *AF*, "the over-emphasis on Alexander's bad fortune was introduced to contrast with the Romans" (sc. as in *De fortuna Romanorum* 316B ff.). Frazier & Froidefond (1990) seem to regard the reference to an earlier speech as an "*artifice permettant de donner un semblant de vie à l'ἀγών qui s'annonce*" (114 n.2). Compare Cammarota (2000) 76. The question is not really relevant for the present purpose, which is to view in how far, and in what way, Plutarch is stretching the notion of φιλοσοφία in the process of his obviously rhetorical purpose to present Alexander as the product of ἀρετή alone. See also n. 11 below.

[3] *AF* 1.1, 326D: δεῖ δ' ἀντειπεῖν ὑπὲρ φιλοσοφίας, μᾶλλον δ' ὑπὲρ Ἀλεξάνδρου (….). Schröder (1991) 151 (cf. 153 n. 11) rightly rejects the (in this context) significant suggestion that the title of the first speech would be correctly "*De Alexandro magno philosopho*", apparently *contra* Hoffmann (1907) 93 n. 2—a view recently supported by Prandi (2000) 379 n. 12. Alexander's replacing philosophy highlights the special quality of his virtues.

[4] *AF* 1.2, 326E–327A; cf. 2.10, 341 D–E. On the other hand, Fortune is actually magnified by Alexander's reign (2.4, 336E).

as the contest between Virtue and Fortune, Fortune being on the side of the Barbarians, opposing Alexander (φιλοβάρβαρος καὶ μισαλέξανδρος).[5]

The author argues with much rhetorical force that it was philosophy that provided Alexander with the "equipment with which he carried out his campaign".[6] The selection of comparatively non-martial virtues[7] adds to the paradox: Alexander is going to battle armed (not only with ἀνδραγαθία, manly virtue, but also) with μεγαλοψυχία (greatness of soul), σύνεσις (keen understanding), and σωφροσύνη. His words and his deeds, the way he educated and instructed different nations, and spread civilization throughout his vast empire, mark Alexander out as a true philosopher,[8] actually surpassing philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Zeno the Stoic by the scale of the community he brought together[9]—even if he did not live long enough to unite all human beings under one law, under the rule of justice.[10]

The characterization of Alexander's way of acting as "philosophical", which constitutes the main issue of the first speech, may be seen as a rhetorical *tour de force*.[11] It culminates in the famous anecdote of Alexander's legendary[12] encounter with Diogenes the Cynic, from which we learn that Alexander himself also considered himself a philosopher. Here Plutarch leaves out the story of the actual encounter which *is* told in Alexander's *Life*; in the speech it is stressed that Alexan-

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[5] *AF* 2.13, 344A–E; cf. 1.2, 327A. See also the opposition between τύχη and ἐπιστήμη (military skill based on experience) in *Comp. Philop. et Flam.* 2.1.

[6] οἷς αὐτὸν ἐφωδίαζε φιλοσοφία πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν, *AF* 1.4, 327E; cf. τὸν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας λόγον, 328A.

[7] Compare the series in 326D–E, above.

[8] ὀφθήσεται γὰρ οἷς εἶπεν οἷς ἔπραξεν οἷς ἐπαίδευσε φιλόσοφος, *AF* 1.4, 328B.

[9] *AF* 1.5–6, 328C–329D.

[10] *AF* 1.8, 330D. Contrast Livius' view, who judges that Alexander died in time to leave unimpaired his reputation (9.17).

[11] For a comparison of the two speeches see e.g. Frasier & Froidefond (1990) 71–82; for their epideictic character, see Hamilton (1969) xxix–xxxiii ("'epideictic display-pieces', devoid of any serious purpose", xxxi); Cammarota (1992) 109; 115–116. Hamilton (1969) xxx: "(The perfection of Alexander) is best explained not by the admiration of the youthful Plutarch but by the maxim of the rhetorical schools that one should not rest content with refuting one's opponents, but should seek to prove the exact opposite. So there is no hint of criticism: Alexander is the embodiment of all the virtues." Dio of Prusa reportedly wrote eight books *On the Virtues of Alexander*, now lost: Bowie (1974) 170. Prandi (2000) defends the view that the valuation of Alexander in the speeches does reflect different stages in Plutarch's intellectual development.

[12] According to Hammond (1993) 28 the meeting is historical. For other references to this legend and literature on the subject, see Hamilton (1969) 34.

der, at a later stage of his career, actually cherished the story of his confrontation with Diogenes, which gives the author the opportunity to elaborate on the interpretation of Alexander's words:[13]

> (…) when he came to talk with Diogenes himself in Corinth, he was so awed and astounded with the life and the worth of the man that often, when remembrance of the philosopher came to him, he would say, "If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes" (εἰ μὴ Ἀλέξανδρος ἤμην, Διογένης ἂν ἤμην), that is to say, "If I did not practise philosophy, I would apply myself to theoretical pursuits" (ἠσχολούμην ἂν περὶ λόγους, εἰ μὴ δι' ἔργων ἐφιλοσόφουν). He did not say, "If I were not a king, I would be Diogenes" (εἰ μὴ βασιλεὺς ἤμην, Διογένης ἂν ἤμην), nor "If I were not rich and an Argead"; for he did not rank Fortune above Wisdom (σοφία), nor a crown and royal purple above the philosopher's wallet and threadbare gown. But he said, "If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes"; that is to say: "If it were not my purpose to combine foreign things with things Greek (εἰ μὴ τὰ βαρβαρικὰ τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς κεράσαι διενοούμην), to traverse and civilize every continent, to search out the uttermost parts of lands and sea, to push the bounds of Macedonia to the farthest Ocean, and to disseminate the blessings of Greece and shower justice and peace over every nation (τὴν Ἑλλάδος σπεῖραι καὶ καταχέασθαι γένους παντὸς εὐδικίαν καὶ εἰρήνην) I would not be content to sit quietly in the luxury of idle power, but I would emulate the frugality of Diogenes (ἐζήλουν ἂν τὴν Διογένους εὐτέλειαν)."

At first sight, this eleborate interpretation of the drift of Alexander's words is not very clarifying. What Alexander wanted to say is that his life is presently focused on a different goal, but if he were not already philosophizing in deeds (ἔργα),[14] spreading Greek civilization all over the world—according to which criterion he would in fact be the greatest philosopher of all—,[15] he would do so in λόγοι and practice the simple life like Diogenes: power and luxury would be meaningless to him. The significance of this outcome may seem to be somewhat

[13] *AF* 1.10, 331E–332A. Hamilton (1969) xxxii: "(Alexander's remark) is developed in a quite ridiculous fashion into an expression of 'Alexander the civilizer'." For a discussion of the provenance and of the different versions of this popular anecdote see Buora (1973–1974); Niehues-Pröbsting (1979) 89–109. Plutarch's version of this story in the *Life of Alexander* is discussed below. For Plutarch's use of the story in *Ad princ. inerud.* 5, 782A–B (where, significantly, the suggestion seems to be that Alexander could "be Diogenes" while at the same time preserving the position—including the wealth?—of a king), see n. 72, p. 000 below.

[14] "Since Onesicritus (fr. 17) described Alexander as 'the philosopher in arms', the idea of him as 'the philosopher in action' may well be taken from him", Hamilton (1969) xxxi—an arbitrary supposition, according to Froidefond: see Frazier/Froidefond (1990) 105.

[15] *AF* 1.5, 329A.

disappointing, unless what Alexander recognizes in Diogenes is the ambition, the effort to reach a formidable goal. The *field* of ambition may be different, but with his orientation towards completion of a difficult task Alexander, like Diogenes, is a philosopher at heart.[16]

Plutarch opportunely remembers a story that may summarize the drift of the argument: having been captured after the battle at the river Hydaspes, Porus, an Indian prince, reportedly expressed the wish that Alexander should act "like a king" (βασιλικῶς) in his treatment of him.[17] On that occasion, Porus explains that "like a king" summarizes everything he could possibly wish for, and the author adds that *he also* is wont to qualify Alexander's actions by means of one single term: "like a philosopher" (φιλοσόφως)—thus substituting Porus' "βασιλικῶς"[18] by the adverb summarizing, with persuasive force, his own suggestive evaluation of Alexander's conduct.[19]

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[16] The traditional picture of Diogenes also seems to increase the rhetorical challenge: "Although Diogenes had regarded it as his task to educate men according to virtue and to show them the way to happiness, he did it in a manner which stamped him as a prototype of acerbity and made him among the vulgar Cynics the universal example for every kind of misanthropic behaviour", Billerbeck (1991) 164. For a characterization of the "*Diogenes-Typus*" see also Rudberg (1991).

[17] *AF* 1.11, 322E.

[18] "For Plutarch (…), as for Aristotle (*Pol.* 1288b1–2), 'kingliness' (τὸ βασιλικόν) can refer primarily to *character* without any reference to constitutional position", Duff (1999) 90 n. 72. See e.g. *Philop.* 1.2, γενναίαν τινὰ καὶ βασιλικὴν … πλάσιν καὶ αὔξησιν as a quality of the character of Philopoemen as a boy). Plutarch applies the qualifying term to Alexander in *Alex.* 59.7.3: he always waged war νομίμως (in accordance with the code) καὶ βασιλικῶς, but now he slaughters the Indians after he made a truce with them; of his graceful conduct as regards captured women (21.5–7): ἡ … καλλίστη καὶ βασιλικωτάτη χάρις, the finest and most kingly favour (he bestowed on these women): Plutarch adds as an evaluation that Alexander seemed to consider mastery of himself (with the Platonic phrase: τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτοῦ) more kingly (βασιλικώτερον) than the conquest of his enemies. See also 40.1–4, pp. 83–84 below. The term is used quite concretely of corpses laid out in a kingly state (κεκοσμημένον βασιλικῶς: of Darius 43.7.2; of Darius' wife *AF* 2.338E 3; of Archelaus' body *Ant.* 3.11.1, of Antony *ibidem* 82.2.4, of Cleopatra 85.7.1; cf. 86.7.4); the connotation of adornment is prominent also in the metaphorical use describing the good condition of the soul: see *Dio* 10.5.5, where Dion exhorts the young Dionysius that "the royal palace of his soul" (τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ βασίλειον) should be adorned in a kingly and appropriate fashion (κεκοσμημένον ἔχειν βασιλικῶς καὶ πρεπόντως): see also n. 86, p. 100 below. If in the *Lives* βασιλικός is a more unqualified positive term than φιλόσοφος—as I think it is—, this may be due not only to the absence of a straightforward connection between theoretical philosophy and political practice, but also to meaningful contrast of βασιλικός with δουλικός on the one hand, and τυραννικός on the other.

[19] *AF* 1.11, 332E; cf. the reference to Aristotle's advice, neglected by Alexander (*AF* 1.6, 329B, see Hamilton [1969] 18), to treat the Greeks ἡγεμονικῶς (like friends and relations), but Barbarians δεσποτικῶς (like animals or plants); for pragmatical purposes,

In the present paper Plutarch's exercise in encomiastic pleading serves as an introduction to a thought experiment: when we take into account the different genre of the *Lives*, in which Plutarch aims to offer his audience material for moral consideration,[20] is there any plausibility in the suppostition that the Alexander of our speech, endowed with the moral qualities ascribed to him, could just step into Diogenes' role—if he were not too busy following his ambition to build his empire? To put it differently: is there, in Plutarch's *Lives*, any straightforward relation between the qualities required for a king, a general, or any kind of political leader (where possible summarized in the generic designation of "politician", without any modern negative connotations), and those of a philosopher? Is it possible to distinguish a set of "philosophical" qualities by virtue of which a human being stands out among his fellows, whatever the field of his ambition? And are such qualities also sufficient to make an outstanding politician, or are other, non-philosophical qualities required in addition?

For this experiment I have studied the lexeme of φιλόσοφος, φιλοσόφως, φιλοσοφεῖν (&c.) in the *Lives*,[21] in order to find out what conduct or quality is referred to by Plutarch as "philosophical",[22] and how such

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Alexander prefers to use force only when persuasion fails. Compare also *AF* 2.3, 336B: it can be inferred from history that "it is mind which aids us and mind which emblazons our deeds, and it is mind that conquers and overpowers and plays the monarch" (ὅτι … νοῦς ὠφελεῖ καὶ νοῦς κοσμεῖ καὶ νοῦς τὸ νικῶν καὶ κρατοῦν καὶ βασιλεῦον, with reference to Epicharmus).—The story is told also in *Alex.* 60.14–15, where Alexander's treatment of Porus is specified (he is allowed to be "satrap" of his country, etc.), in *De cohibenda ira* 458B, and in [Pseudo-Plutarch?] *Regum et imperatorum apophtegmata* 31, 181E.

20 On the moral utility without moral imperatives aimed at in the *Lives*, see e.g. Pelling (1995); Duff (1999) 52–71; Stadter (2000), esp. 502–506. The audience or reader is expected to see (cf. e.g. *δήλωσις* ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, *Alex.* 1.2), rather than to be convinced and to believe. Plutarch's ambition is to portray (εἰδοποιεῖν) the life of men through τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα in particular, clarified by the analogy with a painter who derives the likeness of his portraits from the face and the expression of the eyes especially, in which the character shows itself (οἷς *ἐμφαίνεται* τὸ ἦθος *Alex.* 1.3; cf. the discussion about the question whether it is possible for a painter to ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος in Xenophon *Mem.* 3.10.3ff.). The *Lives*, then, would seem to belong to the sumbouleutic rather than to the epideictic genre (rather than to both: *contra* De Blois & Bons [1992] 168–169).

21 *TLG* counts 166 occurrences in the *Lives*. Of course the theme of "philosophy" is not covered by this lexeme (in order to study that theme, one should include for example philosophers or philosophic schools referred to by proper names; terms like ἠθικός, θεωρία/ θεωρητικός, &c.).

22 We shall concentrate on "persuasive" use, and in any case disregard passages in which the term refers (1) to an "ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος" as a source (which qualification, by the

actions and qualities relate to fitness for political leadership and involvement in political practice. Of course, for this purpose the persuasive force appealed to in qualifications like φιλοσόφως and φιλοσοφώτερον will be especially informative.

The present paper, then, will deal with some passages bearing witness of

1. self-restraint as a common basis for the quality of both politician and philosopher;
2. the contrast between philosophy and the active life of a politician;
3. philosophers engaged in political action.

Furthermore, we shall consider the question

4. in how far a politician is supposed to be a "better" politician if he is also engaged in philosophy.

Finally, we shall observe that

5. in quite some contexts the power of speech stands out as an indispensable quality anyway.

In our conclusion we shall try to answer the question whether the lesson Plutarch wants us to draw from the *Lives* tends towards a more idealist or a more pragmatic conception of "philosophy".

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way, does not necessarily imply that Plutarch finds the story credible: see e.g. *Them.* 13.5 about the sacrifice of three young prisoners of war to Dionysius "Carnivorous" (with Marr [1998] 106 *ad loc.*); if a story is said to be told ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς … τῶν φιλοσόφων, this seems to imply that it may be true or not (like the story of Pericles driving away the fear of the steersman who gets frightened at the eclipse of the sun, *Per.* 35.2.10–11); on the other hand, the expectation may be that a (famous) philosopher should be a trustworthy source, e.g. *Sol.* 32.4.3–5, where "even Aristotle the philosopher" is said to be among the noteworthy authors who report an altogether incredible and fabulous story); or (2) to scientific or technical activities, such as the adjustment of the calendar cleverly thought out by Caesar (φιλοσοφηθεῖσα χαριέντως, *Caes.* 59.1.2–3), or to instances where Plutarch tells us that Pyrrhus always studies and meditates (μελετῶν … καὶ φιλοσοφῶν) on this one subject, military tactics, which he characterizes—may be not without irony—as μαθημάτων βασιλικώτατον, *Pyrrh.* 8.6.3); or (3) to the activity of reasoning about weighty subjects, for example in a religious context: e.g. συμφιλοσοφεῖν with reference to Solon's participating in the intellectual activity of the most learned of the Egyptian priests, *Sol.* 26.1.6, or Νομᾶ φιλοσοφήσαντος said of Numa reasoning that the god of boundaries, as a guardian of peace and a witness of justice, should be clear of slaughter, *Num.* 16.2.4–5; also *Aem.* 3.3, where Plutarch refers to "those philosophers who define piety as the science of the worship of the gods".

A common basis: self-restraint

Most broadly, for Plutarch a philosophical attitude seems to amount to self-restraint with regard to external factors like luxury, pleasure, and fame.[23] As is to be expected, in the *Lives* also Plutarch takes a more nuanced view of the (Stoic) self-restraint towards emotions and the positive attitude toward self-chosen death.

Even if not an asset—as in the case of Diogenes the Cynic—, the absence of luxury is no problem for those leading a philosophical way of life. The poverty of Epaminondas is hereditary, and has become second nature to him; by philosophizing he made it even easier to handle and lighter to bear (τὴν πενίαν ἔτι μᾶλλον εὔζωνον καὶ κοῦφον ἐποίησε φιλοσοφῶν).[24] A philosopher may be expected to decline the offer of money, as Plato does, even when Dionysius insists that he should accept his generous gift: Dionysius is criticized by Aristippus of Cyrene for being "safely munificent" (ἀσφαλῶς … μεγαλόψυχον), since he is offering only little to those who wanted more, while he offers much to Plato—who would take nothing.[25] The politician Coriolanus also finds even more admirers for his superior attitude to gain (by declining an extra share in the booty) than for the manly virtue he had shown in war; "for the right use of wealth is a fairer trait than excellence in arms, but not to need wealth is loftier (σεμνότερον) than to use it".[26]

On the other hand, people who earn their living by trade are in practice exempted from the virtue of self-restraint as regards luxury and pleasure: Solon's luxurious way of life, and the fact that initially

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[23] For an analysis of σωφροσύνη, see for example *De virt. mor.* 455A: δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη as a μέσον; 445B–C: ὁ λογισμός manages the passionate element (τὸ παθητικόν) so that it will accept moderation and propriety (τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὔσχημον). The ruler, who is the guide-line for the attitude and behaviour of other people, has to put his own inner affairs in order: *Praec.* 800B, *Ad princ. inerud.*, 780B (⟨δεῖ⟩ τὸν ἄρχοντα πρῶτον τὴν ἀρχὴν κτησάμενον ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ κατευθύναντα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ καταστησάμενον τὸ ἦθος οὕτω συναρμόττειν τὸ ὑπήκοον). See also Aalders (1982) 45; Aalders & de Blois (1992) 3392. In *De virt. mor.* 446F ff. Plutarch points out that Stoic thought is wrong in assuming that passion is not essentially different from reason, but "only a conversion of one and the same reason to its two aspects": this is like the assumption "that the hunter and the beast are not two, but one and the same body which, by a change, is now beast, and now becomes hunter".

[24] *Pelop.* 3.6; his choice for a single life (μονότροπος βίος) makes things easier, too.

[25] *Dio* 19.3.

[26] *Cor.* 10.4–8. It is not surprizing in itself that the (mainly) personal virtue of σωφροσύνη becomes the statesman as an individual, too—but see also the analogy between individual and polis in *Lyc.* 31.1–2, see p. 101 below.

he is speaking of pleasure in his poems with more vulgarity than is justified from a philosophical point of view (φορτικώτερον ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον)[27] are thought to be due to his mercantile life, as a reward for the many great dangers he encountered. Notably, Plutarch seems to suggest a continuity between Solon's roots in trade and his predilection for the political branch of philosophy—as opposed to τὰ φυσικά, in which field Solon's notions are said to be primitive.[28] Both in trade and in politics, circumstances justify a certain measure of functional wealth; for other people, happiness consists in being comfortably well-to-do. In the *Life of Cato maior* Plutarch subscribes to the view of the philosopher Ariston, that it is strange that those endowed with a superfluity of possessions are counted happy, rather than those well provided with the necessities of life. The desire for wealth is without any basis in our natural condition: it is imposed upon us by the vulgar expectations of the public.[29]

In the *Life of Alexander*, the encounter between Alexander and Diogenes referred to above is used as an example of self-restraint as regards both luxury and the privileges of fame. Alexander was expecting Diogenes among the (politicians and) philosophers who came to gratulate him on his being proclaimed leader of the expedition of the joint forces of the Greeks and Macedonians against Persia. Alexander goes to see him, and finds Diogenes lying leisurely in the sun, only literally overshadowed by Alexander's kingly presence:[30]

> Diogenes raised himself up a little when he saw so many persons coming towards him, and looked Alexander straight in the face. And when that monarch addressed him with greetings, and asked if he wanted anything, "Yes", said Diogenes, "stand a little out of my sun" (μικρὸν … ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου μετάστηθι). It is said that Alexander was so struck by this, and admired so much the haughtiness and grandeur (τὴν ὑπεροψίαν καὶ τὸ μέγεθος) of the man who had nothing but scorn for him, that he said to his followers, who were laughing and jesting about the philosopher as they went away, "But verily, if I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes".

[27] *Sol.* 3.1.2; in more general terms, Plutarch explains that traditionally a trade did not "bring with it social inferiority, and [that] the calling of a merchant was actually held in honour, since it gave him familiarity with the non-Greek world, friendships with foreign kings, and a large experience in affairs", *ibidem* 2.5–6.

[28] *Sol.* 3.6. In fact, the author adds that all other "σοφοί" of these ancient times (except for Thales) also bear this title on the strength of their πολιτικὴ ἀρετή.

[29] *Cato maior* 18.4 (οὕτως ὁ τοῦ πλούτου ζῆλος οὐδενὶ πάθει φυσικῷ συνημμένος ἐκ τῆς ὀχλώδους καὶ θυραίου δόξης ἐπεισόδιός ἐστιν).

[30] *Alex.* 14.2.2–5.

In the *Life*, then, Alexander's admiration for the undisturbed simplicity of the philosopher who failed to come and gratulate him—as he tellingly expected—invokes the derision of his companions, which in its turn inspires him to his famous *dictum*. In this version of the story, there is more admiration than ambition in his remark: in Diogenes' clinging to the gifts of nature, to which his field of ambition has been effectively reduced, and in his contempt for Alexander's own kingly stature, Alexander recognizes a singular grandeur which cannot fail to escape his followers. In fact, Alexander did have a talent for this virtue, at least if we must believe Plutarch's speech *On Alexander's Fortune or Virtue*, where he describes how Darius (who is said to be surpassed by Alexander in virtue, greatness of soul, manly courage and justice) marvels at Alexander's invincibility in the midst of pleasure, toil, and the bestowal of favours (τὸ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ πόνοις καὶ χάρισιν ἀνίκητον).[31] This self-restraint as to personal interests, linked with the Platonic conception of ἀνδρεία, can be described as a φιλονικία, a love of victory, as to desires;[32] and this is apparently what "theoretical philosophy" and Alexander's own "philosophical kingship" have in common.

A similar message is expressed in Alexander's "gentle and philosophical" adhortation to his comrades, in which he states that self-restraint and hard physical training are required for social superiority and power:[33]

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[31] *AF* 2.7, 339B.

[32] Cf. *Ages.* 11.6, where φιλον⟨ε⟩ικία—on the implication of the different spellings see Pelling (2000) 338—features as the instrument used to fight against desires (ἀπομάχεσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν). In *Alex.* 26.14, his high spirit (τὸ θυμοειδές) is said to make invincible Alexander's φιλονικία, "so that it subdued not only enemies, but even times and places". See also the comparison of the mode of invincibility of Diogenes and Alexander in *Ad princ. inerud.* 5, n. 13 above. The concept is, of course, Platonic (see *Leg.* 731a2–3: φιλονικείτω δὲ ἡμῖν πᾶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀφθόνως), although Plato is using the term more frequently with reference to the desire to fight the subject-matter of the dialectical discussion (which, in a way, amounts to the same thing as fighting for ἀρετή), rather than one's opponent in a dialectical discussion (e.g. *Gorg.* 457d3–5, e4–5).

[33] *Alex.* 40.1–4. In 21.7.2 Alexander is said to hold that τὸ κρατεῖν ἑαυτόν is βασιλικώτερον than τὸ νικᾶν τοὺς πολεμίους (the context concerns his attitude towards women). Lamberton (2001), 100 argues that Plutarch "chose to present (Alexander), somewhat surprisingly, as a figure preeminently characterized by self-control" with a view to the change Alexander will undergo at the end of the *Life* (sc. his increasing adoption of the trappings of oriental despotism), which in the lost *Comparison* "must have been played off against Caesar's manipulative flirting with the symbols of a kingship he so wanted to openly embrace".

> He saw that his companions had grown altogether luxurious, and were vulgar in the extravagance of their ways of living. For instance, Hagnon the Teian used to wear silver nails in his boots; (...) when they took their exercise and their baths, more of them actually used myrrh than olive oil, and they had in their train rubbers and chamberlains. Alexander therefore chided them in a gentle and philosophical fashion (ἐπετίμησε πράως καὶ φιλοσόφως). He was amazed, he said, that after they had undergone so many and so great contests they did not remember that those who conquer by toil sleep more sweetly than those who are conquered by their toil, and did not see, from a comparison of their own lives with those of the Persians, that it is a very servile thing to be luxurious, but a very royal thing to toil (δουλικώτατον μέν ἐστι τὸ τρυφᾶν, βασιλικώτατον δὲ τὸ πονεῖν). "And yet", said he, "how can a man take care of his own horse or furbish up his spear and helmet, if he is unaccustomed to using his hands on what is dearer to him than anything else: his body (τοῦ φιλτάτου σώματος)? Know ye not", said he, "that the end and object of our conquest is to avoid doing the same thing as the conquered?" Accordingly, he exerted himself yet more strenuously in military and hunting expeditions, suffering distress and risking his life, so that a Spartan ambassador who came up with him as he was bringing down a great lion, said: "Nobly, indeed, Alexander, hast thou struggled with the lion to see which should be king".

Not unlike the similarity allegedly recognized by Alexander between his own occupation and Diogenes' chosen way of life, his present adhortation seems to rely on more than an analogy. The inherent assumption is apparently, that the victory of moral superiority over a slavish attitude is exemplified not only by the victory of the individual over his own inferior inclinations, but also by the establishment of Greek supremacy over the Persians. In *On Alexander's Fortune or Virtue* Alexander shows courage by employing his self-restraint in accordance with his task as a king:[34] his courage serves the good cause of uniting the world under one (his own) rule, which would be set at risk if he did not also resist the attacks on his person.

Plutarch's analysis of Timoleon's fate[35] seems to refer to a similar idea of unwavering commitment to the public cause. Timoleon tries to convince his brother Timophanes, "not at all like his brother, but headstrong and filled with a ruinous passion for absolute power by worthless friends and foreign military adventurers who were always about him",

[34] *AF* 1.11, 332D: ἰδεῖν γοῦν ἔστιν ἐν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὸ μὲν πολεμικὸν φιλάνθρωπον, τὸ δὲ πρᾷον ἀνδρῶδες; 1.12, 333 B-C: οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι τῶν πολλῶν διαφέρουσι τῷ τὰς κρίσεις ἔχειν ἐρρωμένας παρὰ τὰ δεινὰ καὶ πεπηγυίας—Alexander, of course, being one of them.

[35] *Timol.* 3.4ff.

and tries hard to make him renounce his mad ambitions. When he does not succeed in doing so, he judges it better that his brother should be killed, and remains passive while this is done. Timoleon is applauded by the most influential citizens for his greatness of soul, because "—although a man of quality, and fond of his family—he had nevertheless set his country before his family,[36] and the good and just before expediency". When others rail at him for the death of his brother, however, and his mother refuses to see him, he is altogether a prey to grief, and in mental disorder: he retreats from public life, and for a long time does not even return to the city, but spends his time wandering in great distress in the most desolate parts of the country. Plutarch adds the following evaluation, which apparently takes the form of a general rule:[37]

> So true is it that the purposes of men, unless they acquire firmness and strength (βεβαιότητα καὶ ῥώμην) from reason and philosophy (ἐκ λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας) for the activities of life, are unsettled and easily carried away by casual praise and blame, being forced out of their native reckonings (ἐκκρουόμεναι τῶν οἰκείων λογισμῶν). For it would seem that not only our action must be noble and just, but the conviction also from which our action springs must be abiding and unchangeable[38] (μόνιμον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον) in order that we may be satisfied with what we are about to do, and that mere weakness may not make us dejected over actions which have once been accomplished, when the fair vision of the good fades away (ἀπομαραινομένης τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασίας). (…) For repentance makes even the noble action base; whereas the choice which springs from knowledge and understanding calculation (ἡ δ' ἐξ ἐπιστήμης

[36] Giving pride of place to the intersts of the community is presented as a feature of a philosophical attitude also in *Fab. Max.* 10.2–3: Fabius Maximus cannot be hurt personally, but ἡ τῶν πολλῶν ἀβουλία hurts him διὰ τὰ κοινά (because it affects the state). Similarly Plutarch suggests that Cicero, when he becomes very petty and mean because of his misfortune, does not deserve to be called "philosopher" on the basis of conduct in public life anyway: he is too much personally hurt by external circumstances: *Cic.* 32.6.3. According to Thome (1998) 173–174, Cicero's—comparatively unproblematic—case constitutes an exception to Plutarch's tendency, in the *Lives*, to avoid highlighting the discrepancy between the supposed ideal and historical reality.

[37] *Timol.* 6.1–4.

[38] Elsewhere in Plutach, ἀμετάπτωτος is more often paired with βέβαιος, as in *Fab. Max.* 5.5.2 (where the context conveys a similar message); it is a characteristic of φιλία (*De amic. mult.* 97B7, *Quaest. Conv.* 659F2). The term is used also with a negative connotation referring to a certain stiffness of mind that allegedly goes together with Stoic thought: *De comm. not.* 1058B2, 1061E11, 1085B2, *De virt. mor.* 441C4: βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον said of λόγος as conceived by those who fail to realize that the irrational "is mingled and joined with reason by some compulsion of nature" (441D).

> ὡρμημένη καὶ λογισμοῦ προαίρεσις) does not change, even though its results are unsuccessful.

The inner conviction and the firmness of mind that make one stick to the course once taken on reasonable grounds (ἐπιστήμη presumably referring, here again, to knowledge based on experience),[39] undisturbed by the judgements of other people, seems to be a signal mark of the philosophical attitude.

On the other hand, as far as self-restriction with regard to pleasure is concerned, even seemingly hopeless cases are not necessarily so much taken in by fortune that they are invulnerable to philosophy (ἄτρωτο ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας) and impervious to the sting of frank speech (παρρησία). Young Alcibiades lets himself be guided only by the good things of life, but when Socrates seeks to expose the weakness of his soul, he appears, after all, to have a sound constitution (εὐφυΐα)—as betokened by the fact that he prefers the company of Socrates to giving ear to his companions and lovers who advocate a very different lifestyle.[40] Alcibiades actually comes to consider Socrates' practice as a kind of "provision of the gods for the care and salvation of youth (θεῶν ὑπερεσία εἰσ νέων ἐπιμέλειαν … καὶ σωτηρίαν)".[41]

As said above, these types of self-restraint (with regard to luxury, the privileges of fame, and pleasure) must be distinguished from self-restraint with regard to passion—a value observed with a certain detachment by Plutarch when he is describing the lives of public figures with Stoic sympathies. The following judgement on the conduct of Cato minor at the death of his brother, for instance, reflects Stoic criteria:[42]

> While Cato was still in military service, his brother, who was on his way to Asia, fell sick at Aenus in Thrace, and a letter came at once to Cato advising him of this. A heavy storm was raging at sea and no ship of sufficient size was at hand, but nevertheless, taking only two

[39] See also n. 5 above.

[40] Plut., *Alc.* 4.2–3. As a general, however, Alcibiades' activities are still accompanied by a great luxuriousness of life, which men of repute consider as "tyrant-like and monstrous" (τυραννικὰ καὶ ἀλλόκοτα), *ibidem* 16.1–2.

[41] In the *synkrisis* of the *Lives of Theseus and Romulus* 1.6 the same formula is presented as the philosophers' definition of Eros. Here Plutarch explicitly subscribes to this—apparently Academic—view: see *Ad princ. inerud.* 780D, where these words are ascribed to Polemon.

[42] *Cato minor* 11.1–3. In the sequel Plutarch describes how Cato's attitude towards those who provided the luxury for the funeral rites—in spite of the slander written by Caesar—is fairly decent.

> friends and three servants with him in a small trading-vessel, he put to sea from Thessalonica. He narrowly escaped drowning, and by some unaccountable good fortune came safe to land, but Caepio had just died. In bearing his affliction Cato was thought to have shown more passion than philosophy (ἐμπαθέστερον ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἐνεγκεῖν τὴν συμφοράν), considering not only his lamentations, his embracings of the dead, and the heaviness of his grief, but also his expenditure upon the burial, and the pains he took to have incense and costly raiment burned with the body, and a monument of polished Thasian marble costing eight talents constructed in the market-place of Aenus.

The expression of grief in private affairs does not seem to be objectionable to Plutarch as such; in the case of a clash between the private and the public spheres, however, here again, he does seem to applaud those who give precedence to their public commitments: Cato maior shows the expected philosophical attitude at the death of his son, which he is said to have borne gently and philosophically (πρᾴως καὶ φιλοσόφως)—without diminishing his keenness in political affairs. In the *Life of Cleomenes* Plutarch comments on the risks inherent in Stoic doctrines where the more inflamable natures among the young are concerned: in the case of a deep and gentle (πρᾷος) character, however, Stoic doctrines turn out well most of the time.[43]

Plutarch does seem to object, then, a certain fanaticism that seems to be inherent in Stoic thought; without the concept of conflicting powers, there is no basis for reasoned control. The Stoic attitude towards self-inflicted death constitutes a telling example of the way in which the value of self-restraint, if not interpreted in terms of conflicting propensities, may lead to the act of self-annihilation. The younger Cato apparently serves as an example of how the adherence to Stoic philosophy may infringe upon the well-being of the individual: when he is discussing philosophical tenets after supper with his companions and the magistrates of Utica, he so seriously defends, against the criticism of his Peripatetic colleague, the "paradox" that the good man alone is free,

[43] *Cato maior* 24.7–8. In *Cleom.* 2.6 Plutarch comments that "for great and impetuous natures the Stoic doctrines are somewhat misleading and dangerous, although when they permeate a deep and gentle character (βαθεῖ … καὶ πρᾴῳ κεραννύμενος ἤθει), they redound most to its proper good". Still, an audience may be tolerant also when confronted with an extreme individual case: see Plutarch's report on Marcus Favonius, "who had become a devotee of Cato, and was more impetuous and frenzied than reasonable in his pursuit of philosophy (οὐ λόγῳ μᾶλλον ἢ φορᾷ τινι καὶ πάθει μανικῷ φιλοσοφῶν)". Plutarch observes that the extreme, "cynical" boldness of his speech took away its offensiveness: men used to put up with his impertinence as a joke (*Brut.* 34.4–5).

that the company is aware that he made up his mind to put an end to life to free himself from present troubles.[44] His death bears all the traits of Stoic harshness.[45] Statyllius, who declares that he will follow Cato's example, is prevented by the philosophers from destroying himself.[46] Only when there is some sort of balance between public (mis)fortune (defeat) and personal (mis)fortune (self-inflicted death), Plutarch seems to view the extreme option of taking one's own life with a little more sympathy. In this vein, it seems, he also describes how Brutus comes to appreciate Cato's attitude: before the battle, Brutus is telling Cassius his views about flight and death: as a young man without experience of the world, he was led somehow to make a bold philosophical statement (οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγον ἀφῆκα μέγαν), blaming Cato for taking his own life, which he thought to be unmanly. Now he is of a different mind: if they are not victorious, he will go hence, praising Fortune.[47]

Philosophy vs. political leadership

Of course, in the *Lives* philosophy is also explicitly contrasted with political activities. In view of the previous section it does not come as a surprise, that the most outspoken difference between the style of life of a theoretical philosopher and that of a politician regards the attitude towards material property; in the *Life of Pericles*, Anaxagoras and Pericles are contrasted in this respect:[48]

> … that philosopher (sc. Anaxagoras) actually abandoned his house and left his land to lie fallow for sheep-grazing, owing to the lofty thoughts with which he was inspired. But the life of a theoretical philosopher is not the same thing, I think, as that of a statesman. The one exercises his intellect for noble ends without the aid of instruments and independent of external matters (ἀνόργανον καὶ ἀπροσδεῆ τῆς ἐκτὸς ὕλης ἐπὶ τοῖς

[44] *Cato minor* 67.2–3.

[45] *Cato minor* 68–70. *Contra* Aalders & de Blois (1992) 3401, who argue that Plutarch views Cato minor "als Musterbeispiel des Philosophen schlechthin". With regard to the *Lives of Phocion and Cato minor* Duff (1999) 156 thinks it likely "that Plutarch intended this pair of Lives to be an essay on the dangers of over-rigid adherence to philosophic tenets in general".

[46] *Cato minor* 73.7, cf. 65–66. On the identity of Statyllius, see Duff (1999) 149–150 n. 63.

[47] *Brut.* 40.7–8.

[48] *Per.* 16.7.

> καλοῖς κινεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν); whereas the other, inasmuch as he brings his specific excellence into close contact with the needs of mankind (εἰς ἀνθρωπείας χρείας ἀναμειγνύντι τὴν ἀρετήν), must sometimes find wealth not merely one of the necessities of life, but also of its noble things (τῶν καλῶν), as was actually the case with Pericles, who gave aid to many poor men.

For a politician, then, wealth can belong to the category of "good things".[49] Plutarch however is aware of the risks involved in a short-sighted concentration on the public cause: he adds the story of how Anaxagoras, in his old age, was lying neglected on his couch, starving himself to death. Pericles is too much engaged in his public pursuits to notice, but when the matter of Anaxagoras' condition comes to his ears, he is struck with dismay and runs to him at once. He bewails not so much Anaxagoras' fate, but rather his own loss of such a counsellor in political matters. The philosopher points out to him that those who need a lamp must pour oil into it.[50] The story seems to convey not so much the drawbacks of political excellence, which fails to observe the good of the individual—the message being rather that the politician should not neglect the instruments he is relying upon to reach his goal.

In the *Life of Cato minor* we find a comparatively banal opposition: Cato drinks a lot, and his friends explain: by day he is so much occupied by civic and public activities, that he does not have time for philological pursuits,[51] and this is why he is drinking with the philosophers by night.[52] A sympotic retreat in a company of philosophers, then, is advanced as an excuse for the apparent lack of self-restraint. In sofar

[49] Formulated in terms of the mean between two extremes in *Sol.* 2.5: "there is no reason why a good statesman should either set his heart too much on the acquisition of superfluous wealth, or despise unduly the use of what is necessary and sufficient". Compare Plutarch's general statement, that "the right use of wealth is a better than excellence in arms", *Cor.* 10.8, see p. 81 above.

[50] *Per.* 16.8–9.

[51] For philosophy as an implementation of philological interest see e.g. *Cato maior* 22.1–3.

[52] *Cato minor* 6.3–4: νύκτωρ καὶ παρὰ πότον συγγίνεσθαι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις; compare the discussion εἰ δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πότον, *Quaest. conv.* 612E ff. "Cato's love of drink, probably a detail of the hostile tradition, is transformed into a very Sokratic tendency to discuss philosophy all night while drinking" Duff (1999) 143. With some detachment Plutarch describes how Favonius' brutal behaviour when he comes to Cassius' supper uninvitedly is accommodated in a surprisingly gentle atmosphere: "And over the wine mirth and jest abounded, seasoned with wit and philosophy (καὶ παιδιὰν ὁ πότος ἔσχεν οὐκ ἄχαριν οὐδ' ἀφιλόσοφον)" (*Brut.* 34.8, cp. n. 43 above).

as we are supposed to take seriously the suggestion that Cato satisfies his intellectual needs during the night, it might be surmised that these philosophical discussions concern the study of political theory, with only limited contrast to the political practice of his daily life. In fact, Plutarch has told us earlier that Cato, in the company of the Stoic philosopher Antipater, devoted himself especially to ethical and political doctrines.[53] His retreat to the country with books and philosophers may involve a similar contrast between political theory and the practice of a statesman—between the politician's leisure and his hectic public life. Plutarch himself describes moral judgement about political actions as a philosophical question, as opposed to more "objective" observations with regard to the outcome of political strategies: whether Themistocles by "luring Athens on gradually and turning its progress toward the sea (…) did injury to the integrity and purity of public life or not" Plutarch leaves to the philosopher to investigate (ἔστω φιλοσοφώτερον ἐπισκοπεῖν), but he does feel competent to judge on the actual effect of Themistocles' policy: apart from other testimony, Xerxes himself bore witness to the fact that the salvation of Athens came from the sea.[54]

By contrast, Plutarch describes how, during his stay in Athens, Brutus is seemingly fully engaged in philosophizing with Academics and Peripatetics (συμφιλοσοφεῖν): he seems not to be worried by political or otherwise practical matters (ἐδόκει παντάπασιν ἀργεῖν καὶ σχολάζειν), and nobody suspects that what he is really doing is preparing for war.[55] In this case, his being occupied with "academic" subjects (in the modern sense of the word) apparently serves to screen off his political activities—testifying to the expectation that these ambitions do not sit well together. The same view may be discerned in Cicero's ideas about the future: if he were driven out of a public career altogether, he

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[53] *Cato minor* 4.2. In *Quaest. conv.* 613B Crato argues that philosophy as τέχνη περὶ βίον ("the craft dealing with the mode of life"—"a definition established among the early Stoics", Clement & Hoffleit [1969] 10 *ad loc.*) is likely to be included in every kind of amusement.

[54] *Them.* 4.5.

[55] *Brut.* 24.1; Brutus attends lectures of the Academic philosopher Theomnestus (of whom we know next to nothing: Armstrong [1967], 58) and of the Peripatetic Cratippus (renowned especially for his thoughts on the soul, *ibidem* 114). Brutus is engaged in philosophical discussion when he has good expectations after supper on the night before the battle (ἐν ἐλπίσι καλαῖς καὶ λογισμοῖς φιλοσόφοις γενόμενος, *Brut.* 40.1). Compare p. 102 below.

would go to Athens, leaving public life behind, and devote himself to philosophy.[56]

In the *Life of Dion*, Plutarch describes how some people pretend to be indignant especially at the irony of the fact that, whereas in former times a whole Athenian army had sailed to Sicily without taking Syracuse, now a single "sophist" should succeed in taking over "the happiness that was based on dominion, wealth and luxury", that is, by the achievement of diverting Dionysius' interests towards a search for a mysterious good in Academic philosophy and "to make geometry his guide to happiness"(*Dio* 14.3).

A somewhat curious example of the opposition between philosophical and political activities is the famous story of Alexander's letter to Aristotle, in which Alexander complains that the publication of the acroamatic teachings devalues his own experience with τὰ ἄριστα—the message of the story being apparently, that Alexander values his familiarity with Aristotle's teaching on "the best things" higher than his present political power.[57] From Plutarch's paraphrase of Aristotle's reply (that they were both published and not published, since they can be used only as a memorandum to those actually educated from the beginning) we may infer that the lectures published were on theoretical subjects, probably metaphysics.[58] That the philosophy valued so highly by

[56] *Cic.* 4.3 (ὁ Κικέρων) διανοούμενος, εἰ παντάπασιν ἐκπέσοι τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν, δεῦρο μετενεγκάμενος τὸν βίον ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ μετὰ φιλοσοφίας καταζῆν. Cicero writes and translates philosophical dialogues, *ibidem* 40.2; cf. *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 1.3. On the other hand, Cicero's interest in philosophy also has effect on his political practice, as may be inferred from Plutarch's observation that in his political actions he makes use of Publius Nigidius, one of his philosophical companions, *Cic.* 20.3.7–9. It may be surmised, however, that his influence concerns the sphere of astrology (and, may be, magic) especially; in any case, Cicero (*In Tim.* 1.1) describes him as a man of learning who took interest in "those things which lie hid in nature" and who gave an impulse to the revival of Pythagoreanism.

[57] *Alex.* 7.6–7: ἐγὼ δὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἄριστα ἐμπειρίαις ἢ ταῖς δυνάμεσι διαφέρειν. "I would rather distinguish myself in experience with the best things, than in greatness of power" (7.7.4–6). Alexander's high valuation of theoretical pursuits (which vaguely converges with the anecdote of Alexander's reaction to Diogenes) seems to disregard Aristotle's warning that philosophy may be also a handicap to the ruler: Fr. 647 R^3 (from Περὶ βασιλείας, *Fragm. sel.* p. 62). Thome (1998) 173 aptly observes that in Plutarch the gap between Aristotle's political theory and Alexander's practice is never made manifest.

[58] *Alex.* 7.8–9: Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπολογεῖται περὶ τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων, ὡς καὶ ἐκδεδομένων καὶ μὴ ἐκδεδομένων. ἀληθῶς γὰρ ἡ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πραγματεία, πρὸς διδασκαλίαν καὶ μάθησιν οὐδὲν ἔχουσα χρήσιμον, ὑπόδειγμα τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γέγραπται (MSS μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, confirmed by Simplicius: see Hamilton (1969) 20; περὶ Xylander); if the name "Metaphysics" originates with Andronicus (Hamilton, *ibidem*), this cannot be a

Alexander concerns hard-core "theoretical" philosophy (as opposed to political theory) may be inferred also from Plutarch's observation that, in spite of Alexander's estrangement from Aristotle, he had not lost his zeal for philosophy,[59] "as appears from the benefits he is bestowing on philosophers also after this enstrangement"—apparently implying that they still do the things Alexander gave up years ago.

The most productive opposition between philosophy and political practice, then, seems to concern the study of political philosophy as a retreat from political occcupations. When theoretical philosophy is opposed to political practice, its independence of external instruments is emphasized especially.

Philosophers engaged in political practice

That politics is sometimes contrasted with philosophy does not preclude, of course, that philosophers may be engaged in political practice.[60] Here different degrees of engagement may be distinguished. The more successful examples of a philosopher involved in political action are those cases in which the two fields of activity are apparently unconnected, especially where "philosopher" seems to be used as a generic name that does not tell anything about the scope of one's actual ambitions. In the case of the Eleatic philosopher Melissus, "then operating as a general at Samos" (ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος στρατηγῶν τότε τῆς Σάμου), for instance, no connection between his philosophical qualities and his public function seems to be intended;[61] in the *Life of Themistocles*, Melissus is named ὁ φυσικός, the physicist.[62]

literal quotation from Alexander's letter. According to Plutarch, the "secret and more profound teachings" in which Alexander may have taken part are those designated by philosophers as "acroamatic" and "epoptic". For the latter term, see *De Is. et Osir.* 382D:"the apperception of the conceptual, the pure, and the simple, shining through the soul like a flash of lightning", also called the "mystic" part of philosophy.

[59] ὁ μέντοι πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἐμπεφυκὼς καὶ συντεθραμμένος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτῷ ζῆλος καὶ πόθος οὐκ ἐξερρύη τῆς ψυχῆς, *Alex.* 8.5.1–3.

[60] "(Plutarch lobt) die Kombination von philosophischer Bildung und politischer Tätigkeit", Aalders & de Blois (1992) 3391. The present paragraph offers some examples of "professional" pbilosophers who are involved in diverse political projects; the next paragraph concerns philosophical influence (through education or otherwise) on people in public positions.

[61] *Per.* 26.2; Stadter comments *ad loc.*: "(Melissus) is frequently cited as an example of a philosopher with practical skills", (1989) 248.

[62] *Them.* 2.5.2–3.

The two fields of interest appear in juxtaposition in Plutarch's characterization of Ecdelus of Megalopolis as an "ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος καὶ πρακτικός". Ecdelus had been an intimate friend of Arcesilaus the Academic at Athens; he now eagerly adopts Aratus' bold proposals to make war upon Nicocles, who had proclaimed himself tyrant of Sicyon. As a commander of the men who carry the scaling-ladders, he plays an important part in the effort to enter the city unnoticed, thus paving the way for Aratus' success.[63] Another example is the son of Cicero, who is studying philosophy at Athens (διατρίβοντα παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις)—although, as we learn from Cicero's letters, he would have preferred to serve under Caesar in Spain. As a kind of countermove to Cicero's strategic connections with the young Caesar (Plutarch suggests), Brutus makes use of Cicero's son: he gives him a command, which brings Brutus success indeed.[64] "Politicians and philosophers" cooperate with Dion making secret preparations for his expedition against Dionysius.[65]

A telling example of the pitfalls of a philosopher operating in the field of politics is Xenocrates, who is added to an embassy by the Athenians merely because of his status as a philosopher—the idea being that, because of his reputation and fame, no one will dare to oppose him:[66]

> Phocion went once more to Thebes, with the other ambassadors, to whom the Athenians had added Xenocrates the philosopher. For so high an estimate was set upon the virtue of Xenocrates, and so great was his reputation and fame in the eyes of all, that it was supposed the human soul could harbour no insolence or cruelty or wrath which the mere sight of Xenocrates would fail to infuse with some reverence and a desire to do him honour (ᾧ Ξενοκράτους μόνον ὀφθέντος οὐκ ἂν αἰδοῦς τι καὶ τιμῆς ἐγγένοιτο πρὸς αὐτόν).

Unfortunately, his taking part in the embassy has the opposite effect, owing to "a certain ruthlessness and hatred of goodness" (ἀγνωμοσύνῃ τινὶ καὶ μισαγαθίᾳ) in Antipater, who actually refuses to greet him, and breaks off his speech right at the start. Xenocrates then observes that this special treatment of him is justified insofar as he stands alone in his rejection of Antipater's policy. As a matter of fact, he appears to be the only one who is not satisfied with the terms of Antipater's proposal; he summarizes his objections by saying that Antipater dealt

[63] *Arat.* 5.1, 7.3ff.
[64] *Cic.* 45.3; Cicero *Ad Att.* 12.7.1.
[65] *Dio* 22.5.
[66] *Phoc.* 27.1–2.

with them moderately if he held them to be slaves, but severely if he held them to be freemen. Apparently the Athenians overestimated not only the sensibility of Antipater when being faced with virtue, but also Xenophanes' fitness as a performer of the role of a silent member of the embassy.[67]

In the *Life of Agesilaus*, Plutarch describes Epaminondas as a man with a reputation for culture and philosophy; he had, however, not yet given proof of capacities as a commander (ἀνὴρ ἔνδοξος ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ, στρατηγίας δὲ πεῖραν οὔπω δεδωκώς). The contrast implied does not only point forward to his political and military career,[68] but also lends relief to the present role of Epaminondas among the other embassadors: in accordance with his reputation, he is the only one who has the courage to plead openly (with παρρησία) for peace on behalf of all Greece, a peace based on equality and justice.[69]

An even more substantial link between philosophy and political activity occurs in the case of Ecdemus and Demophanes, who had been acquainted with Arcesilaus in the Academy. "More than all their contemporaries", Plutarch says, "they brought philosophy to bear upon political action and affairs of state" (φιλοσοφίαν μάλιστα τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ πολιτείαν καὶ πράξεις προαγαγόντες). They take action against tyranny in a couple of cities, and at the request of the people of Cyrene they manage to turn a disturbed and unhealthy political situation into a model of law and order. They themselves, however, estimate their education of Philopoemen as a no less serious accomplishment, considering that they will make the man a common benefit to Greece through philosophy (ὡς κοινὸν ὄφελος τῇ 'Ελλάδι τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀπεργασόμενοι).[70] Plato himself is put in charge of Dionysius' mercenaries, a company bearing an old grudge against the philosopher; he is released from this dubious honour by Archytas and his fellow Pythagoreans, who come to his rescue.[71]

Finally, here again, it does not come as a surprise that also a philosopher who is actually engaged in political practice is allowed to welcome material gifts: even Plato accepts the money he receives from Dion,

[67] "Xenocrates' high philosophic principles were out of place in the world of *Realpolitik*", Duff (1999) 150.

[68] *Pelop.* 12ff.; Plutarch (*Ages.* 28.6) refers to his *Life of Epaminondas* (not extant).

[69] *Ages.* 27.6–7.

[70] *Philop.* 1.3–5. Ecdemus is apparently identical with the 'Ecdelus' in *Arat.*, p. 93 above.

[71] *Dio* 19.8–20.1.

in order to spend it on public performances.[72] In the *Life of Aristides* Plutarch explains:[73]

> those endowed with human excellence (οἱ ἀγαθοί) do not wage an unproclaimed and implacable war against the gifts of friends, but considering as ignoble and mean the gifts offered to be stored away and to satisfy a craving for wealth, they do not refuse gifts as long as these are connected with a certain unselfish ambition and splendour (τὰς εἰς ἀπόθεσιν καὶ πλεονεξίαν ἀγεννεῖς ἡγούμενοι καὶ ταπεινάς, ὅσαι φιλοτιμίας τινὸς ἀκερδοῦς ἔχονται καὶ λαμπρότητος οὐκ ἀπωθοῦνται).

In the *Life of Dion* the story is told from a somewhat different perspective—although with a similar tenor. When it is Plato's turn for paying the tax of *choregia*, he generously allows Dion to provide the money for the chorus: the philosopher indulges Dion in his ambition to impress the Athenians, on the ground that this will bring goodwill for Dion rather than fame for himself.[74]

Although he is not a "professional" philosopher, we shall follow the case of Dion in this respect (for other aspects, see the next paragraph): Dion does live up to Plato's expectations, when after his expulsion of Dionysius from Syracuse he is lavishing rewards upon his allies with a

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72 Plutarch refers with approbation to the sale of oil that defrayed the expenses of Plato's sojourn in Egypt: *Sol.* 2.8, cp. n. 27 above. That a powerful position requires a solid material basis is suggested by the somewhat different version of the story of Alexander's encounter with Diogenes (cp. pp. 76–79 above) told in *Ad princ. inerud.* 5, 782A–B. Here Alexander is advanced as a deterrent example of someone who suddenly realizes he has neglected philosophy to his damage. The passage is notable also because the analysis of Alexander's situation and his ambitions brings out very clearly by contrast the rhetorical *tour de force* displayed in *AF*, where Alexander is portrayed as the champion of virtue, thwarted by fortune: "The teachings of philosophy should keep us from having the same experience as Alexander, who, seeing Diogenes at Corinth, admiring him for his natural gifts, as being astonished by his spirit and greatness (τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος), said: 'If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes', by which he almost said that he was weighed down by his good fortune (εὐτυχία) glory, and power which kept him from virtue (!) and and left him no leisure, and that he envied the cynic's cloak and wallet because Diogenes was invincible and secure against capture (ἀνίκητος καὶ ἀνάλωτος) by means of these, not, as he was himself, by means of arms, horses, and pikes. So by being a philosopher he was able to become Diogenes in disposition and yet to remain Alexander in outward fortune (τῇ τύχῃ), and *to become all the more Diogenes because he was Alexander*, since for his great ship of fortune (πρὸς τύχην μεγάλην), tossed by high winds and surging sea, he needed heavy ballast and a great pilot." The Alexander pictured in this treatise, then, reckons that if he adopts ἀρετή without giving up his τύχη, the scope and the importance of his position will make his invincibility based on virtue (i.e., his Diogeneic quality) even more impressive.

73 *Arist.* 1.5.

74 *Dio* 17.5.

generosity surpassing (even) his resources. As for himself, however, he amazes the world watching him by his simplicity and self-restraint:[75]

> while he was regarded by the people of that time as the greatest of living men, and was thought to be blessed with courage and good fortune beyond any other commander, he was nevertheless so modest in his dress, his attendance, and his table, just as though he were messing with Plato in the Academy, and not living among captains of mercenaries and paid soldiers, who find in their daily feastings and other enjoyments a solace for their toils and perils. Plato, indeed, wrote to him that the eyes of all the world were now fixed upon him alone, but Dion himself, as it would seem, kept his eyes fixed upon one spot in one city, namely the Academy, and considered that his spectators and judges there admired neither great exploits nor boldness nor victories, but watched to see only whether he made a discreet and decorous use of his good fortune, and showed himself modest in his high estate (εἰ κοσμίως καὶ σωφρόνως τῇ τύχῃ χρῆται καὶ παρέχει μέτριον ἑαυτὸν ἐν πράγμασι μεγάλοις).

Plutarch's description of Dion significantly combines the self-restraint of a philosopher and the attitude towards the use of money for the public cause that becomes a politician; Dion's own focus, however, is limited to the circle of the philosophical school admired by him. Accordingly, the positive picture is disturbed by the austerity of Dion's manners, and by his haughtiness with regard to the people. Plutarch quotes a warning from Plato's letters, to the effect that stubbornness has solitude for its the housemate (ἡ αὐθάδεια ἐρημίᾳ σύνοικος).[76] A more promising situation—from a political point of view—occurs when a professional philosopher outshines his colleagues in personal qualities especially, as in the case of Brutus' friend Aristus, a brother of the Academic Antiochus of Ascalon, and he himself a teacher of philosophy at the time of Cicero's stay in Athens. Although inferior to many of the philosophers in learning (τῇ ἐν λόγοις ἕξει), in discipline and gentleness (εὐταξίᾳ καὶ πρᾳότητι) he vied with the foremost.[77]

Is a politician a better politician if he is also a philosopher?

Although we have seen (1) that a politician seems to be a "better" politician if he shows self-restraint as far as his private interests are

[75] *Dio* 52.2–4.

[76] *Dio* 52.5. The quotation is from the (spurious) *Fourth Letter*, 321C 1.

[77] *Brut.* 2.3; for his own role as a teacher of philosophy, see Cicero, *Ad Att.* 5.101.5.

concerned (an attitude which is also part of a philosophical way of life), and if he succeeds in inspiring his subordinates to follow him in this attitude, too, and (2) that practical philosophy may offer a valuable refuge from, and lend support to, political practice, the role of philosophers engaged in actual political practice did not seem to be very impressive. We shall focus now on the question what further qualities Plutarch distinguishes as an asset an for admirable and/ or successful politician, and in how far such qualities coincide with those ascribed to a philosopher.[78]

Let us start, again, with the case of Alexander. Plutarch tells us the story that in Egypt he listened with approval to the philosopher Psammon, who taught that all men are under the kingship of god, considering that in every instance that which rules and has power is divine. Alexander's own view on the subject is, however, qualified as "even more philosophical" (ἔτι … μᾶλλον φιλοσοφώτερον): he said that, although god is indeed the father common to all men, he selects the best of them (τοὺς ἀρίστους) as his own chosen elite.[79] Alexander's alternative may be seen as a refinement, from a worldly perspective, of the profound religious observation made by his Egyptian host. Because of its elitist implications, the designation of this particular insight as "even more philosophical" might strike us as ironical (in the paragraph following the story of Psammon, speaking about Alexander's haughty conduct towards the Barbarians especially, Plutarch comments: "like one fully persuaded of his divine birth and parentage"); still, it does remind us of Plutarch's qualifying as "philosophical" such activities as require special concentration on a weighty task.[80]

The case of Numa is, of course, an obvious example of the positive effect of philosophy on one's qualities as a politician. Numa is pictured

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[78] Cf. for example "he who rules must be schooled in philosophy or be advised by wise men", Aalders (1982) 45. According to the (spurious?) first treatise of the *Moralia*, the ideal way of life consists in "trying as well as one can both to take part in public life, and to lay hold on philosophy so far as the opportunity is granted." ([Pseudo-Plutarch?] *De lib. educ.* 7F–8B). The priority given to one's role in public life is based on pragmatic grounds: the theoretical way of life, falling short in practice, is not useful (ἀνωφελής), the practical life without a share in philosophy, is "rude and harsh" (ἄμουσος καὶ πλημμελής).

[79] *Alex.* 27.10–11 (ὡς πάντων μὲν ὄντα κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων πατέρα τὸν θεόν, ἰδίους δὲ ποιούμενον ἑαυτοῦ τοὺς ἀρίστους, 27.11).

[80] See our observation with regard to Plutarch's choice for φιλοσόφως in preference to βασιλικῶς as an expression qualifying Alexander's conduct in the epideictic context of *AF*, p. 78 above.

as a man of all virtues, both by nature and by education, experience, and philosophy. In his case also it is emphasized that he distinguishes himself from the barbarians by his self-restraint, which is referred to (in accordance with good Platonic usage) as *true* manliness. He is a also good judge and advisor; but during his time of leasure he devotes himself to (study of) the gods:[81]

> By nature his temperament was blended to suit every virtue, and he had subdued himself still more by education, endurance of hardships, and philosophy (ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸν ἐξημέρωσε διὰ παιδείας καὶ κακοπαθείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας). He had thus put away from himself not only the infamous passions of the soul, but also that violence and rapacity which are in such high repute among Barbarians, believing that true manliness consisted in the subjugation of one's passions by reason (ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἀληθῆ τὴν ὑπὸ λόγου τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κάθειρξιν ἡγούμενος). On this account he banished from his house all luxury and extravagance, and while citizen and stranger alike found in him a faultless judge and counsellor, he devoted his hours of privacy and leisure, not to enjoyments and money-making, but to the service of the gods, and the rational contemplation of their nature and power (πρὸς θεραπείαν θεῶν καὶ θεωρίαν διὰ λόγου φύσεώς τε αὐτῶν καὶ δυνάμεως).

Numa's interest in religion and theory of the divine, then, is one of the potential factors to account for his special talents as a politician:[82]

> either fear of the gods, who seemed to have him in their special care, or reverence for his virtue, or a miraculous fortune (δαιμόνιος τύχη), which in his days kept life free from the taint of every vice, and pure, made him a manifest illustration and confirmation of the saying which Plato, many generations later, ventured to utter regarding government, namely, that human ills would only then cease and disappear when, by some

[81] *Num.* 3.7–8. It should be noted that καὶ φιλοσοφίας is not in C; as a matter of fact, it may have been added because of its relevance for Numa's interests in the divine: a reason for doing so may be found in *Num.* 8.5–6, where the fact that Pythagoras' philosophy for a large part consisted in "religious services and occupations", as was the case with Numa's πολιτεία, is advanced as the main reason why Numa's σοφία and παίδευσις are connected with Pythagoras' circle. On the other hand, it may be called in question whether in the case of Numa, "philosophy" does include the study of the divine: see the difference of opinion with regard to the question whether the second coffin burried together with the coffin carrying Numa's body contained only sacred books, or also Greek philosophical books (22.2–6).—In any case it may be argued that in the present context, where the development of personal qualities is concerned, "philosophy" tends to be more or less equivalent to παιδεία (and κακοπαθεία?), so that the addition might seem to be superfluous (and thus: a marginal explanation?).

[82] *Num.* 20.8–10 (also p. 108 below); for the Platonic ideal that by a θείη τύχη the power of a king may converge with philosophical insight see Plato, *Pol.* 592A 7–9. Compare Duff (1999) 90 n. 68.

> divine fortune, the power of a king should be united with the insight of a philosopher (ἔκ τινος τύχης θείας εἰς ταὐτὸ διανοίᾳ φιλοσόφῳ βασιλικὴν συμπεσοῦσαν δύναμιν), thereby establishing virtue in control and mastery over vice.

A statesman of Numa's quality has, besides self-restraint, a good judgement of social virtues; but in order to establish him in the position of a ruler, even in his case a basis in philosophy is not sufficient: some divine factor is required. In the light of the rhetorical contrast between fortune and virtue this does not seem to be a particularly hopeful analysis of the situation—and as a matter of fact, in the context of the *Lives* the factor of divine fortune may be appealed to with special effect, seeing that examples showing that the road to power is paved with violence and corruption abound. In the *Comparison of the Lives of Lycurgus and Numa*[83] Plutarch argues that

> in general, both alike manifestly strove to lead their peoples to independence and self-restraint; but as regards the other virtues, the one set his affections more on manliness, the other on justice—unless indeed the different natures or usages on which the political projects of each were based required different provisions.[84] For it was not out of cowardice that Numa put a stop to the waging of war, but to prevent the commission of injustice; neither was it to promote the commission of injustice that Lycurgus made his people warlike, but that they might not suffer injustice. Accordingly, in removing the excesses and deficiencies of their citizens, both were forced to make great innovations.

As a matter of fact, Numa's policy based on justice may seem to be not essentially better than that of Lycurgus who opts for war, or is forced by the circumstances to do so.

We have met Dion already as a man involved in politics and showing a strong inclination towards philosophy. Plutarch refers to Plato's own account of young Dion as an excellent student, both in learning and in his eagerness to answer the call of virtue. When he gets a taste of philosophical speech leading the way to virtue (ὡς πρῶτον ἐγεύσατο λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡγεμονικῆς πρὸς ἀρετήν), his soul is speedily inflamed; in his youthfulness, he expects that this kind of

[83] *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 2.1–4.

[84] The phrase εἰ μὴ νὴ Δία (which seems to be Plutarch's favourite alternative for the more prosaic εἰ μὴ ἄρα: "unless indeed") introduces a possibility held likely by the author; of the 14 occurrences in the *Lives*, 5 occur in *synkriseis*. For τὰ πολιτεύματα as "political projects" (more broadly than "government", as Perrin has it), compare e.g. *Caes.* 4.8, *Per.* 12.1.

speech will have the same effect on Dionysius.[85] Plutarch's description of how Dion exhorts Dionysius to use every entreaty with the first of philosophers to come to Sicily (in order that, here again, "his character might be regulated by the principles of virtue") offers a second motive for appealing to philosophy in order to exert influence in the political sphere: Dion is hoping that by his contact with philosophers Dionysius "might be conformed to the most divine and most beautiful model of all being, in obedience to whose direction the universe issues from disorder into order": this harmonious situation will bring a lasting leadership which is based on "goodwill and ardour and favour engendered by virtue and justice", that is, "he would become a king instead of a tyrant (γενόμενος βασιλεὺς ἐκ τυράννου)". Surely it would be strange if the body of a ruler was magnificently clothed, but as far as his way of dealing with people is concerned, he would be no more majestic than an ordinary man.[86] As a seemingly appropriate countermove, the enemies of Dion try to make Dionysius call back Philistus, a man versed in letters and acquainted with the ways of tyrants (ἄνδρα καὶ πεπαιδευμένον περὶ λόγους καὶ τυραννικῶν ἠθῶν ἐμπειρότατον), in order that they might have in him a counterpoise to Plato and philosophy. On the occasion of Plato's third journey to Sicily, the Sicilians are filled with hope, that Plato might triumph over Philistus, and philosophy over tyranny.[87]

In the *Life of Lycurgus*, Lycurgus is praised for actually showing in his own behaviour what some philosophers only proclaimed in words—

[85] *Dio* 4.6–7.

[86] *Dio* 10–11 (here also the phrase τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ βασίλειον (10.5.4), n. 18, p. 78 above); βασιλικώτατον … τὸ πονεῖν, *Alex.* 40.2.6, see p. 84 above. For the connotations of "kingly" in political or otherwise social context see also *Publ.* 1.3 (Tarquinius Superbus does not use his power βασιλικῶς but ὑβρίζοντα καὶ τυραννοῦντα); *Rom.* 7.6 (Remus trusts Numitor, who after having heard the defendant makes a well-considered decision on his punishment, and thus seems to be βασιλικώτερος than Amulius, who convicts a defendant without a process); *Ag. et Cleom.* 45(24).3–6: Lysandridas asks Cleomenes to perform an action which is κάλλιον καὶ βασιλικώτατον among all the previous actions; Cleomenes responds by giving him back his city, on the consideration that what is conductive to good repute must be victorious over the profitable (νικάτω τὸ πρὸς δόξαν ἀεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ λυσιτελές); in *Demetr.* 52.6 king Seleucus is said to have repented that in his treatment of Demetrius he failed to reach the level even of the "barbarous Thracian" Dromichaetes, whose treatment of Lysimachus as a prisoner was φιλανθρώπως καὶ βασιλικῶς. See also *Num.* 20.9 (pp. 98–99 above) and *Arist.* 6.2, p. 109 below.

[87] *Dio* 19.1. For the idea that philosophy contributes to the good in the state, see e.g. *Ad princ. inerud.* 780E, 782A.

more or less like Alexander in Plutarch's speech on behalf of philosophy:[88]

> It was not, however, the chief design of Lycurgus to leave his city in command over a great many others, but he thought that, just as in the life of a single individual, the happiness of an entire city is generated by the prevalence of virtue and internal concord (ὥσπερ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς βίῳ καὶ πόλεως ὅλης νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτήν). The aim, therefore, of all his arrangements and adjustments was to make his people free-spirited, self-sufficing, and moderate in all their ways, and to keep them so as long as possible (ὅπως ἐλευθέριοι καὶ αὐτάρκεις γενόμενοι καὶ σωφρονοῦντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον διατελῶσι). His design for a civil polity was adopted by Plato, Diogenes, Zeno, and by all those who have won approval for their treatises on this subject, although they left behind them only writings and words. Lycurgus, on the other hand, produced not writings and words, but an actual polity which was beyond imitation, and because he gave, to those who maintain that the much talked of natural disposition to wisdom exists only in theory, an example of an entire city given to the love of wisdom (ἐπιδείξας ὅλην τὴν πόλιν φιλοσοφοῦσαν), his fame rightly transcended that of all who ever founded polities among the Greeks.

Lycurgus' policy, then, is based on the conviction that an analogy obtains between individual and state—or rather, that their condition is similar: in both cases prosperity depends on ἀρετή and concord.

The qualities required on the part of the statesman being more or less clear, the way how to achieve such concord in the community subject to his rule may need some further investigation. There appears to be a serious risk that through one's policy people may become ἀκόλαστος (intemperate) instead of σώφρων, as exemplified by some of Pericles' public measures.[89] In the *Life of Galba*, Plutarch seems to suscribe to Plato's view that paying attention to the mentality of one's subjects is essential:[90]

> (Plato) sees that a good commander or general can do nothing if his army is not both amenable and loyal (στρατιᾶς μὴ σωρονούσης μηδὲ ὁμοπαθούσης); and he thinks that the virtue of being ready to obey, like the virtue characteristic of a king, requires a noble nature and philosophical nourishment (τὴν πειθαρχικὴν ἀρετὴν ὁμοίως τῇ βασιλικῇ νομίζων φύσεως γενναίας καὶ τροφῆς φιλοσόφου δεῖσθαι), which harmoniously blends the qualities of gentleness and humanity with those of courage and aggres-

[88] *Lyc.* 31.1–3. Compare p. 76 above.
[89] *Per.* 9.1.
[90] *Galb.* 1.3.5. Compare De Blois & Bons (1992) 178.

siveness. Many dire events (…) bear witness to the risk of an army given over to untrained and irrational impulses.

In the case of Brutus anyway, a philosophical education is presented as a more unqualified asset, apparently owing to a felicitous combination of education and special natural qualities. In contrast to his violent ancestor, Brutus "lets his disposition be influenced by philosophical training and speech" (παιδείᾳ καὶ λόγῳ διὰ φιλοσοφίας καταμείξας τὸ ἦθος), and accordingly "his quiet and mild nature is stimulated towards action, apparently resulting in a blend in maximum harmony with the good" (ἐμμελέστατα δοκεῖ κραθῆναι πρὸς τὸ καλόν).[91] Owing to his moral quality, even those feeling hatred against him because of the conspiracy against Caesar, tend to ascribe anything noble in the undertaking to Brutus, blaming Cassius—who is less simple and sincere in his manners—for the villainous outrages that were most difficult to swallow. Here again, a certain straightforwardness in the pursuit of one's ambitions apparently contributes to one's popularity (and thus to one's success) as a politician. In any case the idea seems to be that, while Brutus' philosophical education stimulates, and presumably lends direction to, his political activities, a dignified and mild disposition provides the essential basis for his success.

As a matter of fact, a politician may deliberately draw a line as far as his philosophical occupations are concerned, as is illustrated by Philopoemen, who occupies himself with writings of philosophers—but only those whom he thinks helpful on the road to virtue. As far as he is concerned, the value of these writings (on political and otherwise moral subjects especially?) is comparable to that of the Homeric poems, the *Tactics* of Evangelus, and the historical writings on Alexander: according to Philopoemen, literature, on the condition that it is studied seriously, is conducive to action (τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα καταστρέφειν οἰόμενος, εἰ μὴ σχολῆς ἕνεκα καὶ λαλιᾶς ἀκάρπου περαίνοιντο).[92] This attitude does not detract from the special role on which (as we have seen) Philopoemen's teachers, the philosophers Ecdemus and Demo-

[91] *Brut.* 1.3–4. Compare also *Cor.* 15.4: "(Marcius) had indulged the passionate and contentious side of his nature (πλεῖστα τῷ θυμοειδεῖ καὶ φιλονίκῳ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς … κεχρημένος), with the idea that there was something great and exalted in this, and had not been imbued, under the influence of reason and education, with that gravity and gentleness which is the chief component of political virtue (τὸ δ' ἐμβριθὲς καὶ τὸ πρᾷον, οὗ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀρετῇ πολιτικῇ μέτεστιν, ἐγκεκραμένον οὐκ ἔχων ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ παιδείας).

[92] *Philop.* 4.6–9. Compare Alexander's view of the *Iliad* as a supply of military virtue (τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς ἐφόδιον), *Alex.* 8.2.

phanes, pride themselves, who assume that their pupil will be a benefit to Greece as a result of their teaching especially.[93]

It seems obvious, then, that apart from his personal qualities a statesman needs the power to mould the people subject to his rule; if not by violence, then by the power of persuasion.

Politics and the power of persuasion

Epaminondas' plain speech as a plea for peace on behalf of all Greece clearly illustrates the importance of persuasion for political success.[94] On a smaller scale, between politicians, the philosopher Crates succeeds in convincing Demetrius to raise the siege of Athens, partly by his arguments on behalf of the Athenians, partly by suggesting a course advantageous to him.[95] The power of persuasion is, of course, a risk in the hands of unworthy people, such as Dion's opponent Heracleides, "a man least to be relied upon as partner in an enterprise involving power and glory", especially if he is welcomed by a likewise unworthy audience:[96]

> At once, then, Heracleides sought to win the favour of the multitude, having a certain natural gift of persuading and moving a crowd that seeks to be courted (ἔχων μέν τι καὶ φύσει πιθανὸν καὶ κινητικὸν ὄχλου θεραπεύεσθαι ζητοῦντος), and seducing them and winning them over all the more easily because they were repelled by the loftiness (τὸ σεμνόν) of Dion, which they resented as severe and out of place in a public man (βαρὺ καὶ δυσπολίτευτον), due to the licence and boldness derived from their power, wishing to be the object of demagogy before actually being a *dêmos*.

When the disasters that befell the Syracusans are reported to Dion, and the messengers have finished their speech in the assembly, Dion gives a speech after his own fashion. At first, his speech is checked by copious tears; his mercenaries, sympathizing with him, bid him take heart. After taking much blame upon himself, and by refraining from pressure, he makes a successful appeal to their cooperation.[97]

In his *Lives*, Plutarch more than once refers to Antipater's words in praise of Aristotle, to the effect that in addition to everything else, the

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93 *Ibidem* 1.3; see p. 000–000 above.
94 *Ages.* 27.6–7, p. 000 above.
95 *Demetr.* 46.3–4.
96 *Dio* 32.5.
97 *Dio* 43.

man is also gifted with persuasion—the tenor of this quotation being, that this capacity is not to be neglected. It is used to illustrate, for instance, the qualities of Cato maior, who in the many civil processes in which he was involved was victorious as a plaintiff most of the time, and never lost as a defendant, thanks to "that bullwark and effective weapon of his life, his eloquence" (πρόβλημα τοῦ βίου καὶ δραστήριον ὄργανον ἔχων τὸν λόγον)—which was a more important factor than his τύχη or his δαίμων.[98] In a more political context, Antipater's praise serves as an introduction to the comparison between Alcibiades and Marcius as regards popularity:[99]

> Antipater, writing in one of his letters about the death of Aristotle the philosopher, says: "In addition to his other gifts, the man had also that of persuasion" ("πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις … ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν εἶχε); and the absence of this gift from Marcius made his great deeds and virtues obnoxious to the very men whom they benefited, since they could not endure the arrogant pride of the man, and "that stubbornness which has", as Plato says, "solitude as its housemate" (τὸν ὄγκον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐρημίᾳ σύνοικον … αὐθάδειαν).[100] Alcibiades, on the other hand, understood how to treat in a familiar manner those who met him (χρῆσθαι τοῖς προστυγχάνουσιν οἰκείως), and it is no reason for surpise that when he was successful his fame was attended with goodwill and honour, and flowered luxuriantly, since some of his errors often had charm and felicity. This was the reason why, in spite of the great and frequent harm done by him to the city, he was nevertheless many times appointed leader and general; while Marcius, when he stood for an office which was his due in view of his many valorous achievements (μετιὼν ἐπὶ πολλαῖς ἀριστείαις καὶ ἀνδραγαθίαις ἀρχὴν προσήκουσαν), was defeated. And so it was that the one could not make himself hated by his countrymen, even when he was doing them harm; while the other was after all not beloved, even though he was admired.

Popularity among the people may be attained also by rhetorical skill, existing independently of other competences.[101] In Plutarch's view, this apparently obtains in the case of Crassus: after describing his rhetorical

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[98] *Comp. Arist. et Cato mai.* 2.5.

[99] *Comp. Alc. et Cor.* 3.3–6.

[100] See also p. 96 with n. 76 above.

[101] An interesting—and somewhat curious—case is Aratus, who is inclined to view everything from a public, rather than a private point of view; he has a natural talent for politics (like fruit growing spontaneously, without any agriculture involved). He is brilliant in his strategies for manipulating people, but shows a certain deficiency when he has to operate in the open, like an animal unable to see by day. His natural virtue is not supported by philosophical λόγος (*Arat.* 10). I agree whith Thome that the emphasis on his lack of *philosophic* education seems to be somewhat far-fetched here

skill, Plutarch mentions that—besides all this, as it were—he is said to have been versed in history, and not without experience in the field of philosophy, attaching himself to Aristotle's views. Plutarch seems to have a favourable opinion on the way in which Crassus uses his rhetorical competence:[102]

> As for his literary pursuits, he cultivated chiefly the art of speaking which was of general service (παιδείας … τῆς περὶ λόγον μάλιστα μὲν τὸ ῥητορικὸν καὶ χρειῶδες εἰς ⟨τοὺς⟩ πολλοὺς ἤσκησε), and after he became one of the most powerful speakers (δεινὸς εἰπεῖν) at Rome, his care and application (ἐπιμελείᾳ καὶ πόνῳ) enabled him to surpass those who were most gifted by nature. For there was no case, they say, however trifling and even contemptible it might be, which he undertook without preparation, but often, when Pompey and Caesar and Cicero were unwilling to plead, he would perform all the duties of an advocate. And on this account he became more popular than they, being esteemed a careful man, and one who was ready to offer his help (μᾶλλον ἤρεσκεν ὡς ἐπιμελὴς καὶ βοηθητικός). He pleased people also by the kindly and unaffected manner (τὸ … φιλάνθρωπον αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτικόν) with which he clasped their hands and addressed them. For he never met a Roman so obscure and lowly that he did not return his greeting and call him by name.

Eloquence is also one of the positive characteristics ascribed to "Callisthenes the philosopher", a relative of Aristotle, whose mode of life is well-ordered, dignified, and independent. He tries to alleviate Alexander's suffering after he had killed Cleitus by considerate and gentle methods (ἠθικῶς ἐπεῖρατο καὶ πρᾴως), making use of allusion and circumlocution so as to avoid giving pain.[103] Alexander, however, appears to be more sensitive to the approach of Anaxarchus of Abdera, "who had always taken a path of his own in philosophy, and had acquired a reputation for despising and slighting his associates", who shouted out as soon as he entered Alexander's chamber:[104]

> "Here is Alexander, to whom the whole world is now looking; but he lies on the floor weeping like a slave, in fear of the law and the censure of men unto whom he himself should be a law and a measure of justice, since he has conquered the right to rule and mastery, instead of

([1998] 172 n.9). In 3.3 it is said that Aratus' cultivation *of oratory* was less intense than suitable for a politician.

[102] *Crass.* 3.3–5. By contrast, the scope of Cicero's ambition is illustrated by his renouncement of his previous encomium on Crassus as merely a rhetorical exercise by way of praising an inferior subject (*Cic.* 25.2.).

[103] *Alex.* 52.3.1–53.

[104] *Alex.* 52.5–6.

> submitting like a slave to the mastery of vain opinion. Knowest thou not," said he, "that Zeus has Justice and Law seated beside him, in order that everything that is done by the master of the world may be lawful and just?" By using such arguments as these Anaxarchus succeeded in lightening the suffering of the king, it is true, but rendered his disposition in many ways more vainglorious and lawless; he also made himself wonderfully liked by the king, and brought the intercourse with Callisthenes, which had always been unpleasant because of the man's austerity, into additional disfavour.

The other sophists are annoyed at the serious attention of the young men Callisthenes attracts by his eloquence, and people are jealous of his reputation; still, he makes himself unpopular by his lack of feeling for the demands of social intercourse. With reference to his less than tactful choice of quotations when he was bidden to speak at Alexander's table, Plutarch subscribes to the verdict on Callisthenes once expressed by Aristotle, to the effect that he is an excellent speaker, but lacking in νοῦς (sagacity). When Callisthenes takes a strong position against the *proskunêsis*, Plutarch's appreciation of his attitude is likewise qualified:[105]

> in the matter of the obeisance, at least, by refusing sturdily and like a philosopher (ἰσχυρῶς ἀπωσάμενος καὶ φιλοσόφως) to perform the act, and by standing forth alone and rehearsing in public the reasons for the indignation which all the senior and best of the Macedonians cherished in secret, he delivered the Greeks from a great, and Alexander from a greater, disgrace by leading him not to insist upon the obeisance; but he destroyed himself, because he was thought to use force rather than persuasion with the king.

To act according to a conviction based on solid moral reasoning is acting like a philosopher and to be appreciated; it is ill-judged for a orator to get the better of a mighty opponent, without giving him the opportunity to save face.

As for rhetorical skill, Cato minor does not meet with more approval than was the case with his philosophical attitude. As we have seen, Cato is devoted especially to the ethical and political branches of philosophy. Not without some second thoughts, it seems, Plutarch describes how Cato is overcome by an inspiration for every virtue, and is especially fond of that form of goodness which consists in a rigid form of unbending justice. In addition, Cato practises the kind of speech that is brought to bear on the masses (τὸν ὀργανικὸν εἰς πλήθη λόγον), on the supposition that in political philosophy, just as in a great city, there is always

[105] *Alex.* 54.3.

also a certain warlike element (ἀξιῶν ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει μεγάλῃ τῇ πολιτικῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ μάχιμον εἶναί τι παρατρεφόμενον). In practice, however, he did not actually speak in public: when he was blamed for holding his tongue, he explained that he had only things to say that were better left unsaid.[106] Further on in this *Life* it appears that his training is certainly effective when he is addressing people actually preparing for war: where many others have failed, Cato succeeds in inspiring the soldiers by a speech, in which he applies all the sentiments philosophy has to offer:[107]

> when Cato, after all the other speakers, had rehearsed with genuine emotion all the opportune sentiments to be drawn from philosophy concerning freedom, virtue, death and fame (ὅσα καιρὸν εἶχε τῶν ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀκούσιν λεγομένων περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ θανάτου καὶ δόξης), and finally went on to an invocation of the gods as eyewitnesses of their struggle in behalf of their country, there was such a shouting and so great a stir among the soldiers thus aroused that all the commanders were full of hope as they hastened to confront the peril.

After at least partial success, Cato alone is weeping for his country and he bewails the love of rule (φιλαρχία) that had brought so much misfortune and destruction, as he saw that may brave citizens had fallen by one another's hands.

On the other hand, the power of speech without accompanying political or philosophical qualities involves a serious risk. Demosthenes is brave insofar as he openly pleads for war, but his conduct during in the battle is inconsistent with his words: he forsakes his post and runs away as a real *rhipsaspis*. After his victory, Philip shudders "at the power and the ability of the orator who had forced him to hazard his empire and his life in the brief span of a single day".[108]

Theodotus of Chios, who is attached to Caesar as a paid teacher of rhetoric, and who has a place in the council but only for lack of better men, is immediately responsible by his speech for the death of Pompey; in the end, he has to pay his due:[109]

> The council adopted his opinion, and Pompey the Great lay dead, an example of the unexpected and incredible in human life (παράδειγμα τῶν ἀπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτων), and it was the work of Theodotus and

[106] *Cato minor* 4. See also Duff (n. 45 above) on Plutarch's negative description of both Phocion and Cato minor.
[107] *Cato minor* 54.8–9.
[108] *Dem.* 20.2–3.
[109] *Brut.* 33.5–6.

> his clever rhetoric (τῆς Θεοδότου ῥητορείας καὶ δεινότητος ἔργον), as that sophist himself was wont to say with boasting. A little while afterwards, however, when Caesar came, the other wretches paid the penalty for their crime and perished wretchedly; as for Theodotus, after borrowing from Fortune enough time for a wandering, destitute, and inglorious life, he did not escape the notice of Brutus, who at this time traversed Asia, but was brought to him and punished, and won more fame for his death than for his life.

All things considered, it may seem that, according to Plutarch, the most compelling way of persuasion is persuasion by displaying virtue, as signposted by Plutarch's emphasis in the *Lives* on social virtues such as πρᾳότης and φιλανθρωπία;[110] this also seems to be the message of Plutarch's second thoughts about the basis of Numa's success:[111]

> For possibly (τάχα) there is no need of any compulsion or menace in dealing with the multitude, but when they see with their own eyes a conspicious and shining example of virtue in the life of their ruler (αὐτοὶ δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐν εὐδήλῳ παραδείγματι καὶ λαμπρῷ τῷ βίῳ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ὁρῶντες), they will of their own accord walk in wisdom's ways, and unite with him in conforming themselves to a blameless and blessed life of friendship and mutual concord, attended by righteousness and temperance (ἑκουσίως σωφρονοῦσι καὶ συμμετασχηματίζονται πρὸς τὸν ἐν φιλίᾳ καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς μετὰ δικαιοσύνης καὶ μετριότητος ἀμύμονα καὶ μακά-ριον βίον). Such a life is the noblest end of all government, and he is most a king who can inculcate such a life and such a disposition in his subjects (βασιλικώτατος ἁπάντων ὁ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάθεσιν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἐνεργάσασθαι δυνάμενος). This, then, as it appears, Numa was preeminent in discerning.

In practice, the authority of the Platonic philosopher, which is ultimately supported by an absolute truth, must be replaced by rational persuasion in accordance with self-restraint and the more social virtue of kindness. Most kingly is the man who is able to let the people obey without force, by setting an example. And *possibly*, then, someone like Numa does not have to wait for a θείη τύχη after all: a leader who is able to win over the people to ἀρετή by setting an example by his own way of living will be as kingly as a king can be.[112] Lycurgus, in the parallel *Life*, holds that the preference ⟨for the good⟩ (προαίρεσις),

[110] See Wardman (1974) 226–226; Martin (1960), (1961), de Romilly (1979).
[111] *Num.* 20.11–12; see also p. 98–99 above.
[112] Compare *Ag. et Cleom.* 34(13).9: κάλλιστον καὶ βασιλικώτατον is trying to win over people not by gifts but by intercourse and conversation which inspires pleasure and confidence. Compare de Blois & Bons (1992) 176; "Plutarch's admiration for non-philosophical leaders"—sc. in a Platonic sense—, *ibidem* 180.

implanted into the young by education as a kind of personal lawgiver, is more likely to lead to success than constraint (ἀνάγκη).[113] In this *Life*,[114] Plutarch finds reason to observe that

> "men will not consent to obey those who have not the ability to rule, but obedience is a lesson to be learned from a commander. For a good leader makes good followers, and just as the final attainment of the art of horsemanship is to make a horse gentle and tractable, so it is the task of the science of government to implant obedience in men (βασιλικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔργον ἀνθρώποις εὐπείθειαν ἐνεργάζεσθαι)".

Plutarch's conviction that ἀρετή is the only divine good that is within our reach (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) is made explicit in the *Life of Aristides*:[115]

> Of all his virtues, it was his justice that most impressed the multitude, because of its most continual and most general exercise. Wherefore, though poor and a man of the people, he acquired that most kingly and godlike surname of "The Just" (τὴν βασιλικωτάτην καὶ θειοτάτην προσηγορίαν τὸν Δίκαιον). This no kings or tyrants ever coveted, nay, they rejoiced to be surnamed "Besiegers", or "Thunderbolts", or "Conquerors", and some "Eagles", or "Hawks", cultivating the reputation which is based on violence and power, as it seems, rather than on virtue. And yet divinity, to which such men are eager to adapt and conform themselves, is believed to have three elements of superiority,—incorruption, power, and virtue; and the most reverend, the divinest of these, is virtue. For vacuum and the elements partake of incorruption; and great power is exhibited by earthquakes and thunderbolts, and rushing tornados, and invading floods; but in fundamental justice nothing participates except through the exercise of intelligent reasoning powers.[116]

In addition, a life passed in power and great fortune and authority needs justice to make it divine; by injustice it is made bestial. This scale of values is also exemplified by the "ideal" case of Brutus, who relies not so much on his δύναμις as on his ἀρετή.[117]

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113 *Lyc.* 13.2. Compare the story of Alexander's taming of Bucephalas, and the moral with regard to his future kingship drawn from it by Philip, *Alex.* 6.

114 *Lyc.* 30.4.

115 *Arist.* 6.1–3.

116 τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι [τὸ θεῖον, MSS]; θεῖόν ἐστι, Ziegler (after Bernardakis).

117 *Brut.* 29.8. For a description of his moral character, see 29.3. Brutus is "simply the philosopher in action", Duff (1999) 156 n. 86, Pelling (1989) 222–226. Plutarch's political ideal is not based on a particular form of government or on a particular institution, but in the first place on moral values, on justice and humanity. Cp. Aalders (1982) 44; Aalders & de Blois (1992) 3395; see Plato, *Nom.* VI 757B. The seemingly similar contrast used by Marcius in his adhortation to the aristocracy (who should show their

In such passages we seem to light upon the Plutarchean value of persuasion by displaying virtue (and justice in particular), which holds in the public and in the private sphere alike, but will have more impact in proportion to the reach of one's influence. Relatively many people will profit from a politician displaying this virtue[118]—and, one might add, in a secondary sense also from the author of the *Parallel Lives* displaying the mechanism involved.

Conclusion

In the *Lives*, philosophy is first and foremost associated with self-restraint, also where philosophical qualities of a politician or statesman are concerned—although Plutarch recognizes that for a politician, as for a tradesman, a certain measure of wealth may be functional (which accordingly also holds for a philosopher engaged in politics).

Obviously one can be a philosopher very well without having political ambitions. Diogenes is an extreme example; "theoretical" philosophy sometimes offers a refuge to those who want (or are forced) to keep away from the *vita activa*. When the theoretical life centers on metaphysics, it may offer a real refuge, or even be invoked as an "*arcanum*" (as, apparently, in the case of the lectures of Aristotle attended by Alexander).

Those situations in which philosophy features as a refuge from the world of social interaction may in actual fact include the study of political and otherwise moral questions. On the other hand, those who are versed in this kind of studies are likely to be both capable and willing to assist those actually engaged in political functions; the next step being that they choose, or are urged, to take part in politics themselves. In effect these "philosophers in action" are not really different from those politicians who have a philosophical quality or show a philosophical attitide; on the other hand, the examples in the *Lives* make clear that a basis in practical life is an obvious asset.

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superiority to the common people in ἀρετή rather than δύναμις, *Cor.* 7.4) involves the opposition between the special valour of the aristocrat and the political power of οἱ πολλοί prepared to go to war in great numbers.

[118] In *Max. cum princ.* 777A Plutarch comments on the economy involved in teaching a ruler, a statesman, or a man of action, since many people benefit from this.

Sometimes a politician with all the qualities of a philosopher fails as a politician where someone who is less qualified as a philosopher proves to be superior as a politician. In real life, then, the good of a community cannot be reached by philosophy alone: persuasion appears to be a necessary instrument, and popular appeal is a value not to be underestimated. The power of speech is essential—and it may be no coincidence, that where the requirement of being versed in λόγοι is spoken of, it is often impossible to specify whether "rhetoric" or "philosophy" is referred to. The most outspoken passages in the *Lives*, then, are those where persuasion by openly displaying virtue is presented as the ideal situation. Those cases in which Plutarch must recognize that virtuous acts sometimes have negative political effects often seem to involve a deficiency at the level of communication.

For Plutarch, then, apart from the virtue of self-restraint there seems to be no straightforward connection between the competence of a philosopher and political qualifications. Philosophers may exert influence as teachers or counsellors; even in the case of politicians with a strong philosophical leaning who in some way operate as law-givers, personal qualities and external circumstances are more important than (knowledge of) principles. Plutarch seems to be more impressed by that kind of frankness of speech which voices an appeal to political unity than by the "Socratic" variety of *parrhesia* that claims to tell the truth.

If this analysis of Plutarch's view on the philosopher's profile holds water, it does not seem to make much sense to place his conceptions as belonging to a specific school of philosophy. Plutarch shares with Plato the high value attached to education, but without the Platonic emphasis on knowledge and an objective concept of justice;[119] his own views may be characterized as "philosophical" in a more pragmatic Isocratean sense also where convincing the public by rhetorical means is concerned—and even then, deeds (representing common notions of virtue and justice) are better than words. Taking into account Plutarch's aim to offer his audience material for moral consideration, the all-importance of self-restraint, and the emphasis on the less radical ways to political success are hardly surprising.

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[119] Thome (1998) 173 points out that the *Lives* are more pessimistic (or, realistic) than the *Moralia* in this respect. Compare Nikolaidis (1995) 311–312; Aalders (1984) 61: "Plutarch was no revolutionary, nor was he longing for the coming of a better world; he was too sober of mind and too pragmatic to indulge utopian dreams".

If one most important lesson can be distilled from the *Lives*, I submit that we should listen, again, to Plutarch's favourite hero invoked to illustrate the social arena in its narrowest form: when asked how to take stand against an enemy, Diogenes the Cynic reportedly answered: "by proving yourself a man of virtue" (αὐτὸς καλὸς κἀγαθὸς γενόμενος). Significantly, Plutarch qualifies Diogenes' assertion as being highly philosophical—as well as political (φιλόσοφον σφόδρα καὶ πολιτικήν).[120]

[120] *De cap. ex inim.* 88B.

"STABBED WITH LARGE PENS": TRAJECTORIES OF LITERACY IN PLUTARCH'S *LIVES*[1]

Alexei V. Zadorojnyi

It is well-known that Plutarch's political views are centred on the idea of concord and abhorrence of violent conflict (*stasis*) within a community.[2] The double *Life* of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchi is constructed as a negative paradigm of *stasis*.[3] Plutarch shows Rome plunging for the first time (*Tiberius-Gaius Gracchi* 20.1) into a period of bloody civil strife for which the brothers are responsible—despite their noble intentions (9.4: καλὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ δικαίαν), they are ambitious demagogues pandering to the masses (*Agis-Cleomenes* 2.3–8).[4] The *stasis* is presented as a reversal of the norms and expectations of civic life.[5] Legislation and persuasion collapse (*Tiberius-Gaius Gracchi* 20.1–2; 37 [16].1–4). Neither gods, nor laws can be trusted any more, as Cornelia will point out (36 [15].4). The temple of Concord built by the consul Opimius in the aftermath is really a monument to madness (38 [17].8–9). Likewise, artefacts are used in a violent, abnormal way during *stasis*: tribunes of the people start to carry bandit-style stilettos (10.9, cf. 36 [15].2), Tiberius is clubbed to death with pieces of senatorial furniture (19.8–10).

The immediate prelude to Gaius' death can be read as adding a further dimension to the portrayal of crisis:

> On the day when Opimius prepared to repeal Gaius' laws, the Capitol was occupied early in the morning by both parties. After the consul had performed the sacrifice, his lictor (τῶν ὑπηρετῶν), one Quintus Antyllius, was carrying the entrails away and said to Fulvius' supporters, "Make

[1] Successive drafts of this paper were presented to classicists at Exeter, Liverpool, Nijmegen, and Canterbury. I am grateful to all participants of these meetings as well as to this volume's referees for their feedback and suggestions. The remaining errors are entirely my own.

[2] *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 823F–825D; *Comparison Agis-Cleomenes-Gracchi* 4.3; Duff (1999) 89–91, 93, 196, 296–297; Gómez Espelosín (1990); Ash (1997) is a brilliant case study of *stasis* in *Galba* and *Otho*.

[3] See Ingenkamp (1992), especially 4336–4344.

[4] On Plurarchan stereotyping the Gracchi as champions of the *demos*, see Pelling (2002a) 214–216.

[5] A narrative move that dates back to Thucydides, 3.81.5–83.4.

> way for the good people, you wicked citizens (κακοὶ πολῖται)!" Some say that he also made a rude gesture with his bare forearm (τὸν βραχίονα γυμνὸν οἷον ἐφ' ὕβρει σχηματίζοντα παρενεγκεῖν). Anyway, Antyllius died right there, stabbed with long styluses—which were allegedly new ones, made specially for this purpose (μεγάλοις γραφείοις κεντούμενος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιῆσθαι λεγομένοις). The crowd was confounded by the murder, but the two leaders reacted in opposite ways. Gaius was angered and reproached his men for having given the enemies the much-awaited cause to attack. Opimius, on the other hand, got elated, as if he had received the signal, and urged the people onto vengeance. (34 [13].3–5).

The passage reflects some of the main anxieties of the *Life*. Sacrifice fails to reunite the divided community, ending in bloodshed instead, communication degenerates into insults and rude, then stabbing gestures. But there is also a poignant detail about Antyllius' end: his murderers are armed with pens.[6] Roman citizens (the offensive address κακοὶ πολῖται momentarily reminds us of the civic nature of the conflict) use their "specially prepared" styluses in the forum not to write, but to kill another citizen. Writing tools, such as tablets and stylus, would be ubiquitous on Roman streets as an essential part of "civilized" communal functioning—trade, oratory, government, schools.[7] Plutarch's message seems to be that when the pen becomes an instrument of *phonos*, not of *logos*, the community must be in crisis indeed.

A question might be raised as to whether a crowd of Gracchan supporters, who were mostly working-class and so assumed semi-illiterate, would be an unusual and provocative sight when equipped with styluses in the forum. Firstly, it is not certain that the *lictor* was in fact attacked by the mob rather than by a small group of Gracchus' closest associates. There are serious discrepancies in the ancient sources. While in Plutarch Antyllius is pen-stabbed spontaneously and to Gaius' great displeasure (*Tiberius-Gaius Gracchi* 34 [13].5; *Comparison Agis-Cleomenes-*

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[6] For the Roman political conscience to be carrying a weapon in the public space is a major transgression. So arming oneself with styluses and pieces of furniture rather than with swords and daggers is an attempt to stay somehow on the right side of the law: cf. e.g., Cicero, *In Catilinam* 2.1, *Philippica* 2.112–113, especially *Philippica* 5.17–18; Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 34.139; *Digesta* 48.6.3; Nippel (1995) 54–55, 58; Richardson (1976) 95; generally, Lintott (1968) 107–124. The trick did not work. Ancient historians typically describe the Gracchan crisis as the point when violence and weapons were introduced into Rome's life: Velleius Paterculus 2.3.3: *hoc initium in urbe Roma ciuilis sanguinis gladiorumque inpunitatis fuit*; Appian, *Bellum Civile* 1.2.4: ξίφος.

[7] Fascinating picture in Morgan (1998) 1–2. In the riddling list of Trimalchio's gifts (Petronius, *Satyricon* 56.9) the epithet "of the forum" (*forensia*) refers to writing tablets (*tabulae*). For ancient writing tools, see Blanck (1992) 64–71; Small (1997) 145–150.

Gracchi 5.1), in Appian (*Bellum Civile* 1.25.110) he is called Antyllus and gets killed with a dagger after attempting a conversation with Gaius, whereas in Diodorus Siculus (34.28a1) it is angry Gaius himself who pushes Quintus (*sic*) to the ground and orders his followers (ἀκολουθοῦσι) to kill him. The anonymous *De viris illustribus* says that Antyllius was a victim of the crowd (65.5 *in turba fuisset occisus*), yet this evidence is outweighed by Diodorus and Appian who seem to imply that he was murdered by Gracchus' lieutenants. Among the latter there were literates, such as the loyal knight Pomponius (Velleius Paterculus 2.6.6, cf. Valerius Maximus 4.7.2).[8] Secondly, use of literacy, however limited, would be still quite common among Roman and Italian working classes. Stylus and tablets belong with the more immediate, functional literacy of basic on-the-spot records, counting, and so on; the highbrow "bookish" literacy operates with reed (κάλαμος) and papyrus. In any case, I argue that in principle there would be nothing wrong for many men to have a stylus in the forum. But with the Gracchans it is only a thin veil of normality over a violent plot since their styluses were deliberately longer than usual…

Styluses and tablets as short-range surprise weapons feature more than once in Greco-Roman texts. As one would expect, they are flashed not in regular battle narrative, but in the murky settings of autocracy, conspiracy, gruesome crime, assassination, and torture.[9] Whereas the contrast between pen and sword is a popular (especially in Cicero) rhetorical move to set up an opposition between peaceful civilian life and military violence,[10] a pen converted into dagger is rather more

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[8] Interestingly, Plutarch is aware of the pro-equestrian policies of the Gracchi (*Tiberius-Gaius Grachi* 16.1, 26 [5].2–4), yet presents them, again, as aimed at winning over the *demos*: Pelling (2002a) 220.

[9] See Appendix 1; Blanck (1992) 64; Small (1997) 147. Pliny the Elder's remarks about early Romans refraining from immoral uses of iron and even writing with styluses made of bone rather than of metal (*Naturalis Historia* 34.139) acquire a sinister ring, too.

[10] Cicero, *Pro Murena* 30, *Pro Cluentio* 123; further examples in Geiger (2002); the mood is certainly that of *cedant arma togae* (Cicero, *In Pisonem* 72; *Philippica* 2.20; *De Officiis* 1.77; *Ad familiares* 1.9.23; *Ad Atticum* 1.19.10; 1.20.6; 2.3.4; Plutarch, *Comparison Demosthenes-Cicero* 2). Horace's comparison of his satirical stylus to a sword (*Satire* 2.1.39–41: *sed hic stilus haud petet ultro / quemquam animantem et me ueluti custodiet ensis / uagina tectus*) grows out of a different rhetoric of describing discourse as wounding or even lethal like a weapon because of its contents: cf. the "edge" of the censor's stylus (Cicero, *Pro Cluentio* 123), word-play on *telum* (Suetonius, *Caligula* 53.3; Ammianus Marcellinus 30.5.10) and *acies* (Ammianus Marcellinus 18.3.7, 29.1.19), also Juvenal, *Satire* 4.109–110 (*tenui iugulos aperire susurro*), Ammianus Marcellinus 30.4.9 (*sicam ingenii destringentes*), *P.Bour* 1, etc. The juxtaposition of sword and pen in Plutarch's *Cato minor* 11.8 points in a different direction altogether; see below, p. 131.

disturbing. It is an image overshadowing political struggle that takes unconstitutional route when normal civic debate is no longer an option. Cicero's admission about the Ides of March in the 2nd *Philippic* is memorable:

> I would have removed from the state not only the despot, but despotism as such, and if that stylus, as they say, would have been mine—believe me, I would have completed the whole drama, not just one act.
>
> *non solum regem, sed etiam regnum de re publica sustulissem, et si meus stilus ille fuisset, ut dicitur, mihi crede, non solum unum actum, sed totam fabulam confecissem* (*Philippica* 2.34)

Cicero's metaphor[11] refers to Brutus' dagger (*pugio*) held aloft after Caesar's murder (*Philippica* 2.28, 30)[12] and represented on Brutus' coinage.[13] The passage imposes a quasi-textual vision of history. Under extreme circumstances of tyranny history becomes a tragic text to be written with the conspirator's dagger. Dagger and stylus become interchangeable, if not indistinguishable.

I would like to take this topos as a starting point of exploration of the undercurrent reflection about the value of literacy and literary materiality (or, if I may coin the word, scriptuality)[14] among the Greco-Roman literati. It is a commonplace that literacy formed a privileged element of identity and self-perception in later antiquity. Literacy carried prestige.[15] For some it could facilitate social rise, for others literary *paideia* was the necessary constituent of status.[16] There were of course many gradations of literacy across Greco-Roman society—indeed, many literacies ranging from the very basic communication through written messages to the "advanced" level of being able to absorb and respond

[11] For it *is* a double entendre: Lacey (1986) 182 and Ramsey (2003) 212, *pace* Denniston (1926) 118.

[12] Which, in turn, was meant to recall Lucretia's dagger upon which the ancient Brutus swore his oath against monarchy (Livy 1.59.1–2).

[13] Crawford (1974) nr. 508/3.

[14] Which, as the discussion below makes clear, is broadly related to but not identical with Gennette's concept of paratextuality: Genette (1997).

[15] The middle class apparently liked being portrayed holding pens and book-rolls: Harris (1989) 263; Zanker (1995) 260–261; Schmitz (1997) 107. Much evidence assembled in Birt (1907) 40–268.

[16] Harris (1989) 248–252, Hopkins (1991) 142–144; generally, Bowersock (1969); Fein (1994) 221–282; Swain (1996); Schmitz (1997) 44–55, 61–66, 94–96, 133–135, 230–231; Morgan (1998); Habinek (1998) 103–121; Whitmarsh (2001) 90–130, 189. For the link between education and power, cf. especially [Dionysius of Halicarnassus], *Ars rhetorica* 5.3; Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Tacitus* 3.4; Aurelius Victor, *De Caesaribus* 40.12–13.

to literature of the accepted cultural curriculum by producing sophisticated self-aware texts. Most recent studies seem to emphasize the limitations of mass literacy in the ancient world,[17] while not enough attention is given to the high-end of ancient literacy and particularly to the strategies adopted by the intellectuals (*pepaideumenoi*) to self-fashion themselves as literates, with specific emphasis on writing and reading.[18]

It cannot be denied that the authors and contemporary readers of such genres as history and biography (and for the purposes of this paper I am not too keen to press the distinction between the two) belonged to the elite class of the exceptionally well-educated. For the likes of Plutarch and Suetonius literacy is part of daily routine,[19] their world being steeped in book-culture. In these circles one personalizes books as friends (Cicero, *Ad familiares* 9.1.2). It is quite standard to have stylus and tablets at hand at any time.[20] One would read and write into small hours, in very old age (in tiny letters, too).[21] Cato the Younger notoriously read in the *curia*;[22] some coolheaded intellectuals read and took notes on the eve of battles and, in one case, a volcano eruption.[23] For members of this group it was surely an unusual, but still not a dishonourable accident to break one's hip slipping on the floor when trying to pick up a heavy volume.[24] For professionals among them it is good to dream of eating a book (whereas for laymen it is a dangerous dream).[25] The high-ranking statesmen among them would complain about too much paperwork—which is, as Plutarch reminds us, the price of power:

[17] Harris (1989); Thomas (1989), (1992); Morgan (1998); various contributions in Bowman and Woolf (1994).

[18] Small (1997) is a welcome exception. The most illustrative example of an ancient bibliomaniac is Athenaeus, on whom see, recently, Jacob (2000); Too (2000).

[19] Cf. Plutarch, *De communibus notitiis* 1082B: "lunching, writing, walking" as examples of typical daily activities; *Adversus Colotem* 1107D; Pliny, *Epistles* 3.5.10–11.

[20] In the countryside: Seneca, *Epistles* 87.3; while hunting: Pliny, *Epistles* 1.6, 9.36.6. See also McDonnell (1996).

[21] Plutarch, *Brutus* 36.4; Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Tacitus* 11.8.

[22] Cicero, *De finibus* 3.7; Valerius Maximus 8.7.2; Plutarch, *Cato minor* 19.1.

[23] Plutarch, *Brutus* 4.6–8, Ammianus Marcellinus 25.2.3 (*sub pellibus*), and Pliny, *Epistles* 6.20.5, respectively.

[24] Verginius Rufus in Pliny, *Epistles* 2.1.5; the accident is "praiseworthy" (*laudabilis*) not just as a professional hazard of scholarship, but because the old man was in the middle of preparing a panegyric for Trajan.

[25] Artemidorus 2.45: "to dream of eating a book is good for educators, sophists, and all those who make a living from discourses or books; for other people, however, [this dream] signifies imminent death" (ἐσθίειν δὲ βιβλία παιδευταῖς καὶ σοφισταῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀπὸ λόγων ἢ βιβλίων πορίζομένοις συμφέρει· τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς θάνατον σύντομον προαγορεύει).

> Seleucus, at any rate, often said (they say) that if the people knew how difficult it was simply to write and read so many letters (εἰ γνοῖεν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ γράφειν μόνον ἐπιστολὰς τοσαύτας καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὡς ἐργῶδές ἐστιν), they would not pick up the crown that had been thrown away. (*An seni respublica gerenda sit* 790A–B)[26]

Extremely advanced literary *paideia* constituted the basis of solidarity among the Greco-Roman educated upper class. But it was a fuzzy and flexible monolith, allowing much scope for competitive diversity and status-negotiation between various groups and mindsets across the same educated class.[27] Biography and historiography as genres for the elite are interested in the multi-faceted manifestations of literary culture within the elite. Different aspects of individual literacy can be brought together and critically assessed in a *Life*, resulting in a portrait that is unique and paradigmatic at the same time.

Thus, it is not surprising that Greco-Roman biography thrives on its subjects' correspondence. Letters are mined for factual information on careers and relationships as well as for direct or indirect characterization.[28] Letters are relatively easy to focalize in various ways within the narrative as they reveal but also conspicuously hide. Octavian laments Antony's death, but insists that the conflict was Antony's fault; as proof, he offers his "friends" to compare the tone of their letters to each other (Plutarch, *Antony* 78.3). Are we expected to be persuaded? Or is the uncertainty increased even further? Another area of ambiguity is treatment of archives and accounts. Generally, archives are of great importance to a wide spectrum of statesmen in biographical and historical texts. Loss of records is regretted, measures are taken to restore or retrieve them.[29] Yet often it is wise and honourable to destroy incriminating archives, especially if you are in a position to use them to your advantage.[30] This core paradigm has many variations. Julius Caesar does burn all the letters found in Pompey's and

[26] The sentiment is nicely captured in the last chapter of W. Golding's *Envoy Extraordinary*. Young Nero in Suetonius, when asked to sign a death warrant, hypocritically exclaims, "I wish I was illiterate!" (*quam uellem nescire litteras*: *Nero* 10.2).

[27] See, recently, Whitmarsh (2001), *passim*.

[28] A handful of Plutarchan examples: *Eumenes* 11.3; *Agesilaus* 13.5; *Pompey* 42.13; *Dio* 21.4; *Brutus* 2.5–8, 29.9; *Comparison Dio-Brutus* 3.7; *Alexander* 7.6–7, 22.2, 22.5, 28.2, 29.7; *Cicero* 37.3. Cf. generally Demetrius, *On Style* 227.

[29] E.g., Plutarch, *Eumenes* 2.6–7; *Tiberius-Gaius Gracchi* 6; *Cato minor* 18.9, 38.2–4; Suetonius, *Vespasian* 8.5; Cassius Dio 57.16.2.

[30] Cf. the actions of Eumenes (Plutarch, *Eumenes* 16.4), Pompey (Plutarch, *Sertorius* 27.4–5, *Pompey* 20.7–8; Appian, *Bellum Civile* 1.115.536–537), Otho (Cassius Dio 64.15.1),

Scipio's baggage (Cassius Dio 41.63.5–6, 43.13.2), but does not fail to make a point of his non-tyrannical magnanimity in propaganda (Cassius Dio 43.17.4, 44.47.5–6). At the opposite pole is Caligula who pretends to have burned documents incriminating family enemies, whereas in fact he keeps them, even makes additional copies, and uses them to prosecute people (Suetonius, *Caligula* 15.4, 30.2; Cassius Dio 59.4.3–4; 59.10.8; 59.16.2–3; 60.4.5). Augustus does not go all the way in either direction: he only destroys some letters (Cassius Dio 52.42.8; Appian, *Bellum Civile* 5.132.548).

Ancient biographers realize that characters of individuals can be gauged through texts these individuals prefer to read, or do not read, or forbid others to read, or produce themselves. Plutarch as a Platonist is strongly aware of the influence that literature holds over the readers' emotions, their psyche. He himself composed the *Parallel Lives* with the explicit goal of "setting characters aright" (*Aemilius* 1.3; cf. *De profectu in virtute* 79C–D).[31] Suetonius does not operate within a defined philosophical framework, yet he famously dedicates a section to each emperor's stance towards liberal studies, especially literature. Biographies of Aurelius Victor and *Historia Augusta* contain much similar material, too, although less systematically arranged.[32]

The message can be political. Caligula, as an extreme example of mad tyrant, considered imposing ban on the works of Homer, Virgil, and Livy (Suetonius, *Caligula* 34.2); Commodus in his turn sentenced a man to death for reading Suetonius' *Life of Caligula* (Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Commodus* 10.2); the third-century emperor Tacitus, who was a friend of the senate, promoted the works of Tacitus the historian (Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Tacitus* 10.3). Alternatively the message can be ethical. Solon condemns tragedy as immoral falsehood (Plutarch, *Solon* 29.6–7); Tiberius is a fan of several Greek erotic poets and makes sure their books and portraits are added to public libraries (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 70.2); Ovid on love and Apicius on gastronomy are the favourite read of the hedonistic Helius Verus (Scrip-

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Lucius Maximus (Cassius Dio 67.11.1–2), Marcus Aurelius (Cassius Dio 71.28.4, 71.29.1–2; Ammianus Marcellinus 21.16.11).

[31] As Duff (1999) 17 and 33–34, points out, Plutarch draws a picture of his heroes' lives (*bioi*) in his *Lives* (also *bioi*) in order to improve the actual lives (*bioi*, to be sure) of his friends and contemporaries, as well as his own. *Bios* thus applies both to the contents and to the textual form, creating a wonderful circle of self-referentiality.

[32] Wallace-Hadrill (1983) 66–72, 83–85; Baldwin (1983) 129–131, 362–368; Rösger (1978); Bird (1984) 71–80.

tores Historiae Augustae, *Helius* 5.9); the virtuous Alexander Severus prefers Cicero's *De officiis* and *De Republica* (Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Alexander Severus* 30.2). More frequently politics and ethics cannot be separated. Suetonius claims that the only books Domitian read in his mature years were the *Memoirs* and enactments of Tiberius (Suetonius, *Domitian* 20): how appropriate for a narrow-minded and tyrannical personality![33] The discovery of erotic texts in the baggage of Crassus' officer is seized upon by the Parthians as an opportunity for anti-Roman propaganda. However, the locals understand that the Parthians are as corrupt as the Romans or even worse; the Parthian horribly literal reading of Euripides is behind the gory theatricality of the *Life*'s finale (Plutarch, *Crassus* 32.4–33.7).[34]

Examples could be multiplied. However, I do not want to go down this more beaten path. In the rest of this paper I propose to explore the significance of those often minor episodes in ancient biography where we see people reading, writing, and generally handling books and stationery, concentrating on *how* and *when* they read and write, what they physically *do* with and to books, tablets, pens, and other *Schreibnecessaries*, rather than the contents of *what* they read and write. Such episodes deserve close attention. On the one hand, as several modern theorists have argued, evolving technologies of literacy generate a new, autonomous culture of discourse that must be interpreted on its own terms.[35] Historically, format and appearance of text matter. Black letter typeface in German publications of 1910–1940s, pre-1917 orthography of Russian émigré editions of 1920–1930s, diacritics in Greek in 1950–1970s, smileys and hyperlinks in today's electronic documents are all fairly straightforward ideological statements pre-loaded onto the texts even before the act of reading occurs. Greco-Roman authors also toy with the possibility of a text's contents being reflected and enhanced by its real or metaphorical outlook.[36] Distress of the exiled poet is matched by the squalid (*incultus*) appearance of his volume (Ovid, *Tristia* 1.1.3–14);[37] severe legislation could be described as having been written not in

[33] On Domitian's character, see Waters (1964); Southern (1997) 119–125; on his literary tastes, Coleman (1986) 3088–3095.
[34] Zadorojnyi (1997) 181–182.
[35] Olson (1994), modifying Ong (1982), but cf. criticism in Street (1984), (1995) 16–45, 153–159.
[36] See, generally, Birt (1907) 1–3; Thomas (1992) 75; Jacob (1996) 56–58; Small (1997) 141–145.
[37] Williams (1992).

ink, but in blood or death (Plutarch, *Solon* 17.3; [Plutarch] *Vitae decem oratorum* 841E); a book that cost its author his life is written as it were in his own blood (Seneca, *Ad Marciam* 1.3 on Cremutius Cordus). Cornelius Gallus made boastful inscriptions about his achievements in Egypt—on the pyramids (Cassius Dio 53.23.6). This is symptomatic of Gallus' much-berated arrogance that led to his downfall in 27/26 BC. But the story is also a lesson in state literacy. Inscribing the pyramids is a form of written discourse which would not be tolerated in an imperial governor; clearly we are to infer that the pyramids' surface is reserved exclusively for the words of the supreme ruler.[38]

Certain texts have a meaningful outside, then. I contend that references to acts and tools of writing and reading *within* texts should be approached as an essentially parallel phenomenon. Scenes of writing and reading project technologies of literacy inside the text, new meaning is generated through inclusion of literacy itself into the narrative. The relevance of such scenes for Greco-Roman literature must not be underestimated. Given the privileged status of literacy for elite authors and elite readership, along with the on-going debate on the role of small detail in ancient biography,[39] it is highly likely that *minutiae* involving reading, writing, and pen-treating habits would be received as indicative of psychological conditions, political and cultural attitudes, or as linking the narrative with a philosophical framework of thought. This would be equivalent of asking today, when writing biography of Prof X: How more illegible did her handwriting become as she progressed in her career? Did she use cheap or expensive pens? How often did she lose them? If European, was she bothered about the default US spellchecker on her word-processor? What was her favourite font—Courier New, Arial, Times New Roman, or something more exotic? Did she readily accept smileys and acronyms of Internetese, and so forth? Ink, bookmarks, bindings, signatures, coffee stains, and dog's-ears tend to tell us something about the person who reads and pens here. Ancient authors, notably Plutarch, seem equally alert to the fact that uses of literacy and its paraphernalia help to frame characters and minds.

[38] Cf. Gibson (1997). On Gallus' demise, see Boucher (1966) 49–57; Raaflaub and Samons II (1990) 423–425.

[39] Nepos, *praefatio* 1–3, *Epaminondas* 1.1–3; Plutarch, *Alexander* 1.2–3, *Cato minor* 24.1, 37.10; Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Opilius Macrinus* 1.4–5, *Maximinus minor* 1.7–8, *Gordiani* 21.3, *4 tyranni* 6.2–4, 12.6. Cf. Ammianus Marcellimus 26.1.1.

To pick up the stylus-theme: the emperor Domitian killed time by impaling flies upon his stylus. "Who is with Domitian?" someone asked. A court wit replied, "Not even a fly!" (Suetonius, *Domitian* 3.1; Cassius Dio 66.9.4–5, cf. Aurelius Victor, *De Caesaribus* 11.5 = epitomator 11.8) A ruthless, psychotic, but somewhat boring tyrant here. Yet Cassius Dio stresses that this is an important detail for understanding Domitian:

> unworthy as this incident is of the dignity of history (ἀνάξιον τοῦ τῆς ἱστορίας ὄγκου), yet because it shows his character so well and because he still continued the practice after he became emperor, I felt obliged to write about it (ἀναγκαίως ἔγραψα). (66.9.4)[40]

Such more or less direct symbolism abounds. The Plutarchan Demosthenes manages to escape arrest by biting his pen (κάλαμος) in which poison was concealed (*Demosthenes* 29.4–30.1).[41] Caligula kept hit-lists in notebooks entitled *Sword* and *Dagger* (Suetonius, *Caligula* 49.3; Cassius Dio 59.26.1). Alexander the Great kept his copy of the *Iliad*, with a dagger, in a casket under his pillow; the original casket was subsequently replaced with a more splendid one (Plutarch, *Alexander* 8.2; 26.1–2).[42] Helius Verus always had Ovid's love poems handy on his couch (Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Helius* 5.9 *Ouidii libros amorum semper in lecto habuisse*). Aristides was just to the point of writing his own name on an *ostrakon* for an illiterate Athenian (Plutarch, *Aristides* 7.7–8). Archimedes continued to draw geometrical figures even when taking a bath, on his own anointed body (Plutarch, *Marcellus* 17.11): total commitment of a mad genius. Numa's sacred writings are buried alongside his body in a separate coffin (Plutarch, *Numa* 22.2): these texts effectively died with their author, as Rome returned to the ways of war.[43] The emperor Trajan, when leading a military campaign in Dacia, was brought a huge mushroom (μύκης) with an inscription in Latin urging him to turn back, yet he disobeyed and marched on—to victory (Cassius Dio 68.8.1): the

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[40] On Domitian's fly-stabbing see more in Zadorojnyi (forthcoming); Penwill (2000) 63, 75, 77.

[41] Note that other versions of Demosthenes' suicide were available that did not have such strong connection with literacy: poison contained in signet ring, in a bracelet, or did Demosthenes die by holding his breath (*Demosthenes* 30.1–3 [Plutarch], *Vitae decem oratorum* 847A–B)?

[42] Cf. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 7.108. This was the recension (διόρθωσις) "of the casket" prepared by Aristotle (Strabo 13.1.27). Birt (1913) 296, points out a technical problem in cramming many rolls of text into a small-size casket. So, *pace* Hamilton (1969) 20–21, Alexander's *Iliad* must have been an abridged version; cf. Birt (1907) 159, 216. On Alexander's epic aspirations and imitation of Achilles, see Mossman (1988).

[43] Svenbro (1993) 133–134.

outlandish presentation of the message is strangely akin to the barbarian surroundings of the episode. In the wilderness of Dacia one has to read mushrooms.

But there are also less transparent, more challenging cases. Tacitus' Agricola never used the formal laurelled letters (*litterae laureatae*) to report victories (*ne laureatis quidem gesta prosecutus sit*); drawing the line between modesty and ambition is problematic here (*sed ipsa dissimulatione famae famam auxit*).[44] The emperor Titus competed with secretaries in shorthand and prided himself on being good at imitating handwritings (Suetonius, *Titus* 3.2): was it a whimsical pastime or a more serious pursuit? Teenaged Alcibiades punched a schoolteacher who did not have a copy of the Homeric texts (Plutarch, *Alcibiades* 7.1): was it his trademark insolence or real passion for Homer or sheer hooliganism? Why does Plutarch insert a lengthy digression on the Spartan *skytalê* into the *Life of Lysander* (19.7–12)? Does it add to the contrast between Lysander and the Spartan tradition?[45] Or does it rather recall the contradictory nature of Sparta's image as maximum valour blended with maximum secrecy and deceit—a combination that is not abandoned, but reproduced in the devious Lysander?[46] What is the reader to make of the fact that Publius Vitellius (the emperor's uncle), when placed under arrest, tried to open his veins with a penknife (Suetonius, *Vitellius* 2.3 *scalpro librario*), which he had obtained under pretext of writing (Tacitus, *Annals* 5.8: *per speciem studiorum*)? Should we take the man to be inventive, desperate, or pathetically inadequate—maybe all three at the same time? What does it tell us about Augustus that the image on his seal changed over time from that of a Sphinx to Alexander the Great and then to his own portrait, and that all his letters were dated to exact hour?[47] How important are his handwriting and orthographical vagaries (Suetonius, *Augustus* 87.3–88) for reconstructing his personality?

One gets a feeling that literacy-related episodes in ancient narratives are better suited to pose questions rather than to supply answers. It

[44] Tacitus, *Agricola* 18.6. For *litterae laureatae*, cf. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 15.133.

[45] So Duff (1999) 164–165; Pelling (2002b) 300 n. 46.

[46] Cf. Candau Morón (2000) 466–473, esp. 469. The noble Spartan mirage constantly gets broken: cf. Herodotus, 6.72; Euripides, *Andromache* 445–453; Pausanius 4.17.2; Plutarch, *Lysander* 16.2–4. On Plutarch's Lysander as a controversial figure, see Stadter (1992); Duff (1999) 162–165, 168–193; Pelling (2002b) 292–297. On *skytale*, see Birt (1907) 274–275, (1913) 255–256; Kelly (1985).

[47] Suetonius, *Augustus* 50; Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 37.10; Cassius Dio 51.3.5–7. Baldwin (1983) 128; generally, Instinsky (1962). Zanker (1995) 270–271, cannot be right about the Sphinx as symbol of hope.

has been argued recently that ancient elite discourse about discourse, be that rhetoric or creative writing, has a tendency to become deconstructing, undermining the validity and prestige of its respective *logos*. Rhetorical persuasion and written knowledge appear to be thwarted by brute force or a superior moral framework. In Rome, leisurely aristocratic creativity and scholarship are reclaimed and redirected by professionals of middle-class or slave origins. (Needless to say, deconstructing discourse only results in proliferation of discourse.)[48] I suggest that through episodes involving technicalities and tools of discourse, such as close-up scenes of reading and writing, papyrus rolls, tablets, seals, styluses, and other apparatus of literacy, it is possible to outline awareness and anxiety of the Greco-Roman *pepaideumenoi* about various problem areas on the inside of their own literary culture. The overall value of *paideia* is not doubted, but there is much going on around the fringes. The appearance of technologies and artefacts of literacy in biographical texts both visualizes and problematizes literacy. Pen that has been turned into dagger is but a clichéd symbol of how literacy by no means guarantees stability of civilization and *paideia*. Another tasty example of a miniature crisis of *paideia* is the ending of Plutarch's *Pompey*. As the rowing boat approaches land, Pompey reads to himself, from a "little notebook", the speech in Greek that he prepared to address Ptolemy (*Pompey* 79.2: ἔχων ἐν βιβλίῳ μικρῷ γεγραμμένον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λόγον 'Ελληνικόν, ᾧ παρεσκεύαστο χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον, ἀνεγίγνωσκεν). Pompey's little book catches our eye as a metaphor of the scale of his plight. For here is Pompey the *Great* (*Pompey* 13.7–11, 80.5–6)—reduced to an asylum-seeker rehearsing his spiel from a *little* book! Literacy is Pompey's last resort as a pleader. Significantly, he starts to read the speech after he had tried to talk to people in the boat. But communication dies unborn: there is no friendly word for Pompey (79.1 ὡς οὐδεὶς παρὰ τῶν συμπλεόντων ἐγίνετο λόγος φιλάνθρωπος πρὸς αὐτὸν), the nod of the gloomy veteran Septimius is followed by "long silence" (79.2 πολλῆς οὖν πάλιν οὔσης σιωπῆς). Pompey's trust in his "Hellenic *logos*" is pathetic in the face of the very un-Hellenic cruelty that awaits him on the shore…

Criticism of literacy and book-culture coming from the ancient educated class can take several distinct lines of objection:

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[48] See, respectively, independent studies by Mossman (1999); Hesk (1999); Habinek (1998) 103–121.

1) the "occupational" argument. Extensive exposure to literacy and related activities is regarded as unbefitting the aristocratic intellectual. Scribal activity is an occupation of the lower classes; cultural professionalism is best avoided by statesmen. It is clearly odd when an emperor invents new letters for the alphabet, as Claudius did (Suetonius, *Claudius* 41.3; Tacitus, *Annals* 11.13–14).[49] Gallienus was a decent poet and orator, but quite different qualities are required from an emperor (Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Gallienus* 11.9).

2) the "political" argument. Literacy, when its presence is somehow excessive and over-concentrated, is connected with manipulative and authoritarian government, that is, tyranny. Written communication is seen as usurping authority while cancelling any chance of debate.[50] This attitude could be usefully compared with Claude Lévi-Strauss' criticism of writing: both the Lévi-Straussian argument and the ancient misgivings seem to be rooted in a broadly similar angst of literate intellectuals towards the oppressive state.[51]

3) the "actuality" argument. Written texts are rejected in favour of real experience and live discourse.[52] This approach builds upon common sense, as illustrated, for example, by the story of the consul Octavius in Plutarch's *Marius*. Trusting optimistic prophecies, Octavius refused to flee from Rome. After he is murdered by the Marian soldiers, a horoscope is found in his lap (*Marius* 42.7–8). More pointed objections to literacy came from rhetoric, that as a general rule considered written texts inferior to extempore speeches,[53] and from philosophy. Thus, Plutarch's scepticism about Solon's written laws (*Solon* 5.4; *Comparison*

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[49] See Papke (1986).

[50] Cf. Plato, *Laws* 858e–859a; Aristotle, *Politics* 1286a9–17; Herodian 3.11.9.

[51] Lévi-Strauss (1961) 299–300: "The only phenomenon with which writing has always been concomitant is the creation of cities and empires, that is the integration of large numbers of individuals into a political system and their grading into castes and classes … it seems to have favoured the exploitation of human beings rather than their enlightenment … the primary function of written communication is to facilitate slavery … Through gaining access to the knowledge stored in libraries, these peoples have also become vulnerable to the still greater proportion of lies propagated in printed documents." The insight, certainly requiring contextualization, remains immensely valuable. More below, pp. 129–131 and in Zadorojnyi (forthcoming).

[52] Generally, Alexander (1990).

[53] E.g., Alcidamas, *Against Writers of Speeches* (= fr. 15, pp. 135–141 Radermacher); Plutarch *Demosthenes* 8.5; Lucian, *Pseudologista* 5–7; Schloemann (2002); Schmitz (1997) 121, 158.

Solon-Poplicola 3.4) is obviously indebted to Plato's critique of writing (*Phaedrus* 274b–277a; *Protagoras* 329a; *Laws* 968d–e; *Epistles* 7.344c–e),[54] which Plutarch as Platonist should be sometimes expected to share. Indeed, even Plato's texts on their own might fail to produce the desired effect: Cato manages to botch up his "philosophical" suicide despite having re-read the *Phaedo* three times on the night (Plutarch, *Cato minor* 68.1–5, 70.1–2, 70.8–10).[55] The explanation of Cato's failure (in Plutarch) to achieve Socratic serenity in the moment of death lies, I think, in Plutarch's conservative Platonism. You need to be a follower of Plato in order to appropriate Socrates as a model (Stoics like Cato[56] cannot succeed by definition) and you certainly cannot learn to be Socrates just by reading a book, without full Platonic training.

In the rest of the paper I propose to address in more detail the "occupational" and the "political" objections to literacy as reflected in Plutarch's *Lives*, using *Eumenes* and *Caesar* as two short case studies.

The *Life of Eumenes* is a story of a secretary who makes a serious effort to become a leader, but in the end is rejected and betrayed by his troops. The Herodotean narrative of the ill-fated attempt by Polycrates' former secretary (γραμματεύς) Maeandrius to rule Samos (Herodotus 3.123, 142–148) is worth recalling here. Maeandrius started with good intentions of restoring democracy on the island (Herodotus 3.142.1), but fell foul with both the Samians and the Persians and ended up in a mess.[57] This is the archetypal tale of the Sorcerer's Apprentice—a servant failing to replace his master because he lacks his master's qualities. Yet in Maeandrius' case there is an anti-scribal tinge to the story: he is not good enough because he is an ex-clerk. For Eumenes, too, it proved difficult to establish his authority because, Plutarch explains, the Macedonians despised him for having served as a scribe (*Comparison Sertorius-Eumenes* 1.6 διὰ τὴν γραμματείαν καταφρονούμενος); his family origins were, possibly, humble (*Eumenes* 1.1). The theme of contempt is

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[54] Plato's attack on writing is a much-studied field: Slezák (1985) is fundamental; see also Derrida (1972); Burger (1980); Erler (1985); Griswold (1986) 202–229; Heitsch (1987); Ferrari (1987) 204–222; Kullman (1991); Slezák (1992); Isnardi Parente (1992); Ferber (1992); Gill (1992); Cerri (1992); Svenbro (1993), 198–216; Kahn (1996) 371–392. Broadly similar criticism of writing was developed by the Stoics and the Cynics: cf. Arrian's preface to Epictetus' *Discourses*, 8; Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.4.6–9, 1.4.14–16; Marcus Aurelius 2.2–3; Antisthenes ap. Diogenes Laertius 6.3, 6.5, 6.48.

[55] Griffin (1986) 202 n. 20; Lamberton (2001) 126–127; esp. Trapp (1999).

[56] On Cato's not always consistent Stoicism in the *Life*, see Babut (1969) 169–175; Swain (1990a) 197–201; Duff (1999) 149–151, 155–158.

[57] See Van der Veen (1996) 54–68.

signalled early in the *Life*. Neoptolemus, the commander of Alexander's men-at-arms (ἀρχιυπασπιστής), rebukes Eumenes for his past as "first secretary" (ἀρχιγραμματεύς):

> while he, Neoptolemus followed Alexander with shield and spear, Eumenes went with pen and writing-tablet
>
> ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν ἀσπίδα καὶ λόγχην, Εὐμενὴς δὲ γραφεῖον ἔχων καὶ πινακίδιον ἠκολούθει (1.4–6)

The prominence of such criticisms in Plutarch's *Life* contrasts with the picture one finds in Nepos' *Eumenes*. Nepos insists that Eumenes was rejected as a foreigner (*Eumenes* 1.2–3, 7.1), not because he was an ex-secretary:

> So he [vid. Philip] kept him by his side in a scribal position, which is much more honourable among the Greeks than among the Romans. For with us, scribes are treated as mercenary workers—which, in fact, they are. But there, on the contrary, no one is accepted for the job unless he is a man of respectable birth as well as of proven loyalty and commitment, since he will necessarily be private to all policies.
>
> *itaque eum habuit ad manum scribae loco, quod multo apud Graios honorificentius est quam apud Romanos. namque apud nos, re vera sicut sunt, mercennarii scribae existimantur; at apud illos e contrario nemo ad id officium admittitur nisi honesto loco, et fide et industria cognita, quod necesse est omnium consiliorum eum esse participem* (*Eumenes* 1.4–5)

Unlike Nepos, Plutarch chose to evoke the negative paradigm of writing as a lowly occupation in his biography of Eumenes. (Contrary to Nepos's statement, patronizing attitude to scribes and secretaries is well-attested in the Greek world, too.[58]) However, Eumenes' presentation in the *Life* does not bear out this negative model. No details are given about his activity as Alexander's secretary, apart from the episode of the archive that burned together with his tent and so had to be recreated from scratch (2.6–7). His writing style is described briefly, on the evidence of his correspondence, as "not powerful but agree-

[58] Cf. Demosthenes 18.265: "You taught reading and writing, but I went to school. You initiated [into mysteries], but I was initiated. You were the secretary of the assembly, I was a voting member. You played third parts in the theatre, I was in the audience"; [Plutarch], *Vitae decem oratorum* 840A–B, F. The New Testament *grammateis* is not an innocent translation, but an intentional humiliating dig at the Jewish scholars: Snyder (2000) 185. In Plutarch's *Aemilius* the son of the despicable king Perseus becomes a clerk in Rome, and the post suits him well (37.4 ὑπογραμματεύειν τοῖς ἄρχουσι, ἐπιδέξιον καὶ χαριέντα περὶ ταύτην τὴν ὑπερησίαν ἐξεταζόμενον). For the Roman attitude to scribes, cf. Wiseman (1971) 73–74.

able and persuasive" (11.3 οὐ δεινός, αἱμυλὸς δὲ καὶ πιθανός). On one occasion Eumenes does seem to behave like a bureaucrat who cannot make a step without documents and audit: confiscating horses from royal stables he does not forget to send a written report (γραφήν) to the regents with whom he is, actually, at war. The *graphê* is a gesture to bolster Eumenes' self-image as loyal, painstaking steward of Alexander's estate—a point Antipater is quick to pick up (8.5). But texts are not wholly on Eumenes' side in the *Life*. His enemies use propaganda leaflets to incite his assassination (8.11); Olympias' letters trigger the events leading to his defeat (13.1, 3–4). Smelling danger, Eumenes withdraws to his tent to write a will and destroy incriminating correspondence (16.4).[59] So, not everything written down is good for an ἀρχιγραμματεύς.

What is more important, Eumenes is in no way constrained by his background. He is not your timid, pathetic scribe unsuited to power. He comes across as a clever commander and heroic warrior, trusting his sword (cf. 10.4 τοῦ ξίφους κύριος). Neoptolemus' attack on Eumenes in the beginning of the *Life* is immediately parried as unjustified: it was not for nothing that Alexander held Eumenes in such high honour (1.7). Neoptolemus is ultimately refuted later in the narrative, when Eumenes meets and kills him in a heroically styled single combat (7.7–12). Neoptolemus and other Macedonians were wrong to look down on this clerk!

Plutarch thus employs a rusé strategy in the *Life of Eumenes*. Having explicitly alluded to the negative stereotype of lowly, scorned scribe-figure, he then proceeds to deny that it was applicable to the hero. Eumenes did become an outstanding leader. His failure was not due to his previous contact with "degrading" literacy—he was undeservingly foiled by the treachery of the Macedonian veterans who later paid for this (17; 19.3). What could have been Plutarch's reasons for rehabilitating literacy in this *Life*, then?

Eumenes was an odd choice for inclusion into the *Parallel Lives* to begin with.[60] In the light of my interpretation it is tempting to postulate contemporary relevance in the way Plutarch constructed his Eumenes as a political persona. From the second half of the first century AD the staffing policy of Roman imperial administration changed dramatically.

[59] The episode is paralleled in *Sertorius* 27.4–5; Bosworth (1992) 62.
[60] On Plutarch's adaptation of sources in *Eumenes*, see Bosworth (1992); Geiger (1995); on Plutarchan choice of heroes see, generally, Averintsev (1965); Geiger (1981).

Important government posts, including those of *ab epistulis* and *a libellis*, that used to be occupied by freedmen, were now filled with knights.[61] Bureaucratic literacy was colonized by the upper-middle class. Could it be that Plutarch intended his Eumenes as an upbeat reminder to his readers that there was no stigma attached to those office jobs? If you have got the aptitude, you may still become a famous commander after having been secretary of state—just look at Eumenes.

I shall now discuss literacy perceived in connection with plotting and tyranny, focusing on the portrayal of Julius Caesar in Plutarch. The Plutarchan Caesar is a man of supreme efficiency. He works hard and travels fast. He is also exceptionally good with paperwork. He dictates on the move (*Caesar* 17.4, 17.7);[62] his messages are forceful and brief—"I came, I saw, I conquered" in a letter to Matius (50.3–4).[63] As he was too busy to meet his friends, he thought of a "new arrangement" (17.8 πρῶτον μηχανήσασθαι) of writing notes to them instead. It appears that Plutarch is not entirely positive about all this. The dubious word μηχανήσασθαι sounds as if Caesar invented a dishonest scheme. For he is also good at suppressing information when expedient: he does not send any letters to Rome about the progress of the civil war because of the shame attached to it (56.9 μήτ' ἄγγελον μήτε γράμματα δημοσίᾳ πέμψαντα ἀλλ' ἀπωσάμενον αἰσχύνῃ τὴν δόξαν).[64] The conclusion is foreseeable: Caesar's smartness with letters is a mark of a developing tyrant.[65]

The tradition of associating written messages with dangerous deception goes back to the first tentative appearance of writing in the *Iliad*

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[61] *Historia Augusta* credits Hadrian with initiating the change (*Hadrian* 22.8), but the policy started already in the first century: Tacitus, *Histories* 1.58; Plutarch, *Otho* 9.3; Suetonius, *Domitian* 7.2; *ILS* 1447; Millar (1992) 85–90; Lindsay (1994); Eck (1997) 88–93.

[62] Cf. the famous description of Caesar at work in Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 7.91: *scribere aut legere, simul dictare et audire solitum*; generally, Cicero, *Philippica* 2.116–117, Ammianus Marcellinus 25.2.3. In Velleius Paterculus the topos is given a twist: Caesar as if physically grabs the writing historian for attention (2.41.1 *C. Caesar, qui scribenti manum inicit et quamlibet festinantem in se morari cogit*).

[63] Plutarch cites the golden line in Greek, though, so that the effect is all but annihilated, with a gloss that it sounds much better in Latin: a small-scale linguistic taunt?

[64] Cf. the tongue-in-cheek observation of Asinius Pollio in Suetonius, *Caesar* 56.4.

[65] For Plutarch's Caesar as ambitious tyrant, cf. *Caesar* 6.3, 57.1, 60.1, 69.1, *Cicero* 20.6, but with a different take in *Antony* 6.7, *Comparison Dio-Brutus* 2.2; Pelling (1997), (2002a) 207–208, (2002c) 5–6, 32 n. 30, (2002d) 104; Duff (1999) 86–87, 303; for the bigger picture, see Allen (1953); Béranger (1975). Note especially Caesar's incestuous dream before crossing the Rubicon (Plutarch, *Caesar* 32.9; Suetonius, *Caesar* 7.2; Cassius Dio 41.24.2) and the identical dream of Hippias in Herodotus 6.107.

in the form of "baneful signs" on the tablet given to Bellerophon (*Iliad* 6.168–169 σήματα λυγρά).[66] In Herodotus letters, especially eccentrically transmitted ones—as tattoo on a slave's head, or sewn into a hare—are typically found in situations of clandestine intrigue and authoritarian command.[67] While in the mid-fifth century BC literacy was new and therefore thrilling and suspicious, the literary opportunities this approach offered had a lasting attraction. In Plutarch alone a strikingly high number of letters turn up in contexts of conspiracy, treason, marital disloyalty, subversive propaganda, and so on.[68] The setting can be very dramatic, as in the scene between Alexander and the wrongly accused doctor Philip (*Alexander* 19.5–8). Composition and transmission of messages can have a flavour of Herodotean exoticism, too: a request for help on behalf of baby Pyrrhus is wrapped around a stone or a javelin and thrown over a torrent (*Pyrrhus* 2.6–7); Demetrius silently warns Mithridates by writing "Run" in the dust with the butt-end of his spear (*Demetrius* 4.4); a letter to the exiled tyrant Dionysius gets stolen by a hungry wolf (*Dio* 26.5–10).

But there were also floating within the ancient literate elite some more profound (and vaguely Lévi-Straussian) concerns about the sinister functions of literacy in politics. A recurrent pattern in Greco-Roman biography of autocrats is to present preference for communication through letters as a feature of over-the-top despotism.[69] Good-natured rulers would communicate face-to-face: Cleomenes answers petitioners directly, not through scribes (Plutarch, *Agis-Cleomenes* 34 [13].3), Vespasian and Marcus Aurelius do their best to attend the senate meetings in person (Cassius Dio 66.10.5–6; Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Marcus Aurelius* 10.7). To write in one's own hand was the second best option, a gesture of goodwill.[70] It is tyrannical rulers who rely heavily

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[66] For the traditional view about σήματα λυγρά as reminiscence of Linear B, see Kirk (1990) 181–182; more enthusiastic is Bellamy (1989) 289–295, arguing that Bellerophon's tablet reflects Assyrian royal records.

[67] Cf. especially Herodotus 1.123; 3.128.2–5; 5.35; 7.239; 8.128; Steiner (1994) 127–185; Hartog (1988) 277–281.

[68] *Themistocles* 9.2; *Cimon* 8.4; *Alcibiades* 25.13; *Lysander* 20.3; *Dio* 31; *Timoleon* 7.3–7; *Phocion* 30.9; *Eumenes* 8.11; *Pyrrhus* 6.6–7, 21.1–5; *Poplicola* 4.3–5.4; *Tiberius-Gaius Gracchi* 34(13).2; *Pompey* 16.5–9, 49.12; *Crassus* 13.4; *Cicero* 19.1; *Cato minor* 24.1–3; *Brutus* 5.3–4; *Antony* 10.8–9, 85.4–5; *Galba* 4.4–5.

[69] See Zadorojnyi (forthcoming).

[70] Nepos, *Atticus* 10.4; Cassius Dio 68.3.4, 71.36.2; Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Clodius Albinus* 2.2; Ammianus Marcellinus 16.5.3.

on literacy, for variable reasons,[71] but with the same basic assumption that written messages are exploitable. Writing takes away the personal, emotional element of communication and conveys authority that is difficult to verify on the spot. Decisions could be taken in secrecy (Cassius Dio 52.33.3–4; Suetonius, *Nero* 15.1), victories are faked (Suetonius, *Caligula* 44.2; Cassius Dio 67.7.3; Herodian 4.11.8–9), it is not clear who signed and sent orders (Tacitus, *Annals* 1.6; Suetonius, *Tiberius* 22.1). Under autocracy, seals and signatures mean power, as demonstrated already in Herodotus' story of the assassination of Oroetes (Herodotus 3.128.2–5). This is, surely, the untold reason why Augustus trained his adoptive sons to imitate his handwriting (Suetonius, *Augustus* 64) and why Titus imitated handwritings (Suetonius, *Titus* 3.2): emperors, their family members, and associates often need to sign for somebody else, with or without permission.[72]

There is a sense of transgression about Caesar being so clever with his correspondence.[73] After he becomes dictator, letters crop up again as routine element of exercising power. During the conversation at Lepidus' about the best kind of death Caesar is, as usual, signing letters (Plutarch, *Caesar* 63.7). In *Cato the Younger* Plutarch, without naming Caesar, describes his attitude as defiantly arrogant. Caesar is a *hybristês* both with his sword and his pen (11.8 οὕτως οὐ τῷ ξίφει μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ γραφείῳ τὸ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ ἀνυπόδικον διεπίστευεν).[74] The tyrannical paradigm is thus quite strongly present in Plutarch's vision of Caesar, and literacy cannot be ignored as part of this paradigm. Suggestively, in Plutarch Caesar's jealousy of Alexander bursts out when he reads a

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[71] Cf. the Herodotean Deioces (1.99–100) and Xerxes (7.100.1–2; 8.90.4; Plutarch, *Themistocles* 13.1); Plutarch mentions Xerxes' threatening letter to Mount Athos (*De cohibenda ira* 455D–E). The letters of Domitian and Constantius II are samples of tyrannical arrogance (Suetonius, *Domitian* 13.2; Ammianus Marcellinus 15.1.3); Nero, as artistic and decadent tyrant, refrains from public speaking for the sake of sparing his voice (Suetonius, *Nero* 25.3, cf. Cassius Dio 63.26.1). One wonders where does this leave Augustus who addressed everyone, including his wife, from a prepared text (Suetonius, *Augustus* 84.2).

[72] Plutarch, *Otho* 3.2; Suetonius, *Otho* 7.1, *Titus* 6.1; Cassius Dio 51.3.6–7, 66.2.1–2, 69.1.4; Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Carinus* 16.8.

[73] Caesar is also said to have used a cipher in his letters (Suetonius, *Caesar* 56.6, cf. *Augustus* 88; Aulus Gellius 17.9.5; Cassius Dio 40.9.3, 51.3.7) and to have invented a new format of official communiqué—he was the first Roman general to write to the senate in codex-like strings of tablets (Suetonius, *Caesar* 56.6). For multiple tablets, cf. Martial 14.4; Harris (1989) 194; Blanck (1992) 46–50; for ciphers, Small (1997) 66.

[74] The immediate reference is to Caesar's attacks on Cato in his *Anti-Cato*. See, further, Geiger (2002).

book about Alexander (*Caesar* 11.5–6), whereas in other sources Caesar is looking at Alexander's statue (Suetonius, *Caesar* 7.1, Cassius Dio 37.52.2).[75]

But on the Ides of March something does go wrong. Literacy deserts Caesar's side as it were.[76] On the fateful morning Caesar fails to pay attention to a tablet (βιβλίδιον, βιβλίον) that contained a warning from Artemidorus.[77] Parallel with the fourth-century Theban tyrant Archias springs to mind. Archias became proverbial for putting off reading a letter that warned him about conspiracy: he did not live to read it (Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 10.7–10, *De genio Socratis* 596E–F, *Quaestiones Convivales* 619D–E). Caesar's is a subtler case. He does not pass Artemidorus' letter to attendants, as he does with other petitions, yet the bustling crowd around him prevents him from reading it (*Caesar* 65.3 δεξάμενος οὖν ὁ Καῖσαρ, ἀναγνῶναι μὲν ὑπὸ πλήθους τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων ἐκωλύθη, καίπερ ὁρμήσας πολλάκις). Even before the murder Caesar is quite literally destroyed by those around him.

So it is appropriate that instruments of literacy accompany Caesar's downfall. In Suetonius (*Caesar* 82.2), Caesar defends himself against the conspirators with a stylus; Cassius Dio specifies that the assassins hid their daggers in pen-cases (44.16.1 ἐν κιβωτίοις ἀντὶ γραμματείων τινῶν). In Plutarch we do not get these details. However, there is an illuminating episode on Caesar's relationship with books in the section of the *Life* describing the turbulent events in Alexandria in 48/47 BC. The Great Library is said to have accidentally burned down in the fire started on Caesar's orders. Next, comes the story of Caesar's narrow escape from an attacked boat. He has to swim for dear life, yet manages to rescue notebooks he happens to have with him:

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[75] As noted by Pelling (2002e) 77–78, (2002f) 257. On the other hand, Suetonius (*Caesar* 87) tells us that Caesar got the idea about sudden death being the best death from reading Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*; contrast Plutarch, *Caesar* 63.7.

[76] Or serves him some bad turns. According to Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGH* 90 fr. 130.78–79, cf. Suetonius, *Caesar* 78.1), Caesar aroused (ἤγειρε) great hatred of potential conspirators by failing to pay attention to a congratulatory procession led by "the best of Romans" (οἱ Ῥωμαίων ἄριστοι) because he was absorbed in papers pertaining to reconstruction of the Forum. Only after someone told him, "Look who is before you!" he put down his notebooks and turned around (ἀποθέμενος τὰ γραμματίδια ἐπεστράφη). In Suetonius, Caesar offends the Roman crowd by working with documents during a public show—a mistake Augustus was careful to avoid (Suetonius, *Augustus* 45.1). Neglecting citizens for the sake of documents was clearly received as tyrannical.

[77] Cf. Nicolaus of Damascus *FGH* 90 fr. 130.66; Velleius Paterculus 2.57.2; Suetonius, *Caesar* 81.4; Appian, *Bellum Civile* 2.116.486; Cassius Dio 44.18.3.

> … in order to save his fleet from being cut off he had to repel the danger with fire, which then spread from the docks and destroyed the great library (τὴν μεγάλην βιβλιοθήκην). Third, during a battle off Pharos, he leapt from the breakwater into a dinghy in order to lend his support to his men in the thick of the fighting, but Egyptian ships bore down on him from all sides, and he had to hurl himself into the sea and swim to safety—a difficult feat which he only just managed. He is also said to have stubbornly held on to a sheaf of papers (βιβλίδια), even though he was under attack from the boats and was being swamped by the waves, using one arm for swimming and holding the papers above the water with the other. His dinghy had been sunk straight away. (*Caesar* 49.5–8, transl. R. Waterfield)

The juxtaposition of the two incidents in Plutarch—destruction of the Great Library followed by Caesar's adventure with the notebooks—is curious. It does not occur quite so visibly in any other ancient source where either fire of the Library or fire in the docks and Caesar's swim are reported.[78] Moreover, it is far from certain that the Great Library burned at all in 48 BC.[79] Yet Plutarch believes in the fire (cf. *Antony* 58.9), and it looks as if he intended the episode as an invitation for the readers to ponder on Caesar's character. This is a situation when eyebrows might be raised. In the swimming scene Caesar is once again resourceful and plucky in protecting—himself and his individual interests. He rescued his own notebooks, while shortly before that his warfare resulted in destruction of the Great Library where thousands of volumes allegedly perished; Seneca, Gellius, and Ammianus Marcellinus quote implausibly high numbers of 400000 and 700000, respectively (Seneca, *De tranquillitate* 9.4–5; Aulus Gellius 7.17.3; Ammianus Marcellinus 22.16.13). Plutarch does not give figures, but the contrast between μεγάλη βιβλιοθήκη and the diminutive βιβλίδια (which no doubt translates *libelli*) makes the incompatibility of the loss very shocking. One is left with the impression that, as so often, Caesar puts private before public. For all his talents, he is primarily ambitious and tyrannically self-centred. His involvement in Alexandria leads to a cultural disaster. Maybe Artemidorus' βιβλίδιον should be taken as a meaningful echo implying some sort of retribution for Alexandria?

[78] See Appendix 2. As can be noticed, the version of Cassius Dio is closest to Plutarch's as Dio mentions both fire of the library and Caesar's swim with the notebooks, yet the two episodes are apart in his text (42.38.2, 42.40.4–5).

[79] See Hemmerdinger (1985); Canfora (1990) 66–70, 96–97, 132–144; Blanck (1992) 143; R. Barnes (2000) 70–72; Casson (2001) 45–47.

Libraries have an ambivalent status in ancient reflection on the links between tyranny and literacy. On the one hand, there seems to be an element of a broadly Lévi-Straussian perception that concentrated literacy of libraries is a tool of consolidating authoritarian control.[80] The earliest Greek libraries were said to have been set up by tyrants, such as Polycrates of Samos, Pisitratus of Athens (Athenaeus 1.3a; Aulus Gellius 7.17.1; Isidorus, *Etymologiae* 6.6.1), or the fourth century Clearchus of Heracleia (Photius, *Bibliotheca* cod. 224 p. 222b). Would Roman rulers who cared about libraries be placed on the same shelf? Julius Caesar, for instance, had plans to improve library provision in Rome, Domitian took active measures to restore Roman libraries (Suetonius, *Caesar* 44.2, *Domitian* 20; Isidorus, *Etymologiae* 6.5.1)—does this attest a genuine devotion to *paideia* or further crystallize their tyrannical nature?

There may be no clear-cut solution. Anecdotal material can be conveniently flexed towards the positive as well as the negative paradigm. Plutarchan episodes involving libraries and book-collections do not form a consistent picture either. Caesar was the cause of fire in the Alexandrian library; that is bad, but he did not wish it. Antony tried to compensate for the loss by donating to Cleopatra 200000 books from Pergamum (*Antony* 58.9). Plutarch is probably not too happy about such off-hand treatment of the donor library: Antony's book policy is as twisted and painful as his philhellenism elsewhere in the *Life* (*Antony* 24, 62.1). Pompey runs into trouble over books and hunting nets he choose for himself from a stock of civil war spoils at Asculum (*Pompey* 4.2). Sulla transfers Aristotle's library to Rome where the books were properly edited (*Sulla* 28.1–3),[81] yet it is the same Sulla who chopped down the groves of Academia and Lyceum, plundered Delphi, and massacred Athenians (*Sulla* 12.4–8, 14.4–9). Destroying Greeks while rescuing Greek books—more eyebrow-raising seems due.

Some Plutarchan Romans score brownie points precisely for amassing Greek books, no matter how. Plutarch likes it when the Romans strive after Hellenic *paideia*[82]and so puts a positive spin on their plundering bibliophilism. Aemilius Paulus is commended for limiting his pick of Macedonian spoils to just one bowl for his son-in-law and the king's books for his "letter-loving" sons (*Aemilius* 28.11 μόνα τὰ βιβλία τοῦ βασι-

[80] Cf. Jacob (1996) 50, with 73–74; Horsfall (1993).
[81] Cf. Strabo 13.1.54; Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 4.10.1; see, more recently, J. Barnes (1997).
[82] Swain (1990b).

λέως φιλογραμματοῦσι τοῖς υἱέσιν ἐπέτρεψεν ἐξελέσθαι). Octavia honours her dead son Marcellus by dedicating a library in his name (*Marcellus* 30.11).[83] But the first prize for handling a library goes to Lucullus:

> His provision of books deserves praise and mention, for he collected many high-quality copies. And the use they were put to was even more magnificent than the acquisition. The libraries were open to all, and their promenades and reading-rooms welcomed without restriction all Greeks who would come and spend time there, escaping gladly from other occupations as if to an abode of the Muses (ὥσπερ εἰς Μουσῶν τι καταγώγιον). Lucullus himself often spent time there, disputing with scholars in the promenades, and giving his advice to politicians who required it. Altogether his house was a sort of home-hearth and Hellenic prytaneum for those who visited Rome (ἑστία καὶ πρυτανεῖον Ἑλληνικὸν). He was fond of every kind of philosophy, and was well-read and expert in all of it. ⟨…⟩ Cicero wrote an excellent treatise in defense of this sect [the Academics], using Lucullus as his mouthpiece in the argument in favor of comprehension, and his own person for opposite argument. The title of the book is *Lucullus*. (*Lucullus* 42.1–4)

The picture is idyllic: Lucullus collected excellent books, generously shared them with Greek intellectuals, and in the end practically became a book himself. Plutarch's forgetfulness of the fact that Lucullus got his books by plundering the Hellenic East[84] must be a conscious move on his part. A scholar trapped for years in small out-of-the-way Chaironeia, he learned to appreciate good library resources, as the agonizing prologues to the *Life of Demosthenes* and the dialogue *On the Delphic E* suggest:

> However for a man who has undertaken to compose a *historia*, the sources of which are not immediately at hand, since they are foreign and scattered in different places, the first concern must be to base himself in a famous, well-populated and cultured city, so that with access to plenty of books (ὡς βιβλίων τε παντοδαπῶν ἀφθονίαν ἔχων) … he produces a work that is not missing any relevant material. But I live in a small city, and I love to live there (φιλοχωροῦντες) so that it does not get smaller… (*Demosthenes* 2.1)
>
> … since you have a great city at your disposal and plenty of leisure amid numerous books and various discussions…
>
> ἅτε δὴ καὶ πόλει χρωμένων μεγάλῃ καὶ σχολῆς μᾶλλον ἐν βιβλίοις πολλοῖς καὶ παντοδαπαῖς διατριβαῖς εὐπορούντων (*De E apud Delphos* 384E)

[83] Cassius Dio obligingly informs that the library was financed out of Dalmatian booty (49.43.8).

[84] Cf. Isidorus, *Etymologiae* 6.5.1: *e Pontica praeda*.

Libraries are just too important for the intelligentsia to be fussy about their origins. As Roman imperialism translated war into culture,[85] the *pepaideumenoi* were happy to be at the consuming end of the process. The pressures of literary *paideia* outweighed moral and/or political scruples and reshaped moral and/or political discourse.

The survey of literacy-related anecdotes in this paper has demonstrated that Greco-Roman historians and biographers were actively reflecting on the value of literary culture for individuals and society. It is through all those varied anecdotes about pens, notebooks, faked signatures, and salvaged libraries that they problematize or rehabilitate literacy. The downside of diversity is lack of systemization. Plutarch is exemplary in this respect. He problematizes literacy and its relationship with politics sporadically, ever ad hoc and ad hominem, switching between stereotypes and approaches as it suits him. The portrait of literacy is fragmented in Plutarch. Caesar and Gracchus' supporters abuse literacy, but Caesar is also let down by it. So are, too, Solon, Cato, and Pompey—each in his own way. Contrary to expectations Eumenes is not hindered by his literacy; Lucullus shines in his. What about Sulla? Was he a providential saviour of Aristotle's texts or did he get away with yet another crime? Or did he get away? What about Lysander and the *skytalê*? Just as Plutarch's moral judgement in the *Lives* is largely open-ended and non-prescriptive,[86] the snapshots of literacy scattered throughout the *Lives* hint at problems but hardly solve them. Plutarch is careful not to dot all his i's: this thankless job is left to his readers.

Appendix 1: styluses, tablets, and weapons

Suetonius, *Caesar* 82.2: Julius Caesar defends himself against the conspirators with a stylus, cf. Cassius Dio 44.16.1: the conspirators hid their daggers in pen-cases.

Suetonius, *Augustus* 27.4: Octavian mistakes writing tablets for a weapon, with deadly consequences for their owner.

Suetonius, *Caligula* 28: on Caligula's orders, a mob pen-stabs and tears apart a senator.

Suetonius, *Claudius* 35.2: pen-cases removed from scribes for security reasons.

Suetonius, *Claudius* 15.4: a knight, displeased Claudius' verdict, throws his

[85] Cf. Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 7.11.5.

[86] Pelling (2002g); Duff (1999), *passim*; Stadter (2000).

stylus and tablets in the emperor's face badly gashing his check.

Seneca, *De clementia* 1.15.1: the crowd in the forum pen-stabs a man who had previously flogged his own son to death.

[Lucian], *Nero* 9: Nero's attendants smash a Greek singer's throat with their writing tablets.

Torturing with stylus: Plautus, *Pseudolus* 544a–545; Plutarch, *De sollertia animalium* 968E.

Appendix 2: Caesar and the Great Library

Great Library destroyed by fire: Seneca, *De tranquillitate* 9.4–5; Aulus Gellius 7.17.3; Cassius Dio 42.38.2; Ammianus Marcellinus 22.16.13.

Fire in port: Lucan, *Pharsalia* 10.498–505; Florus 2.13.59.

Fire of Great Library, Caesar's swim, notebooks not mentioned: Orosius, *Historia adversum paganos* 6.15.31.

Caesar swims with the notebooks: Suetonius, *Caesar* 64; Cassius Dio 42.40.5.

Caesar's swim, notebooks not mentioned: [anonymous] *Bellum Alexandrinum* 21; Florus 2.13.59; Appian, *Bellum Civile* 2.90.377, 2.150.628.

PART II, 2

THE STATESMAN IN PLUTARCH'S GREEK *LIVES*

SINGOLARE E PLURALE NELLE *VITE* GRECHE DI PLUTARCO

Luisa Prandi

Questo titolo, apparentemente ambizioso, preannuncia di fatto una ricognizione sulle *Vite* di personaggi greci scritte da Plutarco, in cerca di soggetti di senso plurale a proposito di un tema ben preciso: la decisionalità politica.[1] Poiché ho voluto tentare essenzialmente uno studio di mentalità, mi sono posta in primo luogo l'obiettivo di considerare e di valutare notizie ed episodi *all'interno* della ricostruzione plutarchea, e non quello di metterli a confronto con la restante tradizione per accertarne l'attendibilità storica. Anche se questa premessa non esclude che, in fase di conclusioni, io integri le mie deduzioni e riflessioni con alcuni aspetti della problematica connessa alla deformazione dei fatti da parte del biografo.[2]

Plutarco ha scritto biografie, cioè storie di singoli[3] e questo implica che in esse debba essere il «singolare» a prevalere sul «plurale» e la decisionalità dell'individuo-protagonista a prevalere su quella di gruppi e masse. C'è quindi un'ipoteca di genere letterario, per così dire, sullo spazio e sul significato del «plurale» nelle *Vite*. Nonostante questo, la mia indagine ha avuto un esito che, a mio giudizio, si spiega in modo adeguato soltanto ricorrendo anche ad elementi diversi da quelli stilistici e compositivi del genere biografico.

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[1] Per quanto riguarda le *Vite* di personaggi romani cfr. Pelling (1986) 159–187, il quale riconosce nella ricostruzione plutarchea delle biografie della repubblica romana un autonomo modello interpretativo greco del tipo *boulê-dêmos*, anche se ciò non significa che la lettura di Plutarco sia totalmente anacronistica; e Mazza (1995) 245–268, il quale invece intende il binomio *boulê-dêmos* piuttosto come una semplificazione intenzionale del contesto politico romano. Ora posso anche rimandare al quadro d'insieme realizzato da S.Saïd, *Plutarch and the People in the Parallel Lives*, in questo stesso volume.

[2] Per la questione del rapporto fra le fonti usate da Plutarco e la sua interpretazione cfr. *infra La Vita di Dione* e *Conclusioni.*

[3] Cfr. Desideri (1995) 17–19.

Ho realizzato una divisione ragionata delle *Vite* in due gruppi, secondo la maggiore o minore accentuazione data alle decisioni dei singoli.[4] La constatazione dell'esistenza di un rapporto dialettico fra l'uno e i molti—che si ripropone varie volte nel secondo e più significativo dei due gruppi—rende opportuna una presentazione e discussione preliminare dei passi teorici contenuti nelle *Vite*, in cui Plutarco espone il proprio pensiero sulle caratteristiche di tale rapporto;[5] di queste sue opinioni si rinviene infatti tanto la causa quanto la conseguenza[6] nella casistica, non povera, che egli offre nel tracciare l'esistenza di personaggi di spicco della storia greca.

Con queste premesse, l'analisi dei passi più specificatamente pertinenti alla decisionalità della massa può offrire elementi abbastanza sicuri per qualificare spazio, importanza e positività (o negatività) degli episodi che Plutarco ricorda in merito. All'interno di questi dedico attenzione particolare alla *Vita di Dione*, nella quale compare la più ampia concentrazione di passi significativi per lo studio della presenza dei «molti» nella decisionalità politica.

Alle conclusioni rimando poi qualche suggestione di risposta ai problemi che ho sollevato all'inizio di questo intervento.

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[4] Credo sia da tenere presente anche il fatto che, in qualche caso, il personaggio greco cui Plutarco dedica una *Vita* è stato scelto con qualche difficoltà ed insoddisfazione per completare una coppia nella quale la figura romana era l'elemento trainante. E' stato notato che Nicia pare funzionale a Crasso—cfr. Titchener (1991) 153–158—che Eumene costituisce una sorta di «doppio» di Sertorio—cfr. Bosworth (1992) 56–79—che Agide e Cleomene vengono individuati per necessità—cfr. Marasco (1981) 183–184. Ma neppure va trascurato che non sempre le indicazioni offerte dallo stesso Plutarco a proposito degli abbinamenti sono esenti da ambiguità, cfr. Desideri (1992) 4478–4481.

[5] A differenza della Frazier (1995) 147–171, che preferisce non fondarsi sulle considerazioni teoriche presenti nelle *Vite* per la difficoltà di riconoscervi il genuino pensiero di Plutarco, e ritiene invece più fruttuoso concentrarsi sulla parte narrativa, io credo che l'inserimento di tali considerazioni risponda nella sostanza alle idee dell'autore e che la notevole omogeneità che è possibile constatare in esse (cfr. *infra Conclusioni*) possa esserne una prova.

[6] Intendo dire che la conoscenza di una serie di episodi storici in cui il singolo uomo politico greco esplicava la propria azione politica interagendo con la sua città—come per esempio accadeva ad Atene—può aver alimentato in Plutarco l'idea che l'attività politica fosse sempre stata un continuo confronto fra singolare e plurale; ma è altrettanto probabile che, ad un certo punto e senza bisogno di ulteriori prove, egli abbia continuato a leggere o a deformare secondo quest'ottica dei fatti storici che non necessariamente corrispondevano ad essa.

Rassegna delle Vite

Le *Vite* si possono dividere, dalla mia prospettiva, in due gruppi.

1 – Biografie in cui la decisionalità politica sembra saldamente e prevalentemente nelle mani dell'individuo e in cui l'autore non lascia spazio narrativo al ruolo di gruppi omogenei o di collettività.

Il caso forse più emblematico è quello della *Vita di Lisandro*, o di quella di *Agesilao*, ma simili ad esse sono quelle di *Teseo* e di *Licurgo*, o anche di *Pelopida*, di *Alessandro* e di *Pirro*; e mi sembrano ascrivibili allo stesso gruppo anche quelle di *Alcibiade*, di *Agide* e *Cleomene*.

Ciò non significa ovviamente che per Plutarco costoro non si fossero imbattuti in ostilità e non avessero avuto contrapposizioni, talora in grado di inibire la realizzazione dei loro progetti; significa che lo scrittore, di volta in volta, pone loro di fronte avversari isolati o piccoli gruppi anonimi.

Qualche esempio può chiarire il mio punto di vista: Lisandro monopolizza in modo tentacolare tutte le iniziative e si scontra con due avversari, di fatto insormontabili per lui ma senza dubbio «al singolare»: il re Agesilao e il rigido regime spartano; per Teseo e Licurgo le difficoltà di un'ambientazione storica circostanziata e l'incertezza della tradizione[7] favoriscono lo sbilanciamento dell'esposizione a favore del personaggio; l'attività politica di Alcibiade è per così dire parcellizzata in una serie di collaborazioni e/o di scontri con vari uomini (come Nicia, i nemici anonimi del 415, Endio, Agide, Tissaferne, Crizia);[8] nella biografia di Alessandro i soldati manifestano la propria volontà un'unica volta, in occasione dell'ammutinamento all'Ifasi, e per quanto si tratti di una circostanza decisiva—per il futuro della spedizione e per i progetti di Alessandro stesso—Plutarco la presenta meno come un successo decisionale delle truppe e più come un'insuccesso del Macedone che egli copre con la propria compassione e che cerca di esorcizzare con espedienti mistificatorii a beneficio di nemici e posteri;[9] nella *Vita*

[7] Cfr. *Lycurgus* 1.1 sui problemi denunciati dallo stesso Plutarco a proposito di figure di così grande antichità.

[8] Alcibiade è l'unico uomo politico ateniese di cui Plutarco scrive la vita ma a cui non applica lo schema mentale e compositivo del rapporto uno/molti. Cfr. *infra* i commenti al punto 2.

[9] Per le strategie a mio avviso impiegate da Plutarco nella composizione di questa biografia, rimando a Prandi (2000) 375–386.

di Cleomene è presente qualche caso di rapporto uomo politico/popolo nel momento decisionale ma sempre a carico di personaggi secondari e non spartani.[10]

2 – Biografie in cui il personaggio si trova ad essere più o meno frequentemente contrapposto ad un'entità plurale, che egli deve vincere o convincere per poter concretizzare i propri progetti. Si tratta di individui che appaiono assai diversi l'uno dall'altro per indole, doti, ideologia e situazione storica, ma che divengono molto simili nella resa letteraria perché ricoprono il ruolo—più o meno fortunato—di interlocutore della massa.

La *Vita* con la più alta concentrazione di episodi e di particolari di questo genere è quella di *Dione*, che tratterò a parte. Corrispondono poi a questo *cliché*, all'interno della realtà della *polis*, la *Vita di Solone*, di *Temistocle*, *Cimone*, *Pericle*, *Nicia*, *Focione* e *Demostene*; sono ad esse assimilabili quelle di *Aristide*, *Timoleonte*, *Eumene*, *Demetrio*, *Arato* e di *Filopemene*.

Connotato evidente, ma certo non imprevedibile, di questo gruppo è che ben 2/3 dei protagonisti di queste *Vite* sono Ateniesi e che nel regime di Atene Plutarco individua e ambienta—con anacronismi e semplificazioni[11]—la dialettica fra singolo e massa.

La teoria

Mi sembra importante mettere in luce che Plutarco dichiara quelli che si possono definire i presupposti teorici della lettura biografica che caratterizza il secondo gruppo di *Vite*.

Il passo in cui più esplicitamente egli pone i termini del rapporto fra il singolo uomo politico e la massa è la digressione proemiale—su politica, gloria e ambizione—suscitata, per sua stessa ammissione, dal caso umano dei fratelli Gracchi e posta in apertura della *Vita di Agide*.

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[10] Cfr. *Cleomenes* 19, 20 e 24. Sul fatto che i due Spartani non corrispondono all'immagine del politico-demagogo che era funzionale al parallelo con coppia dei Gracchi cfr. Marasco (1981) 49–50 e 183–184.

[11] Non credo necessiti dimostrazione del fatto che Plutarco retrodati indebitamente un certo tipo di scenario democratico ateniese nelle *Vite* di personaggi del VI sec. o della prima metà del V; è molto probabile che in questo egli sia anche debitore dell'impostazione di fonti del IV sec.—cfr. già Aalders (1982) 10 e 61–65—ma è un dato di fatto che egli ne ricavi spunti per teorizzazioni personali.

A 1.3, citando due versi di Sofocle su mandriani e armenti, egli afferma che gli uomini politici che seguono come schiavi i desideri e le tendenze delle masse, al fine di essere chiamati capipopolo (*dêmagogoi*) e comandanti (*archontes*), sono come i mandriani costretti a seguire armenti incapaci di parlare; a 2.5–6 egli richiama poi la favola esopica della coda del serpente che vuol prendere la guida del corpo, invece della testa, e lo conduce alla morte, affermando che gli uomini politici che compiacciono la folla e la seguono nelle sue divagazioni poi non riescono più a contenerne il disordine.

La questione, dal punto di vista del singolo, è se dar retta acriticamente alla massa o piuttosto persuaderla; ma dal punto di vista della massa la questione è piuttosto che—come la coda del serpente (o come gli armenti muti)—essa non è in grado di condurre, cioè di decidere in modo assennato.

Stretta parentela con queste considerazioni presenta l'inizio della *Vita di Focione*, dove Plutarco considera la difficoltà di governare una città in crisi, e quindi inasprita, ed afferma (2.5) che i suoi cittadini rovinano l'uomo politico che li compiace, dopo aver rovinato quello che non aveva voluto compiacerli; e poi sentenzia (2.7) che chi contrasta le richieste popolari è troppo duro ma che seguire gli errori della massa è come scivolare giù per una china. Il rapporto sembrerebbe essere senza esito positivo, a meno di non mettere in pratica il difficile consiglio plutarcheo (2.8–9) di fare sagge concessioni per ottenere un utile consenso, cosa che rende il comportamento dell'uomo politico simile a quello della divinità.

Una coesistenza positiva di «singolare» e «plurale» passa quindi anche attraverso la *forma mentis* dell'individuo nei confronti del popolo, *forma mentis* che pare essere una difficile conquista ed il portato di una posizione ideologica: secondo un'opinione che Plutarco attribuisce a Demostene (*Demosthenes* 8.6), un uomo di simpatie popolari prepara i propri discorsi—e questo mostra il suo rispetto per il popolo—mentre la noncuranza dell'opinione delle masse circa la forma dei discorsi rivela un uomo di spiriti oligarchici, che conta più sulla sopraffazione che sulla persuasione. L'impressione che questo comportamento sottintenda per il biografo finalità puramente utilitaristiche è forse solo illusoria, perché nella *Vita di Nicia* (2.6) egli afferma con forza che il maggior onore che uomini potenti (*meizones*) possono fare alle masse è quello di non disprezzarle. Così come ribadisce nella *Vita di Demetrio* (sopr. 30.4–5) che il peggior servizio delle masse è dare ai potenti onori vuoti e dettati dalla paura, perché spesso il popolo nel conce-

dere onori odia chi riceve smodatamente ciò che in realtà è concesso controvoglia.

Quanto queste opinioni fossero condivise nella sostanza da Plutarco stesso[12] appare dal commento che si legge nella *Confronto fra Cimone e Lucullo* (2.7, a proposito dell'ostracismo di Cimone), cioè che è destino delle nature aristocratiche andare poco d'accordo e non essere gradite alle masse, proprio come i bendaggi dei medici sugli arti slogati. Il ragionamento di Plutarco sembra essere che il rapporto fra uomo politico e popolo deve tener conto di una base di incompatibilità; che essa si può superare non se l'individuo aderisce integralmente agli umori della massa—che appare fatalmente attratta dalle scelte sbagliate[13]—ma piuttosto se egli, senza affatto disprezzare la collettività che gli sta innanzi, assolve ad una funzione pedagogica nei suoi confronti, positiva come quella di un medico che talvolta per sanare deve far soffrire;[14] che l'ideale è quello di conciliare—tramite la capacità persuasiva—concessioni ai desideri del popolo con richieste di ubbidienza alle proprie indicazioni e scelte politiche.[15]

La prassi

La casistica di episodi concreti che ho raccolto nelle *Vite* sul continuo «agone» fra singolo uomo politico e popolo—con qualche esempio reperito isolatamente anche in biografie che ho attribuito al primo gruppo—è sorretta da un filo conduttore principale che definirei un «tema della persuasione»: la possibilità del singolo di decidere è direttamente proporzionale alla sua capacità di convincere il popolo ad approvare la sua proposta. Gli esempi si possono catalogare in tre tipologie:

a – L'uomo politico persuade/non persuade il popolo

Teseo persuade casa per casa gli abitanti dell'Attica ad accettare il

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[12] Le idee politico-amministrative di Plutarco sono ben espresse, del resto, nei *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae*, a proposito dei quali rimando a Prandi (2000).

[13] Cfr. Aalders (1982) 30 nota 90, per un elenco di passi in cui Plutarco esprime giudizi negativi sulle masse.

[14] Il parallelo fra uomini politici che si rifiutano di assecondare le tendenze della massa e la sana e necessaria costrizione degli interventi dei medici è del resto frequente in Plutarco.

[15] Cfr. De Blois (2000) 135.

sinecismo (*Theseus* 24.1). Temistocle convince gli Ateniesi a votare la sua legge navale (*Themistocles* 4.2); si trova costretto a ricorrere ad un oracolo per integrare i propri argomenti a favore della resistenza ai Persiani (10). Demostene persuade gli Ateniesi a sostenere la coalizione contro la Macedonia (*Demosthenes* 17.1–2); non vi riesce invece in occasione della rivolta di Agide (24.1). Focione induce gli Ateniesi a revocare gli aiuti per i Bisanzi (*Phocion* 14.4–6); fallisce quando vuole distoglierli dalla coalizione contro la Macedonia e poi quando vorrebbe far loro accettare la pace con Filippo (16). Eumene riesce a persuadere i soldati a non darsi ad una fuga disordinata (*Eumenes* 15.9–10). Nella Vita di Cleomene, Arato persuade gli Achei a rinunciare all'Acrocorinto (*Cleomenes* 19); Aristotele stacca Argo da Sparta (20). Arato persuade i Corinzi a entrare nella lega Achea (*Aratus* 23.4) e fa cambiare il nome di Mantinea in Antigoneia (*Aratus* 45.8). Filopemene convince i Megalopoliti a restare fedeli agli Achei (*Philopemenes* 5)[16] e Sparta ad entrare nella lega (15).

b – L'uomo politico asseconda il popolo

Aristide, constatando che gli Ateniesi desiderano un regime democratico e che il popolo lo merita e non può essere frenato, scrive il decreto che prevede il sorteggio degli arconti fra tutti i cittadini (*Aristides* 22.1).[17] Pericle nella prima fase della sua attività cerca il favore popolare come base politica per contrapporsi a Cimone e per questo vara un regime democratico (*Pericles* 7.3–4; 9.2–5); accorgendosi che il popolo desidera il rientro di Cimone lo fa richiamare (10).

c – L'uomo politico esercita un controllo sul popolo

Grande capacità di controllo della massa per la costituzione di un regime personale è attribuita soprattutto a Pericle (*Pericles* 9.1, dove si cita il noto giudizio di Tucidide; 15, sul passaggio da una politica demagogica ad una «monarchica»; 16.3),[18] ma anche ad Arato (*Aratus* 24.5; 25.7; 26.4). Pelopida mentre conduce le operazioni nel Peloponneso gode di un tale ascendente che gli alleati lo seguono anche senza un formale decreto comune (*Pelopidas* 24.5). Un caso interessante è quello di Timoleonte, del quale Plutarco dice che è responsabile della morte

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[16] Cfr. anche *Cleomenes* 24.

[17] Per i dubbi su questo decreto cfr. Calabi (1954) xxxii e Aalders (1982) 29.

[18] Sul rapporto, formale e ideologico, fra Plutarco e Tucidide cfr. Canfora (1995) 83–90.

della moglie e della figlia di Iceta per il solo fatto di non aver parlato in loro favore nell'assemblea dei Siracusani che le condanna (*Timoleon* 33); e quello di Arato, perché gli Achei approvano l'ingresso di Argo soltanto quando è lui a proporlo (*Aratus* 33.4–5). Eumene inganna (a malincuore) i propri soldati ed ufficiali sull'identità del comandante nemico, perché non defezionino (*Eumenes* 6.6–12).

Anche in casi come questi si intuisce che la massa prende delle decisioni, o cerca di prenderle, ma è sintomatico notare che, sul piano espositivo, Plutarco imbriglia la decisionalità che di fatto scaturisce da un voto collettivo in un'ottica di ubbidienza/disubbidienza alla proposta di un singolo uomo politico.

Azioni di aperto e consapevole contrasto con i desideri del popolo sono attribuite a Solone, che riorganizza con indipendenza di spirito le istituzioni di Atene (*Solon* 15.1);[19] a Cimone, che perde il proprio ascendente solo quando è lontano dalla città per una campagna militare (*Cimon* 15.3);[20] a Pericle, in occasione dei processi al suo *entourage* (*Pericles* 32.3); a Demostene, di cui viene segnalata la *parrhêsia* e la capacità di ribaltare decisioni giudiziarie popolari (*Demosthenes* 14.3–5); a Focione, che non fa nulla per piacere agli Ateniesi (*Phocion* 3) e non ambisce alle cariche (8.1–2).

Vorrei far notare che solo raramente Plutarco riesce, o intende, dar conto di una realtà complessa in cui sulla scena politica si confrontano progetti diversi. Dal punto di vista espositivo le forze in gioco sono per lo più, secondo uno schema biografico semplificato, l'uomo politico da un lato e la massa dall'altro, anche nei casi in cui il lettore si può poi rendere conto che il protagonista ha fallito nel persuadere il popolo perché è stata più efficace la persuasione di un altro.[21]

Questo è quanto capita per esempio a Demostene e Focione, in occasione dello scontro finale con la Macedonia, quando gli Ateniesi di fronte a due «persuasori» danno retta all'uno e rifiutano l'altro: di fatto, Plutarco da conto separatamente del successo oratorio di Demostene nella *Vita* a lui dedicata, e in quella di Focione dell'insuccesso di

[19] Cfr. anche 15.2: le migliori che volessero accettare.

[20] Nonostante Plutarco avesse a disposizione poco materiale per la *Vita*—cfr. Blamire (1989) 3–4, sulla brevità di questa biografia—o forse proprio per questa ragione, la sequenza degli avvenimenti appare molto centrata sul rapporto uno/molti.

[21] Naturalmente è presente nelle *Vite* anche l'antagonismo fra due uomini politici, come quello fra Temistocle ed Aristide: mi sembra però che esso costituisca un differente *cliché* interpretativo—sul quale cfr. Piccirilli (1983) xix–xx—che non si combina e non interferisce costruttivamente con il tema di cui mi sto occupando.

quest'ultimo, aggiungendo che dopo la sconfitta di Cheronea gli Ateniesi si erano pentiti di non avergli dato retta.

In ogni caso, lo spazio per una decisione del popolo che sia indipendente dalle pressioni di un singolo uomo politico appare scarso. I casi che ho raccolto in tal senso si possono tripartire secondo questa tipologia.

a – La massa rimuove o condanna a morte un uomo politico

Gli Ateniesi esautorano Pericle (*Pericles* 35.4) e condannano a morte Focione (*Phocion* 34–35). I Siracusani condannano a morte Mamerco (*Timoleon* 34). I soldati macedoni condannano a morte Eumene (*Eumenes* 8.3) e depongono Demetrio (*Demetrius* 44.6). Gli Argiraspidi consegnano Eumene ad Antigono (*Eumenes* 17). I Corinzi convocano Arato per arrestarlo (*Aratus* 40.3).

b - La massa realizza/impedisce un progetto[22]

Gli Ateniesi votano contro un progetto di Temistocle (che rimane segreto) perché privo dell'approvazione di Aristide (*Themistocles*. 20.1–2).[23] I mercenari di Dione si rifiutano di passare ai Siracusani (*Dion* 38.4–5). I soldati e gli ufficiali di Alessandro si rifiutano di proseguire la conquista (*Alexander* 62). I soldati macedoni decidono di proteggere la vita di Eumene con una guardia del corpo (*Eumenes* 8.11–12); scelgono la versione più giusta del giuramento fra quelle proposte da Antigono e da Eumene (12.4). Gli Achei tagliano i fondi per le spedizioni militari di Arato (*Aratus* 37.5); i Sicionî insistono per seppellire in città il corpo di Arato (*Aratus* 53.1–2). La popolazione di Messene manifesta turbamento e disapprova la cattura di Filopemene (*Philopemenes* 19.1–2); le truppe achee preparano in modo determinato una ritorsione militare per il suo arresto (21.1).

c – La massa induce un uomo politico a compiere qualcosa

Gli Ateniesi eleggono con determinazione a cariche pubbliche personaggi talvolta defilati o riluttanti: Solone, al quale in due fasi viene

[22] Può essere interessante notare che vi è almeno un caso in cui Plutarco mette in evidenza, con un commento sarcastico, l'ignavia della massa: gli Argivi, rassegnati alla tirannide di Aristippo, non prendono posizione e stanno imparziali come arbitri di fronte ai tentativi militari di Arato di liberare la città (*Aratus* 25.4 e 27.2).

[23] Su questo episodio è lecito un grande scetticismo, cfr. Piccirilli (1983) 262.

affidata la responsabilità di modificare le istituzioni di Atene (*Solon* 10; 13.6–14.1 e 16.5); Cimone (*Cimon* 5.5), Pericle, riabilitato dopo la condanna (*Pericles* 37.1–2), Nicia (*Nicia* 14.2).[24] I Corinzi scelgono Timoleonte come stratego da inviare a Siracusa (*Timoleon* 7). Gli Ateniesi costringono Temistocle a compiere un sacrificio umano (*Themistocles* 13.3–5). I Greci scelgono Aristide perché fissi il tributo della lega (*Aristides* 24.1–3; 25.1). Gli Ateniesi tributano iperbolici onori a Demetrio (*Demetrius* 24). I soldati macedoni[25] scelgono Demetrio come re, salvo deporlo dopo qualche tempo (*Demetrius* 44.6); scelgono Eumene come comandante (*Eumenes* 14.2, 4 e 8–11) e poi come comandante unico (16.1). Gli Achei, riunitisi a Sicione, eleggono Arato stratego (*Aratus* 41.1); gli Achei si riuniscono ad Egion e l'assemblea vota la cessione dell'Acrocorinto ad Antigono (42.1–2).

I soggetti plurali che compaiono nelle *Vite* sono per lo più assemblee, cittadine o assimilabili. Talvolta esse sono colte nell'esercizio delle proprie funzioni istituzionali, ma spesso Plutarco trascende il momento puramente narrativo della riunione per riassumere la dialettica decisionale in una contrapposizione più astratta fra il popolo ed il singolo uomo politico. Ed è il termine *dêmos* che definisce idealmente il soggetto plurale delle vicende storiche nelle *Vite,* accanto agli etnici specifici. In quanto vocabolo collettivo, esso ha un evidente significato plurale ma grammaticalmente gli vengono abbinati verbi ed aggettivi al singolare, come all'uomo politico; e quindi questa ambiguità ingenera a volte nel lettore l'impressione che si tratti di un «duello» e non del confronto fra uno e molti.

L'altro tipico gruppo collettivo è quello costituito dai militari, di solito mercenari, ed è presente nelle *Vite* di personaggi «occidentali» o di età ellenistica. Si tratta peraltro di una diversa forma di assemblea, avulsa dal contesto cittadino e che talvolta presuppone il superamento storico del dibattito sui regimi in favore di una gestione di tipo monarchico. Tuttavia siamo incoraggiati da Plutarco stesso a considerare in modo parallelo l'ambiente delle assemblee cittadine e quello delle riunioni militari. Nella *Vita di Eumene* infatti egli fornisce un giudizio, assai negativo, sui Macedoni adulati e corrotti dai satrapi persiani e sul loro

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[24] Anche di Focione si dice che venne sempre eletto mentre era assente (*Phocion* 8.1–2) ma il fatto è narrato dalla angolazione del personaggio e non della massa.

[25] Preciso che nelle *Vite* di personaggi ellenistici Plutarco usa sempre il termine «Macedoni» per indicare gruppi di soldati e di ufficiali ovviamente diversi.

campo, divenuto luogo di baldoria e di intrighi elettorali per la scelta dei comandanti, come nelle democrazie (*Eumenes* 13.11).[26]

Ed anche i singoli episodi che ho raccolto, e in cui emerge tanto il rapporto soldati-ufficiali-comandante quanto la decisionalità, rivelano tratti affini a quelli del mondo delle *poleis*, come la capacità di persuadere o il controllo carismatico della massa.

In tutti i passi si riscontra una certa rapidità e asciuttezza espositiva nel riportare gli episodi e così pure la mancanza di commenti d'ordine generale, che possano attirare l'attenzione del lettore, anche quando le iniziative collettive hanno avuto conseguenze di rilievo. Caratteristica della decisionalità, tanto delle assemblee civili quanto di quelle militari, appare in vari casi l'implicito *background* emotivo da cui essa scaturisce, che può essere l'entusiasmo per un uomo politico che si vuole eleggere o il risentimento nei confronti di un altro che poi si esautora, o l'esasperazione (come nella *Vita di Alessandro*) o la pietà (come nella *Vita di Filopemene*).

Se si considera che invece le decisioni dei singoli sono originate, nella stragrande maggioranza dei casi, dalla volontà di realizzare progetti, più o meno accompagnata dal desiderio di autoaffermazione, si constata che in molti di quegli episodi in cui appare protagonista il popolo trova la sua applicazione il paragone che Plutarco istituisce fra la massa e la coda del serpente.

Molto spesso infatti la decisione appare sbagliata o perché la collettività si pente a breve distanza di tempo (destituzione di Pericle poi riabilitato; sfiducia nei confronti di Focione prima di Cheronea, poi rientrata; acclamazione di Demetrio, poi deposto);[27] oppure perché l'iniziativa che ha assunto è eticamente discutibile[28] (il sacrificio umano nella *Vita di Temistocle*[29]); o perché Plutarco stesso aggiunge un esplicito commento di condanna (aspetti illegali dell'assemblea che decreta la morte di Focione e parallelo fra la sua morte e quella di Socrate; l'esagerazione degli onori concessi dagli Ateniesi corrompe l'animo di

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[26] A 15.14 Plutarco dice che i Macedoni, lasciati a se stessi per la malattia di Eumene, *edêmagogounto*.

[27] Cfr. *Timoleon* 6 per un commento sul pentimento come conseguenza di un atto non ponderato.

[28] Scelte non criticabili—o comunque non criticate—appaiono quella dei Greci di affidare ad Aristide il compito di fissare il tributo della lega o la pietà della gente di Messene verso Filopemene.

[29] Va rilevato che appare per varie ragioni difficoltoso ambientare dal punto di vista cronologico la cattura delle vittime e l'effettuazione del sacrificio, cfr. Piccirilli (1983) 252–253.

Demetrio; l'indegna cessione dell'Acrocorinto al re di Macedonia da parte degli Achei).[30]

La Vita di Dione

Dei 58 capitoli che costituiscono la *Vita di Dione*, almeno 15—cioè quasi ¼ del totale—riguardano in modo significativo il rapporto fra singolo e massa e contengono riferimenti al sistema assembleare; essi si situano, in un *continuum* narrativo, nella parte finale della biografia (dal capitolo 30 in poi).

Sono presenti qui un po' tutti gli spunti che ho già individuato nelle altre *Vite* ma la loro concentrazione, insieme all'estensione dei passi, rende il caso della *Vita di Dione* meritevole di essere trattato a parte. Sono convinta che nessuno schema o riassunto possa sostituire l'effetto di una lettura personale dei capitoli 30–55 della *Vita* e quindi, rinviando a quella, cerco di porre in evidenza gli elementi di interesse sui due livelli cui mi sono riferita per le altre *Vite*: le considerazioni teoriche e la casistica pratica, quest'ultima articolata in agone fra l'uomo politico e il popolo e in momenti di decisionalità collettiva.

Considerazioni personali e teoriche su temi politici formula Plutarco sui Siracusani che, esaltati oltre misura dalla vittoria su Dionisio II, vogliono δημαγωγεῖσθαι (sapersi governare) prima di essere un δῆμος (corpo civico) (32.5); oppure che, come dei convalescenti dalla tirannide, vogliono governarsi autononomamente παρὰ καιρόν (in un momento inopportuno) e quindi commettono degli errori (37.7); o anche sulla massa che vuole essere corteggiata (32.5). A proposito di Dione il biografo dice che il suo progetto politico per Siracusa non è quello di un regime politico non temperato—il temibile «mercato dei regimi» secondo Platone—ma piuttosto un insieme di democrazia e monarchia, all'interno del quale abbia più potere l'aristocrazia e non il popolo (53.4); e che la sua indole era rigida per partito preso nei confronti del popolo, al fine di irrobustirne il carattere (52.5–6).

Con questi presupposti, un agone particolarmente duro fra Dione e i Siracusani è previsione fin troppo facile. A tutto ciò si aggiunge la presenza di un «terzo attore» come Eraclide, che sa conquistarsi una

[30] E' stato notato—cfr. Santi Amantini (1995) 334–335 e 338—che Plutarco concentra le notizie sugli onori all'altezza del 307 a.C.: questa scelta redazionale rivela l'interesse per la questione del rapporto uno/molti e la volontà di farne un «caso».

massa che vuole appunto essere blandita (32.5), che la sobilla per suscitare malcontento e disordini (33.4), che patrocina una misura demagogica quant'altra mai come un γῆς ἀναδασμός (redistribuzione di terre) (37.5–6); un uomo che Dione giudica turbolento, incostante e fazioso (53.5). Il risultato è una combinazione esplosiva, sebbene a mio avviso anche in questo caso Plutarco non realizzi una triangolazione narrativa ma una serie di confronti a due. Ed in effetti, accanto alle vicende militari della «liberazione» di Siracusa da Dionisio II, si snoda nella biografia la vicenda non meno sanguinosa della lotta per il controllo della città e dei sussulti di autonomia dei Siracusani stessi. Il fatto che Plutarco parteggi in maniera aperta per il protagonista, presentando positivamente il suo progetto politico, non oscura del tutto il fatto che vi erano altre opzioni e che le contrapposizioni sociali erano molto forti.[31]

Tratto distintivo dei Capitoli che sto considerando è comunque la decisionalità assembleare: tutto, o quasi, si decide—in modi diversi e sotto l'urgenza di pressioni diverse—in riunioni di cittadini ed il soggetto più volte ripetuto è «i Siracusani».[32] Dione stesso insiste perché Dionisio tratti non con lui ma con i Siracusani «ormai uomini liberi» (30.1; cfr. anche 31.2–6 e 37.1–3). Talvolta i Siracusani assumono iniziative spontanee (e irriflessive): stanziano un donativo per i mercenari di Dione (31.1); si riuniscono in un'assemblea «autogestita» e scelgono Eraclide come navarco (33.1); il popolo vota la condanna a morte di Soside (35.1); i Siracusani cacciano gli ambasciatori di Dionisio (37.3); eleggono 25 strateghi, fra cui Eraclide (38.4).

Ma al di là della catalogazione—che ho predisposto soprattutto per trattare il materiale di questa *Vita* nello stesso modo in cui ho trattato quello delle altre—risulta molto interessante quello che vorrei definire il «gioco delle parti» fra l'uno e i molti, cioè i casi della doppia assemblea del Cap. 33 e dell'approvazione e della revoca della distribuzione di terre ai Capp. 37.5–6 e 48.

Il Capitolo 33 tratta le vicende immediatamente posteriori al rientro di Eraclide, che si inaugurano con uno dei momenti più topici

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[31] Appare probabile che la fonte di Plutarco—per le sue caratteristiche di esasperazione dell'antagonismo fra Dione ed Eraclide, nonché per la difesa a spada tratta del primo—sia da identificare con l'accademico Timonide, cfr. esaurientemente Muccioli (1990) 167–187.

[32] Rimando al recente contributo della Spada (2003) per una fruttuosa analisi delle differenze fra Plutarco e Diodoro che mette in luce come il biografo abbia voluto realizzare—a costo di oscurare i particolari storici contrastanti—una particolare caratterizzazione dei Siracusani.

della decisionalità «plurale»: i Siracusani si riuniscono spontaneamente in assemblea e nominano navarco Eraclide, sull'onda dell'entusiasmo; Dione, che era da prima *stratêgos autokratôr*, lamenta una *deminutio* e i Siracusani (pur contrariati) destituiscono Eraclide in seguito alle sue pressioni. A questo primo atto del confronto fra il singolo—Dione—e il popolo ne segue un secondo, per certi versi inatteso: Dione convoca a sua volta un'assemblea (regolare), propone Eraclide come navarco e persuade i cittadini a concedergli una guardia del corpo pari alla sua.

L'esito finale voluto da Dione è paradossalmente identico a quello che auspicavano i Siracusani, cioè la navarchia per Eraclide; ma le due forze in gioco immaginano due diverse procedure, pur attraverso il medesimo istituto assembleare. E Dione, nel racconto plutarcheo, tiene ai Siracusani una sorta di lezione pratica di metodo, indicando come la decisionalità del popolo debba comunque essere subordinata alla convocazione e alla proposta del singolo. Una questione di forma che sottintende una precisa visione ideologica dei ruoli.[33]

Per la cronaca, il risultato così raggiunto non pacifica Eraclide, che è subito attivo a fomentare malcontento popolare.

Forse meno esemplare ma comunque significativa è anche la sequenza dei Capitoli 37.5–6 e 48. Nel primo passo Eraclide fa proporre da Ippone e fa approvare dall'assemblea—nonostante l'opposizione di Dione, che dopo qualche tempo lascia la città con i mercenari—una redistribuzione di terre e la designazione di nuovi strateghi. Plutarco commenta (in un passo che ho già citato) che i Siracusani, bramosi di libertà, cercano un'autonomia inopportuna e commettono errori. Nel secondo passo Dione, al suo rientro in Siracusa, convoca un'assemblea nella quale Eraclide (appena graziato da lui) propone di conferirgli la strategia autocratica; i Siracusani sono spaccati, anche a livello sociale, fra quanti auspicano tutto il potere nelle mani di Dione e quanti desiderano reintegrare Eraclide alla navarchia. Dione cede sulla divisione dei poteri ma compie un atto di forza e fa invalidare la decisione di redistribuire terra e case; Eraclide riprende subito la sua attività di sobillatore.

Questo episodio ripropone lo schema della lotta per il potere fra Dione ed Eraclide ma in un certo senso mascherato, perché sempre filtrato dal confronto fra Dione ed il popolo: ancora una volta è in gioco in assemblea l'assegnazione della navarchia ed ancora una volta è Dione che decide di farla assegnare ad Eraclide; l'immediata richiesta

[33] Tanto del popolo quanto—se si vuole—di Eraclide, che i voleri del popolo asseconda a spada tratta.

di abolire la redistribuzione già deliberata è una contropartita politica ma nel racconto appare piuttosto come una lezione di metodo, se rapportata all'esposizione del Cap. 37, e soprattutto al giudizio di Plutarco, che è fermamente schierato dalla parte di Dione.

E' naturalmente molto probabile che Plutarco trovasse nella fonte che seguiva, e che aveva scelto in primo luogo perché presentava in una luce favorevole ed esemplare Dione,[34] anche elementi delle vicende assembleari che ho richiamato; resta però il fatto che egli ha seguito con interesse tali vicende, le ha riconosciute come parte integrante della fisionomia di Dione e ha concesso loro un ampio spazio nell'economia della biografia.[35]

Conclusioni

Se la scarsa incidenza numerica dei casi di decisione collettiva può essere un esito normale della scelta del genere biografico da parte di Plutarco, l'analisi del materiale da me raccolto ha suscitato una serie di considerazioni che non si pongono semplicemente sul piano delle implicazioni dei generi letterari ma piuttosto su quello delle convinzioni ideologiche dell'autore.[36]

Più di una volta i moderni hanno individuato in alcune biografie più «monolitiche» un'attenzione specifica e quasi esclusiva ad una caratteristica del personaggio, considerata da Plutarco più interessate e rivelatrice di altre, ed hanno riscontrato nel testo un'accentuazione o perfino una selezione degli avvenimenti volta a mettere in rilievo la «cifra» del singolo.[37] Si tratta però, nella maggior parte dei casi, di *clichés* non soltanto di tipo etico ma diversificati secondo le persone.[38] Invece il

[34] Cfr. ancora Muccioli 1990, *passim*

[35] Cfr. De Blois 1997, sul fatto che la «cifra» del Dione plutarcheo è quella del politico con principi filosofici, che viene tradito dalla massa, e che a questa cifra il biografo sacrifica altri elementi storici (questioni militari, logistiche *etc.*).

[36] Constato con piacere che questa mia conclusione, derivata dall'esame delle biografie greche, è simile a quella che Mazza (1995) 264–268, ha tratto dall'esame di quelle romano-repubblicane.

[37] Cfr., fra gli altri, Georgiadou (1992) a proposito di Pelopida; De Blois (1997) e (2000) per Dione e Timoleonte; Bearzot (1985) per Focione; Geiger (1995) per Eumene.

[38] Solo parziale eccezione costituiscono le biografie «spartane» (*Licurgo*, *Lisandro*, *Agesilao*, *Agide e Cleomene*), per le quali Shipley (1997) 401–402 individua suggestivamente il *fil rouge* del riferimento al sistema politico di Sparta; una sorta di «biografia della città» all'interno della quale è comunque più forte il singolo.

topos del contrasto fra l'uomo politico e il popolo, che affiora e caratterizza 13 biografie greche su 23, non contribuisce a delineare meglio e in modo peculiare la fisionomia di un personaggio ma semmai la rende un po' simile a quella di altri.[39] Di fatto questo *topos* si combina, senza sovrapporsi troppo ma anche senza stemperarsi, con l'interpretazione d'insieme del personaggio nei casi in cui essa è più marcata: e il risultato è una commistione di lettura ideologico-politica e di lettura etica, che mi sembra espressione di alcune convinzioni di base dell'autore.

Il materiale assemblato nelle *Vite* proviene da fonti ovviamente eterogenee. La frequenza con cui l'impostazione del contrasto uno/molti ricorre mostra che Plutarco si riconosceva in esso, al punto di cercare notizie orientate in tal senso.

L'atteggiamento fondamentalmente rispettoso di Plutarco nei confronti dell'idea di democrazia non è tale da fargli esprimere, in qualche passo delle *Vite*, un apprezzamento per il sistema assemblare: eppure egli non lo mette mai in discussione, sembra volerlo comunque accettare non soltanto come un dato di fatto della realtà storica del passato ma—forse—come una *pièce* di difesa nazionalistica, come un retaggio specificatamente ellenico e quindi prezioso.

Plutarco non riconosce poco spazio al popolo che agisce nella storia perché scrive biografie, cioè storie di singoli, ma, paradossalmente, scrive biografie anche perché crede sinceramente che il singolo—in un eterno agone con il popolo—faccia la politica e la storia.

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[39] Per esempio, al di là del contesto storico-geografico, figure come quella di Cimone, Focione e Dione presentano tratti molto simili di aristocratico e «filosofico» distacco e al tempo stesso di dedizione alla gestione dello stato.

THE FIRST FIVE ANECDOTES OF PLUTARCH'S *LIFE OF ALKIBIADES*[1]

Timothy E. Duff

The *Life of Alkibiades* is a particularly anecdotal *Life*. As Russell demonstrated, the first 16 chapters consist largely of short self-contained stories, which are often simply juxtaposed without any casual link, and some of which are out of chronological order. The function of these anecdotes is plainly not so much to provide a narrative of Alkibiades' early years but rather to illuminate and illustrate his character.[2] This paper will focus on the first five anecdotes of the *Life*, told in chapters 2–3. I hope to demonstrate that their function is to refine and flesh out the explicit statement of Alkibiades' character with which the section begins, and to signal and prefigure key themes and key images which will be central to the *Life* which follows. I also hope to demonstrate that these anecdotes do more than amplify the explicit statement of character: these anecdotes illustrate how Plutarch constructs character and provides unity to his texts above all through anecdote and imagery.

First a few words about childhood anecdotes in general. Plutarch frequently uses anecdotes to indicate or explore character. His most famous statement of this occurs in the prologue to the *Alexander—Caesar* (*Alexander* 1.1–3).[3] Anecdotes can occur at any point in a *Life*, but are often concentrated at one of two points: either at the start, where they usually relate to the subject's childhood or early years, or at the high point of the subject's power or success.[4] In both cases, such anecdotes

[1] I am grateful to Christopher Pelling and Philip Stadter for their helpful comments on this paper, and to Diotima Papadi who looked over the final version. A more detailed analysis of these anecdotes can be found in a forthcoming paper in the *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*.

[2] See Russell (1966). I tried to demonstrate in Duff (1999) 229–235 how this section contributes to the picture of Alkibiades as a man about whom it is difficult to come to easy moral judgements.

[3] On this prologue, see Duff (1999) 14–22. Cf. also *Cato Minor* 24.1; 37.10.

[4] Childhood anecdotes: e.g. *Cicero* 2.1–5; *Themistokles* 2.1–3; *Alexander* 4.8–10.4; *Cato Minor* 1.3–3.10; *Demetrios* 3.1–4.5. Characterising anecdotes at the high point: e.g. *Lysander* 18.4–19.6; *Themistokles* 18.1–9; *Cicero* 24.1–27.6. See Polman (1974).

are usually presented either without regard to chronological sequence at all or with only a very loose chronological framework: what is important is the character traits revealed.[5] Despite Plutarch's well-known interest in education,[6] anecdotes about childhood in fact tend not to give any sense of character *development.*[7] On the contrary, childhood anecdotes most often assume a static character and are deployed to reveal and prefigure the character-traits which will be more prominent later in life. They often also perform a second, more "literary" function, related to the structure of the text in which they are placed: as we shall see, they introduce the reader to and prefigure broader themes and images which will recur as the *Life* progresses.[8]

After a discussion of Alkibiades' family, appearance, and voice (1.1–8), all usual features of the opening of a Plutarchan *Life*,[9] the anecdotal section opens with a clear statement of Alkibiades' adult character, the only explicit narratorial statement of character in the whole *Life*.

> Τὸ δ' ἦθος αὐτοῦ πολλὰς μὲν ὕστερον, ὡς εἰκὸς ἐν πράγμασι μεγάλοις καὶ τύχαις πολυτρόποις, ἀνομοιότητας πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ μεταβολὰς ἐπεδείξατο. φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασιν.
>
> His character later displayed many inconsistencies and changes, as one might expect in the midst of great matters and varied fortunes. By nature, there were many great passions in him, but love of winning and love of coming first were the strongest, as is clear from his childhood anecdotes. (*Alkibiades* 2.1)

Plutarch is drawing here upon a common ancient distinction between nature (φύσις) and character (ἦθος).[10] Alkibiades'' character is said to

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[5] The bibliography is immense but see for example Stadter (1989) xxxviii–xl, 187 and 209 on the *Perikles*, Hamilton (1969) on *Alexander* 5.1, Bearzot (1985) 17–21 or (1993) 92–96 on the *Phokion*. On Plutarch and chronology generally see the perceptive general comments of Russell (1973) 102–103 and 115–116, and for example Duff (1999) 312–313.

[6] On education as an important theme in Plutarch, especially in the Roman *Lives*, see Pelling (1989); Swain (1989) 62–66; (1990); (1996) 140–144; Duff (1999) 76–77.

[7] The classic studies of Plutarch's treatment of childhood are Pelling (1988a and 1990a).

[8] See for example the stories told about Alexander the Great's childhood (*Alexander* 4.8–10.4), especially the story of his taming of Boukephalas, with Stadter (1996).

[9] E.g. *Perikles* 3.3–7; *Alexander* 2.1–4.7; *Phokion* 4.1–5.10; *Cato Maior* 1.1–10; *Pyrrhos* 1.1–3.9; *Marius* 1.1–3.1; *Demetrios* 2.1–3; *Antony* 1.1–2.1 and 4.1–5. See Leo (1901) 180–182.

[10] The distinction is set out most clearly in the treatise *On moral virtue*: a person's nature is what he is born with; a person's character is related to his nature, but is

have later been inconsistent, but his underlying nature is presented as constant and rather easier to define: it contained many different passions, the most powerful of which were his "love of winning" and "love of coming first". The stories, which follow are introduced explicitly in illustration of this ambition ("as is clear from his childhood anecdotes").

The first three anecdotes perhaps took their starting point from a brief statement of Sokrates in the Platonic *First Alkibiades* (106e). The first anecdote concerns Alkibiades' biting of his opponent's arm while wrestling: his opponent accuses him of "biting like women do", but Alkibiades replies "no, like lions do". Biting was of course forbidden both in standard wrestling and in the more violent *pankration*[11]—though there are elsewhere references to and even pictures of this happening.[12] The incident may well not have originated with Alkibiades: in the *Spartan Sayings* it is told of a nameless Spartan (234D–E).[13] But the precise origin of the story is not relevant to the function it plays in this text. The story illustrates first and foremost Alkibiades' desire to win, which was stated explicitly in the previous sentence, as well as his cunning.[14] Secondly, there is a suggestion of the blurring of gender boundaries: is the reader meant to think that Alkibiades might be in any sense "like a woman"? An element of sexual ambiguity will indeed be a recurrent feature of the *Life* (e.g. 16.1; 23.6).[15] This first anecdote, then, draws attention to this ambiguity.

The first anecdote is set in a wrestling match. Wrestling grounds were a well-known location for men to pick up youths in Classical Athens.[16] The language of wrestling, furthermore—and indeed of biting—is commonly used metaphorically for sex.[17] The anecdote prepares the reader, then, for the presence of Alkibiades' many lovers, which will be a feature of chapters 3–6. It also prepares us for the presence of Sokrates, already mentioned in the first chapter (1.3). Edu-

effected, for better or worse, by the kind of life he or she habitually leads, and by the extent to which reason has moulded it.

[11] For the rules of ancient wrestling and *pankration*, see Harris (1964) 102–109; Poliakoff (1987) 23–63.

[12] E.g. Harris (1964) pl. 17.

[13] In *Sayings of kings and commanders* 186D it is assigned to Alkibiades.

[14] Note the use of the Odyssean word πολύτροπος in the previous sentence (2.1): τύχαις πολυτρόποις. πολύτροπος is used of Alkibiades at 24.5.

[15] See Duff (1999) 236–237.

[16] See Percy (1996) 113–116; Fisher (1998) 94–104.

[17] At great length in ps.-Loukianos, *Golden Ass* 7–11 (where the female partner is called Palaistra). See Henderson (1975) 169–170; Poliakoff (1982) 101–136.

cated readers would remember Alkibiades' account in Plato's *Symposium* of his wrestling match with Sokrates, which led to Alkibiades' failed attempt to seduce him (217b–c). Plutarch makes no mention of that incident in the *Life*, but their wrestling together is mentioned briefly in 4.4 and Sokrates' educational influence will itself be described repeatedly with wrestling, and biting, metaphors.[18] Wrestling, then, becomes in Plutarch's *Life* a site for debate and reflection on Alkibiades' character: it symbolises his desire to win, his use of underhand methods, his ambiguous sexuality, the attentions of his other lovers, and the educational influence of Sokrates. It also signals a contrast with Coriolanus, whose *Life* is paired with that of Alkibiades. Coriolanus' wrestling matches, described in chapter 2 of the *Coriolanus*, were real and not educational, and to win them he used his strength and not his cunning (2.1). Alkibiades is a very different character.

The word στόμα and an emphasis on the mouth recurs repeatedly in the other anecdotes of this chapter.[19] The reason is presumably because Alkibiades' mouth—his words, the beauty and persuasiveness of his speech—will be such an important part of Plutarch's picture of him. Indeed, several lines earlier Plutarch has already drawn attention to this very feature, the charm of Alkibiades' speech and especially of his lisp (1.6–8). Later Plutarch remarks on his rhetorical powers and, again, on the charm of his speech (10.3–4). Numerous examples of his persuasive speech are included in the *Life*,[20] and in the *synkrisis* Plutarch picks out this ability of Alkibiades as one of the qualities which distinguishes him from Coriolanus (*Coriolanus-Alkibiades* 3.3–6).

What of Alkibiades' reply that he bites "like a lion". A passage from Lucian's *Life of Demonax* (49) shows that "lions" was a popular term for wrestlers, at least in the mid-second century AD; Lucian relates this to their biting. But lions are more generally associated with heroic prowess (for example *Iliad* 5.638–639 of Herakles); the more normal contrast is not with women but with foxes: lions are fierce and brave and not—paradoxically, given the context—cunning, like foxes.[21] The reply then sets up in the reader's mind a question about Alkibiades: what sort of a fighter is he? Is he cunning or brave? Is he to be admired or not?

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[18] δηγμόν (4.2), πιεζοῦντος (4.3), πολλὰς λαβάς (6.2); πιέζων … καὶ συστέλλων (6.5).

[19] καταβαλὼν ἐπὶ στόμα (2.4), αὐλοὺς δὲ φυσῶντος ἀνθρώπου στόματι (2.5), τὸν δὲ αὐλὸν ἐπιστομίζειν (2.6).

[20] For example 14.1–12; 15.4–8; 17.2–4; 18.2–3; 23.2; 24.2; 25.2; 26.4–9.

[21] References in Duff (1999) 175–176.

But lions are also often associated with monarchy or tyranny.[22] The fact that Alkibiades might try to make himself tyrant is a feature both of this *Life* and of much earlier literature on Alkibiades. Indeed, Alkibiades was famously himself likened to a lion in Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1431–1432.[23] Plutarch returns to the lion image at the end of the anecdotal section, with a quotation of the Aristophanic lines, with exactly this connotation: fear of tyranny (16.2–3). The repetition provides a sense of closure to the section. Plutarch makes the point there, as he does in 6.3, where he refers explicitly to Thucydides' similar pronouncement, that it was Alkibiades' outrageous personal life, which fuelled suspicions that he wanted to become tyrant (Thuc. 6.15.4; cf. also *Alkibiades* 16.7).[24] In this the first anecdote of the *Life* we have an example of such outrageous behaviour.

Immediately following this anecdote, is the story of Alkibiades' playing "knuckle-bones".[25] The idea for this story and the next—whether it is an invention by Plutarch or by an earlier author—probably came from another passing remark in the Platonic *First Alkibiades* (110b). In Plutarch's *Life*, this story is told once again to illustrate Alkibiades' ambition: he will risk his life in his desire to win. But again there is much more to say. First, a reference to dice-throwing had occurred in an almost identical point at the start of the *Coriolanus* (3.1). The context is Coriolanus' first military campaign, when Tarquinius Superbus, as Plutarch puts it, "made, as it were, a last throw of the dice" (ἔσχατον κύβον ἀφιέντι).[26] The *Coriolanus* passage, and this passage from the *Alkibiades*, would probably also bring to mind Caesar's famous declaration "let a die be cast" (ἀνερρίφθω κύβος) before crossing the Rubicon (*Caesar* 32.8). In the *Coriolanus*, as in the *Caesar*, the dice-throw is a metaphor for war, a war in which all is staked; for Alkibiades the throw is a childhood game, but even so he risks his life for it. Alkibiades' difference from the militaristic Coriolanus, as well as his outrageousness, ambition, and charisma, are emphasised. These allusions also raise a

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22 E.g. Herodotos 5.56; 5.92; 6.131.2; Aristophanes, *Knights* 1037. See McNellen (1997).

23 Plato exploited the *Frogs* passage in a speech by Kallikles in the *Gorgias*, which is probably intended to bring Alkibiades to mind (483e–484a)—itself alluded to in *Alkibiades* 34.7. Cf. Vickers (1994); Gribble (1999) 234–238.

24 On Plutarch's adaptation of Thucydides in 6.3, see Pelling (1992) 18–19 and 22–24 (=2002 repr., 123–124 and 126–128).

25 On the game, see Beck (1975) nrs. 342–345; Salza Prina Ricotti (1995) 47–48.

26 For the metaphor cf. *Fabius* 14.2; *Pompey* 60.4.

question: Tarquin was a tyrant; Caesar's rule became "acknowledged tyranny" (*Caesar* 57.1):[27] will Alkibiades want to become a tyrant too?

There is a stress in this passage on the reactions of others to Alkibiades' decisive behaviour: the other boys scatter, the driver takes fright, on-lookers are amazed, cheer, and run to congratulate him (2.4). This is a process which will be repeated frequently in the *Life*: the amazing popularity of Alkibiades is continually emphasised, though often together with hints of the fears which this instilled in some about possible desire for tyranny (e.g. 16.7; 32.3). But Alkibiades is not to remain always popular and there may be in the vocabulary with which this incident is described a hint of the reversals of popularity which will follow. The word ζεῦγος—team of horses—is repeated three times here. As the educated reader was no doubt expected to know, Alkibiades was later to be involved in a scandal over a team of horses, which he was accused of stealing. Alkibiades' son was later prosecuted for this crime, and Isokrates wrote a speech on his behalf entitled *On the team of horses* (Περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους: Isokrates 16). The repetition of ζεῦγος would bring this incident to mind and suggest that the characteristics of bravery and ambition, and the popularity, which they brought, would later work against him and lead to his downfall.

The next anecdote concerns Alkibiades' rejection of *aulos*-playing, and the consequent reaction against it by other children. Alkibiades' refusal to learn the *aulos* would probably not have seemed particularly controversial to an ancient reader.[28] Indeed Alkibiades' explanation that the *aulos* takes away the power of speech and his appeal to the mythological precedent of Athena and Marsyas were commonplace.[29] But Alkibiades' explanation of why Athenians should not learn the flute involves an implicit comparison of himself with two deities, Athena and Apollo. Such self-aggrandisement will be a feature of Plutarch's picture of Alkibiades. In the final chapter of the anecdotal section Alkibiades has an image of Eros portrayed on his shield and poses in a picture with the goddess Nemea (16.1, 7)—both of which, as Plutarch tells us, were seen by some as betraying tyrannical aspirations. The particular myth itself, which concerns the punishment of a mortal who vied with the gods, might suggest to the reader a hybristic side to Alkibiades' own nature and lead him or her to expect a bad end for Alkibiades too. The

[27] An allusion to Plato, *Republic* 569b: see Pelling (1997) 221–222.
[28] See e.g. Wilson (1999) 74–85, 79–80.
[29] Plato, *Republic* 399d–e; Aristotle, *Politics* 1341b2–8.

reference to Marsyas would certainly also bring to mind Alkibiades' extended comparison of Sokrates to Marsyas in the *Symposion* (215a–216c). The allusion looks forward to the power of Sokrates' words over Alkibiades, a power which will in chapter 6 be expressed in language drawn from the same passage in the *Symposion* (6.1).[30]

The extraordinary effect, which Alkibiades' rejection of the *aulos* has on the other boys and on public opinion generally prefigures his later popularity and influence, and demonstrates the effectiveness of his speech and his charisma. The explanation which Alkibiades gives centres on the fact that the *aulos* distorts its player's appearance and prevents him from speaking or singing: both of which—beauty and a way with words—are, as we have seen, key elements in the characterisation of Alkibiades. Alkibiades' manipulation of public opinion is a feature of his later behaviour. Plutarch will make this clear later in the anecdote of his cutting off his dog's tail (9.1–2), and in the anecdote that follows where his making a donation to public funds is greeted with shouts of joy (10.1–2).[31] In both anecdotes there are hints that the popular mood may later turn against him. In particular, the reference to "Antiochos the helmsman" in 10.2 looks forward to the latter's defeat at Notion and Alkibiades second exile (35.6–7). Plutarch later makes clear, in his narrative of those events, that the people reacted so badly to news of the defeat at Notion because of Alkibiades' over-popularity, which was such that they were sure that he must have lost on purpose (esp. 35.2–3). The kind of pleasure and applause, then, with which Alkibiades' behaviour in the knucklebone passage is greeted will ultimately be his ruin. Popularity with Alkibiades can so easily turn to unpopularity.

Indeed, the *aulos*-story hints at some reasons for his later fall: a "story spread" (διῆλθε λόγος) that Alkibiades did right in being "disgusted at" (βδελύττοιτο) the playing of the pipes and "mocking" those who learn it. Later it is this kind of fastidious behaviour which in chapter 16 will lead to the "disgust" (βδελύττεσθαι) of the notable citizens at him (16.2), who saw in his affectation a tyrant's ambition. In that final chapter of the anecdotal section Plutarch brings out how it is exactly this—public opinion—which will be so destructive for Alkibiades later on.

[30] E.g. Plutarch, *Alkibiades* 6.1 ~ Plato, *Symposion* 215e. The *Symposion* passage is in fact alluded to frequently throughout *Alkibiades* 4–6: see Duff (forthcoming, a).

[31] The incident which is envisaged here is an *epidosis*, an appeal for voluntary contributions to the state, which took place in the Assembly at times of crisis: see Pritchett (1974) II, 110 n. 286. The version in *Political Precepts* 799D seems to envisage a different context.

The section closes with the remark of Timon the misanthrope "You are doing well to grow up, my boy—for you will grow to be a great curse on the lot of them", to which "some began laughing, others cursed, and others thought deeply about what was said" (16.9). Plutarch concludes, "So undecided was opinion about him due to the unevenness of his nature".[32] The mention of unevenness recalls, of course, the explicit statement of Alkibiades' character in 2.1, with which the anecdotal section opens, and provides a neat sense of closure. But the story, and Plutarch's comment, also foregrounds again the issue of public opinion, both its importance for Alkibiades and its inconsistencies. He courts it, but will fall by it. Exile, and death, is where this courting of public opinion will ultimately lead him, and it may be that even this is hinted at in the story of Alkibiades' rejection of the *aulos* in the choice of the word ἐξέπεσε in 2.7. The immediate reference is to the flute "falling out" of use, but the verb is commonly used of going into exile. As in all these anecdotes, forebodings of disaster lurk below the surface.

The final two anecdotes of this section are explicitly introduced as being taken from the "abuses" of Antiphon.[33] The first concerns a story that Alkibiades, when a boy, ran away from home to join one of his lovers. It is easy to see how an anecdote such as this might have arisen: sexual morality was always a possible line of attack in order to denigrate one's political opponents.[34] But one might wonder why Plutarch has included material so plainly drawn, as he himself acknowledges, from a one-sided polemic?[35] Part of the point must be to suggest the competing and contradictory valuations of Alkibiades, which will be such a feature of this *Life*, as it was of the Alkibiades tradition as a whole.[36] Locating

[32] οὕτως ἄκριτος ἦν ἡ δόξα περὶ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀνωμαλίαν. The fact that here it is Alkibiades' *nature* which is inconsistent—in 2.1 it is only his character (and cf. 23.5)—might be seen as contributing to the reader's difficulty in knowing the "real Alkibiades".

[33] Antiphon of Rhamnous (*c.* 480–411 BC), perhaps to be identified with Antiphon the Sophist, was a speech-writer and a leader of the coup of 411, a crime for which he was executed after democracy was restored (cf. *Nikias* 6.1). See Gagarin (1997); Dover (1950) 55. Plutarch uses another attack on Alkibiades' sexual behaviour, also derived from Antiphon, in 36.2 (see Antiphon fr. 67, Blass-Thalheim = Athenaios 525b).

[34] Cf. Antisthenes' accusation that Alkibiades had sex with (συνεῖναι) his mother, daughter, and sister (*Kyros or on Kingship*: fr. V A 141 Giannantoni=*FGrH* 1004 F 5a–b).

[35] For other examples of Plutarch expressing caution about believing the testimony of a source because of its writer's bias, see Pelling (1990b) 23–24 (= 2002 repr. 145–146); Nikolaidis (1997) 333–334.

[36] Esp. 16.9. See in particular Duff (1999) 222–240 and, on the Alkibiades tradition, Gribble (1999).

the truth about him was and is difficult. For Alkibiades, furthermore, what mattered was as much what people thought of him as what the reality was, a point Plutarch frequently makes; so the doubt attached to these stories is actually important in itself: public opinion mattered. But it is in fact not uncommon for Plutarch to make use of stories or incidents while at the same time expressing doubts about their reliability.[37] In the same way, then, these stories are used in order to throw light on Alkibiades' character and prefigure later themes, and for that their reliability is not of paramount importance.

These two stories from chapter 3 contribute to the picture of Alkibiades' character in several ways. First they introduce his troubled relationship with his guardians, which suggests a self-confidence and an unwillingness to respect authority; this theme will recur in 7.3. Secondly they introduce the theme of Alkibiades' many lovers and his inability to resist sexual or any other kind of temptation—which began even when he was a child. The theme of Alkibiades' sexuality will be dealt with at greater length in chapters 4–6 where Plutarch explores his relationship with Sokrates and with his "other lovers". Alkibiades consistently abandons Sokrates to consort with other lovers who offer him, as Plutarch explains, not just sexual pleasure but flattery (6.2–5). Here we see the start of that process. Alkibiades is presented as running away (ἀπέδρα) from Perikles and Ariphron his guardians, just as later he will run away (δραπετεύων) and be hunted by Sokrates (6.1).

Ariphron, Perikles' brother, wants to make a public announcement of Alkibiades' disappearance, but Perikles demurs, claiming that such an announcement would ruin Alkibiades' reputation: "... if he is recovered safely, he will be beyond recovery for the rest of his life".[38] Perikles' words reinforce the sense of Alkibiades' debauched life, which began when he was young. They also introduce the notion that Alkibiades always managed to "get away with"—to escape the consequences of—his bad behaviour. Many of the anecdotes that follow in the next chapters show him behaving outrageously, but not suffering for it—until

[37] E.g. *Themistokles* 2.8 and most famously *Solon* 27.1, on which see Pelling (1990b) 19–21 (= 2002 repr. 143–145); Duff (1999) 312–313.

[38] The MSS are divided between the legal term ἀποκήρυξις ("renounce as one's child; deny paternity") and ἐπικηρύττειν ("announce" more generally, though also sometimes with the sense of "renounce, condemn"). In fact, it seems extremely unlikely that a guardian could disinherit a ward, so what must be implied here is some sort of moral, but not legal, renunciation. On ἀποκήρυξις, see Harrison (1968) 75–77; MacDowell (1978) 91.

later. Indeed Plutarch comments specifically on this fact in the final chapter of the anecdotal section (16.5), where he tells us that the Athenians were always ready to forgive and put up with his sins, calling them pranks (παιδιάς, the etymology is significant) and the products of ambition. Here is an early example of Alkibiades "getting away with it".

The second item of abuse taken from Antiphon is worse: that he actually beat an attendant to death at a wrestling ground. The fact that it is a wrestling ground is probably significant as this shows where his bad behaviour can lead: biting an opponent while wrestling might seem like a joke and give rise to a clever saying (2.2–3), but Alkibiades is also capable of clubbing someone to death there too. We have then here a reference back to the first anecdote, and a sense of closure before the section which focuses on Sokrates is introduced. This anecdote suggests the violence and dangerousness of Alkibiades, characteristics which lurk below the surface of his charm and flamboyance and will later emerge more clearly (e.g. 7.1; 8.1; 8.5; 16.5–6). If the first anecdotes with which we dealt in this paper introduced an attractive Alkibiades, the last one reminds us that with him there is a darker, more violent side.

To conclude, the first two chapters of childhood anecdotes are introduced explicitly to illustrate Alkibiades' desire to win at all costs. They certainly perform this function. But they are in fact much richer. Plutarch's initial characterisation of Alkibiades is brief and rather stereotyped: it is not uncommon for Plutarch to begin with a fairly crude characterisation, which is then fleshed out as the *Life* progresses.[39] The childhood anecdotes put flesh on the bones, confirming and amplifying the initial statement of his ambitious natures, providing a picture of the kind of outrageous behaviour that Alkibiades' ambition resulted in and prefiguring the later results which this behaviour and this outrageousness will have. Furthermore, through these anecdotes the reader is introduced to a series of images which construct Alkibiades' character in ways not even suggested in 2.1: wrestling, biting, the lion, dice, his mouth, scenes of popular adulation, lovers, violence: images which remain in the mind and convey something essential about the man. Alkibiades' character is constructed above all through action, word and imagery.

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[39] Pelling (1988a) 268–271 (= 2002 repr., 293–294), on Lysander; (1988b) 12–13, on Antony; (1990a) 228–230 (= 2002 repr., 310–312), on Alkibiades and Theseus; and esp. (1996) xlv–vi on *Alkibiades* 2.1.

DE GLORIA ALCIBIADIS. ALCIBIADES' MILITARY VALUE AND ITS RELATION TO HIS *DOXA* IN PLUTARCH'S *ALCIBIADES*

Simon Verdegem

In the treatise commonly called "*De gloria Atheniensium*", Plutarch argues that the Athenians should be held more in repute for their successes in war than for their contributions to the fine arts. However, the famous generals whose achievements are lauded were not only active on the battlefield but were also politically engaged within the city.[1] In the *Comparationes* that follow most pairs of *Vitae Parallelae*, Plutarch himself often draws a distinction "between military achievements and qualities on the one side and political deeds, virtues and vices on the other."[2] So the following question presents itself: how did the Chaeronean conceive the relation between the military skills of his heroes and their own fame? The present paper will focus on the *Alcibiades*. We will examine whether Alcibiades is presented as a man of great military value, and, if so, to what extent this is said to have provided him with glory or *doxa* (δόξα) among his contemporaries.

Alcibiades as a Soldier

1.1. In the *Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadis*, Plutarch states that "Alcibiades was often of service to the Athenians, both as a soldier and as a commander" (4.1). In the *Alcibiades* itself, however, he does not give a prominent place to the exploits of the protagonist as a private soldier. We are only told that the young Alcibiades distinguished himself in the campaign of Potidaea (7.4) and protected Socrates during the rout following upon the Athenian defeat at Delium (7.6). The contrast with the

[1] Plutarch established a dichotomy of political and military functions in fourth century BC Athens (*Phocion* 7.5–6). He was probably wrong; see Tritle (1987); *idem* (1992) 4271–4272; Roberts (1987). I would like to thank Prof. C.B.R. Pelling for his valuable comments and Dr. J. Beneker for checking my English.

[2] De Blois (1992) 4583. See e.g. *Comparatio Solonis et Publicolae* 4.1–2; *Comparatio Aristidis et Catonis* 2.4; *Comparatio Periclis et Fabii Maximi*; *Comparatio Agidis et Cleomenis cum Tiberio et Gaio Graccho* 3.2–4.1.

Coriolanus, the first *Life* of the pair,[3] is striking. Plutarch not only recounts Marcius' feats in the decisive fight against Tarquinius Superbus (3.1–2) and the battle of Corioli (8–9) but he also states that the Roman performed deeds of valour in all the other campaigns in which he served as a soldier (4.3).

This difference in focus reflects a difference in characterization. Plutarch portrays Marcius as a military man in heart and soul, a true child of the times in which the Romans made valour (ἀνδρεία) stand for virtue in general (ἀρετή) (*Coriolanus* 1.6). His education is limited to physical training and exercises in arms (2).[4] Alcibiades is a much more sophisticated character. He receives a liberal education (*Alcibiades* 2.5–7) and benefits from his conversations with Socrates (4.1–4; 6.1–5).[5] Furthermore, he does not hesitate to resort to devious methods when his physical strength does not suffice to gain victory (2.2–3).

1.2. In the light of the foregoing, it does not come as a surprise that one finds more contrasts between the two heroes if one studies the relation between their soldierly exploits and the *doxa* they enjoy in their youth. With regard to military honours, it is noteworthy that Alcibiades receives only one prize of valour (*Alcibiades* 7.5), while Marcius' officers are said to have been striving with one another in their efforts to do him honour (*Coriolanus* 4.3; see also 10.1–11.1). Moreover, the Athenian apparently did not truly deserve his reward. According to *Alcibiades* 7.4, Alcibiades and Socrates both distinguished themselves in the battle of Potidaea but in the end the former fell wounded and had to be rescued by the latter. Therefore, Plutarch argues, the prize of valour should have gone to Socrates (7.5). The generals, however, were anxious to crown Alcibiades with glory because of his social standing (*ibid.*: οἱ στρατηγοὶ διὰ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ σπουδάζοντες ἐφαίνοντο περιθεῖναι τὴν δόξαν).[6] In short, the military honour bestowed on the young soldier did not correspond to his actual merits on the battlefield. This certainly does not hold true for Marcius. The Potidaea affair contrasts in par-

[3] On the order of the *Coriolanus* and the *Alcibiades*, see Ziegler (1907) 26–32; Pelling (1986) 94–96; Duff (1999) 205–206 (with n. 3).

[4] On Marcius' lack of Hellenic culture, see esp. Russell (1963) 27; Swain (1990) 136–137; Pelling (1996) xxvi–xxix.

[5] Duff (1999) 216 points out that the contrast between Marcius' physical training and Alcibiades' philosophical education is highlighted by the metaphorical use of wrestling terms in *Alcibiades* 4–6.

[6] The same motive is mentioned in Plato, *Symposium* 220e; see Russell (1966) 41.

ticular with the Roman's first campaign, when he was rightly crowned with a garland of oak leaves for having saved the life of a colleague (*Coriolanus* 3.2–3.3).[7]

Our two *Lives* also show a remarkable difference in the extent to which the main character's exploits as a soldier contribute to his *doxa* among his fellow-citizens. In Marcius' case, the connection is very close. His reputation and influence in Rome are based on his valour (*Coriolanus* 5.1). As an object of admiration, his courage is only surpassed by his superiority to gain, which manifests itself when he refuses the booty that is offered as a reward for his feats in the battle of Corioli (10). Alcibiades' *doxa* rests upon a larger number of pillars.[8] Before he enters public life, he is already popular with the noble citizens of Athens, owing to his youthful beauty (*Alcibiades* 4.1).[9] As Plutarch discusses the factors that opened great doors to political life for Alcibiades, he brackets his bravery in battle together with his birth (γένος), his wealth (πλοῦτος), and his numerous relations,[10] all of which the Athenian himself is said to have valued less highly than his charm as a speaker for gaining influence over the people (10.3).[11] Finally, the structure of *Alcibiades* 10–13 creates the impression that Alcibiades' unparalleled triumph in the Olympic chariot race (11–12) enhanced his *doxa* at the very beginning of his political career. In reality, however, he carried off the palm in 416 BC, four years after he was first elected general.[12]

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[7] See Duff (1999) 217–218.

[8] When Plutarch writes in *Alcibiades* 1.3 that Socrates' affection largely contributed to Alcibiades' *doxa*, he seems to think of his own times rather than of the fifth century BC.

[9] The contrast with Coriolanus is highlighted through the similar phrasing of the opening sentences of *Alcibiades* 4 ("Ηδη δὲ πολλῶν καὶ γενναίων ἀθροιζομένων καὶ περιεπόντων, κτλ.) and *Coriolanus* 5 ("Ηδη δὲ καὶ δόξαν αὐτοῦ καὶ δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει μεγάλην ἔχοντος, κτλ.).

[10] Cf. *Alcibiades* 8.1: "Alcibiades once gave Hipponicus—the father of Callias and a man of great reputation and influence owing to his wealth (πλοῦτος) and birth (γένος)—a blow with his fist". As soon as Hipponicus decided to give his daughter to Alcibiades in marriage (*Alcibiades* 8.3), the former's *doxa* became a source of the latter's (cf. Gribble [1999] 57).

[11] On the theme of rhetoric in the *Coriolanus-Alcibiades*, see Pelling (2000) 335–339.

[12] Cf. Russell (1966) 42–43. On the dates, see Hatzfeld (1951) 93–94 and 130 n. 3.

Alcibiades as a Commander

2.1. In the *Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadis*, Plutarch argues that Alcibiades' value as a general appears from the fact that he always successfully defended Athens' cause when he was at home and in command, whereas he harmed his country when he went over to the enemy (1.2; cf. 4.1). The *Alcibiades* itself clearly brings out the same idea. First, Plutarch stresses that Alcibiades, immediately after his first appointment as general, strongly improved Athens' position by entering into an alliance with the Argives, the Mantineans, and the Eleans (15.1–2; cf. *Nicias* 10.9). His enforced departure from Sicily produces the opposite effect: instantly, the morale of the Athenian troops drops (*Alcibiades* 21.8–9) and Messana is taken from them (22.1; cf. Thucydides 6.74.1). Later, Alcibiades hurts his native city even more by giving valuable strategic advices to the Spartans (23.2) and by bringing "almost all Ionia" to revolt (24.2). Judging from *Alcibiades* 27–31, however, Alcibiades himself, once he had taken the command of the Athenian fleet at Samos, became almost solely responsible for Athens' resurrection.[13] This impression not only results from the fact that the narrative in *Alcibiades* 27–31 is strongly focused on the main character (see e.g. 27.2–5; 28.8) but also depends on the choices Plutarch made in selecting and adapting his source material.[14] A comparison with the corresponding passages in Xenophon's *Hellenica* and Diodorus Siculus reveals that Alcibiades' merit time and again is the greatest in Plutarch's version of the events. Sometimes, the entire course of the battle differs. Take for example the expedition against Chalcedon (30.1–2). According to Diodorus, Alcibiades simply defeated the troops of the Spartan harmost Hippocrates when they made a sortie (13.66.2). Xenophon relates that the satrap Pharnabazus came to the aid of the Chalcedonians but had to retire to Heracleion because a wall erected by the Athenians prevented him from joining Hippocrates' forces (*Hellenica* 1.3.7). Only in Plutarch, Alcibiades has to face two armies at once (*Alcibiades* 30.2: ἅμα πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους ἀντιτάξας τὸ στράτευμα) and defeats them both. At other times, a particular element makes the difference. In

[13] Plutarch expresses the same idea in *Lysander* 3.1 and *De gloria Atheniensium* 349E. For a totally different view, see Cornelius Nepos, *Alcibiades* 5.6 and *Thrasybulus* 1.3.

[14] Within the scope of this paper we cannot enter at length into the problem of the sources. We think on the basis of *Alcibiades* 32.2 that Plutarch, when writing *Alcibiades* 27–31, mainly used Theopompus' *Hellenica*, Ephorus' *Historiae*, and Xenophon's *Hellenica*; cf. Flacelière & Chambry (1964) 112; Pelling (1996) xl.

Plutarch's account of the naval battle of Abydus (27.2–6), for instance, Alcibiades' sudden arrival disheartens the Athenians and encourages their enemies. Thereupon, he concentrates his attack on those Peloponnesian ships that have the upper hand and drives them away. In this version, Alcibiades' merit is greater than in Xenophon (*Hellenica* 1.1.6) and Diodorus (13.46.3), where he just scares the enemy away through his numerical superiority.[15] Conversely, elements from other authors that somehow diminish Alcibiades' merit, such as the successful retreat of Hippocrates' troops at Chalcedon (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.3.6; Diodorus Siculus 13.66.2; cf. *Alcibiades* 30.1–2) or Clearchus' departure from Byzantium (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.3.17; Diodorus Siculus 13.66.6; cf. *Alcibiades* 31.3–6), do not appear in Plutarch's *Alcibiades*.

When Alcibiades goes into exile for the second time, he does not defect to the Spartans again. On the contrary, he warns the generals at Aegospotami that their anchorage is badly chosen (*Alcibiades* 36.6). As Tydeus and his colleagues disregard Alcibiades' advice, Lysander is able to take them off guard; by capturing almost their entire fleet, he deals Athens a fatal blow (37.1–5). Again, the losses, which the Athenians suffer in Alcibiades' absence bear testimony to his value as a general.

2.2. The reader who concludes from Plutarch's description of the events that Alcibiades' military skills were a decisive factor in the Peloponnesian War will find support for his analysis in the feelings that Plutarch ascribes to the Athenians in those periods during which Cleinias' son lives in exile: each time, they regret their previous actions against him because they realize how valuable a commander he was (*Alcibiades* 25.2; 38.1–2).

That is not to say that Alcibiades' successes for the benefit of his native city go unnoticed. For one thing, he is held in high repute by his own soldiers. When he is accused of having imitated the Eleusinian mysteries, his troops remain loyal; the hoplites from Argos and Mantinea even declare that his generalship is a *conditio sine qua non* for them to partake in the Sicilian expedition (19.3–4; cf. Thucydides 6.29.3 and 6.61.5). The series of triumphs he later gains in the Hellespont and the Propontis gives his men the feeling that they are invincible (*Alcibiades* 29.1) and makes them brag about their commander (29.3). Similarly, the Athenian land forces think themselves unbeatable under Alcibiades'

[15] Cf. Büchsenschütz (1871) 220.

command after the restoration of the overland procession to Eleusis (34.7).[16]

With regard to the relation between his successes as an Athenian general and his *doxa* outside the army, Alcibiades' first exile constitutes an important watershed within the *Alcibiades*. In chapter 16, which immediately precedes the account of the events leading to Alcibiades' first exile (17–22), Plutarch writes:

> His voluntary donations, his support of public shows, his unsurpassed munificence to the state, the fame of his ancestors, the power of his oratory, the beauty and strength of his body, *together with his experience and prowess in war* (μετ' ἐμπειρίας τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ ἀλκῆς), made the Athenians (i.e. the *dêmos*; see 16.2) tolerant and lenient towards everything else. (*Alcibiades* 16.4)

Alcibiades' military skill is here presented as one of several factors arousing positive reactions on the part of the people. We recognize the others from the part of the *Life* which deals with the years before Alcibiades' first appointment as general (4.1; 10.3). But now the narrator explicitly contrasts them to the private excesses of his main character. The latter are strongly disapproved of by "the men of reputation" in Athens (16.2: οἱ ἔνδοξοι; cf. *Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadis* 1.3) but glossed over by the people, who call them "products of youthful high spirits and ambition" (*Alcibiades* 16.4). So whereas Alcibiades' soldierly exploits opened great doors to political life for him, his abilities as a commander for some time prevent him from being shown the door out. It is only after he is accused of sacrilege that the *dêmos* turns against him (19.3; 20.5–6; 21.7). Yet even then Alcibiades' enemies fear that the people will judge him too leniently "because of his usefulness" (19.4: διὰ τὴν χρείαν).

Everything has changed when Alcibiades returns to Athens. In the first place, his renewed popularity rests almost exclusively on his triumphs as a general in the East (32.4).[17] It should be noted that this development was fostered by Alcibiades. According to *Alcibiades* 27.1–2, he deliberately sought out the Spartan fleet since he wanted to come home "in a blaze of glory" (ἐνδόξως) (cf. 32.1). During his short stay in Athens, Alcibiades continues to present himself as a zealous commander in order to enhance his *doxa*. When he gives a speech to the

[16] On *Alcibiades* 34.3–7, see Verdegem (2001).

[17] Cf. especially Cornelius Nepos, *Alcibiades* 6.1–2. See also Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.4.13–19 and Diodorus Siculus 13.68.2–69.1.

Assembly shortly after his landing, he spends most of the time boosting the morale of his fellow-citizens, thus reclaiming the leadership in the war against Sparta (33.2).[18] His decision to re-establish the overland procession to Eleusis by giving the Mystae a military escort is also at least partly inspired by his desire for glory (34.5: πρὸς ἀνθρώπων δόξαν). In the short term, both actions produce the intended effect (33.2; 34.7): the connection between Alcibiades' merit as a commander and his *doxa* has become even stronger. The second major difference vis-à-vis *Alcibiades* 16 lies in the fact that Alcibiades' military triumphs seem no longer to go together with private excesses. From the moment he assumes the command of the Athenian fleet at Samos (26.3), we do not hear of a single scandal.[19] In fact, Plutarch emphatically rejects Duris' account of Alcibiades' entry into Piraeus because he considers it most unlikely that the exile "made such an outrageous display of luxuriousness" (οὕτως ἐντρυφῆσαι) when he came home at last (32.2).[20] Together with Alcibiades' licentiousness, the dissension between the leading citizens of Athens and the masses has disappeared. The whole city is overcome by joy on Alcibiades' return (32.4: τῷ χαίροντι τῆς πόλεως);[21] only a few individuals voice a dissident opinion (33.3: the High-Priest Theodorus; 34.1: ἐνίους).[22] Ironically, it is precisely the exceptional *doxa* which Alcibiades enjoys among the lower classes after his restoration of the Eleusinian procession (34.7) that makes the old fears of the most powerful Athenians come to the surface again (35.1).

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[18] In the versions of Xenophon (*Hellenica* 1.4.20), Diodorus Siculus (13.69.1), and Cornelius Nepos (*Alcibiades* 6.4), Alcibiades' speech contains no such exhortation.

[19] Cf. Pelling (1996) l. We may regard the fact that Alcibiades pays a visit to Tissaphernes "at the head of a princely retinue" (*Alcibiades* 27.6) as an instance of his legendary adaptability (see *Alcibiades* 23.4–5): like most Persians (see *Alcibiades* 23.5), Tissaphernes loves pomp (see e.g. *Alcibiades* 24.7).

[20] Alcibiades 32.1–2 contains several subtle but significant reversals with respect to *Alc.* 16.1: no outrageous display of luxuriousness as in a drunken revel *versus* love of luxury and insolent actions under the influence of alcohol; no purple sail *versus* long purple dresses; numerous shields and triremes captured from the enemy *versus* a shield and trireme designed for purposes other than battle.

[21] Note the divergence from Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.4.13–17 and Diodorus Siculus 13.68.4.

[22] Salcedo Parrondo (2001) 395–398 argues that Plutarch draws attention to the existence of a social conflict by juxtaposing the section on the negative reactions aroused by the coincidence of Alcibiades' arrival with the Plynteria (34.1–2) and that on his restoration of the procession to Eleusis (34.3–7). Her interpretation depends entirely on the hypothesis that the Plynteria were celebrated by the aristocrats only. In our view, the generality of Plutarch's statement that "the Athenians regarded this day as one of the unluckiest for business of any kind" (34.2) contradicts this idea.

2.3. Both the emphasis on the harm Alcibiades did to Athens during his first exile and the close relation between his merits as a general and his *doxa* raise important moral issues. Alcibiades' anti-Athenian actions spread dissension until long after his death.[23] Lysias' first speech against Alcibiades' son represents the opposition: the speaker emphasizes that Athens suffered great damage and states exaggeratedly that Alcibiades "more often marched against his native land with the enemy than against them with his fellow-citizens" (14.30; see also 14.16–17). Other texts contain a justification for the exile's actions. Thucydides, for example, makes Alcibiades maintain that "the true patriot is not the man who, if he has unjustly lost his country, refrains from attacking it, but he who in his yearning for it tries in every way to get it back" (6.92.4). In Isocrates' *De bigis*, Alcibiades' son similarly argues that his father desired to return to Athens, not to ruin her, and only made war on those who had banished him, not on the entire populace (16.19; see also 16.12–14).[24] He also contends that Alcibiades first went to Argos and would have remained there quietly if the schemes of his personal enemies at home had not compelled him to join the Spartans (16.9). In the *Alcibiades*, too, Alcibiades first takes refuge in Argos and later flees to Sparta for fear of his personal enemies (*Alcibiades* 23.1). According to Plutarch, however, the latter move proves that Alcibiades "had completely given up his country" (παντάπασι τῆς πατρίδος ἀπεγνωκώς). The subsequent narrative indeed offers no sign that he assisted the Spartans in the war against Athens in order to win a return to his country. So when we read that Alcibiades, as he was on his way to Artaxerxes after the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami, thought that he had a better motive for offering his services to the king than Themistocles since he would not act against his fellow countrymen but on behalf of his native city (37.7–8), we are also invited to disapprove of Alcibiades' own conduct during his first exile.[25]

On the other hand, the change in Alcibiades' attitude as an exile does him credit. Plutarch thus refers to his intervention at Aegospotami in a section of the *Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadis* in which the Greek's damaging of his native city is favourably compared to the Roman's

[23] See Gribble (1999) 127–131 and Seibert (1979) 389–390. The latter shows that the right attitude of exiles in general was always a controversial point among the Greeks.

[24] See also Cornelius Nepos, *Alcibiades* 4.6.

[25] In *Comparatio Demosthenis et Ciceronis* 4.2–3, Plutarch argues that "Demosthenes showed himself to be a far better citizen than Themistocles and Alcibiades" by continuing his struggle against the Macedonians while living in exile.

(2.6). This comparison (2.6–9) is thought-provoking for at least two reasons. First, some arguments run counter to the tenor of (one of) the preceding *Lives*.[26] Judging from the *Coriolanus*, it is true that Marcius waged war "for the overthrow and destruction of his country, not in order to return and to recover it" (2.7; see *Coriolanus* 21.5; 23.6). But this does not count in Alcibiades' favour unless it is assumed that Cleinias' son supported the Spartans in order to bring about his return to Athens. As we just saw, the *Alcibiades* itself creates a totally different impression. The final argument is even more problematic:

> Furthermore, in this point it may be said there was a difference between them, namely, that Alcibiades went over to the side of the Athenians because he feared and hated the Spartans, who were plotting to take his life; whereas it was dishonourable for Marcius to abandon the cause of the Volscians, who were treating him with perfect fairness. For he had been appointed their leader, and had the greatest credit and influence among them, unlike Alcibiades, who, being misused rather than used by the Lacedaemonians, walked around aimlessly in their city, wandered to and fro in their camp, and at last threw himself into the hands of Tissaphernes. (*Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadis* 2.8–9)

The *Coriolanus* and the *Alcibiades* do not bring out this alleged difference. Although Alcibiades does not become an official commander of the Spartan army, his advice weighs heavily in the military decision-making at Sparta (*Alcibiades* 23.2; 24.1–2). Both exiles are held in high repute in their new surroundings (*Coriolanus* 29.1; 31.2; *Alcibiades* 23.3; 24.3). In both cases, the *doxa* of the newcomer becomes a thorn in the flesh of the leading citizens and the head of the state (*Coriolanus* 31.1–3; *Alcibiades* 24.3–4). The major difference rather lies in the way Marcius and Alcibiades treat their hosts: only the latter behaves offensively, viz. by corrupting the wife of king Agis (*Alcibiades* 23.7–9). Plutarch does not state overtly that this scandal played a part in the decision of the magistrates to have Alcibiades killed but he does report that many Spartans denounced the affair to Agis (23.8), and when he discusses the possible reasons for the same order to be sent to Lysander after the installation of the Thirty, he contends that the Spartan authorities may have wanted to gratify their king (38.6). In this light, the fact that Alcibiades fled to Tissaphernes for fear of the Spartans no longer gives him an advantage over Marcius.

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[26] For another example, compare *Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadis* 2.4 with *Coriolanus* 26.2–3; see Russell (1963) 21 and Duff (1999) 282. On the function of such "reinterpretations", see Duff (1999) 266–267 and 283–286.

Secondly, one may wonder why Plutarch sides with Alcibiades anyway, given the fact that in his *De exilio* he advices Menemachus to make the best of his banishment, that is to accept it. In the *Marius*, for example, he more consistently states that Metellus' reasoning was sensible (ἔμφρονι λογισμῷ χρησάμενος) when he did not allow his supporters to raise a sedition on his account but spoke the following words as he left Rome: "either, when matters have mended and the people have changed their minds, I will return, or, if matters remain as they are, it will be best to be away" (29.10–11). Did Plutarch merely consider Alcibiades "less blameworthy" (ἀμεμπτότερος) than Coriolanus with regard to the way they reacted against their banishment, just like when he compared their approaches to the *dêmos* (*Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadi* 1.3–4)?[27] Or should we conclude that Alcibiades' actions against Athens—irrespective of the underlying motives—are justified by their result, as they made the Athenians aware of his value as a general and thus in the end made it possible for him to place himself in the service of his country again? Several passages in the *Alcibiades* indeed raise the question whether a specific action, which is *in se* morally reprehensible may nonetheless be justified if it is beneficial to the state. In the section on the affairs of the Herms and the Mysteries, we read that a certain Timaeus convinced Andocides to gain immunity by denouncing himself and some others; he is said to have argued that "one who had an eye to the general welfare of the community (τὸ συμφέρον) may betray a few dubious persons, if he could thereby save many good men from the anger of the people" (*Alcibiades* 21.5). Later we are told that Anaxilaus, when he was put to trial in Sparta for having handed over Byzantium to the Athenians, got himself acquitted by claiming that he had acted in accordance with the Spartan principle that "the one unqualifiedly honourable and righteous thing is the country's good" (31.8: ἓν καλὸν ἁπλῶς καὶ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ τῆς πατρίδος συμφέρον). In neither case does Plutarch express his opinion, but when commenting upon Alcibiades' deception of the Spartan ambassadors in 420 BC, which resulted in the formation of an alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, he clearly takes a pragmatic point of view: "nobody approved of the manner of this achievement but the effect of it was great" (15.2'; cf. *Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadis* 2.2–3).[28]

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[27] Commenting upon this passage, Duff (1999) 282 claims that the *Comparatio Coriolani et Alcibiadi* "is largely a comparison of bad traits or actions".

[28] For similar judgments in other Plutarchan works, see Nikolaidis (1995); Frazier

Likewise, the close relation between Alcibiades' merits as a general and his *doxa* raises the question whether a politician's value for the public interest of his country is more important than his personal virtue. This issue presents itself most conspicuously in *Alcibiades* 16.4, where we read that Alcibiades' military value and the large amount of money he spent for the benefit of the city caused the Athenian *dêmos* to gloss over his private excesses. When Alcibiades returns from his first exile, the whole city seems to take a pragmatic point of view, attaching greater importance to his recent victories in the Hellespont and the Propontis than to his condemnation in the Mysteries affair and his subsequent support of the Spartans. On the other hand, Alcibiades twice must go into exile because he is accused of debauchery: the charge of sacrilege against the Eleusinian goddesses outweighs his early successes as a general (19.1–3; 22.4); the second time, Thraso's son Thrasybulus contends that Alcibiades is responsible for the Athenian defeat at Notium "because he entrusted the command to men who had won his confidence by drinking deep and spinning sailor's yarns, so that he was free to cruise around collecting money and to indulge in drunken orgies with courtesans from Abydus and Ionia, while the enemy's fleet was close at hand" (36.1–2). In neither case does Plutarch's account enable us to pronounce with certainty upon Alcibiades' guilt; what matters is that his past made the Athenians ready to believe these accusations.[29] So in the *Alcibiades* Plutarch may offer a somewhat more complex picture of the relation between Alcibiades' private immorality and his final downfall than Thucydides, who maintains that the Athenians removed Alcibiades from office "because they were afraid of the magnitude of the lawlessness he displayed with respect to his own body in his lifestyle as well as of the spirit with which he performed every single thing he was involved in" (6.15.4: φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν).[30] However, the *Life* still shows that Alcibiades' great merit as a general did not render his (youthful)

(1995) 155–157 and 166–170; Duff (1999) 131–133.

[29] See Pelling (1996) xl; Duff (1999) 235; Gribble (1999) 281.

[30] See Pelling (1996) li. We follow Gomme, Andrewes & Dover (1970), 242–245 in taking this phrase as referring to the time of Alcibiades' second exile. Interestingly, Plutarch subscribes to Thucydides' analysis in *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 800D: "What need is there to speak of Alcibiades, who, though he was most active of all citizens in public affairs and was undefeated as general, was ruined by his audacious and dissolute habits in private life, and, because of his extravagance and lack of restraint,

excesses completely unimportant. To put it in general terms: a politician should not entirely rely on his expedience but should seek virtue in his private life as well in order to secure his position; his private morality should enable him to make full use of those talents that serve the public interest, thus becoming beneficial to the state itself. The *Alcibiades*, however, does not clearly instruct the reader how (s)he should judge a public figure who is of great value to his country but is lacking in personal virtue. If it were evident that Alcibiades was responsible for the defeat at Notium, one could argue that this event demonstrates that a city, which allows its leaders to commit immoral acts will pay the price in the end. Since this is not the case, we have to decide for ourselves whether we judge politicians like Alcibiades on their usefulness or by moral criteria.[31] Thus we end up with a paradox: if one reads the *Alcibiades* in search of political advice, one learns that personal virtue should be primary, whereas the reader who is looking for a moral evaluation of Alcibiades which (s)he can apply to similar figures, is asked to question the priority of moral standards.

deprived the State of the benefit of his other good qualities?" (transl. Fowler [1936] 171); cf. Valgiglio (1976) 89; Carrière (1984) 80 n. 5; Caiazza (1993) 206.

[31] According to Duff (1999) 162 and 203–204, the *Lysander-Sulla* confronts the reader with a similar problem.

RETÓRICA VISUAL Y CARÁCTER POLÍTICO, *ALC.* 10: UN MODELO NEGATIVO DE *ENARGEIA*

Maricruz Salcedo Parrondo

> ἐνῆγε δὲ προθυμότατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὢν καὶ ἐς τἆλλα διάφορος τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ διαβόλως ἐμνήσθη, καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγῆσαί τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας· ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. (Thuc. 6.15.2–3)

Hace algún tiempo cayó en mis manos un sugerente trabajo de Hans-Friedrich Mueller titulado "Images of Excellence: Visual Rhetoric and political behavior" publicado en las Actas del V Congreso de la sección italiana de la I.P.S. cuyo tema era *Teoria e Prassi Politica nelle Opere di Plutarco*,[1] título que presenta cierta similitud con el que toca a su fin en estos días. En dicha comunicación Mueller manifiesta, y creo que prueba con sobrada solidez, que Plutarco evoca con su prosa imágenes en la mente de sus lectores, que éstas, a su vez, causan emociones y que juntas, éstas y aquéllas, pueden causar una influencia directa en la conducta política de los lectores.[2] Al respecto Mueller habla de la ἐνάργεια, un recurso retórico destinado a persuadir a los receptores del discurso convirtiéndolos en "testigos oculares" mediante una descripción vivaz, detallada y efecticista de una escena determinada. Habida cuenta de los expertos plutarquistas que hoy están aquí, veo más que una vaciedad, un insulto casi, recordar que Plutarco fue, entre otras facetas, un excelente experto en el arte retórica y que un estilo de composición como el de las *Vidas* es un medio más que apropiado para utilizar este recurso. De hecho el trabajo de Mueller muestra ejemplos del uso de esta *enargeia* en la *Vida de Pericles*[3] que, apoyados con los pertinentes de

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[1] Mueller (1995) 287–300.

[2] Mueller (1995) 287: "I contend that Plutarch's prose evokes images in the mind of the reader, that these in turn evoke emotions, which together with these images reside in the reader's memory, that such memories of images and emotions can influence behavior, (…)."

[3] De las imágenes detectadas por Mueller me quedo con estas tres que les presento

los *Preceptos políticos*, prestan verosilimilitud a la aseveración de Mueller en cuanto a la intención y el efecto que debería provocar la *enargeia* en los lectores del Queronense.[4]

Pero no es cuestión, y desde luego este auditorio no lo merecería en absoluto, de dedicar mi intervención a elaborar un epítome de la exposición de Mueller. Mi intención es muy distinta, pues vengo a presentarles lo que considero una utilización del mismo recurso, la *enargeia*, pero con un efecto contrario al corriente. Si en los ejemplos aducidos en el *Pericles* el efecto es positivo y la intención pasa por un tono aleccionador o de imitación, *imitatio*, para ir acordes a lo retórico de nuestro análisis, el ejemplo que yo les traigo aquí, no sólo enseña, a través de la descripción vívida de una escena, lo que no aparece en los *Preceptos Políticos*, lo que no se debe hacer por tanto, sino que además podría muy bien provocar un efecto de enseñanza "trágica", si se quiere. Ahora les explico:

El capítulo diez de la *Vida de Alcibíades* inicia la primera de las tres menciones que Plutarco hace a la entrada en la política y en la vida pública del prometedor hijo de Clinias;[5] y lo hace del siguiente modo:

> Πρώτην δ' αὐτῷ πάροδον εἰς τὸ δημόσιον γενέσθαι λέγουσι μετὰ χρημάτων ἐπιδόσεως, οὐκ ἐκ παρασκευῆς, ἀλλὰ παριόντα θορυβούντων τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐρέσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ θορύβου, πυθόμενον δὲ χρημάτων ἐπίδοσιν γίνεσθαι, παρελθεῖν καὶ ἐπιδοῦναι. τοῦ δὲ δήμου κροτοῦντος καὶ βοῶντος

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para que se hagan una idea del efecto causado por la *enargeia*: Plut., *Per.* 3.6: Τηλεκλείδης δὲ ποτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ἠπορημένον καθῆσθαί φησιν (fr. 44 CAF I '220) αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει καρηβαροῦντα, ποτὲ δὲ μόνον ἐκ κεφαλῆς ἑνδεκακλίνου θόρυβον πολὺν ἐξανατέλλειν; *Ibidem* 13. 5: κάλλει μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον εὐθὺς ἦν τότ' ἀρχαῖον, ἀκμῇ δὲ μέχρι νῦν πρόσφατόν ἐστι καὶ νεουργόν· οὕτως ἐπανθεῖ καινότης ἀεί τις, ἄθικτον ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου διατηροῦσα τὴν ὄψιν, ὥσπερ ἀειθαλὲς πνεῦμα καὶ ψυχὴν ἀγήρω καταμεμειγμένην τῶν ἔργων ἐχόντων; *Ibidem* 39. 2: τὸν μὲν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς θεοὺς κατοικεῖν λέγουσιν, ἀσφαλὲς ἕδος καὶ ἀσάλευτον καλοῦντες, οὐ πνεύμασιν, οὐ νέφεσι χρώμενον, ἀλλ' αἴθρᾳ μαλακῇ καὶ φωτὶ καθαρωτάτῳ τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὁμαλῶς περιλαμπόμενον, ὡς τοιαύτης τινὸς τῷ μακαρίῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ διαγωγῆς μάλιστα πρεπούσης, αὐτοὺς δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ταραχῆς καὶ δυσμενείας καὶ ὀργῆς ἄλλων τε μεστοὺς παθῶν ἀποφαίνοντες, οὐδ' ἀνθρώποις νοῦν ἔχουσι προσηκόντων.

[4] Tampoco es difícil imaginar la función educadora o de formación de políticos, o de príncipes, por utilizar el tópico de la *Instructio Traianni*, que un Plutarco no desaprovecharía con la casi ilustración ejemplar que supone este tipo de descripciones.

[5] Esta primera se distingue de las demás en el objeto. Mientras que en el parágrafo que nos ocupa, la entrada de Alcibíades es literalmente a la vida pública, las otras dos son en la política: 10.1: Πρώτην δ' αὐτῷ πάροδον εἰς τὸ δημόσιον γενέσθαι λέγουσι μετὰ χρημάτων ἐπιδόσεως; 10.3: Μεγάλας δ' αὐτῷ κλισιάδας ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνοίγοντος τοῦ τε γένους καὶ τοῦ πλούτου τῆς τε περὶ τὰς μάχας ἀνδραγαθίας; 13.1: Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφῆκεν αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἔτι μειράκιον ὤν, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους εὐθὺς ἐταπείνωσε δημαγωγούς.

ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, ἐπιλαθέσθαι τοῦ ὄρτυγος ὃν ἐτύγχανεν ἔχων ἐν τῷ ἱματίῳ. πτοηθέντος οὖν καὶ διαφυγόντος, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκβοῆσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πολλοὺς δὲ συνθηρᾶν ἀναστάντας, λαβεῖν δ' αὐτὸν Ἀντίοχον τὸν κυβερνήτην καὶ ἀποδοῦναι διὸ προσφιλέστατον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ γενέσθαι.

No es necesario hacerles notar lo vívido de la descripción de Plutarco, pues casi nos llegan ecos del alboroto de la gente aplaudiendo cada donación de los aristócratas y ricos ciudadanos, los murmullos de admiración al ver subir a la tribuna a Alcibíades, joven, bello, elocuente y bien conocido en aquella Atenas tan pueblerina, si me permiten la expresión, los aplausos y gritos de júbilo del gentío al escuchar la cuantía de la *epídosis* del joven aristócrata. E imagínense, aunque Plutarco no permite siquiera un mínimo esfuerzo a la mente del lector, el momento en que Alcibíades, encantado con el clamor popular, olvidado de sí, completamente enajenado de placer, deja escapar la codorniz del manto. Ahora no sólo oímos el alboroto de antes; escuchamos con claridad las risas de las personas agachadas, intentando atrapar el ave; casi que, gracias a la descripción del queronense, los podemos ver levantándose de sus asientos, corriendo por la Asamblea. Hasta que la narración concluye abruptamente: Antíoco caza al pájaro y se lo entrega al bello hijo de Clinias. Entonces Plutarco, rompiendo el clímax de la escena tan realistamente pintada, nos hace un valioso apunte: por este gesto Antíoco se convirtió en el más querido a Alcibíades.

En apenas diez líneas, Plutarco logra crear por un proceso acumulativo descriptivo, en esto consiste la *enargeia*, una escena digna de comedia casi al más puro estilo "aristofánico". Una escena cuyo ritmo se rompe en su preciso clímax con dos frases escuetas y sin explicación alguna, en suma, dos braquilogías. Pues será necesario llegar hasta el capítulo 35 para volver a encontrarnos con Antíoco y conocer así la trágica y fatal consecuencia de esta amistosa relación para Alcibíades y para Atenas.[6]

[6] Me resulta curioso constatar en la *Vida de Alcibíades* de Plutarco que cada decisión privada, cada acción de Alcibíades en la esfera de lo personal, tiene una consecuencia directa sobre la suerte de Atenas, quedando la ciudad casi atada, en una relación de dependencia, a la suerte del mismo Alcibíades. No puedo evitar recordar el aserto de Tucídides al respecto, porque viene tan a la ocasión que parece que el mismo Plutarco está también pensando en ella. Me refiero a Thuc. 6.15.4: ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρῆτο ἔς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας ὅπερ καὶ καθεῖλεν ὕστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίαιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὧν καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον ἐν ὅτῳ γίγνοιτο ἔπρασσεν, ὡς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς

Quisiera, antes de pasar a explicar el efecto negativo, y su razón, de esta descripción, analizar brevemente los elementos que hacen de ésta una presentación cómica.

Ya Russel, en su archiconocido y citado estudio sobre Plutarco, en el capítulo dedicado al análisis del personaje de Alcibíades, había mencionado el carácter cómico de este principio de capítulo. Pero no le venía al caso detenerse en sus motivos.[7]

En primer lugar, me llamó la atención que, mientras que en los otros dos episodios en los que Plutarco menciona la entrada de Alcibíades en la política hace uso de giros que representan la entrada simbólica en la Asamblea: Μεγάλας δ' αὐτῷ κλισιάδας ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνοίγοντος (10. 3) y Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφῆκεν αὑτὸν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἔτι μειράκιον ὤν; aquí, por cierto, que es la primera aparición de este tópico, la entrada en política, utiliza πάροδον…γενέσθαι. La *párodos* es el término técnico y específico para señalar la entrada del coro, tanto en tragedia como en comedia, es, tanto la primera actuación del coro, como el pasillo por donde se desemboca a la *orchêstra*.

Luego un ambiente ruidoso de gritos, jaleo, como el bullicioso mercado de *Acarnienses*, por nombrar una escena típica de mercado, que contribuye así a desprestigiar la supuesta donación económica en una asamblea. Comienza a parecer de esta forma, lo que en teoría debería ser un acto privado de generosidad sincera y honrosa, un extraño circo de poses cómicas o teatrales. Visto así, cobra un mayor sentido la aposición tras la primera frase, οὐκ ἐκ παρασκευῆς, la "premier" pública de Alcibíades (por seguir en el ámbito teatral) no fue premeditada, sopesada y cuidada como hubiera correspondido a un hombre de su capacidades naturales, de la familia a la que pertenecía ni de su elocuencia. Al contrario, fue un acto irreflexivo y espontáneo, más obedeciendo a un deseo irrefrenable de los aplausos y exclamaciones de admiración de sus conciudadanos que de un acto político sincero y generoso.[8] Alci-

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ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.

[7] Russell (1973) 120: "The episode suggests a scene of comedy". Lástima que se quedara ahí.

[8] Ya nos ha advertido Plutarco de esta desmesurada apetencia por el reconocimiento de su indudable valía que padecía Alcibíades de forma natural, algo que estaba en el origen mismo de su naturaleza y no de su carácter. Cf. *Alc.* 2: φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον. Y con el término específico de deseo de reconocimiento (φιλοτιμία) aparece en la *Vida de Alcibíades* en 6. 4; 7. 5; 11. 2; 12.2–3; 16. 4–5; 24. 3; 27. 6; 34. 3; 39. 7.

bíades es como un actor, mejor dicho, como un exhibicionista, que no puede resistirse a ser, él también, el objeto de esos aplausos.

La algarabía del δῆμος es otro signo de escena cómica, esta vez, además en dos direcciones, el pueblo, como espectador, aplaudiendo y jaleando a placer (κροτοῦντος καὶ βοῶντος ὑφ' ἡδονῆς) las acciones del héroe cómico y, como elemento cómico, también el pueblo ha sido el protagonista, cuanto menos el coro, en comedias de Aristófanes.

Y el clímax cómico, que llega con la sorpresa del ave, una codorniz, que escapa del manto del joven y encantado Alcibíades. Dice Plutarco que "de resultas que la codorniz se escapó aleteando, entonces los atenienses gritaban aún más y que muchos se levantaban de sus asientos para cazarla." Aparte el gag ya de por sí indiscutiblemente cómico del ave, dando aletadas por la plaza y la gente agachada intentando cazarla, se le une otro elemento, un ingrediente que no puede faltar en una comedia que se precie digna de Aristófanes, las referencias eróticas o sexuales. En esta escena quien aporta este matiz, sutil como conviene a la intención retórica de todo el pasaje, es la naturaleza del pájaro tránsfuga, se trata de una codorniz. Un ave de intercambio cotidiano, como quien regala bombones, entre ἐραστής y ἐρώμενος. Prueba evidente (una traducción de ἐνάργεια, por cierto) de que Alcibíades no ha estado precisamente preparando a conciencia su entrada en política. Viene de sus juergecitas particulares, de recibir a sus aduladores y sus habituales amantes. Aristófanes mismo nos señala la relación de este ave con el dios de alas blancas y carcaj erizado. La cita es de *Aves*, vv. 703–708:

> πολὺ πρεσβύτατοι πάντων μακάρων ἡμεῖς. Ὡς δ' ἐσμὲν Ἔρωτος πολλοῖς δῆλον· πετόμεσθά ⟨τε⟩ γὰρ καὶ τοῖσιν ἐρῶσι σύνεσμεν· πολλοὺς δὲ καλοὺς ἀπομωμοκότας παῖδας πρὸς τέρμασιν ὥρας διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν τὴν ἡμετέραν διεμήρισαν ἄνδρες ἐρασταί, ὁ μὲν ὄρτυγα δούς, ὁ δὲ πορφυρίων', ὁ δὲ χῆν', ὁ δὲ Περσικὸν ὄρνιν. Πάντα δὲ θνητοῖς ἐστιν ἀφ' ἡμῶν τῶν ὀρνίθων τὰ μέγιστα.

Y es en este punto álgido de la descripción, de la ἐνάργεια, cuando Plutarco finaliza en un abrupto cambio secuencial, haciendo uso de una prolepsis y en modo braquilógico, que contribuye a reforzar esa sensación de ruptura temática y temporal; despacha este episodio dando noticia de la identidad de quien le devuelve la codorniz (¿subrayando subliminalmente una relación más que amistosa?) y apuntando un detalle que todavía no ha ocurrido en el tiempo narrativo, que, por otro lado, acaba de romper: por este motivo Antíoco llegó a convertirse en una persona muy querida, muy de confianza para Alcibíades. Cono-

ciendo, como Plutarco confía en que sus lectores ya conocen, el penoso y desafortunado desenlace de la batalla de Notio, la sola mención del piloto logra no ya la suspensión de la descripción narrativa, sino de golpe acaba con el tono cómico, evocando la postrera consecuencia trágica que tendrá esta amistad.[9]

Y llegado hasta este punto ya es hora de retomar la ἐνάργεια por donde la dejamos y demostrar al fin, aunque algo se debe entrever entre tanta comedia y tragedia al tiempo, qué efectos y matices tiene sobre el perfil político de Alcibíades.

Que este recurso es bien conocido por Plutarco es fácil de probar, no tanto porque el de Queronea fue un hábil experto en retórica como porque él mismo hace mención de este recurso y alaba la maestría de otros en utilizarlo. Así ocurre en la *Vida de Artajerjes* donde en el capítulo 8, hablando de la batalla de Cunaxa, refiere la especial habilidad de Jenofonte en la descripción vívida de la contienda:

> Τὴν δὲ μάχην ἐκείνην πολλῶν μὲν ἀπηγγελκότων, Ξενοφῶντος (*Anab.* 1.8) δὲ μονονουχὶ δεικνύοντος ὄψει καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς οὐ γεγενημένοις, ἀλλὰ γινομένοις ἐφιστάντος ἀεὶ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἐμπαθῆ καὶ συγκινδυνεύοντα διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν.

En el de *Gloria Atheniensium* (347A) Plutarco alude a una comparación ingeniosa de Simónides entre pintura y poesía,[10] siempre que ésta última sea una descripción vívida de alguna escena vivida por alguien. Esta vez le toca a Tucídides ser elogiado por su uso de la ἐνάργεια:

> Πλὴν ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν. ἃς γὰρ οἱ ζωγράφοι πράξεις ὡς γινομένας δεικνύουσι, ταύτας οἱ λόγοι γεγενημένας διηγοῦνται καὶ συγγράφουσιν. (…) τέλος δ' ἀμφοτέροις ἓν ὑπόκειται, καὶ τῶν ἱστορικῶν κράτιστος ὁ τὴν διήγησιν ὥσπερ γραφὴν πάθεσι καὶ προσώποις εἰδωλοποιήσας. ὁ γοῦν Θουκυδίδης ἀεὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς ταύτην ἁμιλλᾶται τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οἷον θεατὴν ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ γινόμενα περὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας ἐκπληκτικὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐνεργάσασθαι λιχνευόμενος.[11]

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[9] Para la narración de esta estúpida forma de perder una batalla, ni siquiera planeada, *vid.* Plut., *Alc.* 35. 5–8.

[10] Y Tucídides no hace poesía tal y como la entendemos; sin embargo, su prosa es poética, de la escuela de Gorgias, precisamente, quien dijo que la poesía era λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον. Supongo que es por eso que Plutarco habla de poesía y ve adecuado poner como ejemplo a Tucídides. Este pasaje de Gorgias está en el *Encomio a Helena* 9: δεῖ δὲ καὶ δόξῃ δεῖξαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι· τὴν ποίησιν ἅπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὀνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον.

[11] Es casi inevitable, ya que ha salido a colación en la nota anterior no pensar en Gorgias cuando describe el efecto de la poesía o del logos en los receptores.

En mi opinión, ya aducidas las pruebas suficientes de que Plutarco conoce el recurso técnico de la descripción acumulativa que es la ἐνάργεια, recurso que sin duda usa con profusión en el principio del capítulo 10 de la *Vida de Alcibíades*, creo que esta vez el queronense no construye la escena como en otras ocasiones, en el *Pericles* por ejemplo, para modelar un carácter político acorde al que describiría en los *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*.[12] Se trata de todo lo contrario, la escena pintada como un episodio de comedia, con la violenta ruptura narrativa que acaba en un trágico presagio al evocar la amistad de Antíoco, consigue que "literalmente" veamos a Alcibíades como un bufón que se deja llevar por el clamor de la plebe. No estamos ante aquel Pericles que se aparta del *ochlos* y se refugia en la Acrópolis, como un demiurgo solitario, para pensar el diseño de los magníficos monumentos que construirá Fidias, como Plutarco "pinta" en el capítulo tercero de la *Vida* del genial político. Alcibíades demuestra en su primera entrada cómo la esfera de lo privado aparece una y otra vez a la luz porque eso divierte y agrada al pueblo.

Así, con Alcibíades desfavorablemente "dibujado", sólo tenemos que recordar otras advertencias de Plutarco en los *Preceptos* y pensar en este cuadro del inicio, nada menos, de la vida pública del sobrino de Pericles. Dos advertencias precisamente nos demuestran que Alcibíades es la antítesis del político ideal. Nos referimos a *Praec.* 799C y especialmente 802E:

> δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ οἶνος ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἠθῶν κρατεῖται τοῦ πίνοντος ἡσυχῇ δὲ διαθάλπων καὶ κατακεραννύμενος αὐτὸς ἠθοποιεῖ τὸν πίνοντα καὶ μεθίστησιν, οὕτω τὸν πολιτικόν, ἕως ἂν ἰσχὺν ἀγωγὸν ἐκ δόξης καὶ πίστεως κατασκευάσηται, τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἤθεσιν εὐάρμοστον εἶναι καὶ στοχάζεσθαι τούτων, ἐπιστάμενον οἷς χαίρειν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ὑφ' ὧν ἄγεσθαι

Ibidem: ἧς τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής, ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπραγίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχή. Y ya que nuestro personaje es Alcibíades apuntar aquí la similitud entre los efectos del *logos* en Gorgias y los del *logos* de Sócrates en el hijo de Clinias es una idea difícil de resistir. Para esto les remito a Plat. *Symp.* 215e: εἶπον ὀμόσας ἂν ὑμῖν οἷα δὴ πέπονθα αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν τούτου λόγων καὶ πάσχω ἔτι καὶ νυνί. ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολύ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου, ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλους παμπόλλους τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχοντας.

[12] *Praec.* 779A: ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς φρέαρ οἶμαι τὴν πολιτείαν τοὺς μὲν ἐμπίπτοντας αὐτομάτως καὶ παραλόγως ταράττεσθαι καὶ μετανοεῖν, τοὺς δὲ καταβαίνοντας ἐκ παρασκευῆς καὶ λογισμοῦ καθ' ἡσυχίαν χρῆσθαί τε τοῖς πράγμασι μετρίως καὶ πρὸς μηδὲν δυσκολαίνειν, ἅτε δὴ τὸ καλὸν αὐτὸ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο τῶν πράξεων ἔχοντας τέλος.

πέφυκεν· δημαγωγία γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου πειθομένων ἐστίν, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται τιθασεύσεις τῶν ὄχλων οὐδὲν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἄγρας καὶ βουκολήσεως διαφέρουσιν.

La aparentemente inofensiva escena de comedia nos hace ver a Alcibíades como el modelo opuesto a estos preceptos. Si el buen político debe conducir al pueblo, Alcibíades se deja seducir por el aplauso del público, tanto que hasta se le olvida no airear particularidades de su vida privada, la codorniz, en este caso. Si el lider del pueblo debe manejar a la chusma, Alcibíades se deja llevar por su clamor, hasta poner su confianza en un buen piloto, pero un cretino bravucón. En este caso, la hábil utilización de la *enargeia* por parte de Plutarco ejemplifica el modelo político que jamás debe seguirse. Esta vez, así, la intención del empleo del recurso retórico no es la *imitatio* sino la *reiectio*, si se me permite este uso, el rechazo de este episodio y, por ende, de la particular forma de entender la praxis política del bello hijo de Clinias.

Así las cosas, y como pequeña reflexión "colateral", sería buena idea revisar la seriedad de afirmaciones tan tajantes y, en mi humilde opinión, tan ligeras sobre la absoluta adhesión partidista o simpatía de Plutarco hacia la figura de este controvertido político y estratega ateniense.[13]

[13] Quizá el ejemplo más claro de esta ligereza a la hora de juzgar la opinión de Plutarco sobre Alcibíades—y, a decir verdad, es en quien he pensado en todo momento—sea Bloedow (1973) 2: "In addition there is the weight of Plutarch's panegyric Life of Alcibiades; one need for instance refer only to his descriptive statement of Alcibiades as τὸν κράτιστον καὶ πολεμικώτατον στρατηγόν." Estoy segura que una lectura más atenta y detenida de la biografía del Queronense no le hubiera llevado a calificarla de panegírico.

FONTI SOCRATICHE E STOICHE NELLA *VITA ALCIBIADIS*

Francesca Alesse

Il ruolo che la letteratura socratica, con il suo carattere protrettico e pedagogico più che documentario, ha svolto nello sviluppo del genere biografico, secondo la nota e giusta prospettiva di A. Dihle e A. Momigliano,[1] è ben visibile in alcune *Vite* plutarchee e, in misura veramente notevole, nella *Vita Alcibiadis*. Questa *Vita*, infatti, oltre ad accogliere molti elementi da Tucidide,[2] dai logografi di V e IV secolo,[3] da Teofrasto e dai biografi peripatetici di età ellenistica come Satiro e Duride di Samo,[4] riflette uno specifico schema letterario promosso dai dialoghi socratici intorno al celebre discepolo di Socrate. Alcibiade è certamente un personaggio «esemplare» della cerchia socratica, come è sufficientemente dimostrato dal fatto che un *logos sokratikos* dal titolo *Alcibiade* compare nel catalogo delle opere di Eschine di Sfetto (SSR VI A 22, 25 e 41[5]), di Antistene (SSR V A 41 e 43), di Euclide (SSR II A 10) e di Fedone di Elide (SSR III A 89),[6] mentre ben due dialoghi con questo titolo compaiono nel *corpus platonicum*, quantunque la loro autenticità sia stata ampiamente discussa. Il nostro personaggio è citato più volte anche nei *Memorabili* di Senofonte in cui è definito, tra i sostenitori della democrazia, «il più intemperante e il più arrogante (ἀκρατέστατος καὶ ὑβριστότατος)», e a tal punto desideroso di essere «il migliore degli statisti (κρείττων τῶν πολιτευομένων)», da compromettere definiti-

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1 Dihle (1956) e Momigliano (1971) 45ss.; recentemente il ruolo svolto dai *logoi sokratikoi* sull'opera plutarchea è sempre più riconosciuto, cfr. ad esempio, Aalders (1988) 10, che mette in luce il contributo della letteratura socratica al formarsi del pensiero politico di Plutarco, e Swain (1997) 173, che ribadisce come il *logos sokratikos* sia un modello di riferimento per descrivere un carattere e la sua educazione.

2 Romilly (1988) 22ss.; Pelling (1992) 10ss. = Pelling (2002) 117ss.

3 Turchi (1984) 105ss.

4 Homeyer (1963) 152s.

5 Da questo dialogo di Eschine provengono, anche i testi raccolti in SSR VI A 42–53, su alcuni dei quali torneremo tra poco, nonché Plutarco, *Vita di Alcibiade* 4 = SSR VI A 54. Sul contributo dato da Eschine alla perdurante tradizione su Alcibiade, cf. G. Giannantoni (1997, 2001) 349ss.

6 Cf. Rossetti (1973) 364–381 e Rossetti (1980) 183–200.

vamente la sua amicizia con Socrate.[7] Non è da escludere che la letteratura socratica e la predilezione in essa mostrata per Alcibiade siano all'origine di un noto passo della *Poetica* di Aristotele (1451b7ss.), in cui il filosofo, per distinguere la prospettiva universale della poesia da quella particolare della storia, fa l'esempio, per quest'ultima, delle azioni di Alcibiade.[8] Se l'ipotesi che Aristotele stia qui pensando anche ai λόγοι σωκρατικοί è plausibile, allora si può parlare di un'influenza indiretta della letteratura socratica sul genere biografico sviluppato dal Peripato: non due contributi distinti e indipendenti, quello dei *logoi* socratici e quello dei *bioi* peripatetici, bensì un impulso trasmesso dai primi ai secondi.

Prendiamo spunto dai passi sopra citati di Senofonte per notare che ci troviamo di fronte a due temi tipici del ritratto di Alcibiade, la ὕβρις e la φιλονικία: già diffusi nella letteratura del V secolo, essi sono variamente trattati dagli autori socratici. Platone vi fa riferimento esplicito in *Alcibiade* I 105b, 5–6 e in *Simposio* 216a-b e allusione in *Repubblica* 494c–d;[9] Antistene (SSR V A 198) descrive Alcibiade come un giovane dotato di «tempra virile», cioè ἰσχυρός e ἀνδρώδης, in ciò somigliando a Socrate, ma da quest'ultimo molto diverso perché «ignorante e audace (ἀπαίδευτος e τολμηρός)». Il motivo dell'arroganza di Alcibiade è sfruttato anche da Eschine di Sfetto il quale vi unisce quello di una giovanile tendenza all'empietà o ἀσέβεια (SSR VI A 51).

Anche Plutarco richiama questi tratti inserendoli in un'illustrazione generale del carattere di Alcibiade in cui compare a più riprese il motivo, fondamentalmente positivo, della εὐφυΐα o buona disposizione per la virtù e per il ragionamento.[10] Si tratta, anche in questo caso, di un tema presente in almeno una parte della letteratura socratica, come si ricava dal già citato frammento di Antistene e dalle allusioni

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[7] Cfr. Senofonte, *Memorabili* 1.2.12, e 1.2.47. Su questa letteratura, cfr. anche Slings (1999) 71–73.

[8] Ἡ δὲ ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει, ἔστιν δὲ καθόλου μέν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὗ στοχάζειν ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθέμενη. τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον, τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν.

[9] Sulla possibilità di riconoscere in questa parte della *Repubblica* un'allusione ad Alcibiade, cfr. Hatzfeld (1951^2) 53; Hershbell (1995) 209ss.; Alexiou (1999) 70. Sulla possibilità che Plutarco descriva Alcibiade rifacendosi alla descrizione platonica della «grande natura», capace di grandi vizi e di grandi virtù, cfr. Duff (1999a) 216ss. e Duff (1999b) 316ss.

[10] *Vita di Alcibiade* 4.1–2.

di Platone nella *Repubblica*,[11] e che si consolida nelle generazioni successive, come si vede da Isocrate,[12] Demostene[13] e soprattutto Aristotele[14] che annovera Alcibiade, a titolo di esempio, in quel genere di «magnanimi» che non tollerano la ὕβρις altrui. L'intento dei Socratici, nell'attribuire ad Alcibiade una duplice natura, è evidente: Alcibiade è εὐφυής e ciò legittima l'interessamento di Socrate; ma l'eccessiva φιλοτιμία del personaggio—che lo induce a credersi superiore a Pericle[15] e in grado di competere con la fama di Temistocle[16]—, nonché un contesto sociale e politico uso all'adulazione (κολακεία) e perciò inadatto allo sviluppo delle migliori attitudini dei giovani, hanno fatto sì che il progetto educativo di Socrate fallisse.

Plutarco, come vedremo più in particolare, non sembra recepire quest'ultimo aspetto e non pare mai seriamente preoccupato di difendere Socrate dall'accusa di esser stato un «cattivo» maestro. Nella sua descrizione del comportamento di Alcibiade prevale piuttosto il lato della sua difformità caratteriale (ἀνομοιότης) e della sua capacità di adattarsi all'ambiente e al momento (cfr. 23.5ss.). Ma in vari luoghi delle *Vite* Plutarco sottolinea che Alcibiade poteva condurre un esercito alla vittoria o trarre l'Assemblea dalla sua parte con l'arte del discorso,[17] ma non porre le sue capacità strategiche al servizio del «buon» governo, cioè di una politica improntata al giusto e al bene morale.[18] E ciò per via di una fondamentale intemperanza ed incostanza morale, particolarmente manifesta sia nelle relazioni con gli ateniesi e gli alleati, all'occorrenza traditi e raggirati, sia nelle relazioni private, più esattamente sessuali, improntate ad una assoluta libertà.[19] Malgrado che questi lati negativi fossero ampiamente documentati nel V e nel IV secolo, Plutarco risente fortemente della letteratura socratica soprattutto al momento di ricostruire la fase giovanile del *bios*, perché è

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[11] Cfr. 494e1–2.

[12] Cfr. Isocrate 11.5; 16.7ss.

[13] Cfr. Demostene 21.145.

[14] Cfr. *Analitici posteriori* 2.13.97b15ss., *Retorica* 2.15.1390b28.

[15] Cfr. Platone, *Alcibiade* I 105b, 1–2 e Plutarco, *Vita di Alcibiade* 6.4.

[16] Cfr. Eschine Socratico *ap.* Elio Aristide, *I quattro oratori* 348–349 = SSR VI A 50 e Plutarco, *Vita di Alcibiade* 37.7–8.

[17] Su questo aspetto, cfr. Pelling (2000) 331–339 = Pelling (2002) 339–347.

[18] Cfr. Plutarco, *Vita di Alcibiade* 16.1, e 35.3, *Vita di Flaminino* 11.5, *Vita di Nicia* 9.1; *Vita di Focione* 3.7, con l'eccezione degli episodi della guerra del Peloponneso narrati in *Vita di Alcibiade* 26, durante i quali Alcibiade dà prova di una superiore visione politica.

[19] Cfr. *Vita di Nicia* 10.3, ss., *Vita di Pelopida* 4.3, *Vita di Alcibiade* 2.1; 6.1–4; 16.1 cit., 23.6–7, *Vita di Agesilao* 3.1–2.

quella che gli fornisce il retroterra, per così dire, a cui fare riferimento per comprendere la complessa natura del personaggio.[20]

Il nome di Alcibiade è frequente nella letteratura biografica e dossografica costruita su Socrate nel primo e tardo ellenismo e nei primi secoli dell'impero,[21] nella «retorica filosofica» della seconda sofistica,[22] negli scritti etico-religiosi della stessa epoca e nella produzione apologetica dei Padri della Chiesa.[23] I motivi dell'interesse che Alcibiade seppe suscitare sono strettamente legati al controverso giudizio morale e politico che si volle dare sull'operato di Socrate all'indomani della sua morte.[24] Nel V secolo Alcibiade non è praticamente mai citato con Socrate: egli è giudicato in prima persona da Tucidide[25] e da Antifonte[26] per le sue attitudini politiche, religiose, private.[27] Stando ad un noto passo del *Busiris* di Isocrate (par. 5), fu il sofista Policrate che, componendo una *Categoria di Socrate* dopo il 396, «creò» la tradizione di un discepolato di Alcibiade presso il filosofo con l'intento di farne una prova a carico di quest'ultimo. I vizi che fino a quel momento

[20] Cfr. *Vita di Alcibiade* 2.2: «Benché per natura numerose e violente fossero in lui le passioni, tuttavia più forte di tutte fu l'ambizione e il desiderio di primeggiare, come appare chiaro dalle testimonianze relative alla sua infanzia» (φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων παθῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασιν). Trad. italiana di L.M. Raffaelli, Milano 2001[3].

[21] Döring (1979) 75, 77 nota 125, 133 ss.

[22] Cfr. Desideri (1978) 325 e 481.

[23] Questi testi, ricavati ad esempio da Plutarco stesso, da Ateneo, Frontone, Eliano, Massimo di Tiro, Elio Aristide, Filostrato, Dione Crisostomo e dalla letteratura patristica, si trovano raccolti in SSR I A 29; I C 31–39, 54, 58–59, 61; 99; 108–109; 145; 411; 417; 435, 444, 508; I D 1; SSR I E 1; 4; 9; infine, per le citazioni di Alcibiade presso i Padri della Chiesa, si vedano i testi raccolti in SSR I G 38, 84, 99. Nella grande maggioranza dei casi elencati, Alcibiade è menzionato solo per la sua relazione con Socrate; l'occasione nella quale ricorre la citazione può variare: le circostanze che offrono maggiormente la possibilità di menzionare Alcibiade sono due: 1) l'amore di Socrate per Alcibiade, descritto sia in senso svalutativo, nel qual caso si cela una condanna per Socrate stesso, che in senso edificante, nel qual caso l'eros socratico è il mascheramento di un insegnamento volto alla moderazione e alla correzione della *hybris* del giovane; questi aneddoti richiamano una letteratura che raffigura un Alcibiade ancora molto giovane; 2) le imprese militari di Alcibiade, dalle battaglie di Delio e Potidea alla campagna di Sicilia, e che riguardano una biografia più matura di Alcibiade.

[24] Sulla valutazione politica che viene conferita all'amicizia tra Alcibiade e Socrate, cfr. ora Romeyer Dherbey (2001) 25 ss.; Brisson (2001) 71 ss.

[25] Sulla *philonikia* di Alcibiade, cfr. Tucidide, 5.43.2 e 6.15.2; sulle tendenze oligarchiche, 6.60.1; 8.48.1 ss.: sulla ἀσέβεια e sulle inchieste relative alle parodie dei misteri eleusini e alla mutilazione delle erme, 6.28.1 ss., 6.53.1.

[26] Sull'eccessiva libertà nel comportamento sessuale, cfr. Antifonte, fr. 67 Thalheim, e Lisia, fr. 4 Thalheim. In questo testo vi è anche una strisciante accusa di incesto.

[27] Duff (1999a) 222 ss.

erano stati addebitati al cattivo ἦθος di Alcibiade, potevano trovare, ora, una diversa spiegazione: il magistero di Socrate.[28] Malgrado che Isocrate non reputi degna di fede la *Categoria* di Policrate, è evidente che quest'ultima pare aver introdotto un filone nuovo, quello del rapporto Socrate—Alcibiade come maestro—discepolo, al cui consolidamento contribuiscono tutti quei *logoi sokratikoi* scritti dai discepoli del filosofo anche con lo scopo di sollevare Socrate da ogni responsabilità nella cattiva riuscita di Alcibiade.

Alcuni aspetti del ritratto di Alcibiade tipici dei *logoi sokratikoi* si trasmettono al Cinismo e alla Stoa che li inseriscono in una più ampia concezione pedagogica e politica incentrata sui concetti di *eros* e *philia.* Il mio scopo è pertanto di mettere in luce che il ritratto fornito da Plutarco su Alcibiade risente fortemente di questo retroterra; alcuni esempi riveleranno infatti che Plutarco ha fatto ricorso non solo a Platone, come ha recentemente ribadito T. Duff,[29] ma anche all'*Alcibiade* I e al *Simposio* di Platone, all'*Alcibiade* e ad altri scritti di Antistene, all'*Alcibiade* e forse all'*Assioco* di Eschine di Sfetto. È inoltre rilevabile la presenza di mediazioni stoiche, in particolare dovute alle opere morali di Cleante di Asso.

All'esordio della *Vita*, Plutarco tradisce la sua dipendenza da un filone socratico sostenendo di condividere un'opinione diffusa, quella secondo la quale la fama del personaggio sarebbe da attribuirsi anche alla familiarità con Socrate (1.3). Una prova di ciò è data dal fatto che degli altri strateghi antichi si ignora il nome della madre e di lui si tramanda persino il nome della nutrice, Amicla, e del precettore, Zopiro, conservati rispettivamente da Antistene e da Platone. Per quest'ultimo, il riferimento è ad *Alcibiade* I 122ab. Nella *Vita di Licurgo*, 16.5, si aggiunge (ma senza fare il nome di Antistene) che Amicla era spartana e che Zopiro, un semplice schiavo, fu preposto da Pericle stesso all'educazione di Alcibiade. Il dettaglio dell'origine spartana di Amicla non è irrilevante per la paideia socratica che, soprattutto in Antistene, in Senofonte e in Diogene, è caratterizzata da sentimenti filolaconici; il particolare dello stato di servitù di Zopiro ha in Plutarco una valenza negativa, la medesima che ha nell'*Alcibiade* I, con la differenza che in quest'ultimo la servitù di Zopiro è contrapposta all'alta qualità dei precettori persiani, in Plu-

[28] Cfr. Senofonte, *Memorabili* 1.2.12 e Montuori (1974) 262ss.; cfr. anche Libanio, *Declamazione* I 48 e 53 (=SSR I E 1) e Montuori (1984) 21–22.

[29] Duff (1999a) 222–224.

tarco a quella degli educatori spartani. Vale però la pena di ricordare che Zopiro, anche indipendentemente dal suo rapporto con il giovane Alcibiade, è personaggio della letteratura socratica, e che la sua presenza nei *logoi sokratikoi* si deve certamente a Fedone, a cui è attribuito un dialogo dal titolo *Zopiro*,[30] e forse anche al *Fisiognomico* di Antistene. Il particolare della sua origine servile, se è presentato sotto una cattiva luce nell'*Alcibiade* I e nella *Vita di Licurgo* e taciuto nella *Vita di Alcibiade*, potrebbe aver avuto un significato positivo all'interno della tradizione antistenico-cinica, nella quale la schiavitù, la δουλεία sociale, era talora esaltata come mascheramento della vera ἐλευθερία, ovvero della libertà morale. D'altra parte, la tradizione biografica dice che l'autore del dialogo *Zopiro*, Fedone, fu schiavo prima di essere liberato per volontà di Socrate, e che schiavi furono per un certo tempo Platone e Diogene di Sinope.[31]

Sull'importanza dei dialoghi antistenici nella diffusione del *topos* di Alcibiade fornisce una prova indiretta e, in certa misura, inconsapevole, lo stesso Plutarco poco dopo. Per celebrare la bellezza di Alcibiade, non guastata ma anzi accresciuta da un lieve difetto di pronuncia, Plutarco ricorda i versi tratti dalle *Vespe* di Aristofane (vv. 44–46), in cui il poeta fa pronunciare al giovane un motto di spirito ai danni del demagogo Teoro. Nella battuta, però, le *rho* sono sostituite da *lambda*, in modo tale che l'epiteto ridicolo κόραξ, «corvo», si trasforma in quello più ingiurioso di κόλαξ, «adulatore» o «parassita». Plutarco non sembra aver colto molto bene il senso della scena aristofanea: anziché celebrare la bellezza di Alcibiade, Aristofane intende accennare al tema topico della commedia antica del «parassita», alludendo peraltro al nesso tra il fenomeno del parassitarismo e dell'adulazione e il regime democratico, nesso stabilito dagli ambienti ostili alla democrazia ateniese.[32] Ma il gioco di parole tra *korax* e *kolax* compariva sicuramente anche in una o più opere di Antistene, forse nel *Ciro o Del regno* e nel cosiddetto *Eracle maggiore*,[33] nelle quali il Socratico condannava il κακῶς ἀκούειν e metteva in guardia dalle lodi dei malvagi; infine, l'apoftegma antistenico «meglio capitare tra i *korakes* (corvi) che tra i *kola-*

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[30] Cfr. SSR III A 8–11. Sulla ricostruzione di questo dialogo, cfr. Rossetti (1980) 183ss. e Esposito (1990) 7ss.

[31] Su Fedone, cfr. Diogene Laerzio 2. 105, su Diogene Cinico si vedano i testi SSR V B 70–80, su Platone Diogene Laerzio 3.19. Non sempre questa tradizione è stata considerata fededegna, cfr. Gigante (1986) 59ss.

[32] Cfr. Ribbeck (1883) 23 e *passim*, Gerhard (1909) 32ss., Kindstrand (1976) 259.

[33] Cfr. SSR V A 86, 89.

kes (parassiti/adulatori)…» era incluso in una raccolta di sentenze di filosofi cinici e stoici redatta da Ecatone di Rodi.[34] La polemica antidemocratica di Aristofane lascia il campo alla condanna dell'adulazione come emulazione della vera amicizia. Se Plutarco inserisce l'episodio nel corso della descrizione della grande bellezza di Alcibiade, ciò può derivare dal fatto che sta seguendo uno schema proprio della letteratura socratica, dato che l'insistenza sulla bellezza del giovane ebbe grande rilievo a partire dai *logoi* di Antistene e Platone.[35]

Anche nel cap. 2 è possibile scorgere qualche labile traccia di temi socratici, soprattutto nel paragone dell'adolescente con il leone (*Vita di Alcibiade* 2.2), ripresentato più avanti a proposito di un episodio della maturità,[36] ma soprattutto nel racconto del rifiuto di Alcibiade di imparare a suonare il flauto (2.5), un episodio meno banale di quanto appaia a prima vista, se se ne considera la motivazione. Alcibiade infatti avrebbe sostenuto che, a differenza della lira che accompagna il canto, il flauto deforma il volto e, soprattutto, «chiude la bocca, impedendo l'uso della voce e della parola (τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸν λόγον ἀφαιρούμενον)»; quindi i giovani ateniesi, protetti da Atena e da Apollo che respinsero l'auletica e punirono chi la praticava, debbono lasciare il flauto ai figli dei Tebani, che non sanno parlare: διαλέγεσθαι … οὐκ ἴσασιν. L'impedimento della parola è un elemento essenziale per ricondurre questa *chreia* giovanile di Alcibiade all'ambiente socratico. Per prima cosa, infatti, il rifiuto dell'auletica da parte del giovane è attestata dall'*Alcibiade* I (106e), che conferma d'altra parte la buona disposizione per lo studio delle lettere, della cetra, e per la lotta, esattamente come nel resoconto plutarcheo, con la differenza che Platone non dà spiegazione per l'abbandono del flauto. È in Aristotele (*Politica* 8.6, 1341a16ss.) che troviamo una motivazione simile a quella indicata in Plutarco: l'uso del flauto è volto alla catarsi e non all'educazione sia perché è uno strumento rituale, quindi celebrativo (ὀργιαστικόν), sia

34 SSR V A 131.

35 Antistene Socratico in SSR V A 199 e Platone, *Alcibiade* I 104a.

36 Al cap. 16 ci sono due riferimenti alla rappresentazione del personaggio come leone. Nel primo caso (16.4), si tratta del verso 1431 delle *Rane* di Aristofane, e che doveva intendersi come un'allusione alla vocazione tirannica di Alcibiade; nel secondo caso (16.7), Plutarco ricorda che l'artista Antifonte raffigurò Nemea con Alcibiade tra le braccia, in luogo del leone, e aggiunge che il dipinto suscitò l'indignazione degli ateniesi che temevano la natura troppo ambiziosa di Alcibiade. Tuttavia il leone può essere la metonimia di Eracle (che appunto si fregiò della pelle del leone nemeo da lui ucciso) e Eracle è, com'è noto, una delle figure mitiche di riferimento morale di almeno una parte della tradizione socratica, in particolare quella cinica.

perché «impedisce di parlare.»[37] Che il «parlare» sia una condizione dell'educazione morale può essere considerato senz'altro motivo tipico della *paideia* socratica, soprattutto se espresso come διαλέγεσθαι, parlare dialogando, che è verbo proprio del magistero socratico, come si ricava soprattutto dall'*Apologia* platonica e dai *Memorabili*. Poiché però Aristotele svolge un discorso teorico senza riferimento ad alcun personaggio e il Socrate platonico non adduce alcun motivo teorico del rifiuto di Alcibiade, è legittimo pensare che nel circolo socratico qualcun altro avesse manifestato più apertamente una avversione all'auletica e l'avesse drammaticamente inserita in un dialogo con Alcibiade come protagonista; deboli cenni al riguardo, d'altronde, non mancano nel *Simposio* platonico e in quello senofonteo.[38] Si può avanzare l'ipotesi che l'aneddoto derivi da Antistene, del quale Plutarco stesso riporta, nella *Vita di Pericle*, un apoftegma ostile al flautista Ismenia.[39] Non è inutile ricordare di sfuggita che anche la *Vita di Pericle* risente della letteratura socratica soprattutto per quel che riguarda la relazione tra lo statista ed Aspasia, personaggio al quale dedicarono due dialoghi rispettivamente Antistene ed Eschine.[40]

Più significativi ed espliciti i richiami nel cap. 4. Nei parr. 1–4, Plutarco si sofferma più a lungo sui rapporti tra Alcibiade e Socrate, richiamando vari aspetti tipici della letteratura socratica. Il primo di essi è l'amore che Socrate provava per il giovane, di natura affatto diversa dal genere di attrazione che questi esercitava sugli altri. Secondo Plutarco furono le «ottime disposizioni per la virtù» (cfr. 4.1: εὐφυΐα πρὸς ἀρετήν) di Alcibiade ad attirare l'affetto di Socrate, disposizioni intralciate sia dalle attenzioni di cui il ragazzo era circondato, sia dalle componenti meno moderate del suo carattere. Secondo la versione plutarchea, il giovane comprendeva la superiorità di Socrate su tutti i loro comuni amici, tanto che, almeno per un breve periodo, non mancò di frequentarlo assiduamente, accettandone non solo gli insegnamenti,

[37] Cfr. *Politica* 1341a24–26: προσθῶμεν δὲ ὅτε συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὔλησιν.

[38] In Platone, *Simposio* 176e, 6ss. viene congedata la flautista, perché vada a suonare per le donne, mentre gli uomini si intratterranno con i discorsi (ἡμας διὰ λόγων ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι); in Senofonte, *Simposio* 3.1–2 si dichiara la superiorità dell'intrattenimento con i discorsi rispetto a quello prodotto dalla musica. Cfr. anche Platone, *Protagora*, 347cd.

[39] *Vita di Pericle* 1.5 = SSR V A 102.

[40] Cfr. *Vita di Pericle* 24.4–5, 165B-C e 32.1–5, 169D-E = SSR VI A 64, 66 e 67, dall'*Aspasia* di Eschine; 24.7–8, 165D = SSR V A 143, dall'*Aspasia* di Antistene.

ma anche talora gli aspri rimproveri «piegando le ali come il gallo battuto.»[41] Alcibiade avrebbe considerato l'intervento di Socrate su di lui e su altri giovani come un soccorso che gli dei inviavano per salvaguardare la loro virtù (cfr. 4.4: τὸ μὲν Σωκράτους ἡγήσατο πρᾶγμα τῷ ὄντι θεῶν ὑπηρεσίαν εἰς νέων ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι καὶ σωτηρίαν...) e avrebbe pertanto stimato e amato solo Socrate, disprezzando gli altri innamorati (*ibidem*: τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἐρασταῖς χαλεπὸν ὄντα καὶ δυσχείρωτον...).

Mentre in queste ultime parole riconosciamo facilmente l'eco di Platone, *Alcibiade* I 103b, 4–5 e 104c, 1–2, il primo rilievo è di maggior interesse, perché l'idea che la φιλία sia una salvezza, un soccorso, sia nella sfera privata che in quella pubblica, è proprio della letteratura del V secolo.[42] Nella letteratura socratica, cioè in Platone (*Liside* 215a ss., *Simposio* 189cd, *Repubblica* 414b, 416, 463b; *Epistole* 7, 337b), Senofonte (*Memorabili* 2.2.4; *Storie* 7.4.8; *Ciropedia* 1.5.13), Diogene Cinico (SSR V B 420; cfr. 420) e in tradizione cinica seriore ma facente capo o ad Antistene o a Diogene di Sinope, troviamo una stretta relazione tra φιλία, ἔρως e soccorso, ἐπίκουρος, o salvezza, σωτηρία.[43] Ma in Plutarco compare un motivo importante per determinare l'origine socratica dell'equivalenza tra φιλία e σωτηρία, e cioè che il soccorso rappresentato da Socrate viene «dagli dèi»: ciò deve essere messo in rapporto con la concezione, certamente contenuta nell'*Alcibiade* di Eschine di Sfetto, secondo cui l'incontro e l'attrazione tra Socrate e Alcibiade si deve ad una θεία μοῖρα, una sorte stabilita dagli dei (SSR VI A 53). Un'immagine analoga, a cui Plutarco può essersi ispirato, è contenuta nelle battute iniziali dell'*Alcibiade* I dove Socrate chiarisce che, pur amando Alcibiade, non lo ha avvicinato fintanto che il dio non glielo ha permesso (cfr. 103a 5–6), mentre ora il giovane trarrà grande beneficio da Socrate, ma con l'aiuto divino, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ (cfr. 105e 5); a questo ordine di idee si può anche confrontare ciò che Platone dice in *Repubblica* 492e 6–493a 2, a proposito dei nefasti effetti della cattiva educa-

[41] *Vita di Alcibiade* 4, 3: ἔπτηξ' ἀλέκτωρ δοῦλος ὣς κλίνας πτερόν. Il verso pare di Frinico tragico, fr. 17 N.[2] In verità, che il verso sia di Frinico lo conferma Aristofane, *Vespe*, 1490, ma che si tratti del tragico e non del comico non è poi così certo. Si veda anche Phrynichus comicus fr. 13 K. = 13 K.-A: Φρύνικος μὲν γὰρ ἐν Κρόνῳ καὶ ἀλεκτρυοπώλιον εἴρηκεν, ὥστε καὶ ἀλεκτρυοπωλεῖν ἂν εἴποις, spunto ripreso da Eschine socratico in un dialogo intitolato *Assioco*, cfr. Polluce, *Onomastico* 7.135.

[42] Cfr. Garzya (1962).

[43] Dione Crisostomo, *Discorsi* 3.35, e Luciano, *Demonatte* 7. Cfr. Brancacci (1992) 3323 e 3332; Brancacci (1994) 453.

zione propinata da un cattivo Stato e dai quali solo la volontà divina può preservare (θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι…).[44]

L'equivalenza di *eros* e salvezza è attestata per Polemone accademico—del quale Plutarco (*Moralia* 780D) riporta una definizione di *eros* praticamente identica a quella attribuita ad Alcibiade[45]—e per Zenone stoico, del quale Ateneo conserva un frammento dalla *Repubblica* (*ap.* Ateneo, 13.561C = SVF I 263). È verosimile dunque che il modo di intendere l'amicizia con Socrate che Plutarco ascrive ad Alcibiade derivi o direttamente da un *logos sokratikos* o da un scritto stoico, a sua volta influenzato da letteratura socratica.

La presenza, in questo contesto plutarcheo, anche di fonti stoiche è d'altronde provata dal cap. 6. In 6.1–2 Plutarco torna a descrivere l'amore che Socrate sentiva per Alcibiade e la diversità di questo sentimento rispetto all'attrazione esercitata dal giovane nei confronti di altri. Socrate, con i suoi discorsi protrettici, induceva il giovane ad una critica dei propri difetti, fino ad ottenerne talora una crisi di pianto. A questa prova di sensibilità faceva però riscontro talora una cedevolezza ai piaceri e il desiderio di sfuggire al controllo del maestro. Come notò giustamente D.A. Russell,[46] le parole di Plutarco «τῶν λόγων… τὴν καρδίαν στρεφόντων καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεόντων» trovano un riscontro molto preciso in quelle di *Simposio* 215e 1–2: «ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου», mentre la locuzione «δραπετεύων … ἐκυνηγεῖτο» risente di quella di *Simposio* 216b 5 «δραπετεύω … καὶ φεύγω», anche se in questo secondo caso è da notare che l'immagine della «caccia», che il verbo κυνηγεῖν suggerisce, potrebbe derivare da Senofonte o magari dall'*Assioco* di Eschine.[47] Inoltre, l'episodio del pianto del giovane Alcibiade è presente anche nell'*Alcibiade* di Eschine (SSR VI A 51), ed è ripreso, stando a Cicerone (*Tuscolane* 3.77 = SSR VI A 52), dallo stoico Cleante. Quest'ultimo è ricordato proprio nel medesimo capitolo della *Vita* plutarchea, per aver narrato che Socrate prendeva Alcibiade «per le orecchie», cioè persuadendolo con i *logoi*, lasciando agli altri innamorati altre «prese», cioè altre forme di lusinga. Cleante recupera, probabilmente in un trattato sul tema dell'educazione, un'immagine in uso nella letteratura socratica: Socrate è

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[44] Duff (1999a) 227 e Duff (1999b) 321 rimanda giustamente anche a Platone, *Apologia*, 30 A.

[45] Cfr. fr. 113 Gigante.

[46] Russell (1966) 40.

[47] Cfr. Senofonte, *Simposio* 4.63–64; *Memorabili* 2.6.8–9; 6.28–29; Eschine Socratico in SSR VI A 58. Cfr. Alesse (1999) 125.

una sirena dal canto irresistibile, un nuovo Marsia (un curioso capovolgimento, questo, del disprezzo antistenico per Ismenia), un mago che usa i discorsi in luogo degli incantesimi, dicono l'Alcibiade ormai adulto del *Simposio* platonico (215ab, 216ac) e il Socrate senofonteo di sé (*Memorabili* 2.6.10–12e31). L'immagine è poi adattata alla biografia del giovane Zenone di Cizio,[48] che sollecita il maestro cinico Cratete ad attrarlo con i discorsi. Possiamo avanzare l'ipotesi che il contenuto del cap. 6 risalga, almeno nelle linee generali, all'*Alcibiade* di Eschine di Sfetto e che quindi l'episodio del pianto di Alcibiade e l'immagine della «presa per le orecchie» giungano a Plutarco tramite lo stoico Cleante.

Per concludere, possiamo affermare che nella composizione di questa vita Plutarco si avvale di vari *logoi sokratikoi*, attingendo direttamente all'*Alcibiade* e al *Simposio* platonici, ma anche agli scritti di Antistene, di Eschine, nonché a quelle fonti stoiche che hanno contribuito a consolidare il *topos* letterario di Alcibiade. Con questo materiale Plutarco delinea quel ritratto giovanile del personaggio così importante per comprenderne la peculiarità e l'eccezionalità dell'età matura.

48 Cfr. Diogene Laerzio 7.24.

GLI ONORI DIVINI PER LISANDRO A SAMO. A PROPOSITO DI PLUTARCHUS, *LYSANDER* 18

Federicomaria Muccioli

Lisandro rappresenta il personaggio chiave per interpretare la storia di Sparta di fine V-inizi IV secolo a.C., dal momento che meglio di tutti incarna la tensione tra tradizione e innovamento tipica di quel periodo. Come è stato scritto, egli «è l'uomo politico più spartano e insieme più antispartano che si possa immaginare».[1] Tale ambivalenza di fondo della sua figura non è individuata soltanto dalla critica moderna ma è riconosciuta già dagli antichi o, quanto meno, da Plutarco, che dissemina nelle sue opere numerosi riferimenti allo Spartiata e gli dedica un'apposita biografia, sotto diversi aspetti complessa e problematica.[2] Questa va letta in stretta connessione con le *Vite* di Licurgo, di Agesilao e della coppia Agide-Cleomene per capire la posizione dello scrittore riguardo al mutamento della società spartana. Nella *Vita di Lisandro*, in particolare, si può notare come le contraddizioni, i fermenti sociali e politici tra V e IV secolo esplodano a causa anche dell'azione del protagonista. Esemplare è l'inizio della corruzione a Sparta, simboleggiato dall'introduzione della moneta d'oro e d'argento e dall'episodio di Gilippo, corrotto luogotenente dell'incorruttibile Lisandro.[3] In tutta la biografia Plutarco è combattuto tra il desiderio di evidenziare gli aspetti positivi dello Spartiata e da lui sinceramente ammirati, e la necessità di stigmatizzarne i difetti, primo tra tutti la φιλοτιμία, come risulta fin dai primi capitoli (2.4ss.; cfr. 2.2–3). Quello della φιλοτιμία è invero un concetto che, agli occhi dello scrittore di Cheronea, può essere inteso positivamente o negativamente.[4] Nel caso di Lisandro la smodata ambizione viene senza mezze misure condannata da Plutarco, che biasima il comportamento dello Spartiata, soprattutto per quanto attiene ai mezzi adottati nella lotta politica e nell'imposi-

[1] Così Musti (1990²) 490–491.

[2] La bibliografia sulla *Vita di Lisandro* plutarchea è abbastanza consistente; cfr. gli studi raccolti da Piccirilli (1997); Muccioli (2001), ai quali si aggiungano Mossé (1999); Candau Morón (2000).

[3] Plutarchus, *Lysander* 16.1–17.1.

[4] In generale, sul tema fonti e discussione in Frazier (1993); Frazier (1996).

zione della supremazia spartana e personale, con il frequente ricorso all'astuzia, all'inganno e a una condotta impudente e priva di scrupoli morali.[5]

Dunque la φιλοτιμία, nelle sue molteplici forme, costituisce un vero e proprio motivo dominante nella biografia plutarchea e trova una sua esplicazione evidente nell'accettazione da parte di Lisandro di onori divini e di varie forme di κολακεία nel cap. 18. Si tratta di un capitolo molto noto, uno dei luoghi fondamentali per chi voglia compiere un'indagine complessiva sui culti divini per mortali nel mondo greco. È opportuno pertanto analizzarlo in rapporto a tale tematica, ma anche in relazione al metodo di lavoro e al pensiero di Plutarco.

Innanzitutto, nel contesto della biografia, il capitolo spicca per la sua collocazione interna, poco oltre la metà della biografia: la datazione è l'estate del 404, dopo la vittoria finale di Sparta e dei suoi alleati nella guerra del Peloponneso. Lisandro è all'apice della carriera, intento al consolidamento del suo potere e della supremazia spartana. Difatti proprio nel capitolo successivo vi è la descrizione dell'inizio dell'eclisse politica, con le accuse di Farnabazo e il richiamo a Sparta. Nonostante la sua importanza, quello di Samo è un episodio che non sembra però aver avuto grande ricezione nel mondo antico. È altrimenti noto principalmente da un passo di Ateneo, che cita gli *Annali di Samo* di Duride di Samo (15.696e = *FGrHist* 76 F 26), del resto fonte di Plutarco stesso nel capitolo.[6] Infatti il biografo menziona espressamente Duride nel par. 5 (*FGrHist* 76 F 71), dopo aver dato notizie importanti sulle forme adottate da Lisandro per celebrare la sua vittoria, ovvero principalmente il monumento dei Navarchi a Delfi (18.1–2). Attingendo ad Anassandrida di Delfi, ricorda poi con una notazione maligna il suo ricco deposito nel santuario (18.3).[7] Ancora più interessante il par. 4, con la sottolineatura della potenza dello Spartiata ma anche della sua alterigia, persino superiore alla sua potenza. Segue la citazione di Duride (*FGrHist* 76 F 71):

> Infatti, come riferisce Duride, fu il primo tra i Greci a cui le città innalzarono altari come a un dio e a cui offrivano dei sacrifici, e anche il primo in onore del quale cantarono dei peani.

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[5] Per limitarsi solo alla *Vita di Lisandro* vd., ad es., 2.4 e 6; 5.6; 7.5–8.5; 13.7–9; 17.2ss.; 18.4; 19.1ss.; 23.7; cfr. 20.8; 22.1–4; 28.1 (nonché *Lysander-Sulla* 2.5–6; 3.6–8).

[6] Vd. anche Hesychius s.v. Λυσάνδρεια.

[7] Nella raccolta dello Jacoby il frammento di questo autore comprende 18.1–3 (*FGrHist* 404 F 2).

Di uno di questi viene riportato l'incipit. Plutarco precisa poi che i Sami decretarono (ἐψηφίσαντο) di cambiare le feste in onore di Era in Lisandrie.

È difficile affermare in quale misura il biografo sia dipendente dagli *Horoi* duridei. Nella raccolta dello Jacoby il frammento comprende 18.5–6 (cfr. 18.7–8 = *FGrHist* 696 F 33c) ma è stata spesso considerata una citazione troppo ristretta. Infatti diversi studiosi vorrebbero estenderla fino alla fine del capitolo (così come figura peraltro in Müller, *FHG*, II, pp. 484–485, F 65), comprendendovi pertanto anche le menzioni di Cherilo di Samo, Antiloco, Nicerato di Eraclea, l'aneddoto relativo a Platone e Antimaco di Colofone e il caso di piaggeria di cui si rende responsabile il citaredo Aristonoo.[8] Concettualmente il nesso tra i parr. 5–6 e quelli successivi è ben saldo, testimoniato se non altro dal ricordo del concorso delle Lisandrie a cui parteciparono Antimaco e Nicerato. L'elenco di questi personaggi (alcuni dei quali ben noti, altri pressoché solo dei nomi, almeno per noi moderni) è perfettamente funzionale nel testo, perché permette di vedere come Lisandro si circondasse di tutta una serie di letterati e artisti, intenti a celebrare le sua gesta e la sua figura arrivando anche agli eccessi.[9] Il problema dell'estensione della citazione di Duride non è di poco conto, perché se tutte le notizie da 18.5 fino alla fine dal capitolo derivano da Duride, ne consegue che il giudizio dello storico samio era fortemente negativo sui culti per Lisandro e sulla sua volontà di essere celebrato e adulato. Sappiamo, d'altro canto, che Duride (così come Democare)[10] aveva manifestato la sua profonda avversione per i culti e gli onori tributati a Demetrio Poliorcete ad Atene. Riporta infatti l'itifallo del 290 a.C. circa intonato ad Atene per Demetrio, e, giudicandolo il frutto di mera adulazione, commenta amaramente e sarcasticamente che a quella fine si erano ridotti i Maratonomachi.[11] Perciò, se è dato istituire un confronto con il frammento tràdito da Plutarco, si può ipo-

[8] Cfr. Landucci Gattinoni (1997) 208–209, 234–239, con bibliografia precedente (soprattutto di ambito storiografico; non interessa in questa sede il versante propriamente letterario, peraltro oggetto di ampio dibattito critico negli ultimi anni).

[9] Antiloco è altrimenti sconosciuto mentre Nicerato era presumibilmente di Eraclea Pontica, data anche la provenienza microasiatica degli altri letterati legati a Lisandro ivi menzionati; cfr. Piccirilli (1997) 264. A questi nomi si aggiunga quello di Cleone di Alicarnasso, citato però solo successivamente nella biografia (25.1–2; cfr. *infra*, nota 48). Sul rapporto di Lisandro con questi personaggi cfr. Bernini (1988) 175–190.

[10] Athenaeus 6.253b-d (= *FGrHist* 75 F 2).

[11] Athenaeus 6.253d-f (= *FGrHist* 76 F 13, dalle *Storie; cfr. F 14*). Cfr. Landucci Gattinoni (1997) 126–129; Ehling (2000); Palumbo Stracca (2000).

tizzare, pur con prudenza, un'ostilità di fondo di Duride nei riguardi di queste forme cultuali, indipendentemente dal fatto che egli, parlando delle τιμαί di Samo, affrontasse un tema legato alla sua patria e quindi toccasse, per così dire, un nervo scoperto nella storia dell'isola.[12]

Tuttavia non si può affatto escludere la presenza nei paragrafi finali del capitolo di notizie ricavate anche da fonti diverse da Duride.[13] E, comunque sia, qui Plutarco non si limita a trascrivere semplicemente un passo, sia pure importante, dell'opera di Duride. Ai fini di un'analisi approfondita occorre dunque individuare la peculiarità del culto per Lisandro nel mondo greco, anche in rapporto a tutta la tradizione spartana. Nel far ciò non si può però prescindere da una riconsiderazione del giudizio plutarcheo su tali forme cultuali.

Queste τιμαί segnano indubbiamente una grande novità, qualunque posizione si prenda al riguardo, anche in rapporto ai culti tributati ad altre personalità anteriori a Lisandro. Plutarco, e prima di lui almeno Duride, ne è perfettamente cosciente, dato che viene riportato proprio il giudizio dello storico samio sul fatto che Lisandro fu il primo ad avere onori divini in vita. Dal testo non è però possibile evincere se si tratti di onori attribuiti solo a Samo, oppure se nel ricordo delle città al plurale nel par. 5 siano comprese altre realtà microasiatiche, il che comunque non si può affatto escludere.

Vi è dunque piena consapevolezza a livello storiografico di questo *prius* in materia cultuale. In modo implicito, Lisandro viene visto come precursore di τιμαί che trovarono piena concretizzazione solo successivamente e che, già nella prima età ellenistica, interessarono a macchia d'olio le più svariate realtà greche, compresa la stessa Samo.[14]

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[12] Una posizione molto prudente al riguardo è espressa da Landucci Gattinoni (1997) 238–239, secondo la quale comunque Duride potrebbe aver considerato gli onori tributati a Lisandro «adeguati alla grandezza della sua personalità e ai successi che egli aveva conseguito nella guerra contro Atene.» Un altro elemento che andrebbe soppesato è anche la (presunta?) discendenza da Alcibiade dello storico samio, nel quadro dei rapporti dell'isola con l'Ateniese; Plutarchus, *Alcibiades* 32.1–2 (= *FGrHist* 76 T 3, F 70). Cfr. inoltre Pausanias 6.3.14–16 (ivi una dura condanna dell'opportunismo dei Sami e degli Ioni, proprio sulla base dell'atteggiamento tenuto nei confronti di Alcibiade e Lisandro).

[13] Vd. l'ammirazione di Platone per Antimaco, del resto ben attestata nella tradizione, e che potrebbe essere stata conosciuta da Plutarco anche attraverso fonti (filo)accademiche: Heraclides Ponticus F 6 Wehrli^2; Cicero, *Brutus* 51.191; Plutarchus, *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 106B. Circa il giudizio di Plutarco su Antimaco vd. *Timoleon* 36.3; *De garrulitate* 513A-B.

[14] Vd. gli onori e i culti resi agli Antigonidi e ai loro familiari nonché il rapporto con

Nelle fonti letterarie raramente si riscontra una tale coscienza e messa a fuoco del problema in materia di culti, quale si evince da *Lysander* 18.5. È una consapevolezza, di Duride fatta propria da Plutarco, che non è smentita implicitamente dal resto del *Corpus Plutarcheum*.[15]

Contrariamente a quanto si potrebbe pensare, il luogo plutarcheo non ha però particolarmente attirato l'attenzione degli studiosi. Ad es., nel noto articolo di Kenneth Scott del 1929, intitolato *Plutarch and the Ruler Cult*, tra i molti passi addotti riguardo al mondo greco non figura, incredibilmente, *Lysander* 18.[16] È interessante a questo proposito chiarire i motivi per cui Plutarco si sofferma sul culto dei Sami, così come occorre far luce sulle dinamiche del conferimento del culto, che si lasciano scorgere o forse solo intuire nel capitolo plutarcheo attraverso questa citazione di Duride e l'accenno a una decisione assembleare (individuabile dall'uso del verbo ψηφίζεσθαι). Preliminarmente il capitolo va inquadrato in rapporto all'atteggiamento di Plutarco riguardo agli onori divini. Giustamente viene osservato dalla critica che lo scrittore di Cheronea è avverso a culti divini per viventi, e manifesta questa idiosincrasia soprattutto per quelli tributati ai sovrani ellenistici e ai magistrati di epoca greco-romana, mentre non si esprime direttamente, e probabilmente non a caso, sul culto imperiale.[17] È un giudizio di massima che va condiviso anche se deve essere meglio precisato in relazione al mondo greco e alle sue individualità. Infatti spesso Plutarco applica o tempera questa valutazione in base al suo atteggiamento riguardo ai protagonisti. Esemplari sono a questo proposito i casi di Dione e di Demetrio Poliorcete.

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i Tolemei, su cui cfr., tra gli altri, Habicht (1970²) 62–64, 111 e nota 1; Shipley (1987) 173, 181 ss.; Carney (2000) 32–33.

[15] Ad es., Plutarco non raccoglie la notizia, sicuramente non attendibile, di onori divini per Alcibiade al suo ritorno ad Atene nel 407 (su cui vd. Iustinus 5.4.7–18); vd. inoltre la sua critica al colorito racconto di Duride, in *Alcibiades* 32.1–2 (comunque senza menzione di culti). Cfr. Habicht (1970²) 7–8, nonché Landucci Gattinoni (1997) 243–246, per un'analisi del passo di Giustino e del frammento di Duride, in rapporto alle altre fonti.

[16] Scott (1929).

[17] Così Bowersock (1973) 187–191, riprendendo e correggendo quanto affermato da Scott (1929); una posizione simile a quella di quest'ultimo autore è anche in Taeger (1960) 527–532. Oltre alla discussione seguita alla comunicazione del Bowersock (207–212), cfr. le posizioni più sfumate di Price (1984) 115–116 (sulla base di Plutarchus, *De adulatore et amico* 56E-F; *De superstitione* 170E-F; *De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando* 543D-E); Swain (1996) 182 e nota 146; Duff (1999) 116, 189–190. Pur ammettendo l'assenza di riferimenti espliciti, non si può del tutto escludere che talora Plutarco giochi con

Nella *Vita di Dione* si fa menzione di onori divini, segnatamente a 29.2 (l'occasione è l'ingresso in città di Dione nel 357 a.C.) e a 46.1, a proposito del ritorno di questi da Leontini nel 356/5. La seconda testimonianza è in contrasto con Diodorus 16.20.5–6, in cui si parla invece, e in modo più verosimile, di onori eroici. Indipendentemente da questa divergenza, anche se sostanziale, e dal valore da attribuire ai passi plutarchei, va notato come la narrazione di Plutarco sia tutta volta in chiave positiva nei confronti di Dione, che venne addirittura acclamato dai Siracusani come padre e salvatore, oltre che come dio.[18]

Quello del culto divino e dell'identificazione o assimilazione a una divinità è uno dei temi principali della biografia di Demetrio Poliorcete e di quella del suo omologo Antonio, come hanno dimostrato recenti studi del Brenk: in queste opere sono palesi l'adattamento e la rielaborazione di Plutarco.[19] A tal proposito va ricordato come il giudizio dello scrittore, pur attraverso il filtro delle sue fonti, sia fortemente negativo riguardo ai culti tributati dagli Ateniesi a Demetrio e ad Antigono nel 307/6ss. a.C. (*Demetrius* 10–13), come risulta soprattutto in base al confronto con il capitolo relativo di Diodoro (20.46.1–4). Emerge, dal testo plutarcheo, la reazione di parte dell'opinione pubblica ateniese, fortemente contraria a tali forme cultuali, ed altresì la ferma condanna dello scrittore nei riguardi di chi, come Stratocle, propose culti e onori mosso solo dal desiderio di adulazione.[20]

Il giudizio plutarcheo su Lisandro è senz'altro simile a quello espresso su Demetrio, anche se con toni appena più sfumati e tutt'altro contesto (l'immagine dello Spartiata come anticipatore dei sovrani ellenistici può risultare stimolante ma è anche, in buona misura, pericolosamente fuorviante). Indubbiamente dietro la concessione degli onori divini a Samo vi era una complessa dinamica sociale e politica che nel passo non viene sfiorata, anche se non vi è da dubitare che fosse presente nel testo durideo. Mi riferisco, in particolar modo, ai rapporti di Samo con Atene e Sparta. Senza risalire indietro nel tempo fino alla partecipazione di Samo alla Lega delio-attica e alle rivolte del 441–439 (peraltro

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l'allusività, lasciando intravedere figure imperiali nei protagonisti o nelle τιμαί oggetto di critica.

[18] Cfr. la descrizione degli onori tributati *post mortem* a Timoleonte (Plutarchus, *Timoleon* 39; vd. anche Diodorus 16.90.1; Nepos, *Timoleon* 5.1 e 4). Sul problema, nel quadro della realtà politica e religiosa di Siracusa nel IV secolo, cfr. Muccioli (1997); Muccioli (1999) 318, 361–362, 471–481.

[19] Cfr., in particolare, i saggi ripubblicati in Brenk (1998) 128–169.

[20] Cfr. l'analisi di Landucci Gattinoni (1981).

ben note a Plutarco),[21] basterà qui ricordare come Samo abbia un ruolo importante nelle vicende tra il 412–411 e il 404. Il rapporto con Atene e Sparta culminò, tra il 405 e il 404, con il conferimento della cittadinanza ai Sami da parte degli Ateniesi (su cui si è molto discusso),[22] a cui fece da contraltare proprio il legame dei Sami (ovvero dell'aristocrazia filospartana) con Lisandro e i «liberatori» spartani, che imposero nell'isola una decarchia e l'armosta Torace.[23] È proprio dagli aristocratici, legati da rapporti personali al comandante spartano, che nacque la volontà di rendere queste τιμαί, combinando elementi politici con altri prettamente religiosi. Infatti le feste più importanti di Samo, quelle dedicate ad Era, vennero ribattezzate Lisandrie.[24] Di tutto ciò non vi è traccia in Plutarco, che focalizza l'attenzione solo sul momento terminale di questo legame complesso e tormentato, anche se poi non manca di tornare, fugacemente, sul rapporto tra gli Spartani ed i Sami nello stesso 404, quando ricorda il richiamo in patria e l'eliminazione di Torace, fedelissimo di Lisandro, conseguenza del repentino declino di quest'ultimo.[25]

Per capire i parr. 5–6 del cap. 18 della *Vita di Lisandro* è fondamentale quanto lo scrittore afferma nel par. 4 e nei parr. 7–10, che formano un unico blocco, per così dire, concettuale. Tutto l'accento è posto, come si è visto, sulla φιλοτιμία e sulla κολακεία degli intellettuali e degli artisti alla «corte» di Lisandro. La concessione di onori divini è messa in stretta connessione con la creazione da parte di Lisandro di una vera e propria strategia del consenso, conseguenza neanche troppo implicita della sua potenza e del suo orgoglio, che lo proiettano in una dimensione superiore a quella di altri potenti nel mondo greco. Per rimarcare ancora di più questa interpretazione dei culti sami, nel capitolo succes-

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21 Vd. Plutarchus, *Pericles* 25–27; 28.1–3 (dove viene citato espressamente Duride, con una critica alla sua faziosità = *FGrHist* 76 F 67; cfr. T 8).

22 Al riguardo è assai ampia la bibliografia (incentrata soprattutto su *IG*, I^3, 127 nonché *IG*, II^2, 1b-c) e, stranamente, senza un adeguato confronto con il culto lisandreo, che invece è a mio avviso strettamente collegato. Sulle dinamiche politiche samie nella seconda metà del V secolo cfr. Shipley (1987) 113–134 e, più recentemente, Landucci Gattinoni (1999).

23 Sul ritorno degli aristocratici nell'isola e l'esilio in massa dei democratici vd. Plutarchus, *Lysander* 14.2; cfr. Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.2.6; 2.3.3 e 6–7; Diodorus 13.106.8; 14.3.4–5. Nel complesso il giudizio del biografo sull'operato e la popolarità di Lisandro nell'Egeo e in Asia Minore è positivo, pur con qualche distinguo (vd., ad es., 3.3; 7.2 e 4; 23.1ss.; 30.2 ma anche 14.3–4; cfr. *Lycurgus* 30.5).

24 Cfr., per un'analisi, Habicht (1970^2) 3–7, 237ss. e gli studi citati in Muccioli (2001) 119.

25 Plutarchus, *Lysander* 19.7; cfr. 9.5.

sivo Plutarco scrive che l'ambizione di Lisandro era invisa solo ai primi e ai suoi pari, lasciando intendere così che veniva ampiamente tollerata da quanti erano socialmente e politicamente inferiori a lui; poi precisa che, quando per colpa degli adulatori presero ad insinuarsi nel suo carattere accanto all'ambizione alterigia e arroganza, perse completamente il senso della misura: di ciò fornisce un esempio a proposito di Mileto, per quanto il passo sia impreciso o confuso cronologicamente (*Lysander* 19.1–4).[26]

Uno dei problemi che si presentano a chi studia i culti divini e l'atteggiamento degli onoranti è quello di determinare se ci sia stata effettivamente partecipazione religiosa o almeno emotiva nell'attribuzione delle τιμαί, in altri termini se l'onorato è sentito realmente come un dio oppure se prevalgano mere considerazioni e speculazioni di ordine politico. È un problema che si riscontra, ad es., anche per il succitato itifallo per Demetrio Poliorcete, in cui il dinasta viene definito proprio *deus praesens*, contrariamente alle divinità tradizionali, troppo distanti e lontane o incapaci di ascoltare le preghiere dei supplici.[27] L'eterno dilemma tra sincero afflato religioso e adulazione travestita sotto forme cultuali si ripropone anche nel cap. 18 della *Vita di Lisandro*. Plutarco però, pur rendendosi conto che con Lisandro, effettivamente, si ha uno stacco rispetto alla tradizione, subordina completamente l'aspetto religioso o comunque cultuale al tema dell'adulazione, lasciando inoltre sullo sfondo quello politico.

L'episodio di Samo è funzionale nella biografia per evidenziare la distanza di Lisandro rispetto alla tradizione lacedemone, peraltro preferita e idealizzata da Plutarco: ciò emerge nei confronti interni presenti nella *Vita*, in particolare in quello del protagonista con Callicratida, che ben sintetizza le diverse spinte centrifughe e centripete nel sistema culturale (prima ancora che sociale e politico) di Sparta. È proprio Callicratida il personaggio integerrimo, colui che difende ancora i

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[26] È probabile che nel raccontare questo episodio Plutarco riferisca a Mileto eventi che le altre fonti invece attribuiscono a Taso (seconda metà dell'estate del 404); vd. Nepos, *Lysander* 2.1–3 (che sottolinea la *crudelitas* e la *perfidia* di Lisandro); Polyaenus 1.45.4 (cfr. 1.45.1). Cfr. anche Diodorus 13.104.7, dove si parla della conquista di Iaso in Caria (poco prima della battaglia di Egospotami del 405). Ἴασον nel testo è frutto di correzione, giacché nei manoscritti si legge Θάσσων o Θάσον. Di Mileto Plutarco aveva già parlato già in *Lysander* 8.1–3 (eventi del febbraio-marzo 405). Sui problemi storici e storiografici di *Lysander* 19.1–4, in rapporto alle altre fonti, cfr. le diverse soluzioni proposte da Bommelaer (1981) 154 e nota 225, 157–158; Fabiani (1997); Piccirilli (1997) 264–266; Duff (1999) 313–314.

[27] Cfr. Ehling (2000) 157–159.

vecchi ideali, anche nei rapporti con gli alleati e con i barbari, rispetto all'«antispartano» e φιλοβάρβαρος Lisandro.[28]

Ma oltre a ciò, gli onori divini per Lisandro sono in contraddizione con tutta la tradizione spartana, avversa a queste innovazioni cultuali. In un'analisi diacronica e anche sincronica Lisandro si pone in contrapposizione, in modo più o meno esplicito, con celeberrimi *exempla* positivi di moderazione, come Licurgo o Agesilao, ben noti allo stesso Plutarco. Nel mondo spartano vi è sì posto per onori divini, ma solo per Licurgo, in forme peraltro assai discusse tra i moderni. Lo attesta Plutarco stesso nella biografia omonima, laddove riporta un frammento di Aristotele, in cui si sostiene il carattere divino di Licurgo (31.4 = F 544 Gigon).[29] È importante notare come la citazione aristotelica sia inserita in un paragrafo successivo ad una più ampia esaltazione delle capacità di legislatore di Licurgo, nel confronto con quelle di ben noti legislatori, anche se solo su un piano teorico, come Platone, Diogene e Zenone.

È poi significativo che gli onori divini per Lisandro a Samo siano in implicita contrapposizione con quelli proposti dai Tasi e rifiutati da Agesilao, come emerge da un aneddoto contenuto negli *Apoftegmi spartani*, di cui, a mio avviso, si può senz'altro accettare l'autenticità storica.[30] Il rifiuto di Agesilao di essere equiparato ad un dio e, conseguentemente, di essere onorato come tale marca una distinzione netta rispetto all'atteggiamento di Lisandro. L'accostamento del comportamento di Lisandro a quello di Agesilao, assente in Plutarco, è tangibile invece in Senofonte. Costui nell'*Agesilao* sottolinea, in maniera direi

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[28] *Lysander* 5.7–7.6. La contrapposizione tra i due è giocata a più livelli (vd. la descrizione della statua di Lisandro a 1.1 e il paragone di Callicratida con una statua di un eroe a 5.8). In proposito è fondamentale l'analisi di Bernini (1988); cfr. anche Duff (1999) 168–176, con attenzione rivolta peraltro soprattutto al testo plutarcheo. Sul concetto di barbaro nello scrittore di Cheronea cfr. Schmidt (1999).

[29] Per un esame del complesso problema del culto tributato a Licurgo cfr., ad es., Piccirilli (1978) 917–936.

[30] 210C–D, nr. 25 (cfr. 210B-D, nrr. 24 e 26, anche se non si parla esplicitamente di offerta di culti). Per un'analisi è fondamentale Flower (1988), che individua come fonte Teopompo di Chio, sulla scorta del confronto con Athenaeus 14.657b-c (= *FGrHist* 115 F 22). Questo storico è peraltro favorevole a Lisandro, come emerge chiaramente da Athenaeus 12.543b-c (= *FGrHist* 115 F 20, che deriva dal decimo libro delle *Elleniche*) e da Plutarchus, *Lysander* 30.2 (= *FGrHist* 115 F 333, da confrontare con Plutarchus, *Lysander* 2.4; *Lysander-Sulla* 1.6–7; 3.2; 5.6); cfr. 17.3 (= *FGrHist* 115 F 332). Sulla posizione teopompea nei confronti dell'ἀρχή spartana e i suoi protagonisti cfr. Candau Morón (2000) 457–461; Schepens (2001). Non mette conto qui indagare sull'autenticità della raccolta di opuscoli nota come *Apoftegmi spartani*; sul problema cfr. comunque Santaniello (1995).

volutamente allusiva, il distacco di Agesilao rispetto a quanti volevano che venissero loro tributati onori divini o si erigessero statue (*Agesilaus* 1.34; 11.7). Qualunque lettore, attento alle vicende spartane soprattutto fuori del Peloponneso e della Grecia, non poteva non scorgervi, tra le righe, una critica a Lisandro e a un certo modo di interpretare i rapporti con le città d'Asia Minore, certamente non consono ai rigidi dettami comportamentali in vigore tra gli Spartiati.

Era una condotta, spregiudicata e intrisa di opportunismo, che si inserisce in un diverso rapporto tra i condottieri spartani e le città, quale si può intravedere per lo meno già nel corso della guerra del Peloponneso (ma vd., in precedenza, la politica estera di Pausania il Reggente o, per certi aspetti, anche gli onori resi forse dai Turini a Cleandrida, padre di Gilippo). Infatti l'atteggiamento degli Spartiati in materia di politica estera sembra essere stato molto diverso rispetto a quello in politica interna, con inevitabili ripercussioni anche in materia di culti. La chiave per un'interpretazione di questo tipo può davvero essere costituita dall'esempio di Brasida e dal suo rapporto con Anfipoli. Costui, alla sua morte (nel 422), fu oggetto di un vero e proprio culto eroico: gli abitanti di Anfipoli lo consideravano loro σωτήρ e sostituirono l'eroe fondatore Agnone con lo Spartiata.[31] Tali onori sono concettualmente cosa assai diversa dagli onori eroici tributati di norma ai re spartani *post mortem* e, insieme con quelli tributati allo stesso Agnone, sono di grande importanza per capire il cambiamento di mentalità tra V e IV secolo in ambito cultuale, anche se, a rigore, si tratta pur sempre di culti eroici e non di culti divini.

Nella biografia plutarchea la connessione tra Lisandro e Brasida è chiaramente percepibile, fin dall'incipit.[32] Anche se non lo si afferma esplicitamente, è logico dunque pensare che Lisandro, nel suo rapporto con Samo (e presumibilmente con altri centri di Asia Minore e dell'Egeo), avesse ben presente l'*exemplum* di Brasida e il culto a lui tributato, sia pure *post mortem*.

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[31] Thucydides 5.11.1. Sul culto cfr. Braun (2000) 198 (ivi un raffronto con gli onori resi a Temistocle e a Cleandrida); Hoffmann (2000).

[32] Plutarchus, *Lysander* 1.1 (cfr. 18.1–2). Sul rapporto tra i due cfr. Bernini (1994). Negli altri luoghi plutarchei non vi è peraltro traccia di questo legame. Brasida è comunque per lo più altamente apprezzato da Plutarco, in quanto esponente della virtù di Sparta: vd. *Lycurgus* 25.8–9; 30.5; *Nicias* 9.3–4; *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 76A, 79E; *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 190B-C, 207F; *Apophthegmata Laconica* 219C–D, 240C; *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* 2.343A, 343D; *De gloria Atheniensium* 347B, 349D; *De Pythiae oraculis* 400F, 401C; *De sera numinis vindicta* 548B-C.

Dopo Lisandro (o anche, *e contrario*, dopo Agesilao), il rapporto degli Spartani con i culti divini fu di ostilità o, semmai, di superiore, laconico distacco. Lo attesta la celebre risposta dello spartano Damide alla richiesta di Alessandro Magno di decretare di considerarlo un dio, come figura negli *Apoftegmi spartani*.[33] Una cesura si ha solo successivamente, in età ellenistica, sempre tra continuità e tradizione. Esemplare da un lato è infatti l'atteggiamento di Cleomene, che con il suo comportamento si pone in antitesi rispetto ai sovrani ellenistici.[34] D'altro canto tuttavia, e forse non casualmente, Plutarco nella *Vita di Cleomene* non ricorda affatto il culto tributato ad Antigono Dosone a Sparta, noto peraltro da Polibio.[35]

A fronte di numerosi passi plutarchei, nel capitolo 18 della *Vita di Lisandro* e nel resto della biografia non emerge, neanche in modo allusivo, il confronto con gli altri protagonisti di Sparta, compreso Agesilao, che anzi nella *Vita di Lisandro* viene visto in luce molto meno positiva che nella biografia a lui dedicata. Questo silenzio di Plutarco può avere diverse spiegazioni: la principale è che tutta la sua attenzione nel capitolo è basata sulla citazione di Duride, e sui risvolti intrinseci ed eminentemente locali che comportarono le τιμαί, a prezzo di subordinarvi uno sguardo prospettico di più ampio respiro storico-religioso.

Pertanto, se Plutarco sceglie di menzionare i culti dei Sami, è proprio per accentuare la dimensione tutta antispartana di Lisandro nel rapporto con le città «liberate». L'effetto è comunque stridente, forse volutamente stridente: l'eroe si trasforma in un antieroe, da protagonista positivo diventa protagonista negativo. Lo possiamo avvertire noi moderni, così come lo avvertivano gli antichi. A questo proposito è indicativo un passo, peraltro non molto conosciuto, della *Legatio* di Atenagora, autore cristiano di fine II secolo (cap. 14). Costui rinfaccia ai pagani i culti per uomini e ricorda, *inter alia*, il culto dei Sami per Lisandro, sottolineando che egli viene venerato ἐπὶ τοσαύταις σφαγαῖς καὶ τοσούτοις κακοῖς. Così però ribalta la realtà storica e travisa, volutamente, le dinamiche della causa e dell'effetto nell'assegnazione delle τιμαί samie: Lisandro viene onorato non come benefattore, ma proprio come malfattore! Anche se la tendenziosità e la polemica antipagana di

[33] 219E; cfr. Aelianus, *Varia Historia* 2.19 (dove si parla genericamente di Spartani e si accentua il giudizio negativo sulla stoltezza di Alessandro, nella prospettiva lacedemone).

[34] Vd. Plutarchus, *Cleomenes* 13; cfr. 33; 35.3; 39. Anche se i culti non vengono esplicitamente menzionati, aleggiano comunque nei passi in questione.

[35] Polybius 5.9.10; 9.36.5; cfr. *IG*, V, 1.1122, con l'analisi di Le Bohec (1993) 447ss.

Atenagora sono evidenti, è proprio nel cap. 18 e nel cap. 19 della *Vita di Lisandro* che vi sono i presupposti per arrivare ad elaborare un giudizio simile ed è pertanto probabile che Atenagora utilizzi e manipoli proprio il testo di Plutarco.[36] L'uso del presente non deve comunque certo indurre a ritenere che il culto di Lisandro fosse vivo fino al II secolo d.C., ma è decisamente acronico. A quanto risulta dalla documentazione epigrafica il culto durò per lo meno dal 404 al 401 a.C., anche se non è del tutto azzardato supporre che proseguisse anche nel IV secolo, almeno fino alla sua morte (avvenuta nel 395).[37] Nonostante quello che comunemente viene definito «Lysander's Fall», ovvero l'eclisse del nostro dopo il tentativo di cambiare la costituzione spartana e che si data generalmente al 404–403, egli continuò ad essere molto popolare presso i Greci d'Asia Minore. Lo dimostra lo stesso Plutarco, in modo inequivocabile, nella descrizione della contrapposizione con Agesilao nel corso della spedizione condotta insieme colà nel 396. I capitoli relativi della *Vita di Lisandro* sono indicativi del rapporto tra i due e della gelosia del re verso il suo sottoposto, anche e soprattutto a causa del credito e del favore che costui godeva presso le città microasiatiche.[38]

A ben guardare, però, la dimensione divina nella biografia di Lisandro non è soltanto limitata al cap. 18. Trova già una sorta di anticipazione a 11.11–13, dove Plutarco, riprendendo una fonte non meglio specificata, afferma che la conclusione della guerra del Peloponneso grazie a Lisandro costituiva «un'opera divina».[39] Ritorna poi, ben più esplicitamente, a proposito di quello che è il tema dominante degli ultimi capitoli, ovvero l'aspirazione di Lisandro a diventare re, nonostante la sua origine di Spartiata non predestinato: capp. 20 e 24ss. Nel cap. 24 il racconto si riallaccia a quanto scritto a 20.6–9 e agli eventi di poco successivi alla fine della guerra del Peloponneso. Tuttavia questa ripresa costituisce una sorta di duplicazione, che mal si inserisce in un contesto

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[36] Il confronto con il testo plutarcheo è usualmente proposto dai commentatori della *Legatio*. Sull'utilizzo e la manipolazione da parte di Atenagora delle fonti è particolarmente significativo quanto segue subito dopo nel testo, nonostante le corruttele ivi presenti: l'autore cristiano sembra presumibilmente aver attinto ad Erodoto (5.47.2; 5.114.2; 7.167.2), a proposito del culto eroico per Filippo figlio di Butacide, Onesil(a)o e, forse, Amilcare.

[37] Cfr. Habicht (1970²) 3–7, 237ss.

[38] *Lysander* 23.1–24.2, dove il tono è ben diverso rispetto ad *Agesilaus* 6–8. Su questi due luoghi, in rapporto anche a Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.4.9, cfr. Meriani (2000).

[39] Nella sottolineatura dell'importanza di questo conflitto, rispetto agli altri combattuti in precedenza, è evidente il riecheggiamento di Thucydides 1.1–3; cfr. 23.1–3.

cronologico relativo all'anno 396, in cui sono ambientati questi capitoli. Plutarco, descrivendo il progetto di riforma istituzionale di Lisandro, che avrebbe dovuto portarlo a diventare re, nonostante non appartenesse né alla famiglia degli Agiadi né a quella degli Euripontidi, scrive esplicitamente che lo Spartiata

> meditava il piano di togliere alle due casate la potestà regia e di restituirla a tutti quanti gli Eraclidi o, come sostengono alcuni, non agli Eraclidi, ma a tutti gli Spartiati, perché fosse un privilegio che non spettava solo ai discendenti di Eracle, ma anche a coloro che, come Eracle, ne venissero giudicati degni grazie a quella virtù, che aveva innalzato anche quello a onori divini. E sperava che, se si fosse assegnato in tal modo il regno, nessuno Spartiata gli sarebbe stato anteposto nella scelta (24.5–6).

E i capitoli successivi, 25 e 26, con il tentativo di manipolare gli oracoli di Dodona e Siwah e, soprattutto, con il racconto dell'inganno ordito da Lisandro e poi miseramente fallito a Delfi, sono tutti in una duplice dimensione, umana e divina.[40]

È una dimensione divina che nelle pagine plutarchee è però significativamente ribaltata, in antitesi rispetto alla religione avita e alla sua sacralità. Nelle mani di Lisandro la religione diventa un semplice *instrumentum regni*, in linea con la sua condotta spregiudicata, stigmatizzata da Plutarco.[41] Il filo del racconto parte, propriamente, all'inizio del cap. 25. Plutarco usa come fonte guida un autore che lascia volutamente indeterminato, affermando a 25.5 che si tratta di uno scrittore che è storico e filosofo insieme. Si tratta forse di Eforo, citato espressamente più volte nel corso della biografia, o—più probabilmente—di Teofrasto o di Posidonio.[42] Ciò che precede dipende piuttosto da più fonti, come risulta dalle varie versioni sul progetto lisandreo, con notazioni dello stesso Plutarco. È interessante notare come il biografo si differenzi, a questo proposito, dal resto della tradizione sul progetto di Lisandro (Aristotele, Diodoro e Nepote), proiettando lo Spartiata in

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[40] Cfr. Diodorus 14.13.3–7; Nepos, *Lysander* 3.2–4. Un accenno è anche in Cicero, *De divinatione* 1.96.

[41] Cfr. Plutarchus, *Lysander* 8.4–5; *Apophthegmata Laconica* 229B e D, con il commento di Bernini (1988) 126–127.

[42] Plutarchus, *Lysander* 17.3; 25.3; 30.3; cfr. 20.9 (= *FGrHist* 70 FF 205, 206, 207; cfr. *FGrHist* 596 F 29a). Per l'utilizzo di Eforo si pronuncia, ad es., Bernini (1985) 222 e nota 111, 227–236. Gran parte della critica propende comunque per Teofrasto (già ricordato a 13.2; 19.5 = FF 623, 618 Fortenbaugh) o Posidonio: cfr. Piccirilli (1997) XIX e note 2–4, 279; Muccioli (2001) 226–227, nota 224. Vd. inoltre Plutarchus, *Themistocles* 13.5, in cui è usata per il peripatetico Fania di Ereso una espressione simile a quella di *Lysander* 25.5.

una dimensione sostanzialmente diversa rispetto a quella che lasciano intuire questi autori.[43]

In questa prospettiva, sia pure attraverso il filtro dell'esempio di Eracle, può essere interpretato storicamente il cap. 18. Ora, come si è detto, la citazione di Duride, con il conferimento delle τιμαί da parte dei Sami costituisce un episodio importante, ma limitato geograficamente e cronologicamente: gli onori divini riguardano solo Samo o comunque un ambito microasiatico e come tali venivano sentiti, più o meno implicitamente, dalle fonti antiche e anche da Plutarco stesso. Tuttavia proprio nel confronto con Eracle, in particolare nella menzione della virtù che fece assurgere a dio Eracle, il biografo offre lo spunto per proporre una chiave di lettura diversa.[44] Il culto tributato a Samo fu sollecitato o comunque ben accolto da Lisandro, tanto che costui lo utilizzò, con ogni probabilità, anche per la propaganda a Sparta. Quello che Plutarco lascia intendere è che il riconoscimento di uno status superiore, basato sull' ἀρετή, rappresenta per Lisandro la condizione, la premessa per imporre anche a Sparta un cambiamento costituzionale, con l'estensione della regalità. Non si tratta semplicemente della riproposizione di un concetto, quello dell' ἀρετή, su cui vive, si può dire, la società spartana, ma è la *condicio sine qua non* per diventare da eroe dio, e vale per Lisandro come era valsa per Eracle. Lisandro, nel richiedere per sé il titolo di re, era consapevole o voleva accreditare l'idea di avere una natura non umana ma divina (e riconosciuta nei territori dell'impero spartano), e ne reclamava il riconoscimento anche a Sparta. Difficile dire se egli credesse davvero alla sua operazione: in considerazione della sua πολυπραγμοσύνη, della sua astuzia, della sua capacità di agire da leone o da volpe, a seconda delle circostanze (tutti aspetti ben noti a Plutarco), saremmo tentati di dare una risposta negativa e ritenere che si tratti di un inganno, il più grosso inganno che Lisandro tentò di attuare.

Ma, a prescindere da queste osservazioni a posteriori, lo Spartiata era senza dubbio consapevole di quanto i culti sami potessero essere avversati a Sparta o quanto meno di come fossero del tutto estranei alla mentalità lacedemone. Era altresì perfettamente conscio dell'im-

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[43] Aristoteles, *Politica* 5.1301b.19–21; 1306b.31–33; Diodorus 14.13.2; Nepos, *Lysander* 3.1 e 5 (testimonianza divergente dal resto della tradizione: Lisandro voleva sì abolire il potere regio, ma introducendo un comandante per condurre la guerra). Vd. anche Plutarchus, *Lysander-Sulla* 2.1–2; *Agesilaus* 8.3 (e i passi riportati *infra*, nota 48). Per un'accurata indagine sul progetto lisandreo cfr. Bernini (1985); Bernini (1988) 117ss.

[44] Cfr. Plutarchus, *Lysander* 2.1 e 5; 7.6; 22.12; 27.6.

portanza di una strategia del consenso efficace: ovvero quella stessa strategia del consenso evidenziata nel cap. 18, peraltro rintracciabile anche presso altri autori coevi.[45] A questa si riconnetteva, pur tenendo conto della dialettica tra onorante e onorato, un diverso utilizzo della sua immagine anche a livello epigrafico-monumentale: si pensi, tra l'altro, all'erezione del monumento dei Navarchi a Delfi e alle iscrizioni ivi presenti, come risulta pure dal testo plutarcheo, o alla celebrazione di Lisandro ad Olimpia.[46]

Il ricorso a una pubblicistica come quella rappresentata da Cherilo, Antimaco e dagli altri letterati, poteva e doveva trovare adeguata eco anche a Sparta, indipendentemente dal problema del rapporto tra Sparta e letteratura o, viceversa, proprio in considerazione di ciò.[47] Era uno dei mezzi a cui ricorse Lisandro per far capire e, soprattutto, far accettare agli Spartiati che egli non era uno Spartiata come gli altri, fors'anche solo più valente degli altri, ma era proiettato in una nuova dimensione, ormai sovrumana. Del resto il caso di Cleone, logografo prezzolato al suo servizio per accreditare la legittimità delle sue pretese regali attraverso la composizione di uno scritto *ad hoc*, prova senza ombra di dubbio come il generale spartano intendesse utilizzare tutti gli strumenti nella ricerca del consenso al suo progetto e alle sue aspirazioni.[48]

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[45] Cfr. le ipotesi di Gambetti (2001), riguardo ai *Persiani* di Timoteo e alla propaganda filolisandrea.

[46] Vd. *Lysander* 18.1 (e 1.1: statua di Lisandro nel tesoro di Brasida e degli Acanti a Delfi); *De Pythiae oraculis* 397E-F; i testi epigrafici in Meiggs-Lewis^2 95; Pausanias 6.3.14–16 (statua di Lisandro con iscrizione dedicata ad Olimpia dai Sami; statua dello Spartiata da parte degli abitanti di Efeso nel santuario locale di Artemide). Sulla documentazione archeologica un quadro complessivo è in Bommelaer (1981) 7–23.

[47] Sulla questione, invero assai complessa, cfr., recentemente, Millender (2001).

[48] Plutarchus, *Lysander* 25.1–2; 30.3–5 (= *FGrHist* 583 TT 1b, 1c). Vd. anche *Agesilaus* 20.4; *Apophthegmata Laconica* 212C–D, 229E–230A; Diodorus 14.13.8; Nepos, *Lysander* 3.5 (= *FGrHist* 583 TT 1a, 1d, gli ultimi due passi). A giudicare dalla sua opera, che doveva chiamarsi Λόγος (o Βιβλίον) περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, Cleone era un logografo o un retore. In proposito cfr. Piccirilli (1993); Piccirilli (1997) 277–278, 287.

TIMOLEON, THE FORTUNATE GENERAL

Sven-Tage Teodorsson

Timoleon of Corinth is probably the most enigmatic and elusive personality presented to us by Plutarch in his *Lives*. His character appears as strangely difficult to grasp, and his political and military activities are described in such a puzzling way that we may have doubts as to what extent the presentation depicts reality.

Our three main sources, Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, and Cornelius Nepos, offer partly different pictures, and the earlier sources, Theopompus, Ephorus, Athanis, and Timaeus,[1] are lost. Timaeus of Tauromenium was certainly the basic source of our three extant writers.

The Corinthian preludes to Timoleon's career as a general are reported in more detail by Plutarch than by Diodorus and Nepos. He reports that he belonged to an illustrious family and describes him as a man of patriotic mind and with an exceedingly gentle character.[2] However, his mild temperament did not prevent him from hating tyrants and base people generally. Plutarch's delineation suggests a young man of aristocratic outlook and a profoundly moral character.

Plutarch contrasts this earnest young man of firm principle with his elder brother Timophanes who, according to Plutarch, was entirely unlike him, headstrong and absorbed by his passion for absolute power. As an energetic man and effective warrior he was furthered by his fellow-citizens and was appointed commander of the cavalry, whereas Timoleon remained a hoplite.

Having thus depicted the two brothers, Plutarch narrates how in a battle against the Argives and Cleonaeans Timophanes' horse was wounded and threw him in among the enemy. Several Corinthians

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[1] Plutarch mentions Timaeus three times in *Timoleon* 4.6; 10.7 (together with his father Andromachus); 36.2, and in *Quaestiones convivales* 676D he refers to him for the story about the parsley omen (*Timoleon* 26.1–5). He mentions Theopompus and Ephorus once each (4.6), and Athanis twice (23.6; 37.9). In book 12 Polybius criticizes Timaeus of his excessive praise of Timoleon: 23.1–7; 25.7; 25 K. 1–2; 26 A. 1–4. Polyaenus mentions him at 5.12.1–3.

[2] *Timoleon* 3.4: πρᾶος διαφερόντως, "exceedingly gentle".

took to flight, but Timoleon rushed forward to help his brother and, repulsing the enemy, succeeded in saving him. This episode is only told by Plutarch (4.1–2).

At some time after this episode—Plutarch gives no precise information—Timophanes declared himself tyrant of Corinth, after he had put several leading citizens to death without trial. Timoleon, together with two other men besought him to change his mind. When he refused and was violent, Timoleon withdrew a little and stood weeping with muffled head, while the other two drew their swords and stabbed him down. It is noticeable that Diodorus (16.65.4) instead says that Timoleon personally slew his brother in the marketplace, whereas Nepos (20.1.4) unambiguously sides with Plutarch.

Though the murder is reported differently by Plutarch and Diodorus, the reaction of the citizens was unequivocal: Timoleon was denounced as murderer. Thus the completely passive part assigned to him by Plutarch is probably exaggerated. Plutarch's account (5.1–2) gives the impression of a predominance of sympathetic feelings for Timoleon amongst the aristocratic citizens, while others denounced the deed as impious and abominable. Plutarch does not say anything about a legal pursuit, as does Diodorus (16.65.5–7). According to Plutarch, the harsh censure drove Timoleon to despondency. He decided to live by himself outside the city and entirely to keep out of public life. Plutarch asserts (7.1) that he lived in this way for twenty years. Diodorus says nothing about this excessive time-out but states that his case was being disputed in the council, when a Syracusan embassy arrived, asking for help against Dionysius the tyrant. The embassy had been sent by Hicetas, the ruler of Leontinoi, who wanted help to overthrow the regime of Dionysius II, the tyrant of Syracuse. In reality, Hicetas secretly aspired to be tyrant there himself with the help of the Carthaginians.

These two accounts are incompatible. Plutarch tells (37.6–7) that, when Timoleon had accomplished his mission in Sicily within less than eight years, he was already an elderly man and soon lost his sight. How are we to imagine that a retired, unsociable, middle-aged man could have been invested with the extremely difficult mission of liberating Syracuse from its established government? And how could this private soldier without experience whatsoever of military command, a man, who probably had only negligible and at that twenty years out-of-date training in politics, a man who still had no purpose of taking part in public business, be picked out before all other, certainly ambitious, can-

didates? This at least is how Plutarch depicts Timoleon at the moment he was appointed general (στρατηγός) and leader of the Sicilian expedition. However, Diodorus (16.65.2) says that he did have experience of military command.

Several questions must be answered: 1. Did Timoleon have experience of military command? 2. If so, when had he received it? 3. When did the murder happen? 4. Did he really live for twenty years away from public business, as Plutarch asserts? 5. Did the Corinthians really consider it possible or even important to change the regime in Syracuse and thus to send a competent general?

Plutarch (7.7) intimates that the Corinthians were rather less interested initially in sending a force to Italy, but later when they received a letter from Hicetas in which he declined help they eagerly furthered the expedition. It is noticeable, however, that they only provided him with seven ships (8.4, 11.5). Plutarch obviously exaggerates the eagerness of the Corinthians. The oligarchic Corinthian government probably considered it less important to overthrow the Syracusan regime than to get rid of the oppositional, antispartan Timoleon. Plutarch's representation of Timoleon is characterized by idealization throughout. His description of how Timoleon was appointed general after twenty years of passivity looks like a naive effort to depict the situation of Timoleon at the outset as even more precarious than it was in reality. His silence about Timoleon's experience of military command may also be part of the idealization of his hero. We may safely presume that Timoleon did have experience of military command and also of politics to a certain extent, and that he probably got such competence during the period before the murder. Our sources say nothing about the time of that event, but we may presume that it occurred in 366/5. The twenty years life in desolation is simply not credible. He probably participated to some extent in public life even during these years, and then, for some reason, may have been brought to the fore in 346/5. Diodorus' account could then be correct, namely that the embassy from Sicily arrived just at the moment the council was about to decide on his case. But all this remains hypothetic.[3]

It is not necessary to relate here the astonishing series of victories and the rapid process of liberation of the Greek cities in Sicily that followed. Timoleon was successful in practically every enterprise. According to

[3] The interpretations and explanation presented by Sordi (1961) 3–12 are largely hypothetic and speculative.

Plutarch, everything went his way in a fantastic series of favourable events, defeats of the enemies, and diplomatic achievements, which resulted in agreements and sudden surrenders of autocratic rulers. One is tempted to doubt the veracity of these reports of a nearly continuous progress on the part of Timoleon, but the parallel accounts by Diodorus largely confirm Plutarch's narrative. In addition we also now have decisive archaeological evidence to support our literary sources. During the second half of the last century a large number of ancient sites in Sicily have been excavated. The investigations have proved that the so-called Timoleontic revival was a reality. Besides defeating all Greek tyrants—not only Dionysius of Syracuse—he gained victories over the Carthaginians, especially the famous decisive victory by the river Crimisus, which made them give up their aspirations for a position of power in Sicily. As soon as the warfare was ended, Timoleon took energetic care to introduce lawful constitutions[4] in the Greek city-states, calling in legislators from Corinth and securing that practices of jurisdiction were established. In order to repopulate the devastated cities, he called in colonizers both from Corinth and from other parts of Greece.

These measures brought about a remarkably rapid and great recovery. The archaeological finds indicate a marked increase of economic and cultural prosperity, not only in the Greek population, but also in the Sicel cities. The great difference between this new state of affairs and the previous situation shows that Timoleon was a formidable organizer and a great statesman. The change cannot be explained otherwise than as being due exclusively to his appearance on the stage of Sicilian politics in 344 B.C. He accomplished the reorganization in Sicily in less than eight years,[5] and after that only a few years of peace and decent government were needed to bring about general prosperity in the island. The archaeological evidence bears out this development with unequivocal clarity. Especially striking is the fact that the revival prevailed all over the non-Carthaginian area. Traces of the recovery and prosperity during the second half of the

[4] Dreher (1995) 141–146 underlines that these constitutions were widely oligarchic. Plutarch is far from using the term *demokratia* in the purely Athenian sense. On the other hand Timoleon did not, as Dion had tried to, follow Plato's unrealistic conception of government. On the Platonic programme for Syracuse see below, note 30.

[5] *I.e.* during the years 344–338, see Plut., *Timoleon* 37.6; Diodorus Siculus 16.90.1; Talbert (1974) 47. On Timoleon and the recovery of Greek Sicily see also De Blois (1978) 132–143; (2000) 131–139.

fourth century are found in every site that has been excavated.[6] There was an extraordinary predominance of Corinthian coinage during this same period,[7] and the newly liberated cities of the confederation, the συμμαχία established by Timoleon,[8] issued local bronze coins, as an assertion of their new-found independence.[9]

Our two main sources, Plutarch and Diodorus, agree in substance, but on the whole they are rather different. Both praise the remarkable achievements of Timoleon. But while Diodorus describes the actions and events in a matter-of-fact manner, Plutarch's account is highly coloured by his moral intentions. This difference is of course what we should expect, seeing that he announces in the preface that what interests him in particular about the lives of Timoleon and Aemilius Paullus is their moral wisdom and their conspicuous fortune. He indicates that his main reason for writing these two biographies was to incite to a debate among his readers on the function and interrelation of valour and fortune in the careers of military commanders. The two generals he chose as examples were no doubt well qualified for the study of this philosophical problem.

Diodorus does not, like Plutarch, make the role of fortune a central theme. As a historian he tells the story of Timoleon's career and reports his actions in an objective manner. Only rarely does he mention divine intervention and support in the form of omens,[10] while Plutarch reports omens almost continuously, and also tells of an attempt at assassination of Timoleon, which Diodorus does not mention. Plutarch regards the remarkable rescue of Timoleon as an evident example of divine intervention.[11] Seeing that both writers used Timaeus as their source, either Diodorus left out these features, or Plutarch used some additional source that contained them.

In contrast to Diodorus, Plutarch repeatedly emphasizes the exceedingly good luck of Timoleon, and the bad luck of his enemies.[12] These

[6] See Talbert (1974) 146–160; Sjöqvist (1973) 59–60. *Kokalos* 4 (1958) is almost entirely dedicated to Timoleon's revival of the Greek cities of Sicily.

[7] See Talbert (1974) 161–178.

[8] Diodorus Siculus 16.82.4.

[9] See Talbert (1974) 180–188.

[10] E.g., Diodorus Siculus 16.66.3–5, the torch in the sky that showed Timoleon and his ships their way from Corinth to Italy, a token of support by the Eleusinian goddesses; 79.3–4, the parsley omen on the way to river Cremisus.

[11] *Timoleon* 16.5–9.

[12] *Timoleon* 13.4; 14.2; 16.1; 19.1–2; 20.1; 21.5; 30.7.

frequent comments on the good luck of his hero seem to be his own. The question of Plutarch's view of *tychê*, fortune, as expressed in the *Timoleon* was treated recently by Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp in a penetrating analysis. He takes his departure in Plutarch's basically Platonic outlook, which should have prevented him from taking the position towards *tychê* that he does in this biography. According to the classical view of *tychê*, the value of a deed of virtue, purpose and wisdom is seriously diminished, if the result of the action can to some extent be suspected as due to chance or fortune. However, in the syzygy of Aemilius and Timoleon as well as in several other biographies, especially the *Sulla*, we notice that Plutarch displays another, quite different view of the concept of *tychê*. In these biographies he reveals a new notion of fortune that had developed in the meantime. The change took place gradually during the Hellenistic period. *Tychê* was conceived as a personified power, a goddess, who at times interferes with human activities, for better or for worse. Thus *Tychê* may even enter into a kind of cooperation with *aretê*, virtue, of a human and support him in obtaining the proposed end. In the case of Timoleon Plutarch calls this cooperation ἀρετὴ εὐτυχοῦσα, fortunate valour.[13]

However, Ingenkamp is concerned at Plutarch's exceedingly strong emphasis on the ease with which Timoleon, with permanent assistence by fortune, could carry through his mission, and he concludes that Timoleon cannot be regarded as a hero at the same level as others presented in Plutarch's *Lives*. Instead of keeping the part played by fortune within limits, Plutarch vigorously underlines it. How are we to understand that Plutarch decided to write the biography of Timoleon at all, and why did he present him in this way?

I think we can safely assume: Plutarch himself considered Timoleon highly qualified for a place in his collection of *Lives*, and he certainly took it for granted that his readers would agree. Thus it remains for us to try to understand why he, and probably most of his contemporaries, looked with admiration upon Timoleon and his achievements, in spite of the fact that these were widely due to fortune.

Plutarch was obviously determined by all means to give prominence to *tychê*. He emphasizes Timoleon's fabulous good luck even with disregard to historical truth. Thus he occasionally omits or camouflages failures and unfortunate incidents that actually happened to Timoleon,

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[13] *Timoleon* 36.4.

while Diodorus does report them.[14] In short, one gets the impression that Plutarch never hesitates to stress Timoleon's fortune.

As a rule, Plutarch displays a basically "Platonic" view of the role of *Tychê* in human activities. For example, in *De fortuna* he forcibly rejects the opinion that man is always subjected to the caprice of chance and argues in defence of human initiative. Sagacity, self-control, justice, and bravery are the real causes of success or failure, not the irresponsible *Tychê*. Similarly, in *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute*, Plutarch defends Alexander's virtue as the main cause of his success.[15]

Now, if we turn to the essay *De fortuna Romanorum*, we meet with two forces, *Virtus* and *Fortuna*, which are engaged in a contest of dominance and power. Plutarch puts the question, regarding the hegemony of Rome, whether it was established by Fortune or by forethought.[16] This is precisely the disjunctive question he puts in the preface of our syzygy regarding the successes of Aemilius and Timoleon.[17] Plutarch's answer is the same in both cases: Even if the two powers are normally engaged in continual strife and discord with each other, in the case of the establishment of the Roman hegemony, they suspended hostilities and joined forces in cooperation.[18] And in *Timoleon* 36 Plutarch explains how these otherwise competitive powers entered into a kind of cooperation or coalition constituting an agent that he calls ἀρετὴ εὐτυχοῦσα, fortunate valour.

We have here neither the "Platonic" concept of an illogical, capricious chance, nor the rather inconstant Hellenistic Greek *Tychê*, who is sometimes good and sometimes bad. Instead we here meet with the Roman goddess *Fortuna*, which on occasion may side durably with certain individuals and even with whole nations. Plutarch's changed attitude to fortune is probably due to his close study of Roman history and to influence of the Roman way of thinking about *Fortuna* and *Felicitas*, successfulness, as potent factors, especially in the lives of military commanders. The fact that this Roman conception is more common in the *Lives* than in the *Moralia* is an indication. Plutarch often emphasizes *Tychê*'s strong and stable support of the virtue of great

[14] For example Diodorus Siculus 16.72.2, the failure of Timoleon's attack on Leontinoi, not mentioned by Plutarch.

[15] See *De Alexandro Magno* 326D.

[16] See *De fortuna Romanorum* 316E.

[17] See *Aemilius* 1.6.

[18] *De fortuna Romanorum* 316E.

leaders. The most conspicuous case is Sulla who ostentatiously adopted the surname *Felix*.[19]

The basis of this belief is the conception of *Tychê* as a goddess. Plutarch observes[20] that the Romans erected temples to *Fortuna* early, before they built schrines to *Virtus*. *Fortuna* held an important position, since the Romans conceived of her as conveying *felicitas* to persons who possessed *prudentia*. The two words are frequently mentioned together and sometimes appear as practically synonymous. Furthermore, *felicitas* is more often juxtaposed to *virtus* than to any other word, and it is noticeable that only military commanders can have *felicitas*.[21] *Fortuna* is somehow the agent of the gods. The success she conveys to prudent leaders is a sign of divine blessing. Theoretically, imprudent people are not supported by the gods.[22] The Hellenistic Greek *Tychê*, which was more or less a blind, capricious, amoral force, had changed fundamentally into the moral, benevolent goddess *Fortuna* of the Imperial period.[23] The Stoic concept of *pronoia*, providence, probably furthered the change, and the conspicuous success of the Roman Empire may also have substantiated the belief in a moral world order. Plutarch's eulogy of the Roman fortune in *De fortuna Romanorum* seems to indicate that. Plutarch obviously believed that moderate behaviour and great valour are normally supported by the divine forces, while vices of impiety and lawlessness are punished. It was clearly on this assumption that he wrote the *Life of Timoleon*. He represents him as an ideal figure, a practically faultless person, who is *therefore* constantly protected and furthered by divine blessing. He depicts him as a firmly pious man who always puts his trust in the gods and is supported and protected by them, and he even overtly designates him a ἱερὸς ἀνήρ, a holy man.[24] Only exceptionally does he express critique, e.g. when Timo-

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[19] *Sulla* 34.3; cf. *Sulla* 6.9; 19.9 and further *Marius* 14.14.

[20] *De fortuna Romanorum* 318D–F.

[21] See Erkell (1952) 67. Timoleon's successfulness is emphasized by Nepos 20.2.1: *incredibilis felicitas*.

[22] The meaning and function of the Roman concepts *fortuna* and *felicitas* were analysed and clarified by Erkell (1952) 43–128, 131–173. See also Wistrand, 1987.

[23] See Brenk (1987) 306–307.

[24] *Timoleon* 16.5, 11–12; 20.1; 30.9–10. Plutarch asserts that, at the beginning of the battle at the river Crimisus (27.9) Timoleon's voice seemed to sound stronger than usual and more than human. Plutarch (3.2) suggests divine guidance already from the beginning: When the Corinthians were deliberating on whom to choose as leader of the expedition, an unknown person proposed Timoleon: "a man in the crowd rose and proposed Timoleon, son of Timodemus, prompted, as it seems, by divine inspiration."

leon allowed the wives and children of Hicetas and his friends to be put to death, instead of making efforts to restrain the furious rage of the Syracusans against Hicetas.[25] The strain of idealization is perceptible throughout the text. In the parallel *Life of Aemilius* the picture is somewhat different, even if good luck is quite prominent. In *Aemilius* we find examples of the mutability of *Tychê* and the instability of human existence. This is especially conspicuous when the two sons of Aemilius die at the time of his triumph. In *Timoleon* Plutarch acquits *Tychê* of guilt when the elderly general looses his sight; we are informed that the disease had a congenital cause.

We inevitably get the impression that Plutarch represents Timoleon in this extremely idealizing way in order to illustrate how a highly deserving individual can receive divine guidance and support almost without limitation. It seems that he makes him an almost emblematic figure symbolizing the concept of ἀρετὴ εὐτυχοῦσα, fortunate valour. In a study on Plutarch's preferences in the choice of heroes for his *Lives*, Joseph Geiger[26] noticed the fact that the syzygy *Aemilius-Timoleon* appears to have been written late and even may be the last one, and for that reason he concluded (p.101) that "Plutarch was never specially attracted to the figure and story of Timoleon". Frederick Brenk[27] considered his judgement convincing. I do not agree. Timaeus was certainly the originator of the eulogistic story of Timoleon, but, as we have observed by comparison with the account of Diodorus, Plutarch himself clearly intensified the praise and raised it to the level of hagiography by means of omissions, apology, and idealization. Thus, if Plutarch had been little interested in the case of Timoleon, he would either not have selected him at all, or he would have been content with the level of laudation found in Timaeus. We may plausibly assume to the contrary that Plutarch was highly interested in Timoleon as a person and that he admired his steadfast anti-tyrannic conviction, his unyielding struggle against unlawful Greek rulers and Carthaginian invaders in Sicily, his consistent commitment to regulated democracy and lawfulness, and his remarkable lack of greed for power. I believe that Plutarch considered Timoleon a person especially worthy of being adopted in his series of biographies.

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[25] *Timoleon* 33.

[26] Geiger (1981) 99–104, esp. 101.

[27] Brenk (1987) 312.

Plutarch depicts a very generous portrait of Timoleon, but he does so entirely by means of excessive praise of his achievements, while he has very little to say about him as a person. Anecdotes are practically absent, apophthegms are very scarce, speeches are absent, informations about his family are confined to the mention of the wrath of his mother after the murder of his brother, and the brief information that he never returned to Corinth after his career, but sent for his wife and children to stay with him at ease on his beautiful estate near Syracuse. Plutarch underlines that he did not take part in politics either in Corinth or in Syracuse. In case the Syracusans wanted to consult him about some difficult issue, they had to pay a visit to him in his home, and for more important deliberations they had him carried to the city on a mule-car.

One gets a strong impression that Timoleon was an unobtrusive and unsociable person who spoke little and preferred a retired way of living to a glorious life in public. Such a character is likely to be a man of principle, self-contained, little humorous, and perhaps rather boring. We should certainly not expect such a person to be famous for brilliant apophthegms or to leave behind numerous anecdotes. Critics complain that Plutarch gives an indistinct portrait of Timoleon.[28] This is true indeed, but I do not think it fair to blame Plutarch for that. Due to Timoleon's particular personality he probably left very little material to the historians of the kind needed for a more detailed portrait. Had Plutarch found such information in his sources, he would certainly have used it.

I will finish off this study with the question of the relation between Timoleon's career and achievements on the one side, and the programme for the solution of the political problems in Sicily proposed in the Platonic *Seventh Letter* on the other. This programme announces four measures as necessary for the recovery of order and prosperity in the island: 1. Expulsion of the Carthaginians from Sicily; 2. Abolition of tyranny and introduction of laws and constitutions; 3. Repopulation of the devastated Greek cities with colonizers from Sicily itself, Magna Graecia, and Greece; and 4: Formation of a league of Greek cities as security against the Carthaginians.[29]

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[28] For example Talbert (1974) 1–5.

[29] *Seventh Letter* 332E–333A, 334C, 336A, 336D. Cf. De Blois (1979).

Some scholars have argued that Timoleon consciously carried this plan into effect.[30] This assumption is quite arbitrary, seeing that there is no indication whatsoever in our sources that would suggest that Timoleon himself had any knowledge of Plato's plan, or generally of his philosophy. If he had received any philosophical instruction, Plutarch would certainly have mentioned it. And Plutarch never suggests, either in the *Life of Timoleon* or elsewhere, that he regarded Timoleon's achievement as an implementation of Plato's programme. As a matter of fact, he never mentions it in any context, not even in the *Life of Dion*, for which he demonstrably used the Platonic *Letters*, the *Seventh* and others. These facts are puzzling indeed.

Ludwig Edelstein arrived at the conclusion that the *Seventh Letter* cannot have been written by Plato. He argues that this text was written by a Platonist at the earliest ten years after Plato's death, when Timoleon had ended his career,[31] and that the forger felt it a pressing need to stand up in defence of his master whose Sicilian affairs were exposed to severe criticism at that time. The Academy was criticized of having favoured tyrannic regimes. The author wanted to show that Plato himself had developed exactly the adequate programme for Sicily, which was realized by Timoleon.

Edelstein's argumentation is seductive but not convincing. The old Plato may well be credited with such lamentation over his complete failure as we find in the S*eventh Letter*, and which Edelstein regards as evidence that Plato could not have written the letter. He may have done that in the feeling of disaster after the murder of Dion in 353.

In fact, Plutarch is among the writers who use this source most often. It is remarkable, then, that in the *Timoleon* he does not make any reference to the programme for Sicily propounded in the *Seventh Letter*. Whatever may have been the cause of his silence, it implies that he gives full credit to Timoleon of having himself conceived the planning and the methods of bringing order and prosperity to Sicily. The constitutions he introduced in Syracuse and the other Greek cities were not of the kind conceived by Plato. By his silence about the Platonic programme Plutarch detracts severely from the credit of Plato, who proposed plans for the salvation of the people of Sicily; plans

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30 Grote (1869) 477; Scheliha (1934) 96–99, with notes p. 159; Sordi (1961) 21–25. Sordi also regards *the Eighth Letter* as predicting the reforms in Sicily, in opposition to Berve (1956). The refutation of Sordi by Berve, 1963 is convincing.

31 Edelstein (1966) 62.

which Plutarch did not deem worth mentioning. He is so discreet as to refrain from contrasting Plato with Timoleon in plain words; it is clear enough that the general, not the philosopher, is his admired hero.

How shall we imagine the feelings of Plutarch when he sat pondering over the complete failure of his revered Plato, who was counteracted and defeated not only by humans, but even by the gods? I suppose that he may have meditated roughly in this manner: "To accomplish arduous missions in politics and warfare takes effective men of action, while a pronounced theorist without knowledge of how to solve practical tasks is bound to fail. I do not at all regard Plato's Sicilian failure as diminishing his grandeur as a philosopher," Plutarch contemplates, "and it is evident that Providence stopped him exactly because politics was not his mission. Instead Timoleon was the man elected by the divine powers to rescue Sicily from chaos. He had precisely the right personality and he was exactly the man needed in the prevailing situation. He was not only endowed with practical ability", Plutarch reasons, "but he was also a pious man of high moral principle. It was his consummate competence and his moral quality that caused Fortune to side firmly with him and to further his mission to the glorious end."

PLUTARCH'S *LIFE OF AGIS*, OR THE HONOURABLE COURSE OF A BEGINNING POLITICIAN

Geert Roskam

I

The unity of Plutarch's œuvre has often been emphasized: *Moralia* and *Lives* do not stand apart, but can be connected as two pillars that buttress the same moral project. Much material that is used in the *Moralia*, reappears in the *Lives*, and *vice versa*,[1] and often a similar range of ideas is argued by means of the same arguments and examples.[2] Furthermore, the central subject of one treatise of the *Moralia* is more than once illustrated more concretely in one *Life*. The *Life of Coriolanus*, for instance, illustrates important aspects of Plutarch's argument in *De cohibenda ira*[3] and the *Life of the Gracchi* corresponds to the thesis Plutarch defends in *De fraterno amore*.[4]

In this contribution, we want to establish a similar parallel, that is, between the *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* and the *Life of Agis*. Plutarch's *Political Precepts* can be regarded as an "open letter"[5] in which he gives political advice to a beginning politician, Menemachus of Sardis.[6] In the *Life of Agis*, on the other hand, Plutarch tells us about the short life of another young politician, king Agis IV of Sparta. Of course, the context of both works is quite different: the specific socio-economical problems in Sparta during the second half of the third century B.C. considerably differ from the problems of provincial politics in the Greek cities of the Roman empire during the first century A.D. And yet, this

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[1] See e.g. Valgiglio (1992) 3979–3992.

[2] When passages show a cluster of similar elements, they can often be traced back to one of Plutarch's notes; see e.g. Van der Stockt (1999a) 575–599 and (1999b) 127–140; Van Meirvenne (1999) 527–540.

[3] Duff (1999) 212.

[4] Bannon (1995) 44–50.

[5] Renoirte (1951) 66–69.

[6] On Menemachus see e.g. Renoirte (1951) 69–79; Carrière (1984) 29–30 and Puech (1992) 4859.

gap is bridged to a certain extent by Plutarch's moral perspective, into which the great heroes of the past can appear as timeless paradigms that can always again be imitated by later generations.[7] Accordingly, Agis appears to apply in many domains what Plutarch advizes to Menemachus. The short life of the Spartan king can in this way contribute to an understanding of a philosopher's life in the open (ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου βίον ὕπαιθρον), with all its political actions and public contests (*Praec.* 798B), and Agis himself can be regarded as one of the concrete examples that tangibly illustrate many aspects of Plutarch's political advice.

2

First of all, it is very important that the statesman enters political life with a good motivation.

2.1. At the very outset of his *Political Precepts*, Plutarch emphasizes that the basis of political activity should be a fundamental choice (προαίρεσις) which has its beginning in judgement and reason (798C). The statesman should not regard politics as a pastime (798CD); he should not give in to a strong passion (as Caius Gracchus did; 798F) nor enter politics by mere chance (799A). He should certainly not be guided by love of wealth (φιλοπλουτία, 798E), which Plutarch considers to be the source of all kinds of injustice (819E), nor should his decision be based on ambition (φιλοτιμία, 799A; 819F–820F), which is perhaps more imposing than love of gain, but which is no less pernicious in politics (819F). The basic motivation of the politician should in any case be what is honourable (τὸ καλόν). He does not engage in politics in order to gain for himself some external advantages, but because he is convinced that statesmanship is in fact a most fitting and honourable activity (798E). Therefore, his final goal (τέλος) can only be what is honourable itself (τὸ καλὸν αὐτό), and nothing else (799A). Therefore, he will also have no reason to change his strategy or to be thrown into

[7] Pelling (1995) 208–217. Stadter (2000) 505 rightly points to a tension between the timeless and timely aspect of the *Lives*: "Plutarch saw the problem of living a virtuous life as timeless, but the purpose of the biographies is to portray these problems in concrete situations, and especially in the context of an individual life."

confusion: contrary to those politicians who merely strive for money or reputation, he will never have to regret his course (798DE; 799A).

This honourable basic motivation is certainly present in Agis. At the moment when he became king, the situation in Sparta was far from rosy. Love of money had gradually set in, and the law of Epitadeus, which made it possible to give or leave one's estate and allotment even during one's lifetime to anyone,[8] as a kind of catalyst accelerated this pernicious evolution (*Agis* 5.3–4), so that a small minority obtained all wealth, whereas poverty governed the rest of the city (*Agis* 5.5). The result was, next to feelings of envy and enmity towards the propertied class, illiberality of mind and lack of leisure for what is honourable (ἀσχολίαν τῶν καλῶν; *Agis* 5.5; cf. 3.1). It was this distorted situation, which Agis wanted to set right, through a very honourable project. He intended to restore the body of citizens to its full number (*Agis* 6.1 and 8.3), planned a redistribution of land and a cancellation of debts (*Agis* 7.8; 8.1; 12.1; 13.2), and wanted to return to Lycurgus' way of living (*Agis* 2.10; 4.2; 8.4; 19.7; *CG* 42.3–4; *Agesilaus* 40.5). In that way, equality among Spartan citizens would be restored,[9] which of course implied a battle against the love of wealth of a small, but influential minority. In any case, Agis himself proved to be above money, for he gave away his own property (*Agis* 9.5; *CG* 41.7) and regarded as greediness even the lawful possession of more goods than another one had (*CG* 41.8). And more than once, Plutarch explicitly underlines that the young king was striving for an honourable goal (*Agis* 6.1; 7.4; 13.1; 21.5; *CG* 41.5 and 42.4) which was worthy of Sparta (*Agis* 10.1; 13.1; 21.5). Indeed, Agis will remain faithful to his honourable motivation through his whole further career, also in misfortune, to the bitter end. For also during his show trial, he did not disavow his previous convictions, and when one of the ephors offered him a way of escape, he did not respond to the offer, but proudly claimed responsibility for all his political actions (*Agis* 19.6–7), and denied that he regretted his deeds. Thanks to his insight into the honourable nature of his political course, he was not confused, even while seeing that he was to suffer the extremest penalty

[8] On this law, see Asheri (1961); Christien (1974); Marasco (1980); MacDowell (1986) 99–110.

[9] *Agis* 6.1; 7.3; 9.4; *CG* 42.4; Fuks (1962), 161–166; see, however, also Marasco (1981) I, 97–98.

(*Agis* 19.7–8). On the contrary, sticking to his noble project, he almost died a voluntary death (*CG* 43.1).[10]

2.2. It is clear, then, that Agis' honourable motivation meets the high standards Plutarch elaborates in his *Political Precepts*. However, the question of the politician's motivation is more complex than the overall importance of the honourable course seems to suggest. A bad ambition, connected with contentiousness (798C; 811D; 819C), is strongly rejected by Plutarch: a politician should rather avoid that great honours are given to him, or should in any case take care, if he is forced somehow to accept some favour from his people, that the gift is not an expensive statue, but a symbol, thus imitating the example of Epimenides, Anaxagoras or the Seven Persians[11] (820B–F).

There exists, however, also a good ambition, a striving for "true honour and favour, which lies in the goodwill and disposition of those who remember" (820F). The politician will of course not reject such an honour, for a good reputation, based on the politician's sincerity and virtue (821D), will inspire confidence in the people, and will give him the power he needs to realize his political project (821B–D; cf. also *Maxime cum principibus* 777EF). In general, the statesman can gain such a reputation in two ways: he can take the quick and brilliant road, which leads directly to reputation, but which is not without danger, or he can prefer the slower road, which is more like a foot-journey, but safer too (804CD). The politicians who opt for the slow road can share in the reputation of an older political mentor, and gradually grow towards personal fame (805E–806F). On the other hand, those who prefer the quick road immediately gain great fame by some conspicuous, bold action (804D–805E).

The general theoretical introduction at the beginning of the *Life of Agis*[12] corresponds to Plutarch's position in his *Political Precepts*. A perfect man only needs fame to the extent that it enables him to accomplish his projects (*Agis* 2.1). A young, ambitious politician, on the other hand, can pride himself somewhat in his reputation, provided that this reputation is based on honourable achievements (*Agis* 2.1). Now Agis is obviously

[10] Cf. Plato, *Epist.* VII 334e: τὸ γὰρ τῶν καλλίστων ἐφιέμενον αὐτῷ τε καὶ πόλει πάσχειν ὅ τι ἂν πάσχῃ πᾶν ὀρθὸν καὶ καλόν.

[11] On the puzzling passage about the Seven Persians, see Roskam (2001).

[12] For an analysis of this introduction, which Plutarch presents as introduction to the four *Lives*, see Ingenkamp (1992) 4300–4304.

such a young statesman who is not indifferent to feelings of ambition (*Agis* 6.3; 7.2; 7.4; cf. also 18.5). He in fact proposes a very ambitious plan, thus opting for the quick but dangerous road to reputation. One of the possibilities, which Plutarch recommends to his contemporary politicians who prefer the quick road is the reintroduction of the honourable practices which have been neglected, and the removal of bad customs (805B). A somewhat similar project, though at a much more general and radical level, was set up by Agis, who wanted to banish all bad habits and to bring his city back to its proper Lycurgan form (*CG* 42.3). Plutarch explicitly emphasizes the boldness of the deed (*CG* 42.1), and tells how Agis' mother demurs to a deed, which she considers neither possible nor advantageous (*Agis* 7.1). And yet, the great ambition of the young king is laudable, because it is in the end connected with his honourable goal. Therefore, his mother will finally give in, lifted up by his ambition and enthusiastic for the honourable course (*Agis* 7.4).

3

The politician's noble motivation (both the basic orientation towards what is honourable and a good ambition) also presupposes personal virtue. In his *Political Precepts*, Plutarch emphasizes the importance of virtue for the politician's credibility. If moral perfection is perhaps unattainable, the statesman should in any case banish the greatest faults from his soul (800B), for the people knows (the character of) its leaders and wants them to be as good as possible (800D–801A). And even if it is true that occasionally also unworthy persons can come into power, their success is doomed to remain momentary (801A–C).

At this point too, Agis appears to come up to Plutarch's greatest expectations. The young king indeed surpassed in natural goodness (εὐφυΐᾳ) almost all the kings who ruled after the great Agesilaus (*Agis* 4.1). Quite remarkably, his virtue is only based on a good nature, not on education,[13] for even though he was nurtured under quite corrupting circumstances, "amid the wealth and luxury of women" (*Agis* 4.1), he

[13] Plutarch usually attaches more importance to the education of his Roman than to that of his Greek heroes; Swain (1990) 134–136. Cf. in this respect the difference between Agis and Tiberius Gracchus, who according to Plutarch surpassed all other Romans in natural goodness, but whose virtue was nonetheless more based on education than on nature (*TG* 1.7).

immediately gave evidence of his good disposition.[14] Throughout the whole *Life*, many qualities and virtues are attributed to the king: natural goodness and high spirit (*Agis* 4.1; cf. *Cleom.* 1.4), self-restraint and simplicity (*Agis* 7.3; cf. *Cleom.* 1.4), high-mindedness (*Agis* 7.3 and 10.1), plainness and love of hardships (*Agis* 14.4), ardour and courage (*Agis* 15.1), caution (20.5; cf. *Cleom.* 1.4), mildness (*Agis* 20.5; cf. *Cleom.* 1.4) and humanity (*Agis* 20.5). Furthermore, the importance he attached to justice appears from his saying when he was on the way to his execution: "while suffering a lawless and unjust execution, I'm still better than my murderers"—a truly Socratic insight indeed (*Agis* 20.1; cf. *Apophthegmata Laconica* 216D).

Moreover, and quite remarkably, there is hardly any trace of viciousness or shortcomings. In other *Lives*, Plutarch always has an eye for the negative features of his hero's character, even if he considers them to be shortcomings in some virtue, rather than wickednesses of vice (*Life of Cimon* 2.5). Here, however, even such shortcomings remain almost completely absent.[15] Agis perfectly meets even the highest moral demands, which Plutarch makes on the politician in the *Political Precepts*.

4

In politics, the final success does not only depend on the honourable goal and the high moral qualities of the statesman, but also on the latter's pragmatical attitude, on his capacity to assess the situation and to deal with it in a flexible way, and on sufficient political power and influence.

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[14] Many scholars believe that Agis (just as Cleomenes) was influenced by the Stoic philosopher Sphaerus. See e.g. Ollier (1936) 546, 564 and *passim*; Cloché (1943) 54, n. 1 and 56; Flacelière-Chambry (1976) 13. In any case, Plutarch himself does never even suggest this possibility. Presumably, he preferred to attribute Agis' virtues only to his natural goodness.

[15] Not only in Agis, but also in women just like Chilonis; cf. Bux (1925) 429 and Candau Morón (1991) 22, who both explain this fact by accepting that Plutarch was largely influenced by Phylarch. Marasco (1981) I, 29 rightly observes that Plutarch did not copy his source in an uncritical way, and that the praise of virtue fits in very well with Plutarch's own project. Nonetheless, the almost complete absence of any sign of depravity (apart from some critical observations in the concluding *synkrisis*) remains remarkable.

4.1. In the first place, the statesman should proceed with caution. Indeed, Plutarch often recommends a cautious approach in his political writings.[16] This is certainly true in the case of a young politician. Indeed, whereas an influential statesman who already enjoys the confidence of his people is perhaps able to change directly the character of his fellow citizens (800AB), this is probably aimed too high for a young politician, who should rather examine the character of his people (799B–800A) and take into account its proper nature while proceeding to action (800A).

Here as well, Agis' way of proceeding is quite in line with Plutarch's political advice. It is true that Agis has great ambitions: as a young politician, he wants to effect a radical change in the character of his people, a project, which is neither easy, nor safe (799B). But he also avoids thoughtless recklessness, and in conformity with his usual caution (*Agis* 20.5 and *Cleom.* 1.4), he refrains from enforcing directly his honourable goal. First, he prefers to canvass opinion among his people (*Agis* 6.1), and then seeks political associates. The latter strategy corresponds to Plutarch's advice in the *Political Precepts*.

4.2. If a politician wants to accomplish something important and useful which involves much controversy and effort—as Agis indeed wanted to do—, he should turn to the most powerful among his friends or to the mildest of the leaders for support (819B), and should use everyone according to his own talents (812CD; 819B–D). For this will entail a greater balance in the actions (819C), will avoid envy of others (812D and 819C), and will lead to greater efficiency (812D). It does not imply, however, that the politician can lose control of particular affairs: he should rather be familiar with everything and keep everything in his own hands (812B and 813C).

Agis looks for political associates at different levels.[17] He has the young men on his side (*Agis* 6.1), and also the people is eager for his plans (*Agis* 7.8; 10.1; 11.1; 13.5). An important part of the propertied class is opposed to his project, but here as well, Agis finds some supporters (cf. *Agis* 9.1; 11.1; 19.5–8). For instance, he receives the support

[16] *Maxime cum principibus* 776D; *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* 803F and 815C; cf. also *De unius* 826C. Caution was one of the great qualities of Pericles (*Life of Pericles*, 18.1; cf. also 19.3; 20.3–21.1).

[17] It is clear that the conflict at Sparta was not simply between the poor and the rich, for also the reform party counted large landowners among its members, even though they were probably a small minority; cf. Cloché (1943) and Marasco (1981) I, 101–116.

of important men like Lysander (who was held in great esteem among the citizens; *Agis* 6.4), Mandrocleidas (who surpassed all his contemporaries in arranging matters and who coupled daring with intelligence and craftiness; *Agis* 6.4), and Agesilaus (who shared with Agis his noble birth—being the king's uncle on his mother's side—and who was a powerful orator; *Agis* 6.5). The latter was won over by his famous and influential son Hippomedon, who enjoyed the goodwill of the youth (*Agis* 6.5) and was beloved of all because of his manly virtue (*Agis* 16.5). Finally, he could fall back on the important support of his mother, who was very rich, influential, and politically active (*Agis* 6.7).

It is clear, then, that Agis was fully aware of the advantages of friendship in politics. Furthermore, he knows how to use his friends, holding himself the reins and assuming the general coordination.[18] Just as Pericles used Ephialtes to humiliate the Areopagus and Charinus to pass the Megarian decree (812D), so Agis made use of Lysander to introduce his *rhêtra* (*Agis* 8.1). Similarly, Lysander, being held in great esteem by the people (*Agis* 6.4), began the discussion before the assembly, and before king Agis himself addressed his people (*Agis* 9.5), Mandrocleidas and Agesilaus made their plea (*Agis* 9.1). Finally, Agis tries to convince his mother with the help of Agesilaus (*Agis* 6.7 and 7.2). In this case too, he made the right choice, for Agesilaus was his mother's brother (*Agis* 6.5; 6.7) and had the necessary rhetorical talents (*Agis* 6.5).

5

Next to political associates, the statesman also has to deal with (fellow) office holders. If he exercises an office himself, he should honour his colleagues and collaborate with them in friendship and harmony (816A–E). If, on the other hand, he does not hold an office, he should show obedience to those who do (816F–817C) and even endure their anger (817C). There is, however, one important exception: if an office holder hesitates to serve the common good, one can take oneself the matter in hand (817DE), though only in cases of necessity or for the sake of what is honourable (817F).

[18] Probably, Plutarch exaggerated Agis' role. According to Marasco (1981) I, 99, this aspect of Plutarch's positive bias can be traced back to Phylarch; cf. also Gabba (1957) 194–199.

Here as well, Agis proves to be a very good example for the statesman. It is true that the king was at odds with his colleague Leonidas, but in this case, Agis was on the right side. For it is clear that Leonidas hesitates to realize a most honourable project, and under such circumstances, one can indeed ignore one's colleague. Accordingly, Agis takes care, by means of Lysander, that Leonidas is deposed, on the basis of an ancient Spartan law and following the traditional procedure[19] (*Agis* 11.2–9). Somewhat later, however, Agis places himself above the law, by dismissing the ephors and appointing others (*Agis* 12.4), having as acceptable excuse the importance and honourable character of his project (817F).

At other moments, Agis behaves like a good colleague. He collaborates harmoniously with his fellow king (*Agis* 12.4–5; 13.1 and 13.5), and shows great respect towards Aratus, even while differing in opinion. For whereas Agis preferred to enter into combat against Aetolians who threatened to invade the Peloponnese, he left the final decision to his ally, Aratus, on the ground that the latter was an older man and the general of the Achaeans, and that he himself came not as a leader but as a helper (*Agis* 15.2–3). And when Aratus decided not to fight, Agis indeed returned to Sparta (*Agis* 15.5).[20]

6

According to Plutarch, the politician's persuasiveness is in the first place based on his virtue (800D–801C). Nonetheless, the statesman also needs rhetorical talents. The charm and power of his speech can considerably contribute to the realization of his honourable goal, not as the creator (δημιουργός) of persuasion, but as its assistant (συνεργός) (801C). The politician's speech should be full of character and high-mindedness, frankness, forethought, and caring intelligence (802F), containing maxims, history, myths, and metaphors (803A). Additional qualities are moderate jesting (though only in replies and in self-defence; 803B–E; 810E–811A) and a flexibility, which enables the statesman to use his opportunity (803F–804B).

That Agis also meets those criteria is shown by the two speeches, which his *Life* contains. In the first one, he shows his mother that he

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[19] On the procedure, see Parke (1945) 106–112.
[20] For an analysis of this passage, see Orsi (1987) 59–60.

cannot equal other kings in wealth, but that he can surpass their luxury by his virtue and thus gain the name and reputation of a really great king (*Agis* 7.2–3). Here, the persuasiveness obviously lies in the greatness of the king's mind. His words, full of character indeed, contribute as assistant to persuasion. And his speech proves successful, for his mother is persuaded by his ambition and wants to share in his honourable goal (*Agis* 7.4).

In the second speech that is mentioned in the *Life*, Agis gives further evidence of his great rhetorical talents. He opens by a beautiful retort (*Agis* 10.4) that reverses Leonidas' attack (cf. 810E) and that, because it is used in self-defence, gains even more charm (cf. 803C). Then follows a lesson in history (*Agis* 10.5–6) and the anecdote about Ecprepes (*Agis* 10.7), which prepares the imagery that closes the speech (*Agis* 10.8). Furthermore, Agis shows that he is flexible enough to take advantage of the situation, and that he is able to persuade both his people and an important part of the *gerontes* (*Agis* 11.1).

7

In order to win the people over, the politician can use other means next to personal virtue and rhetorical talents.

7.1. If he is rich, he could, for instance, attract the people to himself by a voluntary donation.[21] In his *Political Precepts*, Plutarch, however, formulates some important restrictions: the statesman should not corrupt his people through all kinds of immoral spectacles (802D; 821F; 822C), he should expect no return (822B), and his expenditures should aim at useful and moderate matters, and should serve honourable or necessary things, or harmless pleasure (822C).

Once again, Agis' political course meets Plutarch's standards very well. After a short speech, the king said that he offered his own estate—both landed property and six hundred talents—to the state (*Agis* 9.5). It is clear that this large donation serves a most honourable purpose, and completely dazzles his fellow citizens (*Agis* 10.1; cf. 822B). Furthermore, the king's example is imitated by his mother and grandmother, and by

[21] On the political practice of euergetism, which was very common in Plutarch's times, see e.g. Pavis d'Escurac (1981) 288–290; Carrière (1984) 36–40; Desideri (1986) 376–377.

his relatives and friends, who were the wealthiest among the Spartans (*Agis* 9.6).

7.2. Finally, and even more than such a rich donation (823DE), the fact of being on an equal level with his fellow citizens makes the politician extremely popular among the people. Accordingly, he should avoid all luxury (823B), he should be approachable to all (823A), and he should in clothing and daily living behave just like everyone else (823B).

In the same way, Agis from the beginning of his career firmly opposed all luxury, taking pride in his small cloak and observing Spartan customs in meals, baths, and life-style (*Agis* 4.2). And in the field, he shared the life of his soldiers, keeping to his plainness and his love of hardships, and clothing and arming himself with no more brilliance than a common soldier (*Agis* 14.4).

For all those reasons, Agis was much in favour among the people. After his speech to his fellow citizens, the people took sides with him (*Agis* 11.1). By his exemplary liberality his people, being dazzled and delighted, concluded that after a lapse of nearly two hundred years, they had again a king who was worthy of Sparta (*Agis* 10.1). And by sharing the way of life of the common citizens, he did not only bring about an admirable obedience and discipline in his army (*Agis* 14.2–3), but also inspired much feelings of admiration in the multitude (*Agis* 14.4).

8

On the basis of all those parallels, it is safe to say that Agis comes close to realizing almost all precepts of Plutarch's *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*, and that he is one of the best examples to illustrate Plutarch's political thinking. Furthermore, this ideal picture of Agis is further underlined by internal contrasts and comparisons.

8.1. Agis' principal opponent, Leonidas, is obviously a bad example. He is completely corrupted by oriental luxury (*Agis* 3.9) and is not very popular with the people (3.8; cf. 21.1). He presents himself as champion of the party of the rich, who are led by greed (7.6–7.8; 11.1), and is motivated by a bad ambition, being merely self-seeking instead of looking for the public interest (10.2). Also his political means, that is, campaign of slander (7.8) and deception (18.4–5) are far from

honourable. And after Agis' death, he further yields to base greediness and luxury (*Cleom.* 1. 1–2 and 2.1). Also other persons appear in a more negative light. Cleombrotus betrays his own father-in-law (*Agis* 11.7–9; 16.7; 17.2; 17.9) and is corrupted by vain ambition (18.3). Agesilaus turns out to be weak and avaricious (6.5), unjust (16.1) and cynical (13.4), and with tyrannical features (keeping a bodyguard; 16.2, and showing no respect for office holders; 16.3). No wonder then that he was hated by everyone (16.2). Amphares is perfidious and greedy (18.8), mendacious (20.2) and irascible (20.6), and is hated by the citizens after Agis' death (21.1). Epitadeus, finally, is presumptuous and harsh, and brings disaster to the whole state by striving for personal interests (5.3–5). Only women like Chilonis (11.8; 17.2–18.3), Agesistrata and Archidamia (20.2–7) are presented as virtuous.

8.2. Next to contrast, internal comparison helps to evaluate Agis' virtuous character. It has often been argued that the two *Lives* of one pair should be read together, and that the interpretation of one *Life* risks to neglect some important general patterns which throw light on the pair as a whole.[22] Also in this particular case, many similarities between Agis, Cleomenes[23] and Tiberius Gracchus can be detected.[24] All three of them in their own way appear to set a concrete example, which perfectly illustrates Plutarch's political doctrine.

Cleomenes combines, just like Agis, a most honourable goal (*Cleom.* 1.4; *CG* 41.5; 42.4) with great ambition (*Cleom.* 1.4; 2.3; 6.2; 24.6). His virtuous nature (1.4) fits in very well with his noble ends, although fits of anger occasionally run counter to it (26.2). In rhetorical qualities, he is not inferior to Agis (13.7; see also his speech in 10.2–10.11), and just like his predecessor, he knows how to attract the people towards him by voluntary donations (11.1) and by sharing their simple way of living (13.1–4; 16.7; 32.3; 32.5). Contrary to his predecessor, however, he was less cautious (1.4) and he less appealed to friends (3.5). Also his relation with colleagues was more turbulent than that of Agis (8.1–4; 10.1; *CG* 45.2), even if he repeatedly tried—though without success—to collaborate harmoniously with another king (*Cleom.* 5.2–4; 11.5; *CG* 45.2).

[22] See e.g. Erbse (1956); Bucher-Isler (1972) 74–78; Stadter (1975); Pelling (1986); Larmour (1992) 4158–4162; Duff (1999) 250–251 and *passim.*

[23] Due to the lack of sources, the figure of Agis was perhaps already in Phylarch fashioned after that of Cleomenes; see Gabba (1957) 193–199; Marasco (1981) I, 48.

[24] Some elements also in Marasco (1981) I, 45–47.

Between Agis and Tiberius Gracchus, there can be established even more parallels. Just as the Spartan kings, Tiberius is motivated both by what is honourable (*Agis* 2.7; *TG* 9.4; *CG* 45.6; cf. also *TG* 20.6) and by his ambition (*Agis* 2.7–2.8; *TG* 7.6; 8.8; 8.10; *CG* 45.5). Again, Tiberius resembles the Spartan kings in natural virtue, even though Plutarch adds that his virtue is rather based on education than on nature (*TG* 1.7 and *CG* 41.2). In any case, mildness appears to be one of Tiberius' essential virtues (*TG* 2.2; 2.5; 9.2). Besides, he gives evidence of caution (*CG* 44.6), and just like Agis appeals to powerful friends (*TG* 7.5 and 7.7; cf. also 9.1 and 13.1). One of the most conspicuous characteristics of Tiberius is undoubtedly his great respect for his colleagues (*TG* 5.2) and for his office as such (as appears from his zeal to recover the tablets concerning his quaestorship; 6.1–5; cf. also 3.1). It is true that, just as Agis dismissed—contrary to law, but with good reasons—the ephors, Tiberius placed himself above the law—with equally good reasons—by depriving Octavius of his tribuneship (11.4), but the way in which he proceeds obviously illustrates his great respect for his opponent (10.5–7; 11.5–8; 12.1–2). Finally, just like Agis he is successful in persuading the people by his rhetorical powers (2.3; 9.4–6; 10.1; 15.1–9) and by sharing their plain mode of life (2.4).

9

Also contrasts and comparisons thus appear to underline Agis' political virtue. Now all this finally entails a difficult problem: Agis turns out to be perfectly virtuous, and applies almost all elements of Plutarch's political advice, and yet, his political project ends up in utter failure.[25] On the other hand, Leonidas is completely vicious, ignores most aspects of Plutarch's political ideals, does not even enjoy the people's confidence, and nonetheless, he in the end remains successful. What has gone wrong?

At the very end of the closing *synkrisis*, Plutarch maintains that Agis committed the fewest errors of the four heroes (*CG* 45.7). The many parallels between Agis' political behaviour and Plutarch's advice in

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[25] As, perhaps, that of Menemachus did? In any case, the thesis of Siefert (1896) 74, n. 1, that the exile of Sardis to whom *De exilio* is dedicated should be identified with Menemachus, was accepted by many scholars; see e.g. Ziegler (1951) 819; Puech (1992) 4859; Boulogne (1994) 52; Duff (1999) 293, n. 21.

the *Political Precepts* explain this statement, but fail to account for his ultimate lack of success. Does perhaps Plutarch's own political thinking necessarily lead to failure? Plutarch himself would undoubtedly deny this. Agis' fault should be sought mainly in two interrelated domains, that is, friends and enemies in politics.

9.1. First of all, Agis did not always select his political friends in a right way. He takes into account their respective talents, to be sure, but sometimes misjudges their motivations. According to Plutarch, the statesman should only regard those people as friends who share his enthusiasm for what is honourable (*Political Precepts* 807C; cf. 819D). But then, Agis should never have involved Agesilaus in his projects, for the latter supported the king only because of his self-seeking motivation, being interested merely in the cancellation of his personal debts (*Agis* 6.6; 13.1–2). And he is indeed, according to Plutarch,[26] the only man to be blamed for the disastrous outcome of Agis' honourable plans (13.1).[27] In defense of the king one could argue that Lysander too was deceived by Agesilaus (13.3). Also at the end of his life, Agis trusts his supposed friends too much, misjudging the selfish motivations of Amphares (18.7–9).

9.2. Furthermore, Agis was too tolerant towards his enemies. It is true that Plutarch underlines that one should treat one's political antagonists with mildness (*Political Precepts* 809E–810A), but such an attitude should never run counter to the public interest. When this public interest is at stake, one should indeed remain inexorable (809DE). Agis, however, was less inexorable towards his opponent Leonidas, whom he saved from his murderers (*Agis* 12.6).

Both faults should be traced back to the king's gentle nature. The most benevolent interpretation of Agis' failure is certainly formulated by his mother: "your great caution, your mildness and humanity caused your and our destruction" (20.5). The sharpest criticism is that of

[26] For the influence of Phylarch on this vision, see Bux (1925) 429; Marasco (1981) I, 53.

[27] Usually, Plutarch finds the cause of a politician's failure in the wrong, materialistic orientation of the multitude (see de Blois (1992) 4604–4611 and (1997) 216–219; cf. also de Blois—Bons (1992) 178–180). In this case, the wrong motivation is crystallized in one person, Agesilaus. This also illustrates Agis' greatness: just like Numa (*Life of Numa* 20.3–4 and 20.8), he succeeded in exerting a positive influence on his whole people (with the important exception, though, of one wicked person).

Plutarch in the final *synkrisis*: Agis proved too weak, and lacked the courage that he needed to accomplish his designs (*CG* 44.1). The most neutral evaluation finally is placed at the very end of the *Life*:

> And yet he had chosen a line of conduct that was noble (καλά) and worthy of Sparta, and was of an age in which men are usually pardoned for their errors, and his friends could with more justice blame him than his enemies, because he spared the life of Leonidas, and, most mild and gentle man that he was, put faith in his other foes. (translation Perrin)

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To conclude: what are the main implications of the foregoing analysis for the understanding of Plutarch's *Life of Agis*? It is clear that a correct interpretation of this *Life* should in the first place take into account the proper character of Plutarch's biographical project. To that purpose, Plutarch's political thinking, as expounded in his *Political Precepts*, can have an important function, since it enables the reader to interpret Plutarch on the basis of Plutarch himself, to evaluate his heroes with his own criteria. Agis appears to meet perfectly most of Plutarch's political standards, and even the unsuccessful outcome of the king's honourable project turns out to confirm the importance of some aspects of Plutarch's political advice. This observation does not only elucidate Plutarch's personal judgement of his hero, but also helps in explaining the reason why Agis was selected as a hero (his character lending itself perfectly for moral imitation[28]) and in illustrating the precise aim of this *Life*.

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[28] For other reasons why Plutarch chose Agis, see Geiger (1981) 90 and 94.

PART THREE

THE STATESMAN IN PLUTARCH'S ROMAN *LIVES*

IS NUMA THE GENUINE PHILOSOPHER KING?

Bernard Boulet

It is apparent that Plutarch had Plato very much in mind when he wrote his *Lives of Lycurgus and Numa*. What is less clear about these two biographies is whether therein Plutarch praises or criticizes Plato's notion of the ideal city and its philosopher king.

We know from Plutarch himself that he studied in Athens under Ammonios, the Platonic philosopher (*Themistocles* 32.6). We know, too, through his abundant references to Plato's thought—more than five hundred in total—that he is quite a follower of the "divine Plato", as he calls him (*Pericles* 8.2). And in these two *Lives*, Plutarch constantly points to Plato's *Republic*, presenting the Spartan regime and Numa's reign as historical confirmation of the practicality of Plato's ideas: Numa is *the* genuine philosopher king and Sparta is *the* blueprint for Socrates' ideal republic. History would seem to have beaten philosophy to the task. But as most readers of Plutarch will suspect quite rightly, it is rather "Plutarch [who] shows himself to be transferring Plato's theory of ideas to history."[1] Indeed, Plutarch is bent on carving his two *Lives* using Plato's *Republic* as a model. This anachronous writing is made easy through the semi-legendary character of the era and the "chronological uncertainty"[2] which the author himself purports. Plutarch "based this *Vita* on Hellenistic and Roman legends and took the opportunity to present his version of an ideal ruler, unhindered by historical fact".[3]

But something is not right: Numa and Lycurgus are almost opposite in their approach to statesmanship, and Rome and Sparta are very different regimes. How can these states both reflect Plato's ideal republic

[1] Schneeweiss (1979) 382. Spartan education in the *Lycurgus* follows Platonic views but with a typical Plutarchean approach to moral persuasion.

[2] Stadter (2002). The article begins with a good examination of the question of chronology in both the *Lycurgus* and the *Numa*: "The variants warn the reader not to expect a purely historical account." The author agrees with Flacelière who sees Plutarch throwing doubt on chronological events in order to associate Numa to Pythagoras, (1948) 407.

[3] De Blois & Bons (1992) 159; "This is not the only time in the *Vitæ* that Plutarch took such chronological liberties to enable himself to continue a good story which he found in his sources." (162).

as Plutarch explicitly suggests, when, in fact, neither is in real conformity with the Platonic ideal? To begin to address these difficulties, I wish to refer to two main character traits of Plutarchean historical figures.

Eros and Thumos

Plutarch's *Lives* are biographies, not histories (*Alexander* 1.1). They are vivid portraits of different souls of men. Souls are said, by Plutarch and other Platonists, to experience two opposite passions: *eros*, meaning of course *passionate love*, and *thumos* meaning *spiritedness* or *proud feelings*. Some men are *erotic* in character, like Epicurus who, in his garden, prefers a life of pleasure without pain, while others are mostly *thumotic*, like Martius Coriolanus who knows only war and suffers banishment from Rome and from wife and child without even shedding a tear. Some others are a fascinating mix of the two, such as Alexander who loves a banquet with flowing wine but who also bursts out on the battlefield with a great thirst for victory. In depicting his characters thus, Plutarch is borrowing from the notion of the tripartite soul, composed of the concupiscible (or physical eros), the irascible (the thumotic), and the intellectual (or spiritual eros). The soul must acquire good habits by practicing the three well-known virtues of temperance, courage and practical wisdom.[4] Pythagoras compared the three inclinations of the soul to the three kinds of men present at the Olympic Games: the tradesmen in search of profit, the athletes aspiring for glory, and the spectators just curious to see the games themselves (Cicero, *Tusculanae Disputationes* 5.3.8–9). And Plato's metaphor for the tripartite soul is the famous pair of winged horses with their charioteer (*Phaedrus* 246b), one horse being of little worth, the other noble and spirited. Often, this threesome lives in disharmony. For example, Plutarch's most vivid portrayal of a chaotic character is the famed Alcibiades whose desire for pleasure, craving for honour, and admiration for Socrates

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[4] *Republic* 428a–432a. Schneeweiss observes that Spartan education in the *Lycurgus* follows in many respects this division of the soul: for example, the leader within each group of boys was "not the strongest, but the wisest and the most high-spirited" (1979) 380.

draws him in opposite directions (*Alcibiades* 6.1–4). A happy man, as a happy state, is one in which these three elements are in harmony and this is called justice.

States, too, have different characters, or souls. Some countries, perhaps contemporary China or Iran, and military regimes such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, sacrifice private freedom to public spiritedness and sometimes to heavy-handed unity: these states may be called *thumotic*. Romulus' Rome was of this nature. Other countries, liberal democracies for example, favour individual freedom in private life and can be called *erotic*, for in them each citizen is permitted to pursue what he loves. Sparta, before its reforms, was bent on luxury and in this sense was erotic in nature. Of course, no state can be uniquely thumotic or erotic. They are all, to a greater or lesser degree, a combination of the two characters.

The Best Regime

The greatest political challenge seems to be the following: a regime that best fits the needs of man must be well-disciplined and yet offer its citizens some degree of private life. How can the state run a tight ship while permitting its crew private leisure? Can the most glorious state be home to the happiest of citizens? A great regime will want to bolster thumotic institutions to preserve its strength and public spiritedness, but its citizens, once secure, and if tempted by a little luxury, will seek the pleasures of a private life. Are political virtues and private pleasures compatible?

In his *Republic*, Plato says: "No!" His Socrates discusses with Glaukon, a young ambitious Athenian who demands that the best regime afford more than the mere necessities of life. He wants relishes or commodities, as he tells Socrates; he has a rather erotic soul. Socrates will guide this young soul to what it needs, namely the relishes of the mind. The best life, Socrates will convince him, just like the best regime, involves philosophy; no state can be happy and healthy without the guidance of philosophy and without the rule of the philosopher king (*Republic* 5, 473d). Now of course, the philosopher, or at least the Socratic philosopher, is not a *thumotic* man; he has no political ambition; he prefers the private pleasures of study. The philosopher must then, as Socrates points out, be forced upon the throne. But once king, he will serve justice and harmony, he will set his mind to the task of

maintaining, not the happiness of the few, but the health of the state as a whole. The best and most just regime, as it turns out in the *Republic*, is very community-oriented, with public meals and public education and public ceremonies. And so Socrates and Glaukon, two erotic souls, come to the conclusion that there can be no happy and unified state without a large dose of public spiritedness and consequently with few or no private pleasures. Need it be said that our modern democracies are quite the opposite of Plato's regime?

Plutarch concurs with Plato: the best regime is Lycurgus' Sparta, a *thumotic* one, and the best ruler is the philosopher king Numa. Plutarch's many references to Plato, in these two *Lives*, are well documented and I shall therefore only give a sampling of the tribute they pay to the *Republic*. I will dwell more extensively on what is not documented: that Plutarch seems to object to the *Republic* in that his Numa rules in sharp contrast to Plato's philosopher king, and his Spartan regime does not measure up to Socrates' imaginary city. I shall then offer a possible explanation of this discrepancy.

The Concurrences

Plutarch writes of king Numa that "his reign [was] a living example and verification of that saying which Plato, long afterwards, ventured to pronounce, that the sole and only hope of respite or remedy for human evils was in some happy conjunction of events, which should unite in a single person the power of a king and the wisdom of a philosopher" (*Numa* 20.8–9, cf. *Republic* 5, 473d, *Laws* 4, 711e). This conjunction happens in the historical figure of Numa. He is of course king. And he is indeed a philosopher, a very Pythagorean philosopher, as Plutarch would have it: the similarities between the Roman king and the Greek philosopher are abundant. Numa wrote books on philosophy that were later discovered to be Pythagorean in substance. In Numa's policy, as in Pythagoras' and Plato's philosophy, men must be guided closer to the truth and the good through esoteric myths and religious ceremonies. For example, Pythagoras invented stories of personal meetings with the divine and Numa told of his relations with a wise nymph, and in both cases these meetings and relations are deemed theatrics (*Numa* 8.9–10). In the Temple of Vesta, he placed the Vestal flame in the centre, in keeping with the Pythagoreans and with Plato who place the divine element in the centre of the cosmos (*Numa* 11.1–3). Finally,

many of Numa's precepts seemed borrowed from the Pythagoreans (*Numa* 14.3–12). Numa, then, being philosopher and king, would be the true philosopher king in the Platonic sense.[5]

As for the Spartan regime in the *Life of Lycurgus*, its main feature is public spiritedness, just like in Socrates' imaginary regime. Plutarch likens it to a military camp in which the citizens lived as if they did not belong to themselves but to their country (*Lycurgus* 24): "they were to make themselves one with the public good, and, clustering like bees around their commander, be by their zeal and public spirit carried all but out of themselves, and devoted wholly to their country" (*Lycurgus* 25). To instill such patriotic feelings in the hearts of the Spartans, Lycurgus founded institutions in tune with Socrates' imaginary regime: the warrior class is separated from those who are craftsmen and workmen;[6] the meals are eaten in public; the children are taken from their parents rather young and educated by the state; certain sexual mores favour intercourse between healthy and good citizens (*Republic* 5, 458d). Sparta seems to reflect the Platonic ideal.

A Major Discrepancy

The foregoing comments reflect the usual reading of these *Lives* but they overlook a major point. Numa is apparently in total disagreement with Plato's philosopher king on the question of the best regime. Plutarch may well, in word, associate his Numa to Plato's philosopher king, but in deed his king rules in a contrary manner, for he does not establish a *thumotic* regime. He does away with war altogether: during his reign, the gates of Janus, which were to be left opened in time of war, "were never seen open a single day" (*Numa* 20.3). Rome no longer goes to war against neighbouring cities, its army disintegrates and the soldiers turn to peacetime activities, tilling the land and practicing different trades (*Numa* 17). Numa's Rome is a far cry from Socrates' dream regime. He softens Rome to a degree that it becomes more *erotic* than *thumotic*.

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[5] See explicit references to Plato which aim at suggesting a parallel between Numa and the Platonic ideal: *Numa* 8.2, 11.3, 20.8–9. For explicit references suggesting the parallel between Lycurgus' Sparta and the Platonic ideal: *Lycurgus* 5.10, 7.1, 15.1, 31.2.

[6] In Sparta, only the warrior class enjoyed the status of citizenry, while in the *Republic* the craftsmen and workmen are also citizens.

Numa had warned even before becoming king that he would govern with a view to peace and not war. And as soon as he did become king, "He set himself to the task of bringing the hard and iron Roman temper to somewhat more of gentleness and equity" (*Numa* 8.1), inculcating "the worship of the gods and [...] the abhorrence of violence and war" (*Numa* 5.8). Numa's religious reforms rendered holy and sacred many peacetime activities, making them venerable and worthy of a proud Roman. Agriculture became a noble art, "a sort of charm to captivate the affections of [the] people to peace" (*Numa* 16.6). "But of all his measures the most commended was his distribution of the people by their trades into companies or guilds." (*Numa* 17.1) Numa thus guided his citizens to the quiet pleasures of private life rather than training them for a selfless communal life.

Although Numa's rule is contrary to Plato's ideal, he is himself, at least in his private life, very much a Platonic philosopher king in that he is more philosopher than king: "he spent the most part of his time performing divine service, instructing the priests, or conversing with them on divine subjects" (*Numa* 14.1). These Pythagorean expressions suggest the study of philosophy. Numa spent more time in private study than in public office. He wrote books on religion and philosophy (*Numa* 22.6), secretly teaching both to his priests (*Numa* 22.2). Partly under the guise of holy service, Numa was secretly discussing and teaching philosophy to a group of philosopher priests. Deemed by all the "priest-king",[7] he was in fact more a philosopher high priest than a philosopher king. This private life of the philosopher king is borrowed from the *Republic* (540a). A class of student philosophers would be set apart, Socrates suggests, at the age of fifteen to be educated until fit to rule. These students neither work nor go to war; their time is spent in learning. Like Numa's priests,[8] not only do they study astronomy, mathematics, and philosophy, they also learn how to govern through noble lies: a philosopher king must instigate and uphold superstitions that instill a great regard for the laws. At the age of fifty, these philosophers will, each in turn, consent to emerge from this Epicurean

[7] Stadter (2002).

[8] Their method of lighting a fire from the rays of the sun implied some knowledge and instruments of geometric. The Vestals might have been the guardians of these instruments (*Numa* 9 and *Camillus* 20).

garden, so to speak, to rule the city for a term (*Republic* 540). There is, then, in the *Numa* as in the *Republic*, a philosophical haven in the heart of a well-organized city, and what Plato says of this haven in a few laconic lines—he never describes how this class of philosophers actually deal with the people and how they publicly go about their business—Plutarch describes at length in the vivid story of Numa. What is difficult to decipher in Plato is made explicit in Plutarch. In this way, our clever reader of Plato is a precious commentator, and his Numa, within this haven, very much fits Plato's description of the philosopher king.

But when Numa emerges from his temple and palace, as we have seen, he does not consent, as does Plato's philosopher king, to rule over a thumotic regime. Numa is a philosopher king who would still be a philosopher when king. This philosopher high priest rather brings forth into the forum some inkling of the private life he so cherishes, and shares his life of peace with his countrymen. In *Numa* 20.4–5 Plutarch tells us :

> For not only had the people of Rome itself been softened and charmed into a peaceful temper by the just and mild rule of a pacific prince, but even the neighbouring cities, as if some salubrious and gentle air had blown from Rome upon them, began to experience a change of feeling, and partook in the general longing for the sweets of peace and order, and for life employed in the quiet tillage of soil, bringing up of children, and worship of the gods. Festival days and sports, and the secure and peaceful interchange of friendly visits and hospitalities prevailed all through the whole of Italy. The love of virtue and justice flowed from Numa's wisdom as from a fountain, and the serenity of his spirit diffused itself, like a calm, on all sides.

This picture is sweet indeed, but if Rome had continued after Numa to live under such a gentle rule, it would have been weakened to the point of vulnerability and would never have become Rome, the head of an empire. Numa put Rome on the road to private happiness and political weakness. His idyllic Rome is far removed from the highly disciplined city Socrates and Glaukon agree upon in the *Republic*.

As for Sparta, here again historical reality belies the philosophical model in Plato's *Republic*. Sparta, of course, displays much political virtue and unity but without the presence of any philosopher king. The Spartan kings will not be philosophers under the new constitution; they are not the wise fountain from which will flow just laws and a good regime. On the contrary, the Spartan kings are said to be the main cause, through avarice, for the feverish state of the city, and Lycurgus

will resolve to weaken the kingship.[9] He establishes a regime where no philosopher king will rule and where no philosophy is taught. Indeed, he draws up a permanent constitution by which a fixed mechanism of checks and balances renders the philosopher king superfluous. Sparta may have learned to *practice* love of wisdom (φιλοσοφία) but did not study it: "Lycurgus, […] by the example of a whole city *practicing* love of wisdom, raised himself high above all other lawgivers of Greece." (*Lycurgus* 31.3—italics are mine) Sparta had so little need of the direct and continual government of a wise man that Lycurgus leaves the city forever, precisely to insure a enduring stability to his regime: "When he perceived that his more important institutions had taken root in the minds of his countrymen, that *custom* had rendered them familiar and easy, that his commonwealth was now grown up and able to go alone" (*Lycurgus* 29—italics are mine), he made his citizens swear they would not change his laws without his consent. He then left for Delphi and disappeared forever, or so it seems. Far from proving Plato's contention that the best regime is the one ruled by the philosopher king, the Spartan regime seems to prove quite the opposite: the best regime is one that maintains itself without philosophy.

And so we have quite a paradox: Sparta is said to be the ideal republic but has no ruling philosopher king, and Numa is said to be the ideal king but is not maintaining the ideal republic as Plato saw it. Plato's philosopher king does not appear in the *Lycurgus* nor in the *Numa*. Each of these two *Lives*, then, is a partial implementation of Plato's *Republic*, and as such, each has fatal and opposite shortcomings. Moreover, the demanding communal life of Sparta is at odds with the sweet private life of Rome: Numa's rule is very erotic compared to Lycurgus' thumotic regime. The erotic elements of Plato's ideal republic have been extracted to compose Numa's Rome, while the remaining thumotic elements compose Lycurgus' Sparta. Like the two poles of a magnet, Numa, the philosopher king, and Sparta, the best regime, repel each other and yet Plato's *Republic* would have them come together, like the two halves of an apple, to compose the one ideal regime. This ten-

[9] One might wish to argue here, in considering Lycurgus' wise reforms, that he was, for all practical purposes, a philosopher king, but it would seem truer to say that he was only a clever legislator. Although he became wise and learned through his travels, he never studied philosophy as such, and though he did become king, he quickly abdicated the throne and would only intervene as an omnipotent legislator.

sion between the erotic and the thumotic elements, a tension found both in state and soul alike, is imperceptible in the *Republic*, and here again Plutarch helps us by magnifying what is undiscernible. But is it in order to highlight his disagreement? Do Plutarch's two biographies show Socrates' single regime to be an impossible dream? Is Plutarch objecting to Plato's *Republic*?

Two Different Fevers

A word quoted from Plato may suggest a partial explanation. Prior to the reforms, the two cities, Sparta and Rome, were suffering from two different *fevers*. In qualifying early Sparta and early Rome as "feverish" (*Lycurgus* 5.10, *Numa* 8.2), Plutarch mentions Plato as his source, and indeed Plato speaks of a *feverish* (φλεγμαίνουσαν) state in the *Republic* (372e, cf. *Laws* 691e). But Sparta and Rome, in their early stages, as we see, are feverish for different and contrary reasons. In ancient Sparta, the kings were oppressing the poor and all of Sparta was feverish for luxury; ancient Rome on the other hand was born and bred on the battlefield and was feverish for conquest. The national mood, character, or soul of ancient Sparta and Rome were in opposition: Sparta was shamefully *erotic*, Rome was dreadfully *thumotic*. But both will meet their tutor. Through chance events, both Sparta and Rome are blessed with the right man at the right time. Licentious Sparta needed a stern legislator while belligerent Rome required a self-gratifying king. Lycurgus and Numa each implement reforms that mirror their particular character. Thus, Sparta is made to reflect Lycurgus' soul, and Rome, Numa's. Indeed, Lycurgus tore the Spartans from their love of riches: there would be no more feasts in private for the rich, no more coins of great value, no more luxurious furniture. And Sparta would remain strong and glorious as long as it kept its avarice in check; only centuries later would the fever return, when military victories in Asia Minor brought gold to Sparta and corrupted the citizens once again. As for Rome, it was too aggressive under Romulus and bent only on war. Numa turned swords into ploughshares and made the Romans taste the joys of domestic life. Rome would flourish in virtue and in happiness during Numa's reign. But the following king, Tullus, opened the gates of Janus and turned the people of Rome back to war and glorious victories. In time, Rome, like Sparta, fell back into its particular vice.

This parallel or *syncritic* reading[10] affords a partial answer to our question: the ideal republic and the ideal ruler requires a synthesis of both *Lives*. But this reading, however revealing, is still incomplete and must be carried one step further. Although it might suggest why Numa's Rome is not thumotic, it does not explain why Plutarch gives Numa the title of genuine philosopher king. In "transferring Plato's ideas into history", Plutarch departs slightly from the Platonic ideal and substitutes his less than ideal version of the philosopher king for Plato's. We have yet to explain why "Plutarch found Plato's ideal state too strict and uncompromising."[11]

The Marriage of Greek and Roman Virtues

In their very style, the *Lives* present an author who is part Greek philosopher and part Roman historian. This biographer of great men is writing for his times: imperial rule made original political virtue impossible and forbade any suggestion of educating philosopher kings. Philosophers who wished to influence mores had to proceed discreetly and through accepted channels. One of these was the teachings of wise priests, a Pythagorean method used by Numa. But not only was Plutarch prevented from replicating Plato's education of philosopher kings, he did not wish to do so for the same reason he did not copy his style. As Plutarch explains himself: "Plato wrote a book on the One Ideal Constitution, but because of its forbidding character he could not persuade anyone to adopt it."[12] In the Roman Empire, where Greek intellectualism came second to Roman power, he wished to bring the Platonic ideal down from its Greek intellectual acropolis closer to the Roman forum. Wisdom and virtue must speak in a persuasive tone of voice amidst the clamour of the city. For this reason Lycurgus relied on music and poetry, Numa on religion, and Plutarch on his charming biographies. Through this "genuine human education",[13] the *Pax*

[10] On the notion of *syncrisis* in Plutarch's *Lives*, see Pelling (1986) 83–96; Swain (1992) 101–111; Duff (1996) 141–162.
[11] De Blois & Bons (1992) 165.
[12] Plutarch, *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*, 328d–e. See the commentary of this quote in De Blois & Bons (1992) 165.
[13] Schneeweiss (1979) 382. Plutarch might better apply philosophy to education than other philosophers.

Romana would afford the best of eras by combining "the beautiful and illustrious Athens" and "the invincible and glorious Rome" (*Theseus* 1.5).

Plutarchean syncrisis in these *Lives* suggest, then, the need to combine the Greek character with the Roman. Although Plutarch does depict Greek and Roman virtues as distinct—his Theseus and Romulus stand as their archetypes—Plutarch will sometimes show a Roman to be quite Greek, as with Cicero, and a Greek to be quite Roman, as with Phocion—the latter is a graceful fusion of these two virtues, the former a rather unsatisfactory one. In comparing Greek and Roman figures, this teacher of the new Roman soul was proposing the marriage of the Greek mind and the Roman spirit. And there is no greater cross-matching of the two virtues than in the *Lives of Lycurgus and Numa:* no Greek is more Roman than Lycurgus, and no Roman more Greek than Numa. The question raised by Plutarch is not "Which one is preferable?" but "How does one bring together the best of both?" Theseus and Romulus gave birth to two states, or rather they each impregnated a state with their soul, the one being thumotic in the main, the latter, erotic. But in their first years, Sparta and Rome would acquire, through the wise reforms of Lycurgus and Numa, the complementary virtue they needed to become whole, and wholesome.

Conclusion

Is Numa, then, the genuine philosopher king? The basic agreement that binds Plutarch to Plato on this question is the suggestion that "the power of a king and the wisdom of a philosopher" (*Numa* 20.9) must meet in one. But this principle is not interpreted and applied in the same way. In his political rule, Numa departs from Plato's ideal to serve Plutarch's instead: "it is in this [...] Life of an almost utopian ruler [...] that Plutarch could freely express his views on the good ruler."[14] Numa is Plutarch's view of the good ruler. But Plutarch's realism is not Machiavellian realism, nor is Plato's idealism Neo-Platonist: both authors mix the ideal and the real, albeit in opposite proportions. Plato's philosopher king is so very ideal that his rule only existed in "mere projects and words" (*Lycurgus* 32.2). Plutarch's philosopher king did reign for forty long years until his peaceful death. Of course, Numa's reign was

[14] De Blois & Bons (1992) 160.

a blessing from the gods and owed much to Fortune.[15] In the ordinary course of events, states are troubled by continual political strife and frequent wars. Numa could not have deterred foreign attacks much longer with prayers alone. Yet, by giving the philosopher king a greater footing in reality, by "transferring Plato's theory of ideas to history", Plutarch provides us with a more accessible ideal. In this, Plutarch writes for all times.

In these *Lives*, and in their syncrisis, Plutarch teaches us that it is through some form of dialectics of the soul that we must search for the best regime. It is in this way that this teacher of souls and of states is, to my mind, a great man. Not great like Alexander was great, or Caesar, or some other Greek or Roman figure. Plutarch is great because he knows about these great souls, and because he knows that others—we—need to read about them, about Lycurgus and Numa, in order to find the best regime and the best life.

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[15] See Plutarch, *The Fortune of the Romans* 321b–e.

PLUTARCH AND THE "LIBERATION OF GREECE"

Jan Maarten Bremer

Plutarch is not an uncritical biographer.[1] Not only do his "rogue-heroes" come in for severe criticism—one thinks of the couples Demetrius & Antonius, and Lysander & Sulla—there are quite a few others who receive a rap on their knuckles. But his *Lives* of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus come close to hagiography. A clear sign of this is that he selected two admirable Greek heroes as their "parallels": Philopoimen as counterpart of Flamininus, and Timoleon of Aemilius Paullus.

One would have expected Plutarch to mark more distance from these two Roman commanders as it was *they* who prepared the way for the complete domination of Greece by the Romans. When he composed these *Lives* he had a profound knowledge of the history of Greece in relation to Rome.[2] He knew better than most Greeks of his day that their forefathers had had a very hard time under the Romans from 146 BC onwards; Roman proconsuls had filled their coffers and their villas with the treasures of Greece, Roman tax-farmers (*publicani*) had exploited the economic resources of the Greek cities and countryside, Roman armies had fought their battles on Greek soil, the most catastrophic for the Greeks being Sulla's campaign against the troops of Mithridates in 97–96 BC.[3] It is true that in Plutarch's own day the Greeks had learned to live with the reality of Roman domination which was not unpleasant in so far as it guaranteed them peace and prosperity. But Plutarch knew that the magistrate of a Greek *polis* did not wield any real power. As every Greek city was subject to the Roman *proconsul*, the local magistrate had simply to act the part written for him

[1] Christopher Pelling has helpfully given a critical reading to this paper and suggested some improvements. By sending me her paper Suzanne Said helped me to relate the last part of mine to hers.

[2] Plutarch composed his series of *Parallel Lives* between AD 95–120, the last twenty-five years of his long life: see Jones (1966) 74.

[3] Plutarch reports Sulla's impudent robberies of the sanctuaries in Olympia, Epidauros and especially Delphi (*Sulla* 12.5–9), and his sack of Athens (*ibidem* 14.5–7). About the rapacity of Roman governors in general he is explicit in *Cato Maior* 6.2–4 and *Cic.* 52.3.

by the powers-that-be, and to imitate actors who act their part listening to the prompter.[4] Why, then, was Plutarch so full of admiration for these two Roman commanders who had established Roman power in and over Greece? To this question I present four answers, of which the first, second and third, although not new, are nevertheless worth repeating here; the fourth has not been suggested earlier. Plutarch himself would certainly agree with the first three. Perhaps he would be surprised by the fourth and agree with it in the end.

They were men of high moral standing

A first reason for his admiration is certainly that Plutarch considered both Roman commanders to be men of high moral standing. Participants of this conference do not need to be reminded that his intention in composing biographies is in the first place an ethical one. In his *proemium* to *Aemilius Paullus and Timoleon* he makes this intention even more clear than elsewhere:[5]

> By concentrating upon this kind of inquiry and engaging ourselves in the writing of it we instruct ourselves as we store in our souls the memories of the most excellent and famous men. If the engagement with the past confronts us with something vile, immoral or less than noble, we can shake that off and direct our minds to the noblest paradigms of virtue. From this group of eminent men I now have selected for you the lives of Timoleon the Corinthian and of Aemilius Paullus, men who by the moral choices they made, as well as by the happy outcome of their actions, will bring us to ask ourselves whether their splendid results may have been reached by their good luck more than by their moral wisdom.[6]

Plutarch admires Aemilius' restraint as he never touched any of the Macedonian treasures (28), he praises his independence of mind, as he

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[4] *Praec.* 813E–F. See the discussion by Lukas de Blois in vol. I, pp. 30–34.

[5] Plutarch insists on the moral purposes of his biographical activity also in *Alexander* 1.1–3, *Nicias* 1.5, *Pericles* 1.4–2.4. For a thorough discussion of these (and some other) passages see Duff (1999) 14–42.

[6] *Proem.* 5–6: ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆι περὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν διατριβῆι καὶ τῆς γραφῆς τῆι συνηθείαι παρασκευάζομεν ἑαυτοὺς τὰς τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ δοκιμωτάτων μνήμας ὑποδεχομένους ἀεὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, εἴ τι φαῦλον ἢ κακόηθες ἢ ἀγεννὲς αἱ τῶν συνόντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁμιλίαι προσβάλλουσιν, ἐκκρούειν καὶ διωθεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἀποστρέφοντες τὴν διανοίαν. ὧν ἐν τῶι παρόντι προκεχειρίσμεθά σοι τὸν Τιμολέοντος τοῦ Κορινθίου καὶ τὸν Αἰμιλίου Παύλου βίον, ἀνδρῶν οὐ μόνον ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς τύχαις ἀγαθαῖς ὁμοίως κεχρημένων ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ διαμφισβήτησιν παρεξόντων, πότερον εὐποτμίαι μᾶλλον ἢ φρόνησει τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πεπραγμένων κατώρθωσαν.

never went out of his way to win the favour of the Roman people (38), he praises his moral courage in bearing the loss of his two younger sons (36), and he ends his *synkrisis* by saying that Aemilius is morally perfect to an even higher degree.[7]

About Flamininus Plutarch is equally enthusiastic, describing him as generous, persuasive and mild in his encounters with the Greeks, and keen on administering justice.[8] He stresses the strength of Flamininus' ambition[9] but does not blame him for it at all: as long as his activities were concerned with, first, warfare in Greece and then pacification of Greece, everybody kept admiring him.[10] Flamininus showed the evil side of this ambition only at the end of his life, when he hounded the old Hannibal to death.[11]

In a passage of his *Sulla* Plutarch takes Flamininus and Aemilius together when comparing the rapacious and sacrilegious Sulla with their piety and generosity: "they had not only spared the sanctuaries of the Greeks, but had even made additional gifts, greatly increasing their honour and dignity."[12] To wind up this point: Plutarch's admiration for Aemilius and Flamininus is certainly in large part determined by what he judged to be their moral excellence.

They were philhellenes

A second reason for Plutarch to express such admiration for the two Roman conquerors may have been that he considers them to be bearers or perhaps even promoters of Greek language and culture. In a carefully constructed sentence Plutarch describes the impression made by Flamininus upon the Greeks:

> From the Macedonians they had heard that a potentate was approaching who commanded a barbarian army and subdued and enslaved all and everyone by force of arms. But when they met him and found him to be a man young in years, humane in aspect, a Greek in voice and

[7] φαίνεται τελειότερος ὁ Αἰμίλιος (*Comp. Aem. et Tim.* 2.10).

[8] πρὸς τὰς χάριτας τελεσιουργός (*Flam.* 1.2)—ἐντυγχάνοντί τε προσῆν πιθανότης καὶ πραιότης ἐντυγχανομένωι καὶ τόνος πλεῖστος ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων (*ibidem* 2.5).

[9] φιλότιμος γὰρ ὢν ἰσχυρῶς *Flam.* 7.1.

[10] τὸ δ ᾿ οὖν φύσει Τίτου φιλότιμον ἄχρι μὲν ἱκανὴν εἶχεν ὕλην περὶ τοὺς εἰρημένους πολέμους διατρίβοντος, εὐδοκίμει *Flam.* 20.1.

[11] For this see Pelling (2002) 351–352.

[12] οὐ μόνον ἀπέσχοντο τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δῶρα καὶ τιμὴν αὐτοῖς καὶ σεμνότητα πολλὴν προσέθεσαν (*Sulla* 12.10).

> language and a lover of true honour, they were wonderfully enchanted, and returning to their cities they filled them with goodwill towards him and with the belief that in him they had found the champion of their liberty.[13]

It is another matter whether Flamininus was really a philhellene, in the sense that he greatly cared for Greek culture. I quote Badian:

> It is difficult to see how the myth of his being an educated Greek by nature and inclination ever got into the modern tradition. There are simply no facts to give it the slightest support. He was a traditional Roman aristocrat, in that he enjoyed ruling over those who possessed culture—he preferred it to having culture himself (...). His bronze statue in Rome, which Plutarch still saw, had a Greek inscription; it was certainly the first instance of this in the city, and it was clearly done to advertise not his learning, but his *clientelae*.[14]

As for Aemilius, Plutarch records (6.9) that he had his sons educated the Greek way: they were made familiar not only with the Greek language but also with rhetoric; sculptors and painters introduced them to Greek art. Plutarch also tells us that after his victory over Perseus Aemilius did not select anything out of Perseus's treasures for himself but "allowed his men to set only Perseus' library apart, for his letter-loving sons to have and to use."[15] With special emphasis he notes that Aemilius made a touristic trip through Greece in which Delphi and Olympia occupied pride of place.[16] As final proof of his philhellenism Plutarch points to the lavish festival Aemilius organized to celebrate his victory and the new state of affairs in Greece. This festival took place at Amphipolis and included athletic games, musical performances, lavish symposia, everything the Greek way.[17] It is evident that Plutarch reports these details because he wanted to stress that Aemilius, for all his Roman severity and sternness of character, was a well-educated man with a

[13] ἀκούοντες γὰρ τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων βαρβάρων στρατίας ἔπεισι δι' ὅπλων πάντα καταστρεφόμενος καὶ δουλούμενος, εἶτα ἀπαντῶντες ἀνδρὶ τήν τε ἡλικίαν νέωι καὶ τὴν ὄψιν φιλανθρώπωι, φωνήν τε καὶ διάλεκτον Ἕλληνι καὶ τιμῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐραστῆι, θαυμασίως ἐκηλοῦντο, καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀπιόντες ἐνεπίμπλασαν εὐνοίας τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς ἐχούσας ἡγεμόνα τῆς ἐλευθερίας (*Flam.* 5.7).

[14] Badian (1970) 55.

[15] μόνα τὰ βιβλία τοῦ βασιλέως φιλογραμματοῦσι τοῖς υἱέσιν ἐπέτρεψεν ἐξελέσθαι (*Aem.* 28.11).

[16] αὐτὸν πρὸς θέαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔτρεψε (*Aem.* 28.1). Livy 45. 27–28 gives full details about Aemilius' voyage through Greece: Delphi, Lebadia, Chalkis, Aulis, Oropos, Athens, Corinth, Sicyon, Argos, Epidaurus, Sparta, Megalopolis, and Olympia.

[17] For the "Greek profile" of the festival at Amphipolis see *Aem.* 28.7–8; also Livy 45.32.8–11 and Ferrary (1988) 560–565.

sincere interest in Greece and what it had to offer, not only venerable sanctuaries and age-old works of art, but also a pleasant way of life.

But as in the case of Flamininus, one may wonder if Aemilius was not in the first, second and third place a Roman. We do not know whether he took care to speak Greek with the Greeks he met; but we *do* know from Livy that before the festival at Amphipolis Aemilius went through a ceremony in which he proclaimed the political settlement of all things Macedonian and Greek; he took care to conduct *that* ceremony in the Roman way and to pronounce his final speech in *Latin.*[18]

Whatever may be our final verdict about the deeper strata of the philhellenism of both Roman commanders (much depends on how one defines philhellenism), Plutarch certainly wanted his readers to believe that these two men were dedicated to the interests of the Greeks and respected their culture and religious traditions.

They had come to liberate the Greeks

A third reason for Plutarch's admiration was his belief that Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus had liberated the Greeks from being ruled by a tyrannical Macedonian king. Now Philip V was indeed a harsh and ruthless ruler who did not care for justice or clemency and had failed to win the sympathy of the Greeks, so much is clear from Polybius.[19] As for Perseus, the Romans[20] certainly hated him: they considered him to be a ruthless schemer who used *mafioso* means to attain his ends. Plutarch adopts this negative appreciation of Perseus and uses Perseus as a despicable counterpart to the virtuous Aemilius; he describes him as mean and avaricious (8.10; 12.3–8), as a coward on the battlefield (19.4), and as wretched and abject after his defeat (26.9). But Polybius is there to

[18] *Adsuetis regio imperio tamen novi imperii formam terribilem praebuit tribunal (…) insueta omnia oculis auribusque, quae vel socios, nedum hostis victos terrere possent. Silentio per praeconem facto Paullus Latine, quae senatui, quae sibi ex consilii sententia visa essent, pronuntiavit. Ea Cn. Octavius praetor interpretata sermone Graeco referebat.* (45. 29, 2–3).

[19] Polybius 25.3: Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεύς, ὅτε μὲν ηὐξήθη καὶ τὰ κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξουσίαν ἔλαβε, πάντων ἦν ἀπιστότατος καὶ παρανομώτατος. Walbank (1940) 260: "Often cruel and always unscrupulous, he was never handicapped by sentiment; this wilfulness was liable to blind him to the psychological reactions of the Greeks" etc.

[20] In 171 BC the Romans addressed the Delphic Amphictyons with a long list of accusations directed at Perseus: *SIG* 643. Eumenes II of Pergamon had helped them in forming this bad opinion about Perseus: Livy 42.11–13.

inform us that at the beginning of his reign Perseus became quite popular with the Greeks by proclaiming a sort of amnesty; and that, when he had defeated the Romans in a cavalry battle at Larissa, there was a wave of enthusiasm all over Greece.[21] Perhaps for the Greeks Perseus was not so oppressive at all. However this may have been, one thing is sure: in both cases the Roman commanders succeeded in defeating the Macedonian kings by an incontestable victory on the battle-field; Flamininus did so at Kynoskephalai in 197 BC and Aemilius Paullus in the battle of Pydna in 168 BC. These victories meant the end of the power of Macedonian kings over Greece, definitively. The Roman commanders, especially Flamininus, made much of the point that they had come as *liberators*. Which meaning did the Greeks, and Plutarch himself, attribute to these historical facts, and to the word "liberty"?

Plutarch wants to convince us that the Greeks were enthusiastic about their "liberator" Flamininus. Having narrated the declaration of freedom for all Greeks at the Isthmian Games of 196 BC, a declaration followed by an enormous roar of enthusiasm in the theater,[22] Plutarch continues with a passage in which he pretends to record the words and thoughts of the Greeks:

> When they were tired of shouting around his (*i.e.* Flamininus') tent, and night had already come, they greeted and embraced whomsoever they met, be they friends or fellow-citizens, and shared food and drink with them. Doing this, they became of course even more euphoric and started taking stock of the present situation of their country and exchanging views about it: "How many wars have we not fought for the sake of freedom? But never have we obtained anything so solid and enjoyable as the present freedom. This time *others* have fought on our behalf, and almost without a drop of blood or a pang of grief have we gained the fairest and most enviable prize of all. (…) Commanders like Agesilaus, Lysander, Nicias, Alcibiades knew how to obtain victories on land and at sea, but they did *not* know to use these victories for a noble popularity and for the common good. Except for the battles against the Persians we have fought time and again *against ourselves* in order to reduce other Greeks to slavery, and all trophies hitherto erected stand there as sign-posts of disaster and disgrace to ourselves (…). But this time men have come who are no Greeks at all, although it is said that they have small

[21] Polybius 25.3 about the result of Perseus' amnesty: ταῦτα δὲ ποίησας πολλοὺς ἐμετεώρισε, δοκῶν καλὰς ἐλπίδας ὑποδείκνυναι πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐν αὐτῶι. In 27.9 Polybius describes the reaction of the Greeks to Perseus' victory: τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἱππομαχίαν φήμης μετὰ τὴν νίκην τῶν Μακεδόνων εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διηγγελθείσης ἐξέλαμψε καθαπερεὶ πῦρ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τὸν Περσέα διάθεσις.

[22] κραυγὴ ἄπιστος (*Flam.* 10.7).

> sparks and tiny elements of common descent. It would have been amazing if Hellas had received from them any helpful word or intention at all; but lo and behold: they have undergone the greatest perils and hardships to set us free from harsh masters and tyrants; they are our liberators.[23]

In reporting all this as the *vox populi Graeci*, Plutarch follows Polybius and Livy,[24] but in view of Plutarch's emotional amplification of this theme we may accept that here he himself is speaking, ruminating about the history of his own country.[25] Here, if anywhere, one has to read the two parallel *Lives* as a whole, taking into account the *synkrisis* as well. For it is Philopoimen's contentiousness (*philonikia / philoneikia*) which has led to so many military campaigns against his fellow-Greeks:

> If one examines critically the battles fought by each of these two, then Philopoimen, as commander of the Achaeans, has killed more fellow-Greeks than Titus killed Macedonians when he came to the rescue of the Greeks.[26]

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[23] ὡς δ' ἀπέκαμον περὶ τὴν σκηνὴν αὐτοῦ βοῶντες ἤδη νυκτὸς οὔσης, αὖθις οὕστινας ἴδοιεν ἢ φίλους ἢ πολίτας ἀσπαζόμενοι καὶ περιπλεκόμενοι, πρὸς δεῖπνα καὶ πότους ἐτρέποντο μετ ' ἀλλήλων. Ἐν ὧι καὶ μᾶλλον, ὡς εἰκός, ἡδομένοις ἐπήιει λογίζεσθαι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅσους πολεμήσασα πολέμους διὰ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν οὔπω τύχοι βεβαιότερον οὐδὲ ἥδιον αὐτῆς, ἑτέρων προαγωνισαμένων ὀλίγου δεῖν ἀναίμακτος αὐτὴ καὶ ἀπένθης φερομένη τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ περιμαχητότατον ἆθλον (...) Οἱ γὰρ Ἀγησίλαοι καὶ Λύσανδροι καὶ οἱ Νικίαι καὶ οἱ Ἀλκιβιάδαι πολέμους μὲν εὖ διέπειν καὶ μάχας νικᾶν κατά τε γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν ἄρχοντες ἠπίσταντο, χρῆσθαι δὲ πρὸς χάριν εὐγενῆ καὶ τὸ καλὸν οἷς κατώρθουν οὐκ ἔγνωσαν, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ Μαραθώνιον τις ἔργον ἀφέλοι καὶ τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν καὶ Πλαταιὰς καὶ Θερμοπύλας (...), πάσας τὰς μάχας ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ δουλείαι μεμάχηται πρὸς αὑτήν, καὶ πᾶν τρόπαιον αὐτῆς συμφορὰ καὶ ὄνειδος ἐπ ' αὐτὴν ἕστηκε (...) ἀλλόφυλοι δὲ ἄνδρες ἐναύσματα μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα κοινωνήματα παλαιοῦ γένους ἔχειν δοκοῦντες, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ λόγωι τι καὶ γνώμηι τῶν χρησίμων ὑπάρξαι τῆι Ἑλλάδι θαυμαστὸν ἦν, οὗτοι τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις καὶ πόνοις ἐξελόμενοι τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεσποτῶν χαλεπῶν καὶ τυράννων ἐλευθεροῦσι. (*Flam.* 11.2–7).

[24] Eckstein (1990) 57 points out that already Polybius (18.46.12–15) and Livy (32.21.36 and 33.33.5) introduce Greeks who express their amazement about "these Romans crossing the sea, bearing financial burdens, and running every risk for the sake of our freedom".—There is historiographic and epigraphic evidence for honours paid to Flamininus as "liberator" in various cities: at Corinth (Livy 34.50.9; *BCH* 83 [1964] 608), at Gytheum (*SIG* 592), at Argos (*BCH* 83 [1964] 570), at Chalcis (Plut. *Flam.* 16.5–7), at Larissa (*SIG* 613). The most telling proof of the gratitude felt by the Greeks for their liberator is the fact that the Achaeans ransomed all Roman citizens who during the 2nd Punic war had been made captive and bought on the slave market by Greek masters; they sent them as free men back to Rome for Flamininus' triumph: Livy 34.50.5–7; Plut., *Flam.*13.5–9.

[25] Here I follow Jones (1971) 98: "this passage appears to be his own concoction." Similarly Swain (1990) 127, n.5: "*Flam.* 11 does represent Plutarch's own thoughts, but the words are dramatized as those of the Greeks following Flamininus' proclamation of Greek liberty at Corinth."

[26] Εἰ δέ τις ἐξετάζοι τὰς μάχας ἑκατέρου, πλείους Ἕλληνας Φιλοποίμην Ἀχαίων στρα-

Historians have discussed in detail whether Flamininus' ideology of liberation was sincere or not,[27] and whether it was thought out by himself, or inspired by the Greeks he met in the years of his Greek campaign.[28] But in stressing Flamininus' role as liberator Plutarch could not have been more positive.

They had liberated the Greek elite from social unrest

Is it possible that there was a fourth reason for Plutarch to write the *Lives* of these two Romans with such thankful admiration? I think there is one, which is essentially a variation of the third: I suggest that Plutarch, who belonged himself to the class of landowning notables,[29] felt gratitude for the liberation of the Greek élite from all social unrest. A starting point for thinking about this possible fourth reason can be found in Livy, who informs us that Flamininus, in reorganizing Greek political life in the cities of Thessaly,

> selected persons to be judges and members of the council of the cities *according to the census*, *i.e.* on the basis of their income; on the whole he gave superior power to that part of the citizens who were interested in the continuity and tranquillity of things.[30]

Another passage in Livy contains the same message in ruder words; the speaker is Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, who says to Flamininus:

> What you Romans want is that there should be a few rich people at the top, and that the people be ruled by them.[31]

τηγῶν ἢ Μακεδόνας Τίτος Ἕλλησι βοηθῶν ἀνεῖλε. (*Comp. Phil. et Flam.* 1.4).

[27] The title chosen by Badian (1970) is eloquent enough; more recently there are Walsh's paper (1996), Ferrary's massive monograph (1988) and the compact discussion by Günther (2000). They all agree that Flamininus was driven by Machiavellistic tactics rather than by naive philhellenism. Günther (2000) 127: "*Er hat als erster römischer Feldherr die Bedeutsamkeit der 'Freiheit der Griechen' als das wesentliche politische Instrument römischer Dominanz begriffen.*"

[28] Eckstein (1990) argues that it was the Achaeans, more especially their *strategos* Aristainos who inspired Flamininus to use the theme of *eleutheria*. Walsh (1996) points out that already before Flamininus entered the Greek stage Philip V of Macedon in his approach to the Greek cities occasionally used the same *eleutheria* propaganda.

[29] Jones (1971) 9–10.

[30] Livy 34.51.6: *a censu maxime et senatum et iudices legit, potentioremque eam partem civitatium fecit cui salva et tranquilla omnia esse expediebat.* After 146 BC, the end of the Bellum Achaicum, the same régime was imposed by Mummius on all Greek cities: δημοκρατίας μὲν κατέπαυε, καθίστατο δὲ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων τὰς ἀρχάς (Paus. 7.16.9).

[31] Livy 34.31.17: *paucos excellere opibus, plebem subiectam esse illis vultis.*

The history of the Greek city-states is dominated for a large part by the struggle in each community between the few rich and the many poor. This socio-economic problem became more serious in the Hellenistic period as the centralized power of the Diadochoi and the widened commercial possibilities enabled kings and certain private individuals to amass vast fortunes and a large proportion of the arable areas. There was a widespread feeling that things could not go on this way; and in fact they didn't. There were numerous attempts at revolution,[32] the most striking example being the social reform realized in Sparta by (first) Agis and (then) Kleomenes. As a result of this,

> agitation had become rife among the Achaeans and the cities were eager for revolt, the common people expecting division of land and abolition of debts.[33]

There is evidence, which suggests that in the eyes of the well-to-do-Greeks as well as the Romans, both Philip V of Macedon and his successor Perseus took advantage of this tense climate by moving away from the propertied classes and seeking support from the have-nots.[34] The sympathies of the senatorial government of the Romans could be expected to be on the side of the upper classes in the Greek cities.

> It was inevitable that they should turn to the upper classes of the cities, the landowners and merchants who themselves stood to gain from settled conditions. In time, Roman influence brought about constitutional changes that perpetuated the power of the wealthy and excluded lesser citizens from the guidance of affairs. Democracies in name, the subject cities became in fact local aristocracies.[35]

This sympathy of the Romans for Greek upper class citizens was reciprocated.

> One thing was certain: that in the Greek cities the leading politicians and on the whole the upper class favoured joining hands with the Romans and enjoying the benefits of the *status quo*, and that the common people

[32] Cp. Fuks (1974) and Briscoe (1974). Cercidas' Meliamb 1 (Powell *Coll.Alex.* fr.4), composed by a Peloponnesian poet of ± 250 BC, seems to be an outcry for social justice.

[33] ἐγεγόνει δὲ κίνημα τῶν Ἀχαίων καὶ πρὸς ἀπόστασιν ὥρμησαν αἱ πόλεις, τῶν μὲν δήμων νομήν τε χώρας καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐλπισάντων κτλ. (*Cleom.* 17.3).

[34] For Philip V see Walbank (1940) 163–165; for Perseus see *SIG* 643, the precious document referred to above in n. 20, especially line 11: (Περσεὺς) διαφθείρων τοὺς προεστηκότας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὰ πλήθη θεραπεύων, χρεωκοπίας τε ἐπηγγέλλετο καὶ νεωτερισμούς ἐποίει, κατάδηλον ποιούμενος ἣν ἔχει προαίρεσιν πρός τε Ἕλληνας καὶ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους.

[35] Jones (1971) 110.

> who were not content with their present situation wanted a complete change of things.

This last statement does not come from Geoffrey de Ste. Croix' famous monograph on class struggle; it is Livy again, commenting upon the events of 192 BC.[36] This situation—of pro-Roman aristocrats on one hand and anti-Roman or at least unruly poorer citizens on the other—did not change radically in the following decades, and came to an end only with the defeat of the Achaean League and the sack of Corinth in 146 BC.[37] And not even then, for two years later, in 144 BC, a group of citizens of the city of Dyme, a small polis on the N. coast of the Peloponnesus, ventured to burn the local archives in order to introduce an abolition of all debts. Q. Fabius, the *proconsul* of Greece for that year, put them to death, because their innovations were incompatible "with the liberty which has been rendered to the Greeks and with our political intentions."[38] Liberty indeed! For the poorer citizens this meant the "liberty" to pay debts to their rich fellow-citizens. The situation has been summed up by—and now I do quote him—De Ste. Croix:

> Rome made sure that Greece was kept 'quiet' and friendly to her by ensuring that the cities were controlled by the wealthy class, which now had mainly given up any idea of resistance to Roman rule and in fact seems to have welcomed it for the most part, as an insurance against popular movements from below.[39]

So far I have spoken about tendencies, which can be observed in the relation between Romans and Greek upper class in general. What remains to be discussed is where Plutarch stands in these matters. I can limit myself to quoting from three scholars. In 1971 Jones wrote:

> So far from regretting the absence of freedom, Plutarch welcomes the restrictions imposed on the mob by Rome: as a member of a class whose position depended on external support, he had no reason to welcome the removal of Roman control.[40]

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[36] Livy 35.34.3: *constabat in civitatibus principes et optimum quemque Romanae societatis esse et praesenti statu gaudere, multitudinem et quorum res non ex sententiis ipsorum essent, omnia novare velle.*

[37] See Fuks (1970).

[38] τῆς ἀποδεδομένης κατὰ κοινὸν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας προαιρέσεως. These words are taken from Fabius' decree; the inscription (*SIG* 684) is discussed in Ferrary (1988) 186–199.

[39] De Ste. Croix (1981) 344.

[40] Jones (1971) 120.

In 1986 Christopher Pelling observed that in the Roman *Lives* Plutarch writes about the Roman politics of the Republican period with a continuous emphasis on, and fear of, the *demos*.[41] In the present collection of papers there is Suzanne Said's paper to prove that Plutarch was afraid of the lower classes. She makes the following striking observations: no less than a hundred times Plutarch refers to the people as "mob" (ὄχλος); in another context he qualifies the people as a "suspect and unstable wild animal."[42] He compares the relation of the political leader to the people he is supposed to lead to the relation of a doctor with his patients, of a captain to his ship, of a charioteer to his horses, even of a gardener to his plants. I suggest that we have here an additional reason for Plutarch's admiration for the two Roman commanders: in his eyes it may have been their lasting merit that they had made an end to a period in which the tranquillity and prosperity of Greek cities, more specifically the tranquillity and prosperity of the *ruling class of these cities*, were dangerously threatened by the subversive power of the *dêmos*, the common people.

[41] Pelling (2002) 225.
[42] *Praec.* 800C: θηρίον ὕποπτον καὶ ποικίλον.

PLUTARCH'S *AEMILIUS PAULLUS* AND THE MODEL OF THE PHILOSOPHER STATESMAN[1]

Lora Louise Holland

Plutarch states in the proem for the *Aemilius—Timoleon* pair that he saw in the subjects of his *Lives* a reflection of himself, analogous to looking into a mirror.[2] Though referring to his biographies in general, the statement's placement in this particular proem, along with the Roman life's priority in this particular pair, suggests the extraordinary appeal of Aemilius' life to the biographer. Lucius Aemilius Paullus, like Plutarch, had been a priest and a politician. On the other hand, he had also been, unlike Plutarch, a great military leader. In writing the *Life*, Plutarch emphasizes Aemilius' military accomplishments, especially his success against the Macedonian king, Perseus, at Pydna in 168 B.C.E., passing over most of his youth and early adulthood and mentioning only briefly his many political and religious offices and exploits. The question must then be asked, what reflection of himself did Plutarch see in Aemilius' military career?

We begin to answer the question by noting that he introduces the *Aemilius* by asserting that the namesake of the Aemilii, Mamercus, was the son of the philosopher Pythagoras, a statement found only in Plutarch. The assertion sets a theme for this *Life*: philosophy informed Aemilius' character. Previous analyses have shown how *phrontis* and *logos* inform the roles of *tychê* and *aretê* in the *Aemilius-Timoleon* pair, particu-

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[1] It is a pleasure to thank Philip Stadter for commenting on an earlier version of this paper, which originated in his graduate seminar on Plutarch's *Lives* in 1998, and in general for his excellent guidance and wisdom over the years, Gerhard Koeppel for fruitful discussion of the Aemilius Paullus monument at Delphi, the UNC- Chapel Hill Classics department for a travel grant to attend the *IPS* Conference in Nijmegen/Hernen, Bill Race for helpful comments on a draft of my abstract, the participants and staff of the Conference, and especially Lukas de Blois, both for an excellently organized and hospitable conference, and for his careful editing. The author maintains sole responsibility for the contents of this article.

[2] Philip Stadter has suggested in private correspondence that since Aemilius is a model to be imitated, Plutarch may be playing with the Latin word *aemulatio*. Plutarch also uses the mirror imagery in *Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus* 85B, and the *Regum et imperatorum apophthemata* 172D.

larly Swain's analysis of Fortune as a unifying theme and Ingenkamp's more recent article on the import of *aretê eutuchousa*, "a lucky excellence," in the life of Timoleon (*Timoleon* 36. 3). These studies have noted correlations between these *Lives* and Plutarch's philosophical stance in the *Moralia*, but there is a more concrete application to be made of the theme of philosophy.[3] This paper argues that in shaping the *Aemilius*, Plutarch portrays Aemilius himself as a philosopher by means of metaphorical imagery and anecdote.[4]

Even so, Plutarch was not the first in antiquity to ascribe to Paullus a philosophical aura. This is precisely how Cicero portrayed him, particularly in the *Somnium Scipionis* 14–16, though the historical sources generally do not claim Paullus as a philosopher statesman.[5] No commentator on the *Life*, to my knowledge, has noted Cicero's portrait of the man as a possible resource for or an influence on Plutarch's depiction. It is especially significant that both Cicero and Plutarch focus on three characteristics of the man—his emotional self-control, his religiosity, and his role as an instructor of the young—even though their respective portraits seem to have little in common at first glance. For instance, in the *Somnium*, Aemilius' divine spirit appears to his son as proof of the immortality of the soul. Aemilius plays a minor role in the dream, and no reference is made to the details of his life. Plutarch, of course, deals with both his life and his funeral, with the bulk of his narrative an account of the Battle of Pydna. He makes only brief reference to how he was regarded after his death (e.g. *Aemilius* 2. 3). Plutarch's portrait as a whole, however, offers some insight into his methodology and purpose in writing the *Lives*, and for this reason is an important topic for investigation *per se*. This study will be organized around the salient characteristics of Aemilius the philosopher, as Plutarch portrayed him, with reference to Cicero and to other sources, particularly Livy and Polybius, when pertinent.

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[3] The role of philosophy is only beginning to be explored in the *Vitae Parallelae*. For instance, Sulochana Asirvatham delivered a paper at the *APA* in 1998 entitled "Plutarch's Alexander and *Philosophia*," in which she focused on Plutarch's portrayal of Alexander as a Hellenizing philosopher in contrast to the semi-barbaric Macedonians.

[4] Beck's dissertation on Plutarch's use of anecdote does not focus on this life, but provides an excellent model for his treatment in general, especially how Plutarch creates his own *êthos* in the *Vitae Parallelae* in order to assert his authority onto the text.

[5] Modern scholarship on Aemilius Paullus has focused primarily on historical issues, and Reiter's account of the man does not mention Cicero's characterization at all.

Paullus qua *philosopher*

Many possible models of the philosopher were available to Plutarch upon which to fashion a characterization of Aemilius Paullus, if he so desired. Aemilius' genealogy in this *Life* suggests that Pythagoras would have been an appropriate choice, and indeed Plutarch's choice of certain anecdotes dealing with the mysteries of natural science and numbers, such as the hidden springs of water (*Aemilius* 14), the height of Mt. Olympus (*Aemilius* 15), or the lunar eclipse (*Aemilius* 17), may reflect Plutarch's desire to implicate Aemilius' character to some extent with the mysterious knowledge attributed to his famous philosophical forebear.[6] Socrates, not Pythagoras, however, was the philosopher Plutarch most admired. Hershbell (1988: 380), in summarizing the arguments for Plutarch's interest in Socrates in the corpus of his writings, follows Martin (1984: 87) in suggesting that "perhaps Plutarch regarded himself as Socrates' successor." The current paper argues that Plutarch modelled his Aemilius Paullus in large part as a Socrates figure; in this reflection of the man, he found much to admire, indeed, as if looking into a mirror, and he emphasizes particularly his self-control, his religiosity, and his desire to instruct the young.[7] Unlike the stronger and more explicit emphasis on Socrates in the lives of Aristides, Cato Minor and Phocion, Aemilius Paullus receives a subtle treatment. No obvious analogies between the lives of Socrates and Aemilius Paullus occur. Both men, however, acquitted themselves well in their military service, and perhaps this was enough. Plutarch certainly saw a parallel between the deaths of Socrates and Cato Minor; thus, his decision to endow yet another Roman with Socratic characteristics reveals the extent to which the biographer's interest in Socrates permeated even his *Roman Lives*.

Paullus also had a remembered presence at Delphi: he had come there after the Battle of Pydna and appropriated for himself a commemorative monument set up by Perseus next to the temple of Apollo (*Aemilius* 38. 2). Whether or not it was still completely intact by his day,

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[6] Plutarch's enthusiasm for Pythagoreanism is outlined by Dillon (1988) and (1996 [1977]) 186–187. Plutarch's digressions on these anecdotes focus on the conflict between scientific reasoning and the mysteries of the natural world.

[7] In the *Timoleon* there are no parallels for the emphasis on Aemilius' self-control, religiosity, or concern for the next generation. This suggests that these characteristics play an independent role in the *Aemilius*, and that the primary difference between Aemilius and Timoleon was not of their outward lives, but of the soul.

Plutarch knew of it and described it in detail; we may infer that it had a unique proximity to his daily duties.[8] Plutarch's account of the Battle of Pydna, scenes from which decorated a sculpted frieze on the monument itself,[9] consumes much of the *Life*, and it is primarily here that he develops his characterization of Aemilius as a philosopher. In this way Aemilius' military career is made to serve Plutarch's philosophical ends. He explicitly states that he cannot assign Paullus' conduct of the war against Perseus to Fortune but to his keen courage and excellent counsel (*Aemilius* 12. 1); this is substantiated by his detailed characterization of Aemilius during the Battle of Pydna.

The Good Helmsman

The steering ability of the helmsman and of the charioteer is often cited in philosophical discourse as a metaphor for the self-control of the philosophical man. Perhaps the most famous of these is Plato's analogy of the charioteer of the soul in the *Phaedrus*. Plutarch uses a metaphor to attribute such a control to Aemilius just before the onset of the fighting at Pydna when he is observing the activity of the two camps making their preparations:

> Ὁ μὲν οὖν Αἰμίλιος ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης τῷ παρόντι σάλῳ καὶ κινήματι τῶν στρατοπέδων τεκμαιρόμενος τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀγῶνος'
>
> (*Aemilius* 18, 7–10)
>
> Thus Aemilius, like a helmsman, judged by the present swell and movement of the armies the extent of the coming struggle.

[8] Plutarch's description of it coincides with the archaeological remains, and is the sole description of the monument's appearance after Paullus completed it. Polybius (30. 10) and Livy (45. 27) both cite its column and statue in the plural. Jacquemin & Laroche (1982) 208–211 explain the discrepancy by asserting that Paullus converted Perseus' triangular monument into a quadrangular shape: one was being torn down while the other was being constructed.

[9] The standard work on the friezes is Kähler (1965), who suggested that one bearded horseman was Paullus himself (17–18). Hafner supported this assertion (5–15), but Jacquemin & Laroche (1982) have concluded, after their close study of the fragmentary figure in question, that the figure wears a Macedonian cuirass (212). My tentative suggestion is that the figure might instead be Perseus, since depictions of the opposing commander were often conspicuously displayed in Roman historical reliefs, such as the portrait of the Dacian leader Decebalus on the Column of Trajan. Perseus' portrait (also wearing a beard) does exist on coins (e.g. British Museum B/1841/929), but the face on the frieze is too badly weathered to make the identification certain.

The statesman as helmsman for the ship of state is a common metaphor throughout Greek and Roman history, and indeed continues to our time, so providing the details of its occurrences in the literature is not necessary. In the *Lives* also the theme of the statesman as good helmsman occurs frequently, though rarely applied to a Roman subject.[10] In the passage cited above Plutarch ascribes to Aemilius this leadership quality in a distinctly military, rather than political, context. This is unusual *per se*, but fits well into Plutarch's larger scheme of attributing Aemilius' military success in part to the edifying influence of philosophy.

An artistic representation of the good helmsman in a quasi-military context merits brief mention, since it was probably known to Plutarch though it did not necessarily consciously prompt the metaphor he applied to Aemilius. At Delphi in the Cnidian *lesche* Polygnotus had depicted the Homeric helmsman, Phrontis (*Odyssey* 3. 282–283), whose name suggests a metaphorical guiding wisdom, in his famous fifth-century painting. The painting's context is the end of the Trojan War, when the victorious Menelaus and his men are making preparations for the return to Greece. In Pausanias' description of the painting (10. 25. 2–3), Phrontis is depicted as an older bearded man surrounded by a group of beardless youths as he stands amidships, an image that in general recalls Socrates' role as an instructor of the youth. We shall return to this idea later.

The Romans in general, as is clear from Polybius and from Livy, exalted Aemilius as a revered helmsman of the state, but a philosophical cast to his character appears only in Cicero's works. Most of the references to Paullus in Cicero are brief, but pointed. For example, in sections 82–83 of the *De senectute* the immortality of the soul is being discussed, a topic that is *per se* philosophical. Paullus is named among the immortal souls that are remembered by posterity and the elder statesman Cato expresses his desire to see Paullus when he himself dies. Cicero's most sustained portrait of Aemilius is also distinctly philosophical. In the *Somnium* (6. 9–26) Aemilius' immortal soul makes a cameo appearance. Scipio learns that his father, dead for more than ten years, now resides in the stars in the company of other divine statesmen who have cast off the bonds of mortality. When Aemilius approaches his

[10] Plutarch uses this metaphor in describing the good actions of several Greek statesmen, including Pericles (*Per.* 33. 6) and Solon (*Sol.* 14. 6). The only other Roman to whom the term is applied in a positive context is Cato Maior (*Cat.* 19. 7).

son, Scipio is unable to control his emotions, and bursts into tears. The older man embraces his son and kisses him, but forbids him to cry (6. 14). Only after the younger man regains his composure does Aemilius proceed to give him instruction on the nature of the soul. That Aemilius feels emotions too is clear, but his attainment of philosophical perfection renders them completely under his control; thus, Cicero's characterization of Aemilius has much in common with Plutarch's portrait, beginning with Aemilius' display of self-control.[11]

Polybius (29. 17) relates the anecdote that at the commencement of the Battle of Pydna, Aemilius felt a tremendous fear when he first saw the full force of the Macedonian phalanx drawn up opposite his own troops. Plutarch's version focuses on Aemilius' emotional control: though feeling an amazement and fear that he long remembered, yet he did not show it to his own men; instead, ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἵλεω καὶ φαιδρὸν ἑαυτόν, "exhibiting a cheerful and bright countenance" (*Aemilius* 19. 2), he rode among his troops without helmet or thorax. He had the ability to guide the emotions of his men while controlling his own emotions, just as in his interaction with his son in the *Somnium* as Cicero described it. Plutarch (*De morali virtute* 442C–F) explains how reason, through its mastery of the irrational, enables a man to hold in check the most violent emotions. He describes the phenomenon even more explicitly at 451F–452B: moral virtue happens when reason produces ἐπιεικεία (reasonableness) and μετριότης (moderation) in the passionate area of influence; its opposite is a lack of emotions, ὥσπερ κυβερνήτης πνεύματος ἐπιλείποντος, "like a helmsman when the wind has died down." Without enabling winds the helmsman is not able to provide guidance for the ship, which will stand dead in the water. By implication the wise man must feel emotion just as the helmsman is effective in controlling the ship only when the winds blow; and like the good helmsman, the wise man is able to control the emotions raging within. Both Plutarch and Cicero, then, portray Aemilius Paullus as a man capable of strict control of his emotions: the latter in the context of philosophical instruction of a young man; the former in the context of a military action, but with his actions couched in philosophical language.

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[11] Compare also Cicero's *De amicitia*, sections 7–10, in a discussion about bearing grief with composure, where Laelius cites a great example in Aemilius Paullus. Plutarch is deeply impressed by the way Aemilius bore the deaths of two of his sons with great fortitude, setting this incident against Timoleon's reaction to his brother's death (end of the *synkrisis*).

The legendary self-control of Socrates provides the implicit model for both. It is interesting to note that Plutarch even attributes a similar self-control to himself in the mirror analogy that opens the *Aemilius-Timoleon* pair, discussed above. The instructive influence of the *Lives* he is writing, he says, enables him to focus exclusively on the good exempla they provide, ἵλεω καὶ πρᾳεῖαν ἀποστρέφοντες/ τὴν διάνοιαν, "cheerfully and mildly turning aside my thoughts" (*Aemilius* 3. 8–9).

Religiosity

Aemilius' attention to religious matters plays only a small role in the historiographers' accounts of the Battle of Pydna, and even Cicero has little to say about it explicitly apart from the anecdote (*Aemilius* 9. 3–4) Plutarch gleaned from the *De divinatione* (1. 103) about the omen of the death of his daughter's puppy. Yet in the *Somnium* the religiosity of the man is evident both from his reception into the divine stars, and in his instructions to his son concerning suicide and the "road to heaven" (15–16). Plutarch, on the other hand, comments on Paullus' religious activities throughout the Life, and emphasizes that the gods regarded him favorably.[12] He begins Chapter 3 of the *Life* with a brief account of Aemilius' election as augur, emphasizing that he did not look upon his election as mere political advancement, as did many so elected, but took the position in all sincerity. Plutarch no doubt invented the idea that Aemilius instructed his colleagues on the finer points of their moral duty as priests as part of his illustration of the care he gave to his office. He adds another detail found nowhere else in the extant sources, that Aemilius' conduct accorded with those philosophers (unnamed) who define piety as a scientific *episteme* of how to venerate the gods. Plutarch then sets the stage for his characterization of Aemilius' conduct as a military commander during the Battle of Pydna: ὥσπερ ἱερεύς ὀργίων δεινῶν (*Aemilius* 3. 4), "like a priest who initiates worshipers in holy ritual", he instructed his men in military custom and procedure and punished those who did not adhere to them.[13] Plutarch's emphasis on

[12] The closest parallel for Plutarch's emphasis on religion in other Roman *Lives* is in *Numa* 8, where he again mentions Pythagoras and the *gens Aemilia*. For the influence of Platonic philosophy on this *Life* see De Blois & Bons (1992).

[13] Exempla were available. Valerius Maximus (2.7.14) reports that after the Battle of Pydna Paullus ordered a number of non-Roman deserters to be trampled to death by elephants as an example to the others.

Aemilius' religiosity in his military service should be seen as having an implicit model in Socrates, who likewise conducted his affairs with due attention to the divine.

Instructor of the Youth

In Cicero's account, Aemilius Paullus appears to his son as proof that the good statesman has an immortal soul, and he lingers in the dream to provide brief but important instruction to his son on *res philosophiae.* Plutarch's Aemilius is also devoted to instructing the young, and is portrayed as being most like Socrates in this regard. At *Aemilius* 6. 4–5 Plutarch narrates that Aemilius, while augur, gives his sons training in both Roman and Greek education. Instructing one's sons, however, was expected of a Roman father, though Plutarch is careful to emphasize the Greek influence. A more telling example is found in chapter 27 of the *Life*. Aemilius summons to his tent the men in his charge in order to address them after they saw the captured Perseus throw himself at Aemilius' feet. But when they came in, instead of speaking to them right away or even acknowledging their presence in any fashion, πολὺν χρόνον ἦν πρὸς αὑτῷ σιωπῇ καθήμενος, ὥστε θαυμάζειν ἅπαντας, "for a long time he was turned inwards and sat in silence, so that all were amazed" (*Aemilius* 27.1). We may compare Plato's description of Socrates' habit of getting wrapped up in his own thoughts (ἑαυτῷ πως προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν) for long periods of time at *Symposium* 174D. This relates to his calmness in battle, and in bed, as Alcibiades will tell later.

Plutarch emphasizes in this anecdote that Paullus was particularly interested in gathering around him the youngsters in his company in order to instruct them on the vagaries of Fortune (μάλιστα τοὺς νεωτέρους, "especially the younger men," *Aemilius* 27. 1). The image of the older man surrounded by younger men recalls both Socrates' concern for instructing the youth, and the image of the Homeric helmsman, Phrontis, depicted in the Cnidian *lesche* mentioned earlier, though the latter was not necessarily in Plutarch's mind at the time. But the emphasis on *phronesis* in this Life, noted by Swain (1989: 314–334) is significant, and Plutarch shapes the anecdote under discussion to model this concept.

Plutarch's originality can be observed in light of another treatment of this episode. Livy relates an exchange between the conqueror and the conquered in front of the young Roman officers that differs from

Plutarch's version. Perseus, rather than Aemilius, was silent for a long time: *responsum expectantibus cunctis terram intuens diu tacitus*, "while all were awaiting his answer he stared silently at the ground for a long time" (45.8.2). Plutarch's version of the scene naturally focuses on Aemilius. Since this anecdote appears in this form only in Plutarch, he may have invented it in order to continue the implicit comparison with Socrates. The Platonic flavor of the anecdote as a whole supports my argument, especially the closing simile, which recalls the image of the horses of the charioteer of the soul:

> τοιαῦτά φασι πολλὰ διαλεχθέντα τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀποπέμψαι τοὺς νέους εὖ μάλα τὸ καύχημα καὶ τὴν ὕβριν, ὥσπερ χαλινῷ, τῷ λόγῳ κόπτοντι κεκοσλασμένους. (*Aemilius* 27. 4. 20–22).
>
> They say that Aemilius having said many such things sent away the young men curbed in their pride and arrogance by his incisive speech, as if by a bridle.

Aemilius was engaged in more than speechifying: he was attempting to instruct and curb the irrational parts of the young men's souls by means of his *logos*, which here has a double meaning. Plutarch himself believed in the two-fold nature of the soul, recognized both by Pythagoras and by Plato as one part intelligent and rational, and one part passionate and irrational, the latter subdivided into the *animosus* and the appetitive. These are controlled by the spirited part just as a lead horse controls its yoke-mate in Plato's famous analogy of the charioteer of the soul in the *Phaedrus*, cited earlier. For Plutarch ethical virtue resides in the irrational part of the soul, as he explains in the *De morali virtute* 444C, and is the means by which reason orders and regulates the passions. He makes the connection more explicitly at 445B in a reference to Plato and the function of the reins in taming the unruly part of the soul. The simile of the bridle described above is the finishing touch of Plutarch's account of the Battle of Pydna and coincides with the end of his characterization of Paullus as a Socratic philosopher. In ascribing to Paullus the characteristics of the Socratic teacher, Plutarch by implication draws them to himself. His stated intention in the proem to instruct others by acquaintance with the lives of his chosen subjects is thus fulfilled.

Conclusion

Plutarch brings Paullus and his military career into the philosophical tradition both by subtle allusions to Socrates and to Platonic thought, and by assigning Pythagoras as Aemilius' ancestor. The historical sources do not claim Paullus as a philosopher *per se*, but Cicero does, and his portrait may have influenced Plutarch's decision to imbue his portrait of Paullus with the traits of the philosopher he himself most admired. It is noteworthy that Cicero describes the *virtus* of Paullus, among others, as follows: *quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem aspexit agnovitque in alio, ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est* (*De amicitia* 101). His virtue is compared to a light which sparks recognition in another; thus, from it ignites in turn. While I would not wish to push this too far, the reflection of light recognized in another is quite similar to Plutarch's mirror imagery in which he recognizes in the men of old characteristics that he himself possesses, and by which he is enlightened himself as he seeks to enlighten his readers in turn. Plutarch in this way sets as a minor theme the transmission of virtue from generation to generation: Aemilius is both a product of his heritage, which begins with Pythagoras, and an influence for the next generation, just as is Plutarch himself in writing the *Lives*. The accounts of Cicero and of Plutarch both focus on Paullus' self-control, religiosity, and role as an instructor of philosophy. Paullus, though a Roman general, is set by Cicero in the Greek philosophical tradition and was considered an exemplar of the Philhellene.[14]

Is it merely striking coincidence that Plutarch's characterization of Aemilius Paullus so closely resembles Cicero's view of this man in the philosophic tradition? This paper has argued that it is not, though it is conceivable that both authors relied for their respective characterizations on a source no longer extant, whether Greek or Latin. But more importantly, the unobtrusive manner in which Plutarch alluded to the Greek philosopher in promoting Aemilius' roles as helmsman, religious leader, and charioteer for the younger men in his company reflects his own notion of *paideia*. The mirror analogy with which he introduced

[14] Horace's view of the early Romans could easily be applied to Paullus himself: *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit*. "Captured Greece captured her untamed conqueror" (*Ep*. 2.2.102).

the *Aemilius-Timoleon* pair also informs this notion and encourages the reader to view Plutarch himself in accordance with his authorial *ethos* as one who has an acknowledged interest in Socrates and the Greek philosophical tradition.

THE DECLINE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC IN *PYRRHUS-MARIUS*

Bradley Buszard

Plutarch's *Pyrrhus-Marius* offers a self-contained, consistent portrait of Roman decline, a penetrating critique of the late Republic, which is elaborately prepared in *Pyrrhus*, then consummated in *Marius*. By concentrating upon one half of the pair in isolation, however, scholars have failed to appreciate the significance of Plutarch's comparative method.[1] It is only by interpreting each *Life* as part of an integrated whole that the political program of *Pyrrhus-Marius* may be understood.[2]

Plutarch's analysis of Roman decline is presented largely within *Pyrrhus*, in that *Life*'s depiction of the idealized middle Republic, of Tarentum, and of the Sicilian Greek cities. This concentration of material in the earlier *Life* is reasonable within the scheme of the pair. The patterns for healthy and decadent states are established in *Pyrrhus*; once the reader reaches *Marius*, the framework for understanding the dys-

[1] Other aspects of the combined pair have been noted: the study of greedy ambition (πλεονεξία) in *Pyrrhus-Marius* by Duff (1999) 101–130 is quite extensive; the examination of fate and chance in the pair by Swain (1990) 135 is brief, but insightful. For political themes elsewhere in Plutarch see Wardman (1974) 154–195, Aalders (1982), Pelling (1986), Stadter (1989) xliv–li and lviii–lxxxv, Pelling (1992), De Blois (1992), De Blois (1997), and Hershbell (1997). Studies of the historical Pyrrhus and Marius have focused much of their attention upon Plutarch's *Pyrrhus* and *Marius*, which are the main sources for the careers of the two men: there are historical commentaries for each *Life*, Nederlof (1940) for *Pyrrhus*, Valgiglio (1967) for *Marius*, and biographies for each man; see Nenci (1953), Lévêque (1957), Nederlof (1978), Garoufalias (1979), and Zodda (1997) on *Pyrrhus*; see Van Ooteghem (1964), Carney (1970), and Evans (1994) on *Marius*. Also important are the studies of Pyrrhus' Sicilian campaign by Vartsos (1970) and La Bua (1980), and the work on Marian Rome by Badian (1958, 1964 and 1984), Lintott (1994), and Seager (1994). The recent commentary on the pair by Marasco (1994) is cursory, but his bibliography and introductions are more extensive. See Buszard (2002) 3–7 and 181–195 for the most recent survey of the relevant bibliography. I would like to thank Professor P.A. Stadter for his generous assistance in developing this article.

[2] The treatment of Roman decline I examine in this paper is peculiar to *Pyrrhus-Marius*, the only extant pair in which each *Life* is intimately concerned with a different period of Roman history. *Philopoemen* and *Flamininus* both depict Roman statesmen, but that pair nonetheless falls short on two counts: each *Life* is set in the early second century B.C., so there is no chronological progression, and neither depicts the political operation of the Republic itself.

functional late Republic is already in place. My analysis will mirror the organization of the text: all but one of the passages around which my argument will be organized are from *Pyrrhus*. The first and second passages depict the primary foil for Rome, Tarentum; the third describes the Sicilian Greeks; the fourth, fifth and sixth reveal the political character of third-century Rome itself. I will conclude by discussing the oath imposed by Saturninus upon the members of the senate in *Marius* 29.[3]

Tarentum

The first twelve chapters of *Pyrrhus* are entirely concerned with the affairs of the Hellenistic east. They are, moreover, primarily focused upon the deeds and motives of the individual *diadochoi*. Hints of larger political forces in Epirus and Macedon do appear: Epirote *stasis* is mentioned in 2.1, the Epirotes rise in rebellion in 4.2, their favorable attitude towards Pyrrhus is noted in 5.2, a faction of the Epirotes (described only as "the strongest") is mentioned in 5.14, the favorable Macedonian view of Pyrrhus is described in 8.1–2, and that view influences events in 10.2, 11.7–14, and 12.1. Yet the role of the people in these instances is never described; the presentation is always cursory, sometimes oblique. These early chapters are not sufficiently detailed to expound any particular theory or provide any great insight into the workings of bodies politic. They serve instead to foreshadow the more elaborate treatment of such themes that will commence once the scene has shifted to the Italian peninsula.

The transition occurs abruptly at *Pyrrhus* 13.4, where Tarentum and Rome are simultaneously introduced: "The Romans were at war with the Tarentines".[4] The reader might well expect this phrase to preface a digression on the origins of this war, but since the political motives of the Romans are never at issue in this *Life*, no such digression is

[3] Though the decadence of the late Republic is a prevalent theme in *Marius*, it is not typically the main focus of Plutarch's narrative. The account of Marius' tribunate in *Marius* 4 and the description of Saturninus' oath in *Marius* 29 are the two exceptions to that rule. While *Marius* 29 focuses upon the Republican senate and people, however, *Marius* 4 describes primarily the actions of Marius himself. I have therefore excluded *Marius* 4 from my analysis.

[4] Translations of the quoted passages are my own. I have retained occasional Greek words and phrases where it seemed most important to preserve the connotations of Plutarch's vocabulary.

provided, here or elsewhere. The following narrative focuses instead on Tarentum itself, and describes the effects of discord and demagogy in this dysfunctional state.

First comes a summary analysis of the political situation at Tarentum in 280 B.C.

> Possessing neither the strength to endure the war nor the ability to end it, thanks to the boldness and depravity of their demagogues, the Tarentines planned to appoint Pyrrhus as their leader and to invite him to take part in the conflict (13.4).

This introduction gives the initial impression of a citizen body united behind its demagogues—"they" are at war with Rome; "they" wish to appoint Pyrrhus as their leader[5]—but the remainder of the chapter will demolish this impression through an extended description of Tarentine demagogy in action. The description can be subdivided into two parts. The first will demonstrate the impotence of normal political procedures in this debased state (13.5); the second will narrate at much greater length the inventive but ultimately ineffective trick employed by a citizen named Meton to achieve the same political end in a more dramatic fashion (13.6–11). By the end of the chapter, a version of Tarentum will have been fashioned that is a hostage of its demagogues and incapable of operating in a rational manner. Because the motifs established in this passage will recur frequently in both *Pyrrhus* and *Marius*, *Pyrrhus* 13.5–11 merits close attention.

The brief first section, *Pyrrhus* 13.5, describes a city rent by a peculiar kind of factionalism, a struggle which is both a generational conflict and a contest between wisdom and foolishness.[6] On one side are the older and the thoughtful citizens (τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νοῦν ἐχόν-

[5] The stated reason for the Tarentine proposal, that Pyrrhus is a brilliant general and is currently unoccupied, ignores the ties that already existed between Pyrrhus and Tarentum. The city had provided him with a fleet earlier that year in his successful campaign to recapture Cilicia, q.v. Pausanias 1.12.1, Lévêque (1957) 175, Nederlof (1978) 90–91, and Franke (1989) 458. Plutarch's omission keeps the reader's attention focused on the thematic program of *Pyrrhus-Marius*.

[6] The Tarentine strife is not, *prima facie*, the aristocratic/democratic *stasis* of late fifth-century Greece familiar from Thucydides, the classic description of which appears in Thucydides 3.82–83. Thucydidean *stasis* and this struggle between wisdom and foolishness are related, however. There was an understood link between breeding and intelligence among ancient aristocrats, which gave a phrase like "the thoughtful" (οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες) a political connotation and brought it into line with class-based *stasis*, q.v. Shrimpton (1998). The intrusion of generational prejudice into the passage does not detract from this connection. The depiction of the Tarentine *dêmos* is, in fact, quite similar to that of the Athenian *dêmos* before the Sicilian expedition in Thucydides 6,

των πολιτῶν);[7] on the other side, identified by implication only, are the young and the rash. The wiser generation tries to oppose the summoning of Pyrrhus, but their actions are ineffectual. Some of them first block the measure openly and are rewarded for their efforts by being shouted down, then ejected from the assembly by force. Others, witnessing the expulsion of their fellows, abandon the meeting of their own volition.

Traditional methods of political persuasion having failed an innovator steps into the fray, a citizen named Meton, who is described as ἐπιεικής (13.6). This adjective might best be translated here as "moderate", but no English word can reflect the connotations of the original, in which two ideas are simultaneously in play: moderation and effectiveness.[8] Unlike Tarentum's less creative statesmen, who are never granted a hearing, Meton demonstrates a mild flexibility that enhances his impact in the current crisis. The means by which he attempts to curb his city's foolish impulse, a theatrical farce culminating in a *sententia*, is vividly described in 13.6–9.

> When that day arrived on which the resolution was to be ratified and the people were taking their place in the assembly, (Meton) took for himself a crown of day-old leaves (ἑώλων, sc. φύλλων) and a small torch, just as drunkards do, and cavorted towards the assembly with a flute-girl leading the way. As is typical in the mob of a democracy lacking order,[9] some saw him and hurled abuse, others laughed, but no one stopped him. They instead had the flute-girl play on and told Meton to proceed into their midst and sing. He seemed about to do this very thing, but when a hush fell he instead spoke. "Men of Tarentum, you do well in not begrudging those who wish to play and sing while it is yet possible. If you have any sense you will all enjoy your freedom while there is still

q.v. Pelling (1992) 19, though the generational divisions there are eventually resolved in favor of the expedition.

[7] Unless one interprets the Greek phrase as a hendiadys, these groups do not necessarily comprise the same members. As they undoubtedly intersect, however, I will treat the two as identical.

[8] *LSJ* II.2b and II.2a respectively. Plutarch's usage elsewhere suggests the same double connotation. Cf. *Solon* 29.4, on Peisistratus' successful use of moderation, and *Pericles* 39.1, praising Pericles' ἐπιείκεια and mildness (πρᾳότης). See the note on the latter passage in Stadter (1989) 345–346, where further examples linking gentleness and ἐπιείκεια are cited.

[9] I have translated the genitive phrase δημοκρατίας κόσμον οὐκ ἐχούσης as possessive. One might instead render it as a genitive absolute, but doing so would not significantly alter the meaning of the sentence.

> time, knowing that you will have different concerns, a different life, and a different lifestyle once Pyrrhus arrives in the city".[10]

Meton's speech persuades many, but he fails in the end because other men, threatened by his persuasiveness, take action to prevent their motion from being dismissed. Rebuking the citizenry for their unseemly readiness to succumb to such drunken tricks, Meton's opponents gather themselves together and eject him from the assembly (13.11).[11]

Faction is central to this passage. In addition to the strife between the people and the wise elders described in 13.5, there is also a rift between the people and the demagogues, mirrored in the antithesis between the commons (οἱ πολλοί) and those who fear Rome.[12] Instead of a healthy, or at least functional, relationship between the Tarentine people and statesmen, the leaders, both good and bad, must engage in a demagogic competition to win the people's favor. Tarentum has become a "democracy lacking order", which cannot be led, but must instead be seduced through pleasure.[13] Confronted with such a mob, the straightforward opposition of the "older and wiser" men is doomed from the outset. And Meton's ruse, clever though it is, amounts to little more than an attempt to oppose the demagogues on their own terms; his failure is a further confirmation of the impotence of rational politics.

This indictment of the Tarentine people in *Pyrrhus* 13 is probably what Plutarch's original readers would have expected. The conventional literary prejudice against Tarentum would have predisposed those readers to take a dim view of the city, and the Tarentine behavior in *Pyrrhus* would merely have confirmed their expectations.[14] Put

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[10] This scene is described at some length in Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Antiquitates* 19.7. The account in *Pyrrhus* is considerably longer, however, and Plutarch's interpretation of the event is primarily concerned with Tarentine *stasis* and demagogy. Dionysius says little about the former and nothing about the latter.

[11] The rhetorical tactics of the demagogues are similar to the abusive rhetorical stance taken by Cleon in the Mytilenian debate (Thucydides 3.38.4–7), suggesting again that the contest should be viewed in terms of *stasis*. Meton's approach, in a healthier state, might have worked: cf. Solon's presentation of his elegiac verses on Salamis (*Solon* 8), in which he avoids danger by pretending to be insane. Peisistratus, unlike the Tarentine demagogues, urges his fellow citizens to follow Solon's advice.

[12] The demagogues who force Meton from the assembly supposedly fear a peace treaty, under whose terms they might be handed over to the Romans (13.11).

[13] The Tarentines' dependence on pleasure will be brought to the fore again once Pyrrhus arrives (16.2–3).

[14] Dionysius *Antiquitates* 19.8, for instance, refers to Tarentum as a free and luxuriant state. The evidence has been collected in Barnes (1999); see especially pp. 78–111, where he focuses on the Pyrrhic war.

briefly, the ancient caricature was of a *polis* that had peaked under the leadership of its *stratêgos* Archytas in the fourth century and had since lapsed into decadence. Plutarch would not have been constrained by this common opinion: even if a flattering portrayal was improbable, the city could simply have been ignored. Much has been gained by retaining the Tarentum stereotype, however. The Tarentines become a case study in decline, both a foil for the probity of third-century Romans and a model of the unrest that will plague Rome in the first century.

The Tarentines are a constant presence in the narrative of Pyrrhus' sojourn in Italy. Between *Pyrrhus* 13, the passage discussed above, and Pyrrhus' final Italian defeat at Beneventum, Tarentum is mentioned in all but two chapters.[15] The Tarentine character is already established by the end of chapter 13, so none of these subsequent passages need be as extensive or informative.[16] There is one other passage, however, that adds substantially to the characterization of Tarentum: *Pyrrhus* 16.1–3, which describes Pyrrhus' impression of Tarentum, the steps he takes to prepare the Tarentine citizens for war, and the Tarentine reaction to his harsh measures.

When the Tarentine and Italian ambassadors approached Pyrrhus in chapter 13, they described their alliance as possessing a vast army, needing only a great commander to lead them to victory.[17] Pyrrhus' reaction upon viewing the Tarentine reality for himself is at first not apparent. His troops have a difficult crossing, so he must be conciliatory until his own forces have coalesced (16.1). Once they do, however, he takes decisive action.

> Then he saw that the multitude were the kind of people who would remain at home loitering at baths and parties while he fought on their behalf, who would neither have the strength to save themselves nor to save (others) except under strong compulsion. He therefore closed the gymnasia and the walkways in which they used to wander, trying to conduct the war (merely) by discussing their troubles (ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων λόγῳ διεστρατήγουν). He took away their untimely (ἄκαιρος) drinking

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[15] 13.4, 13.8, 13.10, 13.12, 15.2, 16.1, 17.10, 18.6, 19.4, 21.6, 22.5, 23.6, 24.7, 24.8. The two exceptions are chapter 14, which contains the dialogue between Pyrrhus and Cineas, and chapter 20, which describes the embassy of Fabricius.

[16] Some are mere instances of the name, with no greater relevance (15.2, 18.6, 19.4, 21.6, 24.7, and 24.8). Some that are relevant only repeat what is elsewhere treated in greater depth (17.10 and 23.6 contain oblique criticism of Tarentine military ability; 22.5 relates the Tarentine reaction to Pyrrhus' departure for Sicily).

[17] The combined forces of Tarentines, Samnites, Messapians, and Lucanians purportedly contained as many as 20,000 cavalry and 350,000 infantry (13.12).

> parties (πότοι), revelries (κῶμοι), and festivities (θαλίαι), and summoned them to arms. He was harsh, moreover, and deaf to complaints about the enlistment of soldiers. As a result, many fled the city, calling their inability to live as they pleased slavery because they were unaccustomed to being governed.[18]

Pyrrhus' harshness will contribute to his later troubles with the Tarentines, but the primary focus of this passage is the decadence of the Tarentine people. Three charges are laid against them: they talk instead of act, they carouse at inopportune times, they are unable to endure the strictness of Pyrrhus' corrective measures.

The first two charges are variations of the same complaint. The first contrasts the military crisis and the Tarentine response in an oblique *logos-ergon* antithesis (ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων λόγῳ διεστρατήγουν). Discourse is not itself maligned; the problem is rather the Tarentine misapplication of debate to resolve a problem that requires action. Their behavior is ill suited to their current dilemma. The second charge continues the same idea, though its expression is more complex. Three distinct types of celebration are condemned: πότοι, κῶμοι, and θαλίαι. While the latter two regularly appear in negative contexts, πότοι are not always associated with reproach (cf. *Solon* 29.6); hence the necessity of construing the adjective ἄκαιρος with all three nouns. The root of the charge is therefore the inappropriate timing of the Tarentine revelry, the disjunction between their behavior and their situation.[19] Just as individuals should attune their acts to the times in which they live, so should corporate bodies behave in a manner consistent with their political environment. The Tarentine mob has become so habituated to their decadent lifestyle that they are unwilling to change it even under the threat of Roman conquest.

The third complaint, that the Tarentines flee their city rather than change their ways, provides a context in which the previous two charges can be better understood. The Tarentines collectively demonstrate what is, in Plutarch, a cardinal sign of an unphilosophical life: the

[18] 16.2–3. The articular infinitive I have translated as "to being governed" (τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι) could also be construed as a middle infinitive and translated as "to controlling themselves", an interpretation that would make Pyrrhus' actions seem less offensive and would fit the portrayal of Tarentines in this *Life* very well.

[19] This idea is related to the theme of inopportune rectitude, a recurring character flaw in *Pyrrhus-Marius* that undermines the efforts of well-intentioned Roman aristocrats. See e.g. *Marius* 29.2–12 on Metellus Numidicus' principled opposition to Saturninus, and *Marius* 42.4 on Cn. Octavius' untimely application of rigid ethics.

inability to subjugate one's desires to rational control.[20] The Tarentine people should realize that parties and pointless debate are not in their best interest and should prepare for war on their own initiative, but they lack the moral strength to restrain their impulses and fail to appreciate the need for action instead of speech. When Pyrrhus imposes the restraint upon them that they are unable to provide themselves, many leave Tarentum, preferring to abandon their homes rather than give up their hedonism.

Between *Pyrrhus* 13.4–11 and 16.2–3 the reader is given a complete depiction of a debased city, both the leaders and those they must lead. The Tarentine people are disobedient, obsessed with pleasure, and lack restraint; they are therefore incapable of being wisely led. Those that attempt to guide the state in a traditional aristocratic manner fail. Meton, the one well-intentioned leader willing to resort to demagogy, is beaten at the demagogic game by those more experienced in its tactics. When wiser policy is finally imposed on Tarentum by a foreign general, the Tarentine people rebel against their coercion.

Agathocles and the Sicilian Greeks

Tarentum receives by far the most extensive analysis of *stasis* and demagogy in *Pyrrhus*, but there is also a brief description of Sicilian *stasis* by Pyrrhus in the Cineas dialogue (*Pyrrhus* 14) that bears mention. Asked what he would do if he should manage to subdue the entire Italian peninsula, Pyrrhus responds:

> Nearby Sicily extends its hands. It is a prosperous and populous island, but one easily taken, Cineas, for now that Agathocles has died everything there is *stasis* and lawless cities and rash demagogues (14.8).

Agathocles' son had died shortly before Agathocles himself. Bereft of his successor, Agathocles decided at the end of his life to liberate Syracuse.[21] The resulting power vacuum is the opportunity to which Pyrrhus refers.

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[20] See *Pyrrhus* 31.3–4, comparing Pyrrhus and Antigonus Gonatas, *Marius* 28.1, where Marius acts contrary to his own nature, and *Alexander* 21.7, where Alexander is said to consider self-control more royal than conquest. Cf. *De virtute morali* 446D, with analysis in Duff (1999) 72–78, and *De tranquilitate animi* 465A–B; see also the discussion of both passages in Wardman (1974) 107–115.

[21] See Meister (1984) 408–409.

Though his name appears only three times in *Pyrrhus*, in 14.8–10 and 9.2, Agathocles is an important precursor for Pyrrhus. He was at one time Pyrrhus' father-in-law through his daughter Lanassa (*Pyrrhus* 9.2), and certain aspects of his career are reminiscent of Pyrrhus' own. In addition to his activities in Sicily, Agathocles invaded Africa[22] and fought against a Roman-Bruttian coalition on the Tarentines' behalf. Neither of these events is recounted in *Pyrrhus*, so unlike Agathocles' expedition against Libya, which Pyrrhus does invoke in 14.10, neither necessarily foreshadows Pyrrhus' later actions. Pyrrhus' mention of Agathocles in his description of Sicilian *stasis* does, however, suggest at least one further point of contact between the two kings. The origins of the chaos into which the Sicilian *poleis* had sunk preceded Agathocles' rise to prominence; his departure merely allowed old conflicts to resume. His mastery of Sicily thus had no lasting impact. Pyrrhus' explicit desire to subdue Sicily and, by implication, take Agathocles' place is therefore likely to have the same result. Stated more generally, the Sicilian cities, once having succumbed to faction, can be temporarily controlled by tyranny, but are prone to further *stasis* once that tyranny has ended. The only solution offered in this model is continuous domination, an almost fatalistic view, which will have important implications in *Marius* for Marius himself, for Caesar, and for Caesar's imperial successors.[23]

The Middle Republic in Pyrrhus

Having considered Tarentum and Sicily, the two foils for republican Rome in *Pyrrhus*, let us now turn to Rome itself. Much of the depiction of the Roman state in this *Life* is achieved through the portrayal of its two great statesmen in the Pyrrhic war, C. Fabricius Luscinus and Ap. Claudius Caecus. Chapters 18 and 19, however, offer a complementary view of the Roman people as they consider the advisability of an alliance with Pyrrhus. Three related incidents are examined: the reaction of the Roman people to their defeat at Heracleia (18.1–2), their reaction to the peace subsequently offered by Pyrrhus (18.4–

[22] See Meister (1984) 393–400. The campaign is narrated at length in Diodorus 22.3–18, 33–34, 38–44, 54–55, and 61–70.

[23] Another solution would be a return to rational government, but that possibility is never considered in *Pyrrhus-Marius*.

7), and their defiant response to Pyrrhus after the rousing speech by Ap. Claudius in the senate (19.5–7).

Pyrrhus' losses at Heracleia are heavy,[24] but the battle as described in *Pyrrhus* is nonetheless a crushing defeat for Rome. Despite having no other allies than the Tarentines, Pyrrhus routs the Roman army and captures their camp (17.9), thereby convincing many Lucanian and Samnite cities to join his cause. Yet when news of the disaster reaches Rome, despite Fabricius' claim that the defeat is the product of inadequate generalship, the Romans refrain from stripping the defeated consul of his command (18.1).[25] They instead rebuild the existing legions that were ravaged by the defeat and enthusiastically (προθύμως) form new ones (18.2), all the while making undaunted, confident (ἀδεῖς καὶ σοβαροί) speeches about the war.

Two aspects of this passage are particularly noteworthy. The first is the generous behavior of the Romans towards their defeated general. To understand its full importance, one must recall an earlier description of Pyrrhus' expulsion from Macedon.

> (And so Pyrrhus departed), losing Macedon in the same manner he acquired it. Kings therefore have no cause to fault the mob (οἱ πολλοί) for pursuing their own advantage through revolt, for by doing so they imitate the kings themselves, who teach faithlessness and betrayal and consider the man who least employs justice the man best able to seize advantage for himself.[26]

This passage, expressed in the voice of the narrator (ostensibly that of Plutarch himself) establishes an important causal link between the behavior of a leader and the people who follow him. When the leader is self-serving and debased, the people follow his example and are disloyal, whereas a noble and honest leader would, by implication, enjoy the trust and service of a loyal people.[27] The latter happy condition,

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[24] Plutarch cites Dionysius' figure of almost 13,000 and Hieronymus' lesser estimate of fewer than 4,000. Equally important is the quality of the men Pyrrhus loses. "These were his strongest men. Of his friends and generals he lost those whom he trusted and upon whom he was accustomed to rely" (17.8).

[25] The consul's name is P. Valerius Laevinus. The legality of such an act is irrelevant here because the implicit foil is probably not Roman, but Greek (e.g. the execution of the generals after Arginoussae, Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.6).

[26] 12.11–12. For the opposite extreme cf. *Aristides* 22, where Aristides and the Athenian people are simultaneously praised as loving justice, a description which mirrors Plato's concept of an ideal state governed by philosopher kings, q.v. Aalders (1982) 41–43 and 45–47.

[27] The combination of a debased people and a noble leader is not directly addressed

merely hypothetical in *Pyrrhus* 12, is now realized in the behavior of the Roman people after Heracleia. Though Laevinus has failed, and may even be responsible for the Roman defeat, the people nonetheless stand by him. Instead of dwelling on recrimination, they seek to recover their losses through action.

The other striking aspect of the Roman reaction is its unanimity. "The Romans" leave Laevinus in office; "the Romans" enroll new legions; "the Romans" make bold speeches. All distinctions between patrician and plebeian, senator and *eques*, are obscured.[28] Rome is a state in harmony, united behind its leaders: the antithesis both of Tarentum, which is being torn apart by its demagogues, conservative nobles, and unruly mob, and of the Sicilian *poleis*, which are plagued by faction and anarchy. And though the senate and people will emerge as distinct entities later in the *Life*, the harmonious model of Rome established in this chapter will be consistently maintained. The result is an idealized portrait of a healthy state.

The bold Roman response to Heracleia surprises and concerns Pyrrhus (18.2), who realizes that the conquest of Rome is beyond his current resources (18.3). The result is another, more severe test of Roman unanimity: peace negotiations instigated by Pyrrhus himself. This is only the first set of negotiations in the *Life*. There will be two more. But it is only here that the effects of the offer on the Roman people are considered, only here that the reader is allowed to see the political machinery of the middle Republic in action.[29] Pyrrhus' ambassador for the negotiations is his advisor, the orator Cineas, whom he sends to Rome. Cineas will first try to acquire a settlement through bribery, then by a direct address to the senate. Both attempts will fail, and the manner in which they fail will be central to the portrayal of the Republic in *Pyrrhus-Marius*.

Cineas' initial strategy, narrated in 18.4–5, is based on a presumption of Roman venality. "Cineas met with (ἐνετύγχανε) the leading men

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in *Pyrrhus*, but the previous narrative of Meton and the Tarentine mob does at least hint at the problem. The issue will become central in *Marius*, especially for the depiction of the Caecilii Metelli (e.g. 28–29) and C. Octavius (42.1–4).

[28] Cf. Appian's description of the Roman reaction to Ap. Claudius' speech, *Samnitica* 10.6: "The *senate* (ἡ βουλή) replied to Cineas…" The parallel passage in *Pyrrhus* (19.5) makes no such distinction: the term αὐτοῖς in *Pyrrhus* might be construed as the senate, but no divisions within the city are actually named.

[29] Pyrrhus' other two attempts, at 20.8–9 and 21.5, are both immediately rebuffed by Fabricius.

and sent gifts from the king to their children and wives, but nobody accepted. All instead replied that once a public treaty had been ratified there would be goodwill and gratitude towards the king on their behalf as well". Cineas apparently assumes that he can divide the Roman state by winning over its leading families piecemeal: the verb ἐνετύγχανε here suggests that his meetings with the statesmen are informal, probably with small groups or individuals; the intended recipients of the gifts, the wives and children of the statesmen instead of the men themselves, reinforce the private nature of Cineas' overtures.[30] His efforts cannot succeed, however, because the Roman body politic is portrayed as a cohesive whole. These powerful men (οἱ δυνατοί), their wives, and their children speak for Roman unanimity and for the precedence of public over private interest with a single voice (πάντες καὶ πᾶσαι).[31] The treaty must be public (δημοσίᾳ). To the modern reader, Pyrrhus' attempts call to mind the corrupt Roman statesmen of Sallust's *Iugurtha*, in which Iugurtha famously calls Rome "a venal city ripe for the fall, if only it finds a buyer" (35.10). The apparent link is spurious, however: neither bribes nor greed is an issue in the subsequent *Marius*,[32] nor is Sallust mentioned in either *Life* of the pair.[33] Instead it is the public spirit of the leading statesmen and families of Rome, even to their individual financial detriment, that is striking.

His first attempt having failed, Cineas adopts a strategy of public persuasion. Invited to speak before the senate, he conveys Pyrrhus' offer of peace, an offer whose terms are characterized in the narrative as humane (φιλάνθρωπα, 18.6). The Roman captives from Heracleia are to be released without ransom and Pyrrhus will himself aid Rome in its

[30] Franke (1989) 471 points out that such gifts were customary in Hellenistic society and that the Romans only misconstrued these gifts as bribes. For the purposes of *Pyrrhus-Marius*, however, the Roman reaction to a perceived bribe is as pertinent as their reaction to a real one would have been.

[31] The appearance of the feminine πᾶσαι reinforces the Roman resistance to pleasure, which is the Tarentines' greatest weakness: neither the leaders, nor their wives (nor their children) are susceptible to luxury.

[32] Iugurtha's bribes, so important in Sallust's account, are never mentioned in *Marius*. Iugurtha himself does not enter into the *Life* until Metellus has been sent to Numidia, an event which in Sallust occurs considerably later (44) than Iugurtha's censorious assessment. Greed is important elsewhere in the *Lives*, however: see Aalders 1982, 36, who cites *Cato Maior* 32.4, *Philopoemen* 1.3, *Coriolanus* 15.4, and *Romulus* 31.3.

[33] This despite the great likelihood that Plutarch employed Sallust for *Marius*: see Flacelière (1971) 87 on the similarities between *Marius* 9.2–3 and Marius' speech at *Iugurtha* 85; see also Valgiglio (1967) vii, who adduces seven additional parallels from *Iugurtha* 63, 64, 67, 69, and 82.

subjugation of Italy. For their part, the Romans have only to exchange their enmity with Pyrrhus for friendship and to free the Tarentines from fear.

The description of the Roman reaction to Cineas' speech is framed as an antithesis in which the people's desires are set off against what they see as necessity. The people (οἱ πολλοί, 18.7) are unwilling and unready to accept Pyrrhus' offer (μέν), but are nonetheless about to submit to the peace because they have been defeated in one set battle and expect another one to follow against an even larger force (δέ). The senate concurs: when the terms of the proposal are announced, the common opinion is that they will ratify the cessation of hostilities. At this crucial juncture, Ap. Claudius makes his sole appearance in the *Life* and stiffens Roman resolve with his famous speech before the senate (18.9–19.4).

Claudius' character and speech are less important for the question at hand than the subsequent reaction of the Roman people and senate. They are, in a word, transformed. Eager once again to resist, they send Cineas away with a stern reply:

> Once Pyrrhus has left Italy, then he may, if he wishes, parley about friendship and treaties, but so long as he remains here under arms the Romans will make war against him with all their strength, even if he should rout ten thousand Laevinuses in battle (19.5).

Cineas conveys this reply to Pyrrhus, and adds his own estimation of the Roman state, gleaned from his observation of both the people (τὸ πλῆθος) and their leaders (οἱ ἄριστοι).

> He told him that their senate had the appearance of an assembly of many kings, and relayed his fear that the people would assume the likeness of some Lernaean hydra in battle, since twice as many men had now been enlisted with the consul than were before, and several times as many Romans were yet able to bear arms.[34]

The most impressive aspect of the Roman state during this political crisis is its unity. Roman sentiment does shift, but unlike Tarentum all factions in the state shift together. When poor leadership brings military defeat, the people remain loyal to their leaders. Cineas' gifts to the nobles are likewise unable to sever the aristocratic loyalty to the state as a whole. Before Claudius' speech, both the commons (οἱ πολλοί, 18.6)

[34] 19.6–7. Pyrrhus has already been called the most royal of the *diadochoi* in his military bearing (8.2); the royal nature of the Roman senators, by contrast, is revealed in their deliberation and resolution.

and the senate (ἡ σύγκλητος, 18.8) are prepared to submit to necessity. Afterwards, both are roused to further resistance.

The *Life* of Pyrrhus establishes a polarity between Tarentum/Sicily and Rome. On one hand, the reader is shown once-great Greek *poleis* rent by faction, on the other, a healthy state in which the leaders and the people perform their proper functions in perfect harmony.

The Late Republic in Marius

The Republic depicted in *Marius* has little in common with the happy commonwealth described in *Pyrrhus*. In the narrative of Marius' tribunate, in the contests between Marius and the Caecilii Metelli, during the unrest under Sulpicius, in the final upheavals during the struggle between Marius and Sulla, it is clear that the late Republic has declined sharply from the halcyon days of the third century. The *dêmos* that defeated Pyrrhus followed the senate at every turn; the first-century *dêmos* takes pleasure in hearing the senate reviled (9.4). In *Pyrrhus*, Rome's enemies were subject to *stasis*; in *Marius* Rome itself is on the verge of internal collapse: the *dêmos* veers towards anarchy[35] and senatorial leadership is ineffectual. The state harbors a festering disease, which awaits only the right moment to break out into civil war.[36] In the two centuries that have elapsed since the time of the Pyrrhic war, the Roman state has declined to such a degree that it now resembles third-century Tarentum more than it does the middle Republic.

A consistent portrayal of Roman civil strife pervades *Marius*. Most instances are brief, and present only a partial glimpse of the decadence of the late Republic. Less abbreviated examples include Marius' tribunate (4.6) and the campaign for his first consulship (8.9), but neither instance gives a clear impression of the interactions between the people and the senate. There is one passage, however, that demonstrates all the essential elements of the Roman *stasis*, the same passage that contains the densest collocation of political terms for the senate (ἡ βουλή, ἡ σύγ-

[35] Their lawlessness is artfully conveyed by the μέν/δέ opposition between *dêmos* and *nomos* in 12.1.

[36] Ταῦτα τὴν πόλιν ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων ὕπουλον γεγενημένην καὶ νοσοῦσαν ἀνέρρηξεν (35.1). This assessment appears after the brief narrative of the Social war, at the very moment Sulpicius allies himself with Marius, and brings the civil strife permeating Marius' earlier career once again into focus after the long interruption of his extensive military campaigns.

κλητος), the powerful (οἱ δυνατοί), and the people (ὁ δῆμος). In *Marius* 29, which describes the oath administered to the senate by Saturninus in support of his land bill, the corruption of the late Republic is fully revealed, both the divisions within the senate and the mutual hostility of the senatorial class and the commons.

Marius 29.2–6 provides the background for the oath: a rider has been attached to Saturninus' bill requiring the members of the senate to swear that they will support it. Neither Saturninus himself, nor his bill, nor even the use purportedly made of the bill by Marius to banish Metellus Numidicus are important here. The key passage is the description of the Roman people and aristocracy in section 29.7, which follows immediately after Marius has sworn to uphold the new law.

> The people (ὁ μὲν οὖν δῆμος), pleased by his oath, burst into applause and praised him, but the nobles (τοὺς δ' ἀρίστους) were overcome by a terrible dejection and hatred of Marius for his betrayal.

This logical and rhetorical antithesis between the Roman people and nobility is unparalleled by any description of Rome in *Pyrrhus*. It is certainly unlike the description of the harmonious state that reacted unanimously to the embassy of Cineas (*Pyrrhus* 8.2–8) and the speech of Ap. Claudius (*Pyrrhus* 19.5–7). On the contrary, the passage mirrors instead the depiction of the Tarentine mob in *Pyrrhus* 13.4–11. In *Pyrrhus* 13.7, the Tarentine mob burst into applause (ἐκρότουν) at Meton's antics; here, the Roman mob bursts into applause (ἀνεκρότησε) at Marius' deception. In *Pyrrhus* 13.10–11, the rift between the Tarentine people and their leaders was framed by antithesis (τοὺς πολλοὺς … οἱ δὲ τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους δεδιότες); the same is true of the Roman people and the senate in *Marius* (ὁ μὲν οὖν δῆμος … τοὺς δ' ἀρίστους, 29.7).

The strife aroused by Saturninus' bill is immediately exacerbated, as reflected in yet another antithesis, when Metellus Numidicus' principled resistance to the bill results in his interdiction.

> The basest part of the mob (τὸ φαυλότατον) was there for them (sc. Saturninus and his faction), ready to kill the man (sc. Metellus). Yet, though the best men (τῶν δὲ βελτίστων) were aggrieved and collected themselves around Metellus, he did not allow them to form a faction on his behalf, but instead departed from the city (29.9–10).

The worst of the many are set against the best of the few, and only the restraint of Metellus prevents the passions of the two factions from breaking out into open conflict. The tone and purpose of this last antithesis is the polar opposite of those describing Rome at *Pyrrhus*

18.7–8 and 19.6–7. There the antitheses emphasized Roman unity; here they demarcate Roman *stasis*. The distinction between senate and *dêmos* exists in both *Lives*, but the relationship between the two groups has shifted from harmony to discord.

Conclusion

What might this shift in the relationship between the Roman people and senate have suggested to Plutarch's readers? What of the Tarentum/Late Republic parallel? While we cannot recover Plutarch's intent, and can at best only surmise what various original readers of the text might have thought, these questions are not merely speculative. We can posit an interpretation, adequately supported by the text of *Pyrrhus-Marius*, that would have had particular relevance for elite Greeks and Romans in the early second century A.D.[37]

Both the decline of Tarentum and that of the Greek cities in Sicily led to states incapable of governing themselves. Dysfunctional, torn between their rival factions, they were in the end only brought under control by the forcible imposition of absolute rule. Admittedly, some Tarentines fled their city rather than submit to Pyrrhus, but those who remained played a significant role in Pyrrhus' victories at Heracleia and Ausculum; though the state could not be returned to its former condition, it was at least restored to order. If these third-century cities are indeed literary precursors for first-century Rome as I have suggested, then their depiction in *Pyrrhus* implies that the late Republic too was incapable of self-government, and that the upheavals in the two generations following Marius' death had inevitably to end in despotism if Rome itself was to survive.

[37] See now Desideri (2002) 217–218 on Plutarch's interest in contemporary history; see Stadter (2002) 123–135 on the significance of the *Lives* for the Roman elite of the second century.

SULLA THE WARLORD AND OTHER MYTHICAL BEASTS

Arthur Keaveney

My primary concern in this paper will be with Plutarch's *Life of Sulla* 12, which forms part of his narrative of the first Mithridatic War. We are in late 87. The Pontic forces have invaded Greece and Sulla has been sent to deal with them. He is currently besieging Athens. However, being denied supplies from home he is obliged to levy monies from the shrines of Greece.[1] Plutarch was indignant at this as he tells us how those who were taking the treasures from Delphi were upset:

> So the treasures were sent away and certainly most of the Greeks did not know what was happening. But the silver jar, the last of the royal gifts still in existence, was too large and heavy for the baggage animals to carry and the Amphictyons were compelled to cut it into pieces. As they did so they called to mind the names of Titus Flamininus and Manius Acilius and Aemilius Paulus too. One of these had driven Antiochus out of Greece and the others had conquered the Kings of Macedonia. And these men had not only kept their hands off the temples of the Greeks, but had endowed them and honoured them and done much to add to the general respect in which they were held. But these, they reflected, were the lawfully constituted commanders of disciplined troops who had learned to obey orders without a murmur; they were kingly in soul, but moderate in their personal outlay, keeping their expenditure to the ordinary fixed allowances of the time; and they thought that to show subservience to their own soldiers was more disgraceful than to show fear in the face of the enemy. But now the generals of this later period were men who had risen to the top by violence rather than by merit; they needed armies to fight against one another rather than against the public enemy; and so they were forced to combine the arts of the politician with the authority of the general. They spent money on making life easy for their soldiers and then, after purchasing their labour in this way, failed to observe that they had made their whole country a thing for sale and had put themselves in a position where they had to be the slaves of the worst sort of people in order to become masters of the better. This is what caused the exile of Marius and this was what brought him back again against Sulla. This was what made Cinna's party murder Octavius and Fimbria's party murder Flaccus. And here it was Sulla more than anyone

[1] For background see Keaveney (1983) 78–86; Ballesteros/Pastor (1996) 81–190.

> else who set the example. In order to corrupt and win over to himself the soldiers of other generals, he gave his own troops a good time and spent money lavishly on them. He was thus at the same time encouraging the evils both of treachery and of debauchery. All this required much money and especially was it required for this siege.

Now, all of this appears plausible and coherent. Sulla is behaving as we might expect a late republican general to behave and is, in short, a warlord. When we probe it, however, we find it to be false in every particular. I pass over Plutarch's failure to mention that the Greeks themselves had in the past behaved thus and that Sulla had repaid what he had taken.[2] Rather I wish to concentrate on his position and actions as a Roman.

To begin with, while we may acknowledge Sulla was a figure of controversy, he was, nevertheless, in my view a properly constituted consul and proconsul. Attempts to deprive him of his command were violent and unlawful. Certainly Sulla never saw himself as anything but the duly appointed servant of the Roman state and went to extreme lengths to emphasise it.[3] And, if we accept this, then we can hardly agree that Sulla rose by violence rather than merit. Ultimately, of course, Sulla did fight a civil war over this issue of legitimacy but it hardly fits the facts to say he was nourishing his troops in order to turn them against the state. After all he was using them to fight Mithridates. Confrontation with authority was hardly his primary objective.[4] It is certainly true that Sulla saw to it that his troops were well rewarded—at the expense of the people of Asia. We must realise, however, that this was not the attempt to buy their loyalty, which we might infer from reading Plutarch. Rather he was punishing the Asiatics for their disloyalty and providing his men with what every Roman soldier regarded as his due, booty.[5] Sulla's fear that, upon returning to Italy, his men would follow custom and disperse to their homes is sufficient, I think, to dispose of the notion that he had for some time been indulging them in order to use them in an assault on Rome.[6] Since Sulla had not, as Plutarch

[2] See Keaveney (1983) 86.
[3] Keaveney (1982).
[4] Lovano (2002) 105–110
[5] Keaveney (1983) 111–115. See Harris (1979) index s.v."booty".
[6] Plutarch *Life of Sulla* 27. So far as Sulla is concerned Plutarch's belief that he pampered his troops in order to lure those of others seems to rest on an incident in the Civil War when money played a part in bringing over Scipio's army to Sulla: Plutarch's *Life of Sulla* 28. There is, so far as I can discover, no evidence for the use of this as a systematic ploy.

claims, made himself a prisoner of his troops by buying their loyalty it will come as no surprise to learn that, at all times, the discipline of his men was exemplary.[7]

So, it looks like Plutarch has got it wrong but the most telling observation is yet to come. After castigating Sulla for his lawlessness and his robberies, in order to bribe his troops whom he was going to lead against his country, Plutarch calmly announces that the Roman commander is actually collecting the money to prosecute the siege of Rome's enemies in Athens.

As I am no *Quellenforscher* I cannot pretend to possess the powers necessary to divine where Plutarch found this material. Why it is here at all is another puzzle but it has been suggested to me that it could have something to do with Plutarch's concept of Sulla as a corrupter.[8] What we do have, however, is a passage, which enables us to see clearly the exact nature of Plutarch's error. Appian, *Civil Wars* 5. 27 reads as follows:

> The majority of the commanders were unelected, as happens in civil war, and their armies were recruited neither from the register according to ancestral custom, nor to meet any need of their country. Instead of serving the common interest they served only the men who had enlisted them, and even so not under compulsion of the law, but by private inducements. Nor did they fight against enemies of the state, but against private enemies, nor against foreigners, but against Romans who were their equals in status. All these factors undermined their fear of military discipline. They felt they were not so much serving in the army as lending assistance from personal goodwill and by their own choice, and that their commanders were forced to rely on them to attain their private ends. Desertion, formerly an unpardonable offence for a Roman, was at that time actually rewarded by gifts, and it was practised both by armies en masse and by some prominent men, because they considered that changing like for like was not desertion. All parties were alike, and none of them had been officially condemned as public enemies. The common pretext of the generals, that they were all assisting the interests of their country, made men readier to change sides since they were assisting their country wherever they were. The generals understood this and tolerated it, knowing that they ruled, not by law, but by bribes.

[7] This notion of the high being beholden to the low seems to underline the similar charges made against Marius and others. Their careers—Greenidge & Clay (1960)—do not appear to bear this out.

[8] By Prof. P.A. Stadter in the discussion of this paper; he draws attention to the murder of Albinus narrated in *Life of Sulla* 6.

The broad general similarity of this passage to the Plutarch one needs no emphasis. But Appian is not speaking of the 80's but rather of the Triumvirs and if anybody doubts the accuracy of what he is saying he need only consult Appian's own narrative of those years or that of Dio. Thus we are driven to the conclusion that, for whatever reason, Plutarch has unjustly described Sulla as a Triumvir or something close to it.

The malicious will no doubt observe that it must be refreshing for a biographer of Sulla to discover he has for once wrongly been accused of someone else's crimes. But while the removal of one more slur is always pleasing it is not my intent to make another attempt at Sulla's defence. I did that some twenty years ago and have seen no reason since to retract.[9] Here, I want to suggest that what we have rather just discovered about the Plutarch passage may have other lessons to teach us. If he was mistaken about Sulla's army could it not be that we too have conceived some dubious notions about him, those like him and the armies they led?

What J. Carter has to tell us in an appendix to his translation of Appian's *Civil Wars* is I think fairly representative of what is usually believed.[10] In an essay clearly aimed at the general reader and the student he says, Marius, by jettisoning the property qualification created what was to become a professional army. Those who served in it owed their primary allegiance to their general and were devoid of any kind of political idealism. They looked to their commanders for booty and land. These were the armies and these were the generals who ultimately destroyed the Roman republic.

Plainly a comprehensive refutation would be out of place now but what I would like to suggest is that a picture such as this only becomes valid in the time of Caesar or that of the Triumvirs. A detailed argumentation must be reserved for another occasion but here I think we can say that the vital point to remember is that if we are considering a period, which stretches from the reforms of Marius to the accession of Augustus we are dealing with roughly three generations and there are surely

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[9] Keaveney (1983). One of the most recent negative verdicts, that of Brunt (1988) 463 n 29, is patrician in tone but, in my view, is not a real contribution to the debate, while Wiseman (1994) 87 is purely superficial and based on a view of Roman history which I hold to be fundamentally flawed.

[10] (1992) 408–409. Things had not changed much by 2000 in another popular work. See David (2000) 161.

differences between them. If we were modern historians we would certainly be alive to this.[11] As it is, with the paucity of information at our disposal, we ancient historians tend sometimes, as a matter of course, to blur such distinctions[12] just as Plutarch for whatever reason, I think did. I propose to finish by drawing attention to some ways in which the period before Caesar differs from that which followed.

First of all there is the supposed lack of political consciousness among the troops. This certainly seems to be the case with Caesar. His men appear to have been alive to the falsity of his protestations and took advantage of his position, in the view of some, to try and squeeze concessions out of him.[13] In earlier times things seem to have been different. Sulla's troops appear to have believed him when he had said he had come to free Rome from tyrants and, more remarkably perhaps, soldiers accepted Cinna's claim to avenge the insults done to their assemblies.[14] The mutiny against Lucullus could be seen as transitional leading on to the similar disturbances of a later period but we should bear steadily in mind that these were men who were politically aware[15] and knew that what Lucullus asked was contrary to the laws.[16]

The suggestion that booty was of paramount importance to this supposed new model army is potentially misleading. Booty, as we saw,[17] had always been the expectation of the soldier and not much had changed. Those who expected to do good always looked forward to doing well. Those who helped Sulla crush tyrants expected to be enriched by the Mithridatic War. Indeed booty could be more prized than the famous plot of land at the end of the campaign. That, at least, seems to have been a view held by the Fimbrians and many of those whom Sulla settled in Italy.[18]

Indeed, the whole idea of land hunger may stand in need of some revision. Mutinies were a feature of the second Civil War and the Triumviral period. These often involved a call for land.[19] In contrast

[11] Nobody would claim that the France of 1785 was the same as that of 1795.

[12] As I believe Hatscher (2000) 217–222 has, for example, done.

[13] Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.30, 47 with Gelzer (1969) 219.

[14] Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.57, 65–66 with Keaveney (1983) 62–65 and Pina Pola (1995) 203–216. Lovano (2002) 36–37 is not completely satisfactory.

[15] Degrees of political awareness must have varied of course. See Keaveney (1987) 13–14, 41–42, 61–63.

[16] Keaveney (1992) 124–126.

[17] n.5

[18] Keaveney (1983a) 539–541, (1992) 178.

[19] Appian, *Civil Wars* 5. 128–129; Suetonius, *Divus Julius* 69–70 with Messer (1920)

the soldiers of a previous generation were silent and content to follow where their generals led. It was they, not their troops, who gave the impetus to agrarian schemes.[20] If the accusation made against Sulla of not sending people back to their homes but of planting them in colonies for political motives is true,[21] then the picture of lacklands needs modification. We would be helped in this by remembering that when Pompey's men encountered delayed and failed land schemes they made no protest and so it is reasonable to suppose they had land or booty to live off.[22]

In my view our concept of the warlord and his army may need revision. And that revision I have tried to suggest starts with Plutarch's *Life of Sulla* 12.

169–173; Gabba (1970) 211; Keppie (1983) 38–41.

[20] Greenidge & Clay (1960).

[21] Appian, *Civil Wars* 2.140 with Keaveney (1983a) 543–544.

[22] Seager (1979) 27, 79–80.

HELLENISM AND *TRYPHÊ* IN PLUTARCH'S *LIFE OF LUCULLUS*

Manuel Tröster

> Yet that Lucullus took not only pleasure but pride in this way of living, is clear from the anecdotes recorded of him. It is said, for instance, that he entertained for many successive days some Greeks who had come up to Rome, and that they, with genuinely Greek sentiments, were at last ashamed and declined further invitations, on the ground that he was incurring so much expense every day on their account; whereupon Lucullus said to them with a smile, "Some of this expense, my Greek friends, is indeed on your account; most of it, however, is on account of Lucullus" (Plutarch, *Lucullus* 41.1–2).[1]

The passage quoted above closely accords with the popular image of Lucullus as a *bon vivant* in both ancient and modern times. Towards the end of the first century B.C., Nicolaus of Damascus castigated the consul of 74 for being "the first man who led the way to that extravagance (τῆς δὲ πολυτελείας … πρῶτος ἡγεμών) which currently flourishes",[2] while almost two millennia later Ronald Syme observed that Lucullus "transmitted to posterity not the memory of talent and integrity, but the eternal exemplar of luxury."[3] Apart from elaborating on the consular's self-indulgence, Plutarch's statement on his hero's wastefulness establishes a notable contrast between extravagant behaviour on the one hand and Greek manners on the other. In fact, both Hellenism and luxury constitute themes of crucial importance to the construction of character in the *Life of Lucullus* as a whole. Time and again, the protagonist's political and military undertakings are said to be underpinned by philhellenic motives commensurate with his Hellenic education and scholarly pursuits.[4] On the other hand, Lucullus' excessive wealth, the extravagance of his banquets, and the luxury of his buildings figure in

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[1] Translations are adapted from the Loeb Classical Library. I am grateful to Heinz Heinen and John Patterson for their help and encouragement, and also to Altay Coskun, Tim Duff, and Christopher Pelling.

[2] As quoted in Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 6.274E–F; cf. 12.543A; similarly Velleius Paterculus, *Historiae Romanae* 2.33.4. Cf. Zecchini (1995) 592–599, who conjectures that Nicolaus' statement is derived from Sallust's *Histories*.

[3] Syme (1939) 23.

[4] The relevant passages are examined in Swain (1992a).

a number of anecdotes in the latter part of the *Life*, and finally earn severe censure in the concluding *synkrisis*.

Evidently, both Hellenism and τρυφή correspond to Plutarch's general interests and emphases in the *Lives*. In a number of instances, the biographer investigates his Roman heroes from the angle of Greek παιδεία as a means of measuring their ability to control passionate impulses and to curb their φιλοτιμία.[5] Lucullus is thus praised for "allowing his mind to find complete leisure and repose in philosophy, encouraging the contemplative side of his nature, and giving timely halt and check to the play of his ambition (τὸ φιλότιμον)" (*Lucullus* 1.6; cf. 38.2–5). Moreover, Plutarch generally conceives of the concepts of πρᾳότης and φιλανθρωπία as epitomising Hellenic culture and civilisation.[6] Along with related qualities like δικαιοσύνη and χρηστότης, they are repeatedly ascribed to Lucullus in the context of benefactions to Greeks. Upon relating, for instance, that his hero was commissioned to collect the contribution imposed on the province of Asia by Sulla, Plutarch observes that Lucullus "showed himself not only honest and just (καθαρὸν καὶ δίκαιον), but even mild (πρᾷον) in the performance of a task so oppressive and disagreeable" (*Lucullus* 4.1). Following his account of the capture of Tigranocerta, the biographer likewise commends Lucullus' noble treatment of the city's inhabitants, insisting that the proconsul "was ambitious of the praise that is consequent upon justice and humanity (τῶν ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης καὶ φιλανθρωπίας ἐπαίνων), rather than of that which follows military successes" (*Lucullus* 29.6).[7] At the end of the biography, however, the supposed sea change in Lucullus' way of life (*Lucullus* 39.1) leaves him in opposition to the ideal of Hellenism as embodied in his Greek guests and in the teachings of Plato: "But to divert fair achievements to pleasure as their final end (ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ὡς τέλος), and then to spend the rest of one's life, as a sequel to wars and fightings, celebrating Aphrodite's festival, sporting and living luxuriously (παίζειν καὶ τρυφᾶν) is not worthy of the noble Academy"

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[5] Cf. Swain (1987) 98–101; Swain (1990) 131–134; Pelling (1989) *passim*; more generally Duff (1999) 72–89; further Frazier (1988) 119–127.

[6] Cf. Martin Jr. (1960); Martin Jr. (1961); De Romilly (1979) 275–307; Frazier (1996) 231–239; Schmidt (1999) 22–25 and 53–56. On the prominence of πρᾳότης in the *Cimon-Lucullus* see Fuscagni (1989) 43–52; Stadter (1997) 70–75.

[7] Note that the ensuing phrase establishes an explicit link with παιδεία by interpreting Lucullus' aspirations as ἡμέρου ψυχῆς καὶ πεπαιδευμένης ἐπίδειξις. Further references: πρᾳότης, Plutarch, *Lucullus* 2.1; also *Cimon* 3.1; φιλανθρωπία, *Lucullus* 18.9; also *Cimon* 3.3; δικαιοσύνη, *Lucullus* 36.5; χρηστότης, *Lucullus* 18.9; 32.6.

(*Lucullus* 44.3). In emphasising the contrast between luxury and learning, the biographer studiously avoids the connexion of two concepts which a Roman audience might have conceived of as closely interrelated features of Hellenic culture.[8]

From Plutarch's point of view, the idea of luxury rather ought to be associated with the Barbarian world.[9] In the *Lucullus*, this is most strikingly illustrated by the characterisation of the Armenian king Tigranes which is replete with *topoi* based on the notions of ὕβρις and τρυφή: "Now the sway of the Armenians was intolerably grievous to the Greeks. Above all else, the spirit of the king himself had become pompous and haughty (τραγικὸν καὶ ὑπέρογκον) in the midst of his great prosperity" (*Lucullus* 21.3).[10] Although Tigranes is in fact known to have styled himself φιλέλλην, Plutarch consistently presents him as suppressing his Greek subjects, thus employing the Barbarian king as a negative foil for his Roman hero's philhellenism.[11] As indicated above, it is only at the end of the *Life* that the protagonist himself becomes associated with luxury and the abuse of wealth: "In these ways, then, Lucullus used his wealth wantonly (ὑβριστικῶς), as though it were in very truth something captured and barbarian" (*Lucullus* 41.7).[12]

As Plutarch himself reveals in the *prooimion* to the pair of *Cimon* and *Lucullus*, the theme of Hellenism is closely intertwined with his personal gratitude to the Roman protagonist owing to benefactions conferred on his home town Chaironeia at the time of the Mithridatic Wars (*Cimon* 1–2). Indeed, the biographer programmatically states that "in its fair chapters we must round out the truth into fullest semblance", whereas "errors and defects … we must not delineate in our history with excessive zeal and emphasis, but treat them as though we were standing in awe of human nature for producing no character which is absolutely good and indisputably set towards virtue" (*Cimon* 2.4f.). Impressed by

[8] Cf. Swain (1987) 192–196; Swain (1990) 126–128.

[9] Cf. Nikolaidis (1986) 236–238; Schmidt (1999) 107–139.

[10] Cf. Pulci Doria Breglia (1973/74) with further references.

[11] Also note the emphasis on wealth and luxury in the negative portraits of Ptolemy (Plutarch, *Lucullus* 2.6–3.1) and Cethegus (5.4–6.4) as well as in the depiction of the soldiery (7.1–3 and 30.5: Lucullus' army; 7.4–6: Mithridates' former army), further the stress on the dissolute ways of various female characters (Lucullus' mother: 1.1; Praecia: 6.2–4; his wives: 34.1; 38.1) and on the display of precious objects in Lucullus' triumph (37.3–6; also 36.6).

[12] Also note Plutarch, *Lucullus* 44.5, where Lucullus' table (τράπεζα) is likened to that of a satrap, whereas Cimon's is called δημοκρατική and φιλάνθρωπος. For Plutarch's views on the use of wealth see Desideri (1985).

this passage, a number of modern critics have concluded that Plutarch's persistent emphasis on Lucullus' Hellenism was grossly exaggerated or even fabricated. Most notably, Simon Swain has charged the biographer with giving an "unashamedly favourable presentation of Lucullus in the face of some quite contrary evidence."[13]

In support of this proposition, Swain has noted that the stress on Lucullus' Hellenism took up the theme of panhellenic benefaction established in the parallel *Life of Cimon*, thus suggesting that its elaboration in the *Lucullus* essentially followed from compositional exigencies. Likewise, he has called attention to the preponderance of references to Lucullus' extravagance in the *Moralia* as opposed to a quantitative focus on Hellenic culture and benefactions in the *Life*. Admittedly, τρυφή is the principal point of more than half of the passages citing Lucullus in the *Moralia*,[14] whereas in the biography less than a tenth of the chapters is devoted to this topic as related to the protagonist's mode of life. Nevertheless, it would be precipitate to accept Swain's conclusion to the effect that Lucullus' notorious association with luxury was intentionally downplayed in the *Life*.[15] In what follows, the charge of distortion shall be assessed on the basis of the extant parallel sources and in the light of the material which is likely to have been at Plutarch's disposal.

At first glance, Lucullus' philhellenic disposition appears to be confirmed by Cicero's *Academica priora* in which the consul of 74 is presented as well versed in philosophy, expounding the epistemological ideas of the Academic philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon. Yet in his letters to Atticus, the author of the dialogue justifies the substitution of the participants in the *Academica posteriora* by explicitly denying that the original interlocutors were *philologi* and, while conceding that they were not devoid of education (ἀπαιδευσία), affirms that their inexperience (ἀτριψία) in the matters under discussion was in fact well known (*Ad*

[13] Swain (1992b) 183. Cf. also Swain (1987) 127–134; Swain (1990) 143–145; Swain (1992a); further Reinach (1895) 451; Asdourian (1911) 173–175; v. Ooteghem (1959) 103 and *passim*; Manandian (1963) 81 and *passim*; Carcopino (^{5}1968) 77; Ballesteros Pastor (1996) 239 and 247; Ballesteros Pastor (1999) 331f.; *contra* Flacelière/ Chambry (1972) 46–49; Scardigli (1979) 104f.; Scardigli (1989) 278f.; Piccirilli (1990) xvi–xx and *passim*; Lavery (1994); Wylie (1994) 109.

[14] Plutarch, *Moralia* 204B; 782F; 785F–786A; 792B–C. The remaining references are to the battle of Tigranocerta and to Lucullus' close association with his brother and with Sulla respectively (Plutarch, *Moralia* 203A–B; 484D–E; 805E–F). Also note Plutarch, *Pompeius* 46.6; 48.7.

[15] Cf. Swain as quoted in n. 13; also Pelling (1997) 239–242 = Pelling (2002) 373–375; Duff (1999) 59f.; Sirinelli (2000) 306.

Atticum 13.12.3 = 320.3 Shackleton Bailey; 13.16.1 = 323.1; cf. 13.19.5 = 326.5).[16] Undoubtedly, the evidence from Cicero's correspondence seriously questions the significance not only of the encomiastic statements in the introduction to the treatise itself (*Academica* 1.1–7), but also of Plutarch's remarks on Lucullus' philosophical aspirations; for the biographer explicitly refers to Cicero's dialogue and may to some degree have been impressed by the praise heaped therein on his hero's devotion to Greek learning (*Lucullus* 42.4).[17] While demolishing the image of Lucullus as a scholar, Cicero's observations do not, however, disprove the general's interest in philosophy and his love for artistry. At any rate, Lucullus is attested as the author of a piece of historical writing in Greek (Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 1.19.10 = 19.10 Sh.B.; cf. Plutarch, *Lucullus* 1.7f.),[18] and there is no reason to disbelieve his commitment to the promotion of Greek scholarship in the environment of his well-stocked library (*Lucullus* 42.1f.).[19]

As for Lucullus' benefactions to Hellenic communities, they are in some measure corroborated by a substantial number of honorific inscriptions as well as the adoption of Lucullean eras by at least three cities in Asia Minor,[20] though that sort of honour is of course far from distinctive and may have been prompted by motives other than genuine gratitude.[21] Additional confirmation is afforded by a remark of Cicero's, indicating that Lucullus received substantial legacies from his friends in the province of Asia on account of his lenient policies at the time of his governorship (*Pro Flacco* 85). As Plutarch's *prooimion* shows, moreover, the

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[16] Contrast Plutarch's praise for Lucullus' φιλολογία in *Lucullus* 1.5.

[17] On this passage see Glucker (1978) 380–390; Jones (1982); Barnes (1989) 90–92; Fladerer (1996) 186f. Note the exaggerated view expressed by Crawford (1978) 205, who charges Lucullus with philistinism; *contra* Keaveney (1992) 11f. with 211[41].

[18] Lucullus' authorship is questioned by Crawford (1978) 337[75], however. Also note that Sulla dedicated his memoirs to his former quaestor (Plutarch, *Lucullus* 1.4; 4.5 and *Sulla* 6.10).

[19] Also note Cicero, *De finibus* 3.2.7ff.; Isidorus, *Etymologiae* 6.5.1. Cf. Dix (2000).

[20] The extant inscriptions honouring Lucullus are conveniently recorded in Ameling (1989); Canali de Rossi (2001) 62f. Also note Plutarch, *Lucullus* 29.5, reporting that Lucullus was honoured as εὐεργέτης and κτίστης. For the Lucullean eras of Sinope, Amastris, and Abonuteichus see Marek (1985) 144–152; Leschhorn (1993) 157–169, with catalogue 478–481.

[21] With regard to Lucullus' early years, Schütz (1994) 76 has aptly observed that both the amount of inscriptions and the formulae adopted were out of the ordinary. It is worth noting that, generally speaking, Greek communities were rather restrained in dedicating honorific statues to individual Romans until well into the first century B.C. Cf. Tuchelt (1979) 121–127; Bernhardt (1998) 44f.; Højte (2002) 58f.

Chaironeians' memory of Lucullus' benefactions was very much alive even in the biographer's own day. Likewise, Appian affirms that the city of Cyzicus continued to celebrate games called Λουκούλλεια at his time of writing (*Mithridaticus* 76.330; cf. Plutarch, *Lucullus* 23.1f.). Finally, narrative sources other than Plutarch betray a desire to eulogise Lucullus' achievements in their accounts of the conquest of Mithridates' kingdom. Appian in particular parallels the biographer in recounting the prodigy of the proconsul's visionary encounter with Autolycus, who was worshipped by the Sinopeans, and connects the commander's sympathy towards the inhabitants of Amisus with his desire to emulate Alexander the Great (*Mithridaticus* 83.370–374).[22] Echoes of this encomiastic tradition can further be detected in the briefer accounts of Memnon of Heraclea and Orosius (*FGrHist* 434 F30; F37; Orosius, *Historiae adversum paganos* 6.3.3), with the latter presumably building on Livy.

In Plutarch's version of the capture of Amisus, it is not Alexander but Lucullus' political mentor Sulla who is invoked as a model for the protagonist's zeal in conferring benefactions on Greeks (*Lucullus* 19.5)—a rather unexpected connexion which is exceedingly unlikely to have been made by anyone but Lucullus himself. In this instance at least, the theme of philhellenic euergetism is therefore virtually certain to derive from the propaganda disseminated by the commander's own entourage which included, among others, the poet Archias and the above-mentioned Antiochus of Ascalon. The former is known to have eulogised his patron's achievements in a poem which apparently served a purpose similar to that of Theophanes' famous account of Pompey's campaigns (Cicero, *Pro Archia* 21; also *Ad Atticum* 1.16.15 = 16.15 Sh.B.). While Archias' piece has sometimes been hypothesised to be one of the major sources informing Plutarch's narrative,[23] Antiochus is explicitly cited by the biographer as extolling the Roman victory at Tigranocerta in his treatise Περὶ θεῶν (*Lucullus* 28.8).[24] This background not only accounts for Plutarch's pattern of praise for his hero's philhellenism, but

[22] Cf. Mastrocinque (1999) 108: "Appiano sembra avvicinarsi alla tradizione encomiastica presente in Plutarco". On Lucullus' association with Alexander see Coarelli (1981) 254–257; Coarelli (1987) 157–159; Ballesteros Pastor (1998).—On both Amisus and Sinope Lucullus bestowed *libertas*. Cf. Bernhardt (1971) 137–141, with whose interpretation of the proconsul's policies as exclusively driven by philhellenism I disagree.

[23] Cf. Reinach (1890) 49–54; Reinach (1895) 425 and 442f.; Rizzo (1963) 40, 79–81, and *passim*; Hillard (1987) 39–47; also Coarelli (1981) 254–257; Coarelli (1987) 157–159.

[24] As to Antiochus' connexion with Lucullus, cf. Cicero, *Academica* 1.4; also Philodemus, *Academicorum index* 34; Aelianus, *Varia historia* 12.25. Glucker (1978) 21–27 and 91f. suggests that Antiochus' role was mainly that of a political advisor; similarly

also readily explains the corresponding blackening of Tigranes' record as antihellenic and tyrannical. If the exigencies of war propaganda thus constituted one of the driving forces behind the persistent emphasis on Lucullus' euergetism, the proconsul's desire to woo foreign clients and his wish to pay homage to Hellenic culture were probably complementary factors. To be effective as an item of public self-advertisement, the theme must primarily have been targeted on a Greek audience; for in Roman circles an ambiguous attitude towards *graeculi* persisted well into the first century B.C., with antihellenic reservations performing a key function in the assertion of native traditions.[25] As for Plutarch, he readily exploited this encomiastic tradition in the double endeavour to exalt the benefactor of his home town and to explore certain character traits in accordance with his own interests, yet—*pace* Swain—his emphasis on Lucullus' Hellenism is surely far from "adventitious".[26]

While philhellenism figured as a crucial element in Lucullus' public self-image, the charge of extravagance seems to be derived from the contemporary counter-image propagated by his political opponents.[27] An early instance of polemic against Lucullus' excessive wealth is attested in a passage from Cicero's *Pro Sestio* referring to a *contio* of 67 in which the tribune A. Gabinius employed a representation of one of the commander's *villae* in order to incite indignation against him (*Pro Sestio* 93).[28] In Plutarch's narrative, this attack is mirrored in the double charge of φιλαρχία and φιλοπλουτία which is repeatedly levelled at

Rawson (1985) 81; Rawson (1989) 238f.; more sceptically Barnes (1989) 55–57. Further note Cicero, *loc. cit.*: Lucullus' deeds *fere sunt et Graecis litteris celebrata et Latinis.*

25 Cf. Gruen (1992) 223–271, who essentially reduces the issue to a matter of public posture; Vogt-Spira (1996); Jehne (1999). For antihellenic sentiments in Late-Republican Rome cf. Petrochilos (1974) 163–196; Jocelyn (1977) 358–365; Balsdon (1979) 30–40; Gruen (1984) 1, 260–266; MacMullen (1991) 429–438. Further note Rawson (1985) 3–18, who outlines the intensification of interaction between Roman aristocrats and Greek intellectuals, and Gruen (1990) 158–192, who suggests a "marked maturation" of Roman attitudes in the course of the second and early first centuries B.C.; to the same effect Veyne (1979) 14–29.

26 Swain (1990) 145; Swain (1992a) 314.

27 In general terms, this has already been pointed out by Ballesteros Pastor (1999) 338–342, who seems basically to accept Plutarch's emphasis on Lucullus' change of lifestyle, however.

28 Also note that Lucullus is presumably to be counted among the figures whom Cicero later denounces as *piscinarii.* Cf. Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 1.18.6 = 18.6 Sh.B.; 1.19.6 = 19.6; 1.20.3 = 20.3; 2.1.7 = 21.7 (all dating from 60); also 2.9.1 = 29.1 (dating from 59 and apparently citing Clodius). Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 3.15.6 explicitly mentions Lucullus as one of the men Cicero had in mind.

Lucullus in the course of the Mithridatic campaigns, culminating in a harangue in which the youthful P. Clodius depicts the proconsul's soldiers as merely "convoying the waggons and camels of Lucullus laden with golden beakers set with precious stones" (*Lucullus* 34.4).[29] Against this background, a link was easily forged with the notion of Oriental luxury as reflected in the title of *Xerxes togatus* which Lucullus earned on account of the costly digging operations conducted to secure the water supply of his fishponds.[30] Likewise, the aforementioned passage from Nicolaus styling Lucullus as the first man who introduced extravagance among the Romans is evidently based on the *topos* of moral corruption blamed on the influx of wealth and luxury from the East.[31] The parallels to Livy's disapproving comments on the return of Cn. Manlius Vulso's army from Asia in 187 are obvious, and the underlying concern about public and private conduct firmly attaches the issue to the Roman discourse on *mos maiorum*.[32]

The early charges against Lucullus' love of wealth seem to have been amplified considerably in the wake of his return from the East. Conspicuously, a fair proportion of the surviving anecdotes on the consular's *luxuria* stress the supposed *temperantia* of Pompey who had emerged as his principal enemy upon taking over the Mithridatic command in 66.[33] In one instance, Plutarch relates that "Pompey certainly

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[29] For φιλαρχία and φιλοπλουτία cf. Plutarch, *Lucullus* 33.5; also 24.1; 37.2. Furthermore, Plutarch, *Pompeius* 31.8 contrasts Lucullus' φιλαργυρία with Pompey's φιλαρχία; similarly Velleius Paterculus, *Historiae Romanae* 2.33.2. On Clodius' speech see Tatum (1991).

[30] Plutarch, *Lucullus* 39.3; Velleius Paterculus, *Historiae Romanae* 2.33.4; Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis historia* 9.170; also note Sallust, *Coniuratio Catilinae* 13.1. On the parallel to Xerxes see Herodotus, *Historiae* 7.22–24 and Jolivet (1987) 875f.; Piccirilli (1990) 337f. with additional sources. Further note Jolivet (1987) 897–902; *contra* Keaveney (1992) 246[14] on the location of the fishponds.

[31] Also note Plutarch, *Lucullus* 36.6, citing the πλοῦτος brought to Rome by Lucullus as enticing Crassus into launching his Parthian campaign.

[32] Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 39.6.7–9: *Luxuriae enim peregrinae origo ab exercitu Asiatico inuecta in urbem est.* Cf. also Pliny, *Naturalis historia* 34.14; 37.12; further 33.148; Cassius Dio, *Historiae Romanae* 19 F64 and the analysis of the political context in Zecchini (1982). More generally, cf. Lintott (1972); Petrochilos (1974) 69–87; Bringmann (1977) with discussion of further instances. In addition, see Edwards (1993) 1–33 on the political and social implications of the Roman discourse on morality. On the other hand, note the favourable judgement of luxury in the passages examined by La Penna (1989). Further note Passerini (1934); Cozzoli (1980), who both outline the tradition of censuring τρυφή in Greek literature, but also Heinen (1983) on the positive connotations of the concept as advertised by the Ptolemies.

[33] Cf. Hillman (1991), who convincingly refutes the evidence for earlier enmity between the two politicians. However, there is nothing to commend the opposite view

acquired repute, when he was ill. His physician had prescribed a thrush for him to eat, and his servants said that a thrush could not be found anywhere in the summer season except where Lucullus kept them fattening. Pompey, however, would not allow them to get one from there, but remarked to his physician: 'What! If a Lucullus were not luxurious (ἐτρύφα), a Pompey could not live on?', and he bade them prepare something else that was easily to be had" (*Lucullus* 40.2).[34] Elsewhere, Plutarch cites Pompey and Crassus, along with their partisans, as mocking Lucullus for giving himself up to pleasure and extravagance (*Lucullus* 38.5).[35] The pairing of the two "triumvirs" indeed suggests a connexion with the political struggles of 59 in which the retired general is attested as one of the fiercest opponents of their legislative agenda.[36] This reconstruction will gain additional plausibility, if Giuseppe Zecchini is right in conjecturing that Lucullus figured as a negative foil in Caesar's propaganda on public munificence and private moderation.[37]

At any rate, the contemporary popularity of anecdotes on Lucullus' self-indulgence is corroborated by a statement of Plutarch's, suggesting that the matter was "much talked of (λόγου πολλοῦ) in the city" (*Lucullus* 41.4). After the consular's death, scattered allusions to his wealth and extravagance appear in the works of authors as diverse as, for example, Cicero, Varro, Horace, Velleius Paterculus, and Pliny the Elder.[38] This remarkable range of authorities notwithstanding, the variety of anecdotes recounted is in fact rather limited. Above all, Plutarch himself keeps reproducing the same material in the *Lives* and in the *Moralia*,

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that Lucullus and Pompey had originally been political allies as expressed by Twyman (1972) 850–854 and 872f., and reaffirmed by Hillman (1989) 107f., 118–125, and *passim*. On the theme of Pompey's *temperantia* see Plutarch, *Pompeius* 1.4; 2.11f.; 18.3; 40.8f.; also Cicero, *Pro lege Manilia* 40f. and cf. Edwards (1991) 70–74.

[34] The same anecdote: Plutarch, *Pompeius* 2.11f. and *Moralia* 204B; 786A.

[35] Likewise Plutarch, *Pompeius* 48.7 and *Moralia* 204B; 785F, none of them mentioning Crassus.

[36] Cf. Hillman (1993) 219f., who also calls attention to the chronological context of the parallel passage from the *Pompeius*.

[37] Cf. Zecchini (1995) 599–607.

[38] Apart from sources already cited see Cicero, *De legibus* 3.30f. and *De officiis* 1.140; Varro, *De re rustica* 1.2.10; 1.13.7; 3.2.17; 3.3.10; 3.4.3; 3.5.8; 3.16.2; 3.17.9; Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca* 4.21.4; Horace, *Epistulae* 1.6.40ff.; Seneca the Elder, *Controversiae* 9.2.19; Pliny, *Naturalis historia* 8.211; 14.96; 18.32 (like Columella, *De re rustica* 1.4.6, possibly referring to Lucullus' father); 28.56; 35.155f.; 36.49f.; Anonymus, *De viris illustribus* 74.7; Symmachus, *Epistulae* 2.60.1; 6.70; 7.36 and *Orationes* 1.16; Ampelius, *Liber memorialis* 18.18.

thus evidently building on what Thomas Hillman has aptly called "the well established and prejudicial tradition on Lucullus' proverbial luxury".[39]

As a result, the reality of the consular's final years remains elusive. In Plutarch's narrative, unintentional distortion can be seen at work in the biographer's misreading of the evidence afforded by the *horti Luculliani*: "Even now, when luxury (τῆς τρυφῆς) has increased so much, the gardens of Lucullus are counted among the most costly (ἐν τοῖς πολυτελεστάτοις) of the imperial gardens" (*Lucullus* 39.2). What Plutarch saw in his own day, however, was obviously very different from what the area looked like in the final years of the Republic; for modern excavations have failed to uncover significant remains from Lucullus' lifetime while showing that various lavish structures were erected under the Principate.[40] In general, the archaeological evidence for the consular's wealth is strikingly poor both in terms of the number of his estates and of estimating the value of his property,[41] though this may of course be due to the fortuitous nature of the surviving data.

What is more, Hillman has demonstrated that—contrary to the erstwhile standard view—Lucullus did in fact not retire from public affairs on his return from the East but remained politically active until a year or two prior to his death.[42] In Plutarch's account, however, the protagonist's continued involvement in politics is minimised, not least for the sake of setting Cimon's youthful debauchery against Lucullus' degeneration in old age (*Lucullus* 44.4). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the biographer deliberately suppressed abundant information here; rather his reliance on disjointed and anecdotal material indicates that the sources available on his hero's final years were by far inferior to

[39] Hillman (1993) 218. Cf. Keaveney (1992) 151–154. A particular case is discussed in Hillman (1994).

[40] Cf. Broise/Jolivet (1996). Also note Tacitus, *Annales* 11.1.1, attesting to the embellishment of the gardens under the reign of Claudius. On late-Republican *horti* and their "Epicurean connotations" see further La Rocca (1986) 18–24 and, in particular, Wallace-Hadrill (1998) 2–6, with whose interpretation of Lucullus' supposed retirement I disagree.

[41] Cf. generally Jolivet (1987) with further references. Number of attested estates: Jolivet (1987) 878[15] who cites the *horti Luculliani* as well as *villae* at Tusculum, Misenum, and on the island of Nesis. Conventionally, scholars used to add another domicile at Naples, e.g. D'Arms (1970) 185f. Property value: Shatzman (1975) 35, who ranks Lucullus well behind Pompey and Crassus.

[42] Cf. Hillman (1993); also Keaveney (1992) 156–165; *pace* Lavery (1994) 269f.

the ones which inform his detailed and coherent narrative on the preceding campaigns.[43]

In the final analysis, there is no denying that Plutarch does to some degree overplay the theme of Hellenism, while it is less certain whether he really underplays that of τρυφή. The pedagogic purpose of the *Lives*, the exigencies of parallel composition, and the biographer's avowed gratitude towards his hero may all play a part in this. However, the notion of philhellenism is in fact well attested in the tradition on Lucullus, whereas the evidence for his τρυφή—if remarkably widespread—does not appear to have been particularly rich. As Plutarch's account reflects, in no small measure, the content of public debates and propaganda from the first century B.C., the resulting portrait of Lucullus may be suspected to be rather more significantly distorted by the biographer's sources than by his own compositional adaptation. While being prepared to amplify, compress, and at times reinterpret information, Plutarch does not engage in large-scale fabrication but rather constructs his hero by accentuating the material at his disposal.[44]

[43] On Plutarch's sources see Peter (1865) 106–109; v. Ooteghem (1959) 215–218; Scardigli (1979) 104f.; Scardigli (1989) 254f., 262–267, and 284; Piccirilli (1990) xxxvii f.

[44] For similar conclusions drawn from an investigation centred on a number of other late-Republican *Lives* see Pelling (1979); Pelling (1980); Pelling (1990).

THEMATIC CORRESPONDENCES IN PLUTARCH'S *LIVES* OF CAESAR, POMPEY, AND CRASSUS

Jeffrey Beneker

In this article I examine Plutarch's approach to his triumviral *Lives*, the *Caesar*, *Pompey*, and *Crassus*. Christopher Pelling has argued persuasively that Plutarch researched and composed most of the late-Republican *Lives* as a group,[1] and therefore, one may naturally wonder whether these Roman *Lives*, which are so closely related in their preparation as well as in their subject matter, are also related in other ways.[2] In particular, when we read the triumviral *Lives* together, we discover several close thematic connections between them. By exploring these connections, I hope to demonstrate that Plutarch has developed a composite view of the heroes' interactions with one another, and that he maintains this view throughout all three *Lives*. I suggest that, in Plutarch's conception, Caesar was the dominating contender, Pompey held the second position, and Crassus was subordinate to both of them, and even though Plutarch highlights the best qualities of the heroes where he can, he maintains their relative positions and pointedly describes the weaknesses that hindered Pompey and especially Crassus. In the course of the analysis, I will also suggest that some of the anecdotes presented in the three *Lives* are interrelated and that the *Lives* must be read together in order for these anecdotes to be fully appreciated.

We turn first to the connections between the *Pompey* and the *Caesar*, or, rather, between the *Pompey* and the *Alexander-Caesar* pair. Because Plutarch does not explicitly connect these *Lives*, we must examine them carefully in order to find the connections. The first indication of a relationship is, in fact, stated rather subtly in the introduction to the *Alexander-Caesar*:

> We are writing in this book the *Life* of Alexander the king and that of Caesar, by whom Pompey was defeated. (*Alexander* 1.1)

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[1] Pelling (1979) and Pelling (1980). I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Philip Stadter for his assistance in developing this article.

[2] Brenk (1992) 4377 n. 68 also makes this suggestion.

On its own, the opening is unremarkable: the mention of Pompey appears simply to identify Caesar, just as "the king" identifies Alexander.[3] But a careful reading of the *Pompey* reveals that Plutarch's apparently passing association of Pompey with Alexander and Caesar also hints at something larger. In chapter 2 of the *Pompey*, Plutarch introduces a direct comparison not with Agesilaus, whose life is paired with Pompey's, but with Alexander.[4] Plutarch writes that many likened Pompey's appearance to the images of Alexander, a comparison which, in Plutarch's view, was more imagined than real. As a result, many referred to the young Pompey as Alexander, and Pompey did not decline the honor (*Pompey* 2.2). Not everyone accepted his new identity, however. Plutarch reports that some of Pompey's contemporaries began to call him Alexander in order to mock him, and this mockery perhaps provides a basis for Plutarch's skepticism about the resemblance between the two men. On the other hand, Plutarch concludes the section with a supportive anecdote. He relates that Lucius Philippus, a man of consular rank, acted as an advocate for Pompey and said that "he was doing nothing strange if, being Philip, he loved Alexander". Later, Plutarch compares Pompey favorably to Alexander when he notes that Pompey routed the Iberians, a people who had escaped subjugation by both the Persians and Alexander (34.5).

Despite his skepticism, Plutarch introduces further similarities between the two men by echoing scenes from his *Alexander* in the *Pompey* without making the cross-references explicit, developing the image of Pompey as a potential new Alexander and suggesting that we should have the Greek *Life* in mind while reading the Roman, even though they are not a formal pair. For instance, while Pompey is pursuing Mithridates, he shows great restraint in dealing with captured women:

> Of all the concubines of Mithridates who were brought to him, he was intimate with (ἔγνω) none, but he restored them all to their parents and homes (36.2).

Likewise for the Macedonian when he has captured Darius' women:

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[3] Hamilton (1999) 1, comments that Plutarch is distinguishing Gaius Julius Caesar from Augustus, and he identifies a similar reference at *Numa* 19.4, where Plutarch is explaining the names of the months and must also make a distinction between the two men. He notes that in *Brutus* 1.4, where the context makes clear that the first Caesar is meant, Plutarch uses Καῖσαρ only.

[4] Plutarch also compares Agesilaus to Alexander at *Agesilaus* 15.4.

> But Alexander, as it seems, believing mastery of himself more kingly than conquering enemies, neither touched these women nor was intimate with (ἔγνω) any other woman before marriage except for Barsine.
>
> (*Alexander* 21.7)[5]

The similarities are strengthened by the continuation of *Pompey* 36, wherein Plutarch describes Stratonice, a concubine of Mithridates who became his favorite though she was of low birth. She was commanding a fortress, which was captured by Pompey, providing him the chance to treat her honorably (36.7), as Alexander had treated Darius' wife Stateira and her daughters (*Alexander* 21.5–6). Pompey's Alexander-like behavior is further highlighted in the following chapter, where Mithridates' undisciplined lifestyle, revealed by the discovery of lascivious (ἀκόλαστοι) letters in one of his captured strongholds, is in contrast to his own (37.2). Similarly, when Alexander captures Darius' tent, he witnesses the great luxury of the king's lifestyle, and exclaims, "This, so it seems, was what it meant to rule" (20.13).

The direct references to Alexander and the similarity of these anecdotes create the sort of parallelism that one would expect to find between paired *Lives*.[6] For the first half of the *Life*, Plutarch appears to be writing an *Alexander-Pompey*. However, Pompey's association with Alexander is not maintained. The cause of Plutarch's earlier skepticism is revealed several chapters later, when Pompey is at the height of his power and glory but about to fall (46). Plutarch reintroduces his criticism of those who compare Pompey to Alexander, adding that Pompey would have been happier to have died at this time, while he was still enjoying the good fortune of Alexander (*Pompey* 46.1–2).[7] He adds that the following years were only to bring success that stirred envy in others and misfortunes that were unbearable. Pompey's own power and glory were his undoing: he used them to strengthen others, including Caesar, and in doing so he diminished himself. At this point, where he puts to rest the comparison to Alexander, Plutarch begins to narrate Caesar's eclipse of Pompey. He writes:

[5] Flacelière et al. (1973) 299, note the connection that ἔγνω makes between these two passages.

[6] See Duff (1999) 249–251.

[7] Cf. Livy 9.17.6: Pompey's long life allowed him to see bad as well as good fortune, something that Alexander escaped by dying young.

> Thus by the power of Pompey was Caesar raised up against the city, and he overthrew and defeated the man through whom he had gained power over everyone else. (*Pompey* 46.4)

Thus the likeness of Pompey to Alexander has been proved false, and Caesar, Alexander's true Roman counterpart, has been introduced.[8] When *Alexander* 1.1 is reconsidered, we can see that Caesar overthrew Pompey not only for control of Rome, but also for the role of companion to Alexander. Plutarch, it appears, is highlighting the fact that Pompey fails to become an Alexander by beginning to construct a parallel *Life*, suggesting a possible pairing, and then demonstrating the reason for its rejection.

The comparison of Pompey to Alexander in the first half of Pompey's *Life* sets the stage for the comparison of the hero with Caesar in the second half, wherein Pompey comes out the loser. Caesar is an important character in this part of the *Life*, as we would expect, knowing the history of their civil war. However, we can also notice several thematic correspondences between the *Lives* of Pompey and Caesar, correspondences which indicate that Plutarch must have conceived and planned these *Lives* together, and which also hint that he expected his readers to make connections between these two texts.

One thematic correspondence is found in the courage of the heroes and the presence of fortune. *Pompey*, chapter 50, and *Caesar*, chapter 38, relate similar stories. Pompey, who had been placed in charge of Rome's supply of grain, was about to set sail with his cargo, but a storm caused the ship's captain to hesitate. Pompey ordered him to put to sea, however, and, as Plutarch writes:

> Employing such daring and enthusiasm, along with good fortune, he filled the markets with grain and the sea with ships. (*Pompey* 50.3)

Caesar faced a similar situation while in the course of the civil war he waited at Apollonia for additional forces to arrive. Having grown impatient, he embarked on a small boat disguised as a slave, planning to cross to Brundisium to fetch the rest of his army. The boat, however, entered rough water as it approached the mouth of the river Aous and the Ionian Sea, and so the captain ordered the sailors to turn back. Caesar then disclosed himself and bid the captain to take heart and go on:

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[8] Harrison (1995) 102 notes that Plutarch makes no mention of Alexander in the second half of the *Life* and rarely mentions Caesar in the first.

> "Come, good man," he said, "be daring and fear nothing: you carry Caesar and the Fortune of Caesar as a shipmate". (*Caesar* 38.4)

Here, as in the *Pompey*, we have daring (τόλμη, τόλμα), which Caesar passes to the captain, and fortune (Τύχην, but not τύχη ἀγαθή as in the *Pompey*). Therefore, the ship was not able to overcome the storm, and Caesar was forced to return to land, unlike Pompey, without having accomplished his mission. However, the point of comparison lies not in the success of one hero and the failure of the other, but in the fact that both had identical reactions to nearly identical circumstances. Neither man was afraid in the face of nature's power, nor did either hesitate to assert his dominance while other men were surrendering.

Another point of correspondence between the *Lives* involves the heroes' interaction with pirates. In the *Pompey*, the pirates play a large role. Pompey grew powerful in part because he swiftly and completely rid the Mediterranean of their menace. But what is most interesting is Plutarch's description of the outrageousness of the pirates' actions (24.8–13). While they ruled the seas, they mistreated everyone they met, but they saved special insolence for Roman citizens. If a captive claimed to be a Roman, the pirates would pretend to be frightened, falling before him and begging his forgiveness. Then, after mocking him, they would dress him in senatorial clothes and force him to climb off the ship and into the sea to be drowned, pushing him if he refused to go voluntarily. Only one man does not succumb to this treatment, but we read about him not in the *Pompey* but in the *Caesar*. There Plutarch narrates Caesar's quick and easy dominance of the pirates (*Caesar* 1.8–2.7). Although a Roman citizen, he is able to treat them outrageously, a captive acting as if he were the master, so that in the end, he does not walk the plank but crucifies his former captors. Plutarch, however, does not describe the pirates' boldness when relating the episode in the *Caesar*. In order to appreciate the completeness of Caesar's dominance and the extent to which his own boldness surpasses that of the pirates, one must also read the episode in the *Pompey*. Once again, this is the sort of correspondence that one would expect to find between *Lives* that were written as a formal pair.[9]

The two *Lives* also correspond closely in their portrayal of the defeat of their subjects. In the *syncrisis* of the *Agesilaus-Pompey*, Plutarch faults

[9] Caesar's capture by pirates also appears in the *Crassus*. As evidence of the rivalry between the triumvirs, Plutarch has Caesar exclaim, "You will experience great joy, Crassus, when you learn about my capture" (*Crassus* 7.5).

Pompey for poor generalship because he did not attack Caesar while he was weak, but rather engaged him inland at Pharsalus, where Caesar's army had the advantage of experience and he was separated from his navy (*Syncrisis Agesilaus-Pompey* 4). As was the case when the struggle with Caesar had first begun (*Pompey* 46), Pompey's defeat at Pharsalus was his own doing, a fact which Plutarch underscores by asserting that the divine will had not desired that place to be the site of Pompey's showdown with Caesar: "For god did not appoint the Pharsalian plain to be the stadium and theater for their contest over leadership" (*Syncrisis Agesilaus-Pompey* 4.6). Pompey, as he did when Caesar's power was rising, has again failed to use his strength for his own gain and has instead allowed Caesar to succeed at his own expense.[10]

It is interesting that Plutarch calls the Pharsalian plain the "theater and stadium of their contest for supremacy". By calling the site a theater, Plutarch has made a special connection between the defeat of Pompey and the death of Caesar. On the night before the battle, Pompey dreamed that the people were applauding him as he entered his theater and that he was decorating the attached temple of Venus Victrix with many spoils (*Pompey* 68.2). Thus even in the *Pompey*, Plutarch has associated the victory of Caesar, who claimed descent from Venus, with Pompey's theater. In the *Caesar* we learn that Caesar was killed while the senate was meeting in that very theater and that he fell dead at the base of Pompey's statue (*Caesar* 66), an unmistakable association of Pompey with Caesar's death, just as Caesar was involved in Pompey's. Pompey had celebrated the opening of his theater with athletic and musical contests, but the most impressive sight, according to Plutarch, was the ἐλεφαντομαχία (*Pompey* 52.9). This fight must certainly foreshadow the struggle between the two imposing generals, a struggle that would end ultimately in that very theater. However, the death of Caesar is only briefly mentioned but not described in the *Pompey*, and so, as with the episode concerning the pirates, the *Caesar* must be considered in conjunction with the *Pompey* in order for the scene of Caesar's death to convey its full meaning.

In reviewing these correspondences between the *Caesar* and the *Pompey*, we can make an important observation. Crassus appears to be missing. In fact the contest for supremacy in Rome is not, in Plutarch's

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[10] Caesar's death, on the other hand, was in accord with his destiny, as Plutarch demonstrates by listing, in the *Life* of Caesar, the many divine signs that preceded his assassination (*Caesar* 63).

view, an equal struggle between all three members of the triumvirate, but rather a wrestling match to be held in two rounds. The first contenders, and the strongest, are Pompey and Caesar, and Crassus, the junior partner, waits to take on the victor but dies in Parthia before he can have his chance. This imbalance in the triumvirate is present not only in the *Pompey* and *Caesar*, but in the *Crassus* as well.[11]

If we examine the *Caesar* first, we find that Plutarch has employed the terminology from athletic contests in narrating the struggle within the triumvirate. In chapter 3, Caesar is returning to Rome and stops at Rhodes to study rhetoric under Apollonius. Plutarch describes his skill in speaking, saying that he had exercised his nature so that he held second place without question (3.2). Caesar abandons his training in rhetoric, however, before achieving the first rank so that he may occupy himself with becoming first in power and arms (3.3). Caesar's training continues in chapter 28, where the contest takes on the character of an athletic event. Crassus becomes the *ephedros*, the third competitor in a contest who waits to fight the winner of the first round (28.1).[12] Caesar himself withdraws to Gaul, removing himself far from his opponents (τῶν ἀνταγωνιστῶν). There, like an athlete, he exercises his power and increases his glory, lifting himself by his deeds so that he can contend with the successes of Pompey (28.3). When Crassus dies fighting the Parthians, the *ephedros* is removed, leaving Caesar and Pompey as the only competitors.

Following chapter 28, Caesar returns to Rome and becomes enmeshed in the civil wars, and the contest is resumed when he meets his principal opponent at Pharsalus. In Pompey's final appearance in the *Caesar*, Plutarch has him withdraw from the fight. When Caesar's men have advanced all the way to his camp, Pompey cries out in disbelief and is forced to concede his defeat. Then he removes his clothing, that of a competitor and a general, dresses in a manner that befits a fugitive, and steals away (45.8). We can detect in Pompey's defeat a parallel with Alexander's final encounter with Darius in the *Life* of Alexander. Before sending him into battle at Gaugamela, Plutarch describes Alexander's majestic attire: he wore an iron helmet and collar, a vest and a linen breastplate, his sword was a gift of the king of the Citieans, his belt

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[11] Cf. the assessment of Flacelière et al. (1972) 191 in the introduction to the *Crassus:* "Il [*i.e.* Crassus] fut certainement la dupe de César, et peut-être aussi de Pompée".

[12] LSJ ἔφεδρος II 4. This passage is cited. Cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 792, where Sophocles is the *ephedros* in the contest between Aeschylus and Euripides.

was made by Helicon and was a gift of honor from the city of Rhodes (*Alexander* 32.7). Pompey's exit at Pharsalus is the mirror image: Plutarch has him undress and remove himself from the contest, pointedly calling his old uniform that "of a competitor and a general" in order to reflect the dual nature of Pompey's role. The parallelism continues as Pompey takes on the role of Darius: having fled from his rival when the battle was lost, he is ignobly murdered in Egypt (45.9).[13] Caesar, like Alexander, laments the dishonorable death of his opponent (48.2).[14]

We can also detect a similar presentation of the competition between the two men in the *Pompey*. We have already examined the close correlation between the *Caesar* and the *Pompey* in other regards, but the similarities are especially strong where the contest is concerned. The terminology of athletics is applied to the triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, just as it was in the *Caesar*. Crassus is once again the *ephedros*, and his death opens the way for unhindered competition between the two remaining partners (53.9). Plutarch reinforces the athletic tone of the two-man contest by providing a quotation from a comic poet: "the one wrestler against the other / anoints himself and sprinkles his hands with dust".

The two contestants finally meet in Greece. In this account from the *Pompey* there is much that complements the account in the *Caesar*. Caesar is of course victorious, and the events force Pompey to retire to his tent where he makes the same exclamation he made in the *Caesar*, and then changes into clothes that befit his present fortune (72.3).[15] In narrating Pompey's escape, Plutarch emphasizes the lowly state of the defeated contestant by having him reflect on his lost power and glory, which he had increased through so many "contests and wars", and how he was now small and humbled as he slipped away without an escort (73.1). The phrase "contests and wars" has a pointed meaning. This combination of nouns had introduced Pompey when he was on the brink of greatness (8.6); now it marks the end of his career and his loss to the champion, Caesar.

One final occurrence of the metaphor of the contest appears in the *syncrisis* of the *Agesilaus-Pompey*. We have already discussed Plutarch's

[13] Pompey's murder is not described in detail, but Plutarch refers the reader to his *Life*.

[14] For the flight of Darius, see *Alexander* 33.8; for his death and Alexander's distress, see *Alexander* 43.

[15] In both the *Pompey* and *Caesar*, Pompey exclaims: οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν παρεμβολήν;

designation of Pharsalus as a theater, but at the same time he calls it a stadium, the site of Pompey's final contest (*Syncrisis Agesilaus-Pompey* 4.6). The phrase "theater and stadium of their contest for supremacy" joins two metaphors that Plutarch has employed throughout both the *Caesar* and *Pompey* and which are reinforced by a joint reading.

Finally we turn to Crassus, who is introduced into the *Lives* of Caesar and Pompey primarily, it appears, to be dismissed. In his own biography, he fares little better as far as the triumvirate is concerned: he is clearly the weakest member of the group. Plutarch's assessment of his standing is not unique. Cassius Dio explains that when Caesar formed the triumvirate, Crassus understood that he was inferior to Pompey, that Caesar's power was rising, and that those two would become well-matched competitors, and so he courted both of them to his own advantage (37.56.4–5). Plutarch comes close to this characterization, making Pompey the champion of the "sensible and established", Caesar of the "hasty and reckless", and assigning to Crassus a middle position, which he constantly changed according to where his own advantage lay (*Crassus* 7.7).[16] Suetonius notes Crassus' diminished position by remarking that after Pompey married Caesar's daughter, Julia, Caesar began to call on Pompey to speak first in the Senate, whereas he used to call on Crassus (*Divus Iulius* 21); Suetonius also includes Crassus' wife Tertulla in his list of noble women seduced by Caesar, adding Pompey's wife Mucia as well (50.1).

What is unique in Plutarch's portrait is that Crassus is never allowed out of the shadow of his allies, even in his own biography. This is best illustrated as Plutarch narrates the start of the ill-fated Parthian expedition. Crassus, Plutarch makes clear, intended to go to Parthia as *proconsul* in order to surpass the military successes of his predecessors in the east by taking his army beyond the boundaries of the territory he had been assigned, exactly what Pompey had done earlier in the same region and what Caesar had done in Gaul, both with great success and with no rebuke from Plutarch. But in this case, Plutarch calls Crassus "all puffed up and out of his mind" (16.2) as he considers this enterprise, noting that Crassus made empty and youthful boasts to his friends which were not fitting to his age and his nature (16.1). Moreover, Crassus was unable even to begin his expedition on his own. Caesar writes to him from Gaul to express his support, and, even more

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[16] See Pelling (1986) 161–163, for criticism of this characterization on historical grounds.

indicative of his low standing, Pompey must appear at the head of the party before the crowd will allow Crassus to exit the city. Even so, the tribune Ateius tries to arrest Crassus and calls down curses on him as he departs (16.3–8).[17]

Once again we can compare Plutarch's version to those of others and observe how he is working to characterize Crassus as inferior. In his survey of the various accounts, Adelaide Simpson notes that efforts to prevent Crassus' departure include the observation of adverse omens, an attempted arrest, and the invocation of curses.[18] None of the other accounts, however, relates the presence of Pompey as necessary for mollifying the crowd. Only Plutarch has used the occasion to impress upon the reader the secondary status of Crassus, writing that "Crassus, having become fearful, begged Pompey to be present and to escort him, for he was held in high esteem by the people" (16.4–5). This episode is consistent with Plutarch's general characterization of Crassus' position relative to the other triumvirs. Politically, he occupies the middle ground, with no fixed or reliable power base, and moves toward Caesar or Pompey as necessary. While this makes him politically agile, it also makes him dependent on both of his partners.

Perhaps Plutarch's strongest statement of Crassus' inferior position is found in his assessment of the underlying motivation for the Parthian campaign, inserted into the narrative much later, when the war is lost and the Parthians are about to destroy the Roman army. The soldiers blame Crassus for their predicament but still would like for him to address them. Crassus, however, has hidden himself away and is lying alone in the dark, as Plutarch writes:

> an example to some of the ways of fortune, but to those who are sensible, an example of foolish ambition. On account of his ambition, he didn't enjoy the fact that he was first and greatest among countless men, but because he judged himself inferior to only two, he felt that he lacked everything (27.6).

This statement underscores the fact that Plutarch saw Crassus' inferiority to Caesar and Pompey as real and inescapable, and that it was in

[17] Simpson (1938) makes a case against the veracity of Ateius' curses in Plutarch and other non-contemporary accounts. Important for our argument, however, is how Plutarch has used the curses to depict Crassus in relation to Caesar and Pompey, not his historical accuracy.

[18] Simpson (1938) 533. The other passages are Cicero *De Divinatione* 1.29; Velleius 2.46.3; Appian *Bella Civilia* 2.18; Cassius Dio 39.39; Lucan 3.126–127; and Florus 3.11.3. Some authors relate two or all three elements.

fact ultimately responsible for his demise. While we might have viewed the low standing of Crassus in the other two *Lives* as a technique for focusing the narrative on the heroes and not crowding the biographies with too many characters, we see from Crassus' own *Life* that his diminished role was actually part of Plutarch's assessment of his standing, and this assessment is consistent across all three biographies.

This consistent representation of all three heroes in all three *Lives* leads to a two-fold conclusion. First, in addition to researching and composing the triumviral *Lives* together as part of the larger group of late-Republican *Lives*, Plutarch also developed a single conception of the struggle between Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, and he crafted their individual *Lives* to reflect this single point of view. That is to say, the three *Lives*, where the triumvirate is concerned, together tell a single story. This conclusion is perhaps not very surprising, given the close historical interaction of the three men and the commonalities in the composition of their biographies. However, a second point is perhaps more unexpected: the three *Lives*, and especially the *Caesar* and *Pompey*, are more informative, and their anecdotes richer, when they are read together. It is of course speculation to say that Plutarch intended that his audience would read the *Caesar*, *Pompey*, and *Crassus* as a sort of triad of *Lives*, but my analysis does suggest that he at least suspected that they might, and he certainly included much that can be appreciated by doing so.[19]

[19] Mossman (1992) 92 expresses a similar sentiment with respect to the *Alexander* and *Pyrrhus*.

ATHENS HONORS POMPEY THE GREAT

Michael C. Hoff

During the first century B.C., many Roman visitors passed through Athens' gates in various official and non-official capacities. Some came as visitors and tourists to bask in the reputation of the venerable city. Others came to the city acting in an official capacity. In either case, the fortunes of Athens often came to be affected—for good or bad—by those Romans who would use the city to further their own political gains. Although no longer a major political power, and declining in importance during the Hellenistic period, Athens still held tremendous weight as among the more influential Greek cities in terms of regional politics and trade. The cultural prestige and historical preeminence of Athens were the main reasons that attracted Roman officials to its gates. Among those who came to the city was Pompey the Great.

In the spring or early summer of 67 B.C., Pompey was charged by the Roman Senate under a plebiscite of the Lex Gabinia to rid the Mediterranean from the threat of pirates. The need for this law arose because pirates, operating from bases primarily along the Rough Cilician coast, severely jeopardized the steady supply of grain to Italy.[1] Any resistance within the Senate to this unprecedented investiture of power on one individual was allayed by the need for grain by the urban populace of Rome. In addition to the real threat to the Roman supply routes, there also existed a perceived notion that Rome's mastery of the eastern Mediterranean was at risk. Pirates, operating openly on Rome's *Mare Nostrum*, demonstrated that Rome's *imperium* in the East was incomplete, and thus threatened to undermine the political stability of Rome's relations with her subject cities and nations.[2] As a graphic

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[1] I would like to dedicate this paper to Eugene Lane who taught me Greek and pointed the way down the path towards truth and beauty in Classics. I am indebted to Cathy Callaway, Nicholas Rauh, and Rhys Townsend who read early drafts of this paper. This is a better paper because of their diligence. Any errors of substance are due solely to me.

Lex Gabinia: Miltner, *RE* 21 (1952) 2093–2098; Jameson (1970) 539–560. On the grain supply and the pirate threat, see Rickman (1980) 50–51.

[2] Cic., *Leg. Man.* 53 and 56. Also, see Kallet-Marx (1995) 316–317. For recent discussions on the pirates see Pohl (1993); De Souza (1999); and Rauh *et al.* (2000) 151–180.

example of Rome's weakness in the open sea, the pirate Athenodoros, with backing from the Pontic king Mithradates, easily raided the island of Delos, an Athenian possession, in 69. The pirates captured many inhabitants to be sold into slavery and put many of the commercial and sacred structures to the torch.[3] Gaius Valerius Triarus, a legate under Lucullus, recaptured Delos later that same year and constructed a fortification wall around the city to provide protection against future attacks. Nevertheless, Rome thus could still not guarantee the island's safety from the pirates.[4]

Under the provisions of the extraordinary *imperium*, the Senate provided Pompey with 500 ships, 20 legions, and almost unlimited funds at his disposal. In a coordinated and seemingly simple effort, Pompey's naval squadrons squeezed the pirates back to the Cilician coast—all in a mere 40 days. With the pirates hemmed in by Pompey's legates, it fell to the imperator himself to secure the final victory. According to Plutarch, our best source for these events, Pompey departed Brundisium for Cilicia and made haste toward the East, avoiding most cities and other ports-of-call along the way. But for Athens he made an exception. There Plutarch mentions that Pompey stopped briefly, "sacrificed to the gods, and addressed the *dêmos* (*Pomp*. 27)."[5] Pompey subsequently departed the city for his ships waiting anchored in Piraeus harbor. As Pompey exited the city, presumably through either the Dipylon or Piraeus Gates, he was able to read two lines of poetic verse hastily inscribed for his benefit, one line (perhaps painted) on the inner facade and one on the other. Plutarch records the inscription and the side of the gate upon which each is inscribed:

> Interior:
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> "To the extent that you know yourself to be mortal, the more you are a god."

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[3] Phlegon, *FGrHist* 257 F 12 and 13. On the attack on Delos see Boussac (1988) II 307–340.

[4] For the wall, see Bruneau & Ducat (1983) 198. Triarus issued a series of silver coins possibly for payment to workmen engaged in constructing the wall; see Kroll (1993) 84 and 250 nr. 830. Triarus was honored by the Delians with several monuments in his honor; Phlegon, *FGrHist* 257 F 12 and 13; *I Délos* 1621 and 1855–1858. Cf. Roussel (1916) 331–332; Habicht (1997a) 342.

[5] One can assume that Pompey's speech, likely delivered to a hastily convened meeting of the *ekklêsia*, was given from the *bêma* in the Agora; on the *bêma* see *Hesperia* 7 (1938) 324. Athenaeus 5, 212e–f, in recounting Athenion's pro-Mithradates speech in 88, mentions the *bêma*. For its location at the eastern side of the Agora on axis with the Stoa of Attalos, see Thompson and Wycherley (1972) 51–52.

Exterior:

"We awaited, we worshipped, we saw, we send forth."[6]

It was an expected occurrence for a Roman official to visit Athens, if only for a short period, on his way to, or from, the East.[7] In 120 B.C., Mucius Scaevola *augur* visited the city when returning from Asia, as did the *quaestor* Licinius Crassus *orator* a decade later. According to Cicero, Crassus wished to be initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries, but arrived after the ceremonies had been completed. When the Athenians refused to repeat the rites for him, Crassus abruptly departed in anger.[8] Anticipating the future movements of Pompey, the proconsul Marcus Antonius, grandfather of Mark Antony, stopped in Athens on his way to fight the Cilician pirates in 102. Antonius tarried for several days in Athens and while in the city engaged in philosophical and rhetorical discourses until he was able to depart for Side, although the remainder of his fleet remained anchored in Piraeus for the winter (Cicero, *De Or.* 182).[9] Among other Roman magistrates who visited Athens in an official capacity Cicero was included, who came in 51 while on his journey to Cilicia to take up his post as *proconsul*, and also on his return a year later.[10] On both occasions, he stayed for some time.

Not all Romans came to Athens as benign visitors. In the early 80s a populist upheaval in Athens caused the citizenry to align themselves on the side of Rome's enemy, Mithradates of Pontus.[11] Upon learning of this revolt, the Roman Senate dispatched L. Cornelius Sulla to wrest control of Athens and Piraeus away from Pontic forces. In 87 Sulla arrived in Attica and quickly besieged Athens and Piraeus. The siege lasted for months until spring 86 at which time the Romans, having discovered a weakness in the Athenian fortifications, stormed the city

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[6] Plut., *Pomp.* 27: Ἐφ' ὅσον ὢν ἄνθρωπος οἶδας, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἶ θεός. Προσεδοκῶμεν, προσεκυνοῦμεν, εἴδομεν, προπέμπομεν. Cf. Zonaras 10.3.

[7] For a recent study concerning Roman citizens residing or visiting Athens during the Republic, see Habicht (1997b) 9–17, esp. 10.

[8] Mucius Scaevola: Cic., *Fin.* 1.8–9; see Habicht (1997a) 293–294. Licinius Crassus: Cic., *De Or.* 3.75; see Clinton (1989) 1503.

[9] *ILLRP* 342 ll. 5 and 6; see Kallet-Marx (1995) 204–205, and Habicht (1997b) 10.

[10] Cic., *Att.* 5.10.2; 5.21.14; 6.1.26; cf. Habicht, (1997a) 10. In 79, Cicero spent six months in Athens as a private citizen, engaged in study and was initiated into the Mysteries at that time; Cic., *De Leg.* 2.36; Clinton (1989) 1504.

[11] For an account of events leading up to the siege and destruction, see Hoff (1997) 33–51.

and ruthlessly sacked it. The historical sources and the archaeological evidence point to wide-scale damage to buildings and tremendous loss of life. Sulla did not remain long in Athens after the siege, departing hurriedly to pursue the Pontic force of Mithradates. Sulla returned to the city in 84 while on his return journey to Rome.[12] During this visit, Sulla appropriated the Library of Apellikon, which contained manuscripts of Aristotle and Theophrastos, along with columns from the unfinished Olympieion.

Archaeological evidence of the sack of 86, particularly from the Agora, indicates destruction of several buildings and damage to many others. Most of the damaged structures were not repaired for decades, an indication that the city's economy was in dire straits. Equally significant, the manufacture of ceramic fine ware, often an indicator of economic prosperity, was curtailed in the immediate aftermath of the Sullan sack.[13] Another indicator of a poor economy is the dearth of amphora imports to the city. E. Will has documented a vibrant economy in the years prior to the Sullan sack based on the importation of Italian wine and oil jars.[14] Will finds evidence, however, that following the destruction of Delos in 88 and Athens in 86, vessel imports come to a halt. Although Delos never fully recovers, Will notes a resurgence of trade around 50 B.C. in Athens.

Considered as a whole, the evidence paints a picture of Athens in severe difficulties after 86. Compounding their recovery efforts was the constant threat of pirates playing havoc with shipping routes throughout the Mediterranean. The recent sack of Delos by the pirates in 69 would have certainly affected Athenian economy. But the island's association with Athens, along with pirate raids at Epidauros, Argos and Isthmia, may have revealed how vulnerable Athens actually was.[15] News of Pompey's successful sweep of the Mediterranean by his squadrons, which must have preceded his arrival, brought a great sense of relief to the Athenians. It is no wonder then that the Athenians held Pompey in such high regard when he arrived in the city on his way to Cilicia—even though the final victory over the pirates at Korakesion

[12] Plut., *Sull.* 26.

[13] Rotroff (1997) 102–104.

[14] Will (1997) 127.

[15] For pirate raids at Epidauros, Argos and Isthmia, see Plut., *Pomp.* 24.4–6; other plundered cities and sanctuaries mentioned in the ancient sources include Knidos, Colophon, Samothrace, Claros, Didyma, and Samos: Cic. *Leg. Man* 33.53; Phlegon, *FGrHist* 257 F 12.13.

was still weeks away—and afforded him such good will upon his entry to the city.

The epigram inscribed upon Athens' gate implies that the Athenians awarded Pompey with divine honors (*isotheoi timai*) during his hasty visit; προσκυνεῖν can hardly mean otherwise. If he were indeed afforded divine honors, he would have been the first Roman official so exalted by the Athenians. It is equally likely that Pompey politely declined these honors. The phrasing of the epigram suggests that Pompey declined on account of his mortality. Later emperors often politely refused divine honors on similar grounds; ὢν ἄνθρωπος from the Athenian epigram closely echoes this formulaic denial.[16]

Athens was not alone among eastern cities paying homage to Pompey. On Delos, which had incurred the pirate attack in 69, an association of the Pompeiastae was formed and its members, many of whose members were likely Athenians, erected a monument in his honor.[17] At Side, Pompey was honored as *isotheos*, and at Mytilene as *theos*, *sotêr*, and *euergetês*; the Mytilenaeans also renamed a month in his honor.[18] Cicero mentions that Greek cities, as a result of Pompey's actions against the pirates and Mithradates, regarded his actions as nearly divine.[19] Indeed, temples may have been dedicated to Pompey in the East as implied from the epitaph carved on his gravestone on Alexandria's shores: "How pitiful a tomb for one so rich in temples."[20]

In the spring of 62, following the Mithradatic War and the re-establishment of the *pax romana* in the eastern provinces, Pompey returned triumphantly to Italy, allowing for several stopovers en route. Plutarch catalogues the stops from east to west and the benefactions Pompey made (*Pomp.* 42, 7–11): in Mytilene, he restored freedom to the city and the citizens honored him with an inscription for "having put an end by land and sea to the wars besetting the world."[21] On Rhodes he attended the philosophical schools and bestowed a talent on each philosopher, according to Plutarch. Pompey then arrived in Athens

[16] This formula is similar to Tiberius deprecating divine honors, "ego me…mortalem esse et hominum officia fungi satisque habere" (Tac., *Ann.* 4.37.38). For discussion, see Charlesworth (1939) 1–10.

[17] *I Délos* 1641; see Roussel (1916) 333; cf. Day (1942) 160–161.

[18] Side: *I Side* 101 = *AE* (1966) 462; Mytilene: *IG* XII, 2.59 line 18. For further divine honors to Pompey, see Cerfaux & Tondriau (1957) 284–285.

[19] Cic., *De Imp. Cn. Pomp.* 41: "…de caelo delapsum intuentur."

[20] App., *BC* 2.86: Τῷ ναοῖς βριθόντι πόσῃ σπάνις ἔπλετο τύμβου. Cf. *Anth. Pal.*9.402. No temples to Pompey have yet been identified.

[21] *Syll*[3] 751; also, see Anastasiadis (1995) 1–14.

where he reportedly provided a similar benefaction to the philosophers in residence there. Plutarch (*Pomp.* 42.11) reports that Pompey also donated 50 talents to the city to help in its restoration. Pompey's purpose in these private and civic endowments, according to Plutarch, was to enhance his reputation. Undoubtedly Plutarch is correct in his simple assessment, but in light of other references to his benefactions in Athens, Pompey was sowing the seeds of allegiance owed to him by the cities of the Greek East in his upcoming war against Caesar in 48. We do not know if the Athenians ever acknowledged Pompey's generosity by statues, as none has ever come to light. It is also implausible that statues of Pompey would have survived after Pharsalos in 48.[22] Yet statues to Pompey's grandfather and father, Sex. Pompeius and Cn. Pompeius Strabo respectively, that were set up on the Akropolis, possibly on the occasion of Magnus' visit in 62, are preserved.[23] Their survival post-48 would likely not have been an issue to the victorious Caesar.

There is recent speculation that Pompey may have been initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries during his visit in 62.[24] As the initiation rites are held in late September, it is possible that Pompey could have coordinated his journey back to Italy with a stopover in Athens timed to coincide with the ritual.

Plutarch does not record how the Athenians used the 50 talents other than restoration (εἰς ἐπισκευήν). The repairs to which Plutarch refers almost certainly should be applied to the damage caused by Sulla in 86, 24 years earlier. The implication is that for almost a quarter century many of the buildings and monuments of the city remained unrepaired.[25] Pompey's benefaction is the first recorded instance of repairs to the city. At least part of Pompey's funds was apparently used towards

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[22] A statue inscription in Demetrias in Thessaly, which was originally dedicated to a supporter of Pompey, C. Caelius, and was re-carved shortly after Pharsalos to honor Caesar, echoes this new anti-Pompey/pro-Caesar zeitgeist; on this statue, see Raubitschek (1954) 66–67.

[23] Sex. Pompeius: *IG* II^2 4100; Cn. Pompeius Strabo: *IG* II^2 4101. The statue of Sex. Pompeius has been dated to the time of his pro-consulship in Macedonia; see Broughton, *Magistrates*, vol. 3 (1986) 166. Letterforms on the inscriptions, however, do not suggest to Kallet-Marx (1995) 52 a date in the second century. Kallet-Marx sees either visit of Pompey's as a likely occasion for its dedication, although the briefness of the first visit suggests the later as the likelier candidate.

[24] Coins from the Agora, which bear on the obverse a dolphin and trident, symbols of Poseidon, may be associated with Pompey. On the reverse are ears of wheat, which perhaps refer to an initiation of Pompey into the Eleusinian Mysteries; see Kroll (1993) 99.

[25] See Hoff (1997) 38–44.

the repair of the city's commercial infrastructure. *IG* II^2 1035 is a fragmentary catalogue of repairs to sanctuaries in which a "*deigma* of Magnus" is recorded. It is generally understood that the "Magnus" refers to Pompey the Great.[26] The *deigma* apparently served as a waterfront bazaar in the Piraeus where goods were displayed and sold.[27] The Piraeus was especially hard hit during the Sullan siege of 87/6. After the departure of the Pontic forces, which were headquartered in the fortified Piraeus and the capitulation of the Athenians in March 86, Sulla razed the Piraeus.[28] The reconstruction of at least part of the Piraeus represents a significant step in the rebuilding of Athenian commerce and economic infrastructure. Yet a comment by Cicero suggests that Pompey was not content with the manner in which the Athenians utilized the funds he donated. In a letter to Atticus Cicero reports the following piece of gossip concerning Pompey in early February of 50:

> And by the way, has Herodes really extorted 50 Attic talents out of Caesar for you Athenians? I hear Pompey has become very angry on account of it. He thinks that you Athenians have squandered his money…[29]

Caesar evidently matched Pompey's 50 talents (given 12 years earlier) with an equal sum provided to the Athenians. Cicero does not record what use the Athenians intended for Caesar's benefactions, but it is likely that the funds were meant to be used to construct the Roman Market whose extant dedicatory inscription (*IG* II^2 3175) records Caesar's gift.[30] The Athenian mentioned by Cicero as having "extorted" funds from Caesar, Herodes of Marathon, is well known. He is the earliest known member of a distinguished Athenian family whose ranks will produce the second-century A.D. wealthy benefactor, Herodes Atti-

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[26] Day (1942) 145–146; Culley (1977) 286.

[27] The term *deigma* is often translated as meaning "bazaar" but this is rather vague. *Deigma* is derived from the verb δείκνυμι, which suggests a place where goods could be exhibited. In reference to the Piraeus literary evidence seems to place the *deigma* right at the shoreline, perhaps on a quay (Xen., *Hell.* 5.1.21; Dem., *Or.* 35.29). Because of its close proximity to the harbor and docks, the *deigma* may have operated as a specially defined area, perhaps architectural, where samples of goods direct from moored ships could be displayed and sold. See also Poll. 9.34 and the Scholion to Aristophanes' *Knights* 979; cf. *RE* 4 (1901) 2388 s.v. deigma (Szanto); Judeich (1931) 448; and, most recently, Garland (1987) 154.

[28] Hoff (1997) 38 and note 36; also Garland (1987) 56.

[29] Cic., *Att.* 6.1.25: "Et heus tu, genua vos a Caesare per Herodem talenta Attica L extorsistis? In quo, ut audio, magnum odium Pompei suscepistis; putat enim suos nummos vos comedisse…"

[30] See Rawson (1985) 44–45; Hoff (1989) 1–3; Hoff (1988) 95–96.

cus.[31] The earlier Herodes was a friend of Cicero's, and even served as a tutor to Cicero's son who was studying in Athens. Later in the first century, Herodes' son Eukles, also according to the Market's dedicatory inscription, was successful in soliciting funds from Augustus to complete the Market's construction.

Pompey was angry at the Athenians, Cicero reports, because he felt that his funds were not used to full advantage, and through his comments implicitly suggests that Caesar's 50 talents were put to better use. The Roman Market was to be built within the city, adjoining the Agora and close to the Akropolis. Caesar's Market would thus have greater and visibility and a more preferable location than Pompey's waterfront bazaar. Cicero's comment suggests several significant points. First, it appears that Pompey may not have had, or at least he might not have desired to exercise, the prerogative of specifying the use of his funds. Cicero indicated that Herodes "extorted" a donation from Caesar; acquiescence to such a request would likely have occurred if Caesar knew beforehand the target for his donation. It should be assumed that he was aware of Pompey's benefaction 12 years earlier and its directed purpose. Herodes must have understood the political implications of making such a request from Caesar, as Cicero implies—masterfully playing the two great antagonists off each other. There seems little doubt that Caesar, in donating funds earmarked for such a visible civic edifice, was trying to win some support for his political aims.[32] At this point, however, it is difficult to know whether Herodes—and by implication the Athenian nobility—was in 50 shifting political allegiance from Pompey to Caesar. It may also be possible that the two equal donations may indicate an Athenian desire to remain equal in dealings with the two competing imperators.[33] Nevertheless, it would seem that the Athenians risked losing patronage from Pompey. Two years later in 48, however, the Athenians joined the Pompeian cause against Caesar. Whatever prestige Pompey felt he lost to Caesar in 50 was restored.

After Pompey fled Italy in 49 for Greece to set up his second front against Caesar, he sought contributions from eastern cities in the form of troops, ships, and funds to aid in his efforts. Although Athens clearly

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[31] Geagan (1992) 29–44.

[32] As per Rawson (1985) 46.

[33] Graindor (1930) 7, ignorant of the Cicero letter, suggests that Caesar's purpose in donating the funds was to outdo Pompey.

contributed forces to Pompey's coalition force, our sources provide a confusing account of the degree of Athenian participation. Appian reports (*BC* 2.70) that by proclamation (apparently by both sides) the Athenians were exempt from any fighting and were to do no harm to either side on account of their being consecrated to the Thesmophoroi, i.e., Demeter and Kore. Nevertheless the Athenians joined Pompey's forces as, according to Appian, they wished to share in the glory in the contest for Rome's leadership. The motivation behind this curious passage has puzzled scholars. E.J. Evans sees an altruistic notion in that "both sides cared enough for this old and venerable city to invite it to avoid suffering."[34] Habicht instead interprets the passage as an attempt by the Athenians to seek neutrality in the coming conflict.[35] The Athenians would understandably seek an excuse from fighting when they recalled the disastrous effects of Sulla's siege when they entered into alliance against Rome. An echo of this neutrality perhaps may be found in a letter sent by Caesar's legate Dolabella, a partisan of Caesar's, to his father-in-law Cicero, who was with Pompey in Greece. In the letter Dolabella exhorts Cicero to withdraw from Pompey's camp and seek asylum "in Athens or some other quiet city."[36] Dolabella likely would not have suggested Athens as a place where Cicero should proceed if it were on the side of Pompey.

If indeed Athens at the beginning wished not to participate on either side, her neutrality was apparently short-lived as Athens chose to join in the fray. It would appear then that the Athenians voluntarily aligned themselves with Pompey at the eleventh hour, hoping for political advantage after their side emerged victorious. It may be that victory under Pompey's banner seemed inevitable as his forces, swollen by eastern allied contributions, enjoyed superiority over Caesar's in numbers.[37] The Athenians dispatched two or three ships to join Pompey's fleet stationed in the Ionian Sea to help prevent Caesar's ships

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[34] Owens (1976) 720.

[35] Habicht (1997a) 351. The allusion to Demeter and Kore may suggest ties between the two protagonists and the Eleusinian Mysteries. It has already been suggested above that Pompey may have been initiated into the Mysteries during one of his visits to Athens (supra n. 24). Caesar is not known to have visited Athens before 47 when he came to the city after defeating Pharnaces (Cassius Dio 42.14), nor is there any evidence that he was ever initiated into the Mysteries.

[36] Cic., *Fam.* 9.9: "petere…ut tu te vel Athenas vel in quamvis quietam civitatem." Cf. Habicht (1997a) 351 note 62.

[37] Plutarch reports (*Caes.* 42) that Pompey's troops outnumbered those of Caesar's by over two to one.

from crossing over to Greece.[38] The conscription of infantry, however, was much higher, as Lucan notes (3.181)—although likely with some exaggeration—that Athens was emptied of its fighting men.[39]

At some point before the battle at Pharsalos Caesar dispatched Quintus Fufius Calenus along with 15 cohorts into southern Greece.[40] Among Calenus' objectives may have been to contain a Pompeian contingent possibly stationed in Athens.[41] Although Calenus devastated the Attic countryside, the city was able to hold out until Caesar's victory. It can be inferred from the Dolabella letter that the Athenians likely did not endure Calenus' siege for very long—perhaps only a few weeks—before the battle.[42]

Athens' buildings suffered little, if any, physical damage as a result of Calenus' siege.[43] Immediately after Pharsalos, an Athenian delegation appeared before Caesar, according to Dio, in supplication. Caesar refrained from punishing the city as Sulla had a generation earlier. Instead he merely rebuked the citizens by asking them, as reported by Appian: "How often will the glory of your ancestors save you from self-destruction?"[44] Evidently several more times, as their record of aligning themselves on the losing side in subsequent Roman civil wars, e.g., with Brutus and Antony, will demonstrate.

[38] Lucan, *Pharsalia* 3.181–183: "exhausit totus quamvis dilectus Athenas, / exiguae Phoebea tenent navalia puppes / tresque petunt verum credi Salamina carinae." Livy (109, fr. 36) specifies "nam Athenienses de tanta maritima gloria vix duas naves effecere." Cf. Caesar, *BC* 3.3, who simply states that Athens contributed ships to Pompey. The low number of ships in the Athenian levy likely reflects the poor state of naval preparedness in the years following Sulla and also Roman desire to keep a limit on military equipment.

[39] App., *BC* 2.315.

[40] Caes., *BC* 3,56; Cassius Dio 42.14.1–2; Plut., *Caes.* 43.

[41] A Latin inscription in Athens records an epitaph (*ILLRP* 502) for a centurion, N. Grannonius, in Pompey's Second Legion; cf. Rawson (1985) 46 and Habicht (1997b) 9.

[42] Plutarch (*Caes.* 43) reports that immediately before the battle Caesar asked his troops whether they should wait for Calenus to arrive from Athens and Megara or should they attack without reinforcements from Calenus.

[43] Although in a letter written in 45 to Cicero (Cic., *Fam.* 5.4), Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the governor of Achaea, laments the present state of several Greek cities, including Piraeus and Megara which had been recently damaged by Calenus.

[44] App., *BC* 2, 88; cf. Cassius Dio 42.14.2.

MATRIMONIOS POLÍTICOS EN ROMA

Rosa Mª. Aguilar

Los matrimonios por conveniencia eran práctica común desde muy antiguo en la Roma de la República y servían para iniciar o fortalecer alianzas entre las familias patricias. Como bien señaló J.P.V.D. Balsdon al comienzo de su *Roman Women*[1] Roma nunca fue gobernada por una mujer, ya que desde la época de los reyes hasta el final del Imperio regía una tácita ley sálica por lo que nunca hubo una reina sino la consorte y tampoco hubo nunca una emperatriz. Esto no significaba sin embargo, dice, que las mujeres romanas no gozasen en muchas ocasiones de un inmenso poder tanto en la política de la República como luego en el gobierno y administración del Imperio.

Nosotros nos hemos propuesto como objeto de estudio esos matrimonios por razones políticas tan sólo durante la época republicana, puesto que la información que encontramos en Plutarco pertenece sobre todo a esa etapa de la historia romana. El título de nuestro trabajo podría pecar de demasiado general e impreciso si se piensa que casi todos los matrimonios de época republicana eran concertados por motivos políticos. Por eso pensamos insistir en aquellos que o fueron claramente violentados como fue el caso de la segunda mujer de Pompeyo, Emilia, o que, realizados o no, fueron percibidos claramente como manipulaciones del poder por medio de mujeres, como aquellos intentos de matrimonio frustrados de Pompeyo o los realizados de César que provocaron una dura reacción de Catón.

De forma muy semejante a lo que sucedía en Grecia, los matrimonios de estas mujeres de la nobleza romana eran concertados por los padres y, a veces, como tendremos ocasión de ver, eran las propias madres las que impulsaban tales alianzas repitiendo en sus hijas la biografía propia. Las mujeres de la sangre más azul, citando de

[1] Balsdon (1963) 13: "Rome was never ruled by a woman. In the early days of the Kings and in the later centuries of the Empire the equivalent of a Salic law operated. Early Rome had no Queen … and later no woman was Empress of Rome in her own right. Always it was a male succesion. But this does not mean that—not always behind of the scenes—women were not from time to time inmensely powerful, in the politics of the Republic and later in the administration of the Empire and in the formulation of imperial policy".

nuevo a Balsdon, nunca carecieron de importancia en Roma, porque sus matrimonios, concertados desde luego por sus padres, cimentaron las poderosas alianzas de las grandes familias que, en los siglos III y II a. C., eran el fundamento de la política y del estado romano.[2] De la importancia que tenía la familia de la esposa a la hora de casarse dan cuenta ejemplos como los que siguen. Publio Escipión, el Africano Mayor que derrotó a Aníbal en Zama, estaba casado con una hermana de Paulo Emilio, el vencedor de Perseo en la tercera guerra macedónica, llamada Emilia.[3] Pues bien, la hija de ambos, Cornelia, casada con Tiberio Sempronio Graco, fue la madre de Tiberio y Cayo Graco, los dos tribunos revolucionarios. En general, ese afán de emparentar entre personas iguales en poder llevó incluso a que en la familia del Africano se casaran sus hijos y nietos con los parientes consanguíneos más cercanos.[4] Otro caso, más llamativo, el de la boda de Pompeyo con la primera Emilia mencionada, fue producto de los cálculos políticos del dictador pero también de las intrigas de la propia madre de la muchacha. En parecida línea de actuación Catón el Joven pretendió casarse en primer lugar con Lépida, una rica heredera de la más alta nobleza, lo que le habría emparentado con la casa de los Emilios,—cosa que su antepasado Catón el Censor había logrado por su boda con una hija de Paulo Emilio—, y solamente después, tras el rechazo de aquélla se casó con Atilia, también una heredera de gran fortuna.[5] Todo esto es tan sólo una pequeña muestra de lo que representaron las uniones matrimoniales en la Roma republicana.

Además, la obsesión por la disminución de la natalidad en esta etapa llevó a considerar aceptable y práctico el divorcio de una mujer, cuya fecundidad ya hubiera quedado patente, para que se casara con otro y diera lugar al nacimiento de otros pequeños ciudadanos romanos en una nueva familia. Es así como explica Plutarco que Hortensio hubiera querido persuadir a Porcia, la hija de Catón casada con Bíbulo, para que dejase a éste y se uniera a él, puesto que, según aquél, una mujer en edad fértil, si tenía más hijos, empobrecería el patrimonio familiar y, en cambio, casándose nuevamente daría al otro esposo esos hijos necesarios para constituir su familia.[6] Este mismo caso, entre otros,

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[2] Balsdon (1963) 47.
[3] Plutarco, *Aemilius* 2.5.3.
[4] Münzer (1963) 101 cuenta una detallada casuística de esta familia.
[5] Plutarco, *Cato Minor* 7.1–3. Véase Münzer (1963) 331.
[6] Plutarco, *Cato Minor* 25.8 y Flacelière (1964–1983), *Caton le Jeune, Notice*, 59.

nos informa de cómo el poder del padre sobre el destino de sus hijas seguía vigente en bastantes casos, una vez casadas, ya que muchos de estos nuevos matrimonios eran concertados por el padre[7] con el nuevo esposo y con un consentimiento casi secundario del marido anterior. De otra parte, las madres animaban a sus hijas a abandonar al marido,[8] incluso estando embarazadas, con lo que no hacían en muchas ocasiones otra cosa sino reproducir en aquéllas la misma suerte que ellas habían sufrido antes y siempre con el propósito de engrandecer el poder de la familia.

A partir de este momento intentaremos hacer una revisión sistemática de tres grandes figuras que estuvieron implicados en acuerdos de esta índole. Querríamos, pues, siguiendo un orden cronológico, analizar el papel de estas alianzas en Pompeyo, en César y en Catón de Útica cuyas vidas se vieron implicadas en el final de la Roma republicana y de quienes sus biografías constituyen un ejemplo relevante dentro del programa de los *Bíoi* en nuestro autor.

Pompeyo (106–48 a. C.)

Fueron los matrimonios de éste cinco y podríamos decir que incluso el primero, realizado en su primera juventud tuvo un sesgo de tal clase. Fue la boda con Antistia, hija del magistrado Antistio, aproximadamente el año 86, cuando Pompeyo tenía tan sólo diecinueve o a lo sumo veinte años, tras haber ganado un proceso que en realidad había sido dirigido contra su padre, Pompeyo Estrabón, ya fallecido entonces.[9] Sin duda este matrimonio, promovido por el magistrado, fue ventajoso para Pompeyo quien, aun bien conocido ya por sus éxitos en el ejército a pesar de su juventud durante la Guerra Social, todavía no tenía demasiados apoyos, pero el que contrajo enseguida, tras el divorcio de Antistia tan sólo cuatro años después,[10] debía de promocionarle

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[7] Tal es el caso del consentimiento de Filipo, padre de Marcia, para su divorcio de Catón y su siguiente boda con el orador Hortensio (Plutarco, *Cato Minor* 25.11–13). Dependía ello de la forma de matrimonio realizada y en la más corriente la mujer seguía bajo la *potestas* de su padre y no estaba en las *manus* del marido.

[8] Así Metela con Emilia. Véase Plutarco, *Pompeius* 9.4.

[9] Sobre esta etapa de la vida de Pompeyo cf. Gelzer (1969) 94–95.

[10] Los cinco matrimonios de Pompeyo fueron como sigue: con Antistia el 86 y divorcio el 82; con Emilia el 82; con Mucia poco después tras la muerte de Emilia y divorcio el 62; con Julia el 59 y muere de parto el 54; con Cornelia el 52 y le

más en su carrera política. En efecto, Emilia, la que sería su segunda mujer, era hija de un anterior matrimonio de Metela, a la sazón esposa de Sila, con M. Emilio Escauro. El dictador quería así recompensarle por su ayuda y su mujer no estuvo menos deseosa, como cuenta Plutarco,[11] a pesar de que Emilia estaba ya casada[12] y a punto de dar a luz un hijo. Emilia moriría de parto ya en casa de Pompeyo. Plutarco califica la acción de Sila como un acto tiránico más propio de los intereses de Sila que de los modos de Pompeyo,[13] en una línea de justificación de la conducta de su biografiado y en la *Vida de Sila* hace una valoración algo más dura del dictador.[14] No obstante, y sin el menor afán de justificación a favor de aquél, la dinámica de la vida política romana imponía estas actuaciones y otras aún más chocantes, como sucedería en el caso de Catón quien, de añadidura, profesaba de estoico. El tercer matrimonio de Pompeyo fue con Mucia Tercia, hija de Quinto Mucio Escévola, y debió de realizarse no mucho después de la muerte de Emilia, el año 80 o el 79, quizá tras la vuelta victoriosa de las campañas en África.[15] Seguramente también detrás de este enlace estaban los intereses de Sila que reforzaba así mediante el joven Pompeyo sus relaciones con los Mucios Escévolas y los Cecilios Metelos[16] que le habían ayudado, especialmente los últimos, en la consecución de la dictadura. Con Metelo Pío había sido cónsul Sila el año 80 y aquél había sido jefe de Pompeyo en las campañas de Italia. Y, además, tampoco deberíamos olvidar que Metela, la esposa de Sila, perteneciente a la segunda familia mencionada, hubiera podido influir en este nuevo matrimonio. El divorcio de Mucia, la única de sus esposas de la que tuvo hijos que alcanzaron la edad adulta,[17] dio lugar a que Pompeyo ahora se inclinara a nuevas alianzas. Primero ocurrieron sus intentos fallidos de emparentar

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sobrevivió. Véase *RE* 31, 2, cols. 2209–2210. Para la fecha del matrimonio con Emilia, véase Keaveney (1982b) 131–132.

[11] Plutarco, *Pompeius* 9.2–4.

[12] Emilia era entonces la mujer de M. Acilio Glabrio, cónsul luego en el año 70. Véase *Sulla* 33.2–4, donde Plutarco cuenta más detalladamente la misma historia.

[13] Plutarco, *Pompeius* 9.3. Véase Balsdon (1963) 217 sobre las propuestas de divorcio que hizo Sila a Pompeyo y también a César.

[14] Plutarco, *Sulla* 33.2.

[15] Es la opinión de Greenhalgh (1980) 29 y 236.

[16] Quinto Metelo Celer era hermano consanguíneo de Mucia y adoptado luego por Quinto Cecilio Metelo. Sobre su enemistad con Pompeyo con quien estaba ofendido por el divorcio de su hermana véase Greenhalgh (1980) 194.

[17] Una mujer, Pompeya y los varones Sexto y Cneo Pompeyo quienes proseguirían la guerra contra César a la muerte de su padre.

doblemente con la familia de Catón.[18] Después, y en lo que paradójicamente tuvo éxito, sucedió el compromiso matrimonial con Julia, hija de César, según los rumores el causante de su divorcio con Mucia.[19] Plutarco cuenta tanto en las *Vidas* de César como en la de Pompeyo[20] los manejos de César para que se hiciera esta boda que le daría el apoyo del poderoso Pompeyo. Parecidamente relata en ambas la escena en la que César, ya elegido cónsul, busca su aprobación preguntándole en la asamblea si apoyaría las leyes refrendadas por el pueblo. La única diferencia entre las dos es que en el *Pompeyo* aparece él solo en escena, quizá por un afán de dramatismo, mientras que en *César* éste se adelanta con Craso y Pompeyo a ambos lados. Pero del mismo modo en ambas sigue a este relato la boda con Julia y la referencia a su compromiso con Servilio Cepión, que se rompe para tal fin. Plutarco también habla de lo inesperado de esta decisión y de cómo por ello se conoció después que Pompeyo se había entregado enteramente a César.[21] Asimismo se ha querido ver un paralelo entre la conducta de Pompeyo con César al ver con buenos ojos su marcha a las Galias en el 59 y la de Sila favoreciendo su envío a África en el 82, al igual que también se asemeja la de César en sus maniobras matrimoniales deshaciendo el compromiso de Julia, aun siendo mucho más desconsiderada, sin duda, la del dictador con su hijastra, casada y ya encinta.[22] Pero el afán de arreglar estas rupturas siempre llevaba consigo otras. Fue así como Pompeya, teniendo que dejar su boda con Fausto, el hijo de Sila, se vio a su vez unida por un nuevo compromiso a Cepión a quien quería contentar Pompeyo, aunque finalmente se casaría con el primero.[23] También César aprovechó la ocasión para casarse con Calpurnia, hija de Pisón[24] a quien hizo elegir enseguida cónsul, lo que provocaría las protestas de Catón.

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[18] Plutarco, *Cato Minor* 30. También en *Pompeius* 44.2–3, con menor profundidad, probablemente para atenuar la conducta de su personaje.

[19] Según Suetonio, *Caesar* 50.1. Plutarco (*Pompeius* 42.12–13) sólo habla del engaño de Mucia durante la ausencia de Pompeyo y dice que en las cartas de Cicerón está señalada la causa. Sin embargo, la única carta de éste que habla del divorcio (*Ad Atticum* 1.12.3) sólo dice: *Divortium Muciae vehementer probatur.* ("El divorcio de Mucia está claramente justificado"). Véase sobre ello Weinstock (1971) 23 n. 7.

[20] *Caesar* 14.7 y *Pompeius* 47.6.

[21] *Pompeius* 47.9.

[22] Greenhalgh (1980) 212 y 227. Pero en este caso ya no vivía la madre de Julia, Cornelia.

[23] En *Pompeius* 81.3 habla de la boda y en 47, 10 del compromiso; Dión Casio, 42.13.3.

[24] Plutarco, *Pompeius*, 47.10 y *Caesar* 14.8.

Pero la muerte temprana de Julia deshizo las buenas relaciones de los dos rivales.[25] Parece que César buscó atraerse nuevamente a Pompeyo según cuenta Suetonio,[26] proponiendo su boda con Pompeya y ofreciéndole a Pompeyo un matrimonio con Octavia, nieta de su hermana y casada con Claudio Marcelo. Pompeyo no quiso seguir ahora en la alianza de César, y quizá porque creyera que había perdido su crédito anterior ante los *optimates*[27] con una boda tan sorprendente y quisiera recuperarlo, o porque creyó que se eclipsaba la fortuna de César,[28] buscó otras vías distintas. Su última esposa, Cornelia, pertenecía a una familia doblemente tradicional porque su padre, Quinto Cecilio Metelo Escipión, era realmente por sangre de la familia de los Escipiones y por adopción de Quinto Cecilio Metelo Pío. Ya entonces era viuda de un hijo de Craso que había muerto en la derrota de Carras. Plutarco subraya como sus mayores virtudes que era una mujer cultivada, estudiosa de la filosofía, pero sin ninguna clase de la afectación que podría esperarse en una mujer joven, lo que no resulta una de las mejores afirmaciones de nuestro autor sobre las mujeres.[29] Con todo, quizá esta vez erró nuevamente Pompeyo con este enlace y eso es lo que probablemente quiso Plutarco reflejar en los lamentos de Cornelia ante las desgracias de su derrota frente a César, que ella atribuye a su propia boda y a su duro destino.[30] Hasta tal extremo se tenía por determinante la alianza matrimonial como fuente de avenencia y éxito en la política.

César (100–44 a. C.)

La vida de César está inextricablemente unida a la de Pompeyo, como también su muerte, pocos años después, fue consecuencia de la del primero. Se casaron en parecido número y las alianzas les llevaron a

[25] Weinstock (1971) 263: "The consulate (el de César el año 59) ended in discord, and so did the triumvirate when the guarantor of concord, Iulia, Caesar's daughter and Pompey's wife, died in 54 B.C."

[26] Suetonio, *Caesar* 27.

[27] Seager (1979) 140–141.

[28] Véase Ross Taylor (1968) 150: "…the news of the serious reverses suffered by Caesar in the early part of the Gallic revolt may have had some influence on Pompey's policy. He decided not to accept Caesar's proposal but instead married the widow of Crassus's son, daughter of the noblest man of Rome, Metellus Scipio…"

[29] *Pompeius* 55.1–5. Ross Taylor (1968) 35 dice de ella que "was the great catch of Rome".

[30] *Pompeius* 74.6; Lucano 8.90ss.

emparentar tan cercanamente como se ha visto en el apartado anterior. La muerte de Julia dejó las cosas en su situación anterior y, como dice Plutarco, se vio entonces enseguida que el parentesco, el encanto de Julia y aquella boda no habían sido más que engaño y acuerdos basados en el interés y no en una amistad verdadera.[31] La primera mujer de César fue Cosucia, apenas un nombre, de la que informa Suetonio que era de familia ecuestre, pero mujer muy rica, y añade que tras separarse de ella se casó con Cornelia. Se discute si verdaderamente estuvo casado con ella o sólo prometido, dada la edad de César entonces según esa misma noticia de Suetonio,[32] pero lo que sabemos por cierto es que el matrimonio con la hija de Cinna, Cornelia, quiso Sila romperlo cuando llegó al poder. Cuando ni con promesas ni con amenazas consiguió que César la repudiara confiscó su dote y además le despojó del sacerdocio y de los bienes familiares.[33] La causa de la enemistad de César hacia Sila era su parentesco, también político, con Mario quien estaba casado con una Julia, tía paterna de César. De su afecto por ella nos da cuenta el que César pronunciara la oración fúnebre a su muerte, cosa no demasiado frecuente respecto a una mujer de su edad, aunque mediante aquélla quisiera sobre todo engrandecer el nombre familiar acudiendo a su ascendencia regia por los Marcii Reges y a la divina asimismo por Venus. ¿Quería acaso Sila, después del divorcio, enderezar la carrera de César con otra propuesta matrimonial?[34] No lo dice Plutarco. En este caso, al menos, debemos reconocer la firmeza de César en mantener su matrimonio con Cornelia, aun cuando sus razones fueran más de odio político que personales. De esta unión sería fruto Julia, la segunda esposa de Pompeyo. También según Suetonio pronunció la oración fúnebre por su esposa Cornelia, por el tiempo mismo de la otra, la de su tía Julia, cuando era cuestor.[35] Al terminar el año de cuestura, en el 67, se casó con Pompeya, hija de Quinto Pompeyo Rufo que había tenido a Sila como colega el año 88 y nieta también del mismo Lucio Sila. En este caso no parece que, muerto hacía tiempo el dictador, tuviera esta unión ningún matiz espe-

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[31] *Pompeius* 70.7.

[32] Suetonio, *Caesar* 1.1. Por el cómputo de Plutarco (*Caesar* 5.7) que llama a Pompeya la tercera mujer hay que contar con esta Cosucia como la primera, de la que no se sabe más.

[33] Plutarco, *Caesar* 1.1–3 y Suetonio, *Caesar* 1.1–2.

[34] Véase Keaveney (1982b) 133 y n. 110.

[35] Suetonio, *Caesar* 6.1. Era el año 68. Plutarco, *Caesar* 5.6 dice que fue el primero que tomó la palabra en los funerales de su propia esposa.

cial. Sin embargo se divorció de ella el 62, debido a su supuesta seducción por Clodio y el escándalo ocurrido en la fiesta de la *Bona Dea*.[36] El matrimonio con Calpurnia, la mujer que le sobrevivió, tuvo lugar el 59 poco después del de su hija Julia con Pompeyo. Sorprende hasta cierto punto que no quisiera César hacer entonces lo propio casándose con la hija de Pompeyo y que solamente recurriera a ella para resolver la ruptura de compromiso de su hija con Servilio Cepión, a lo que ya nos hemos referido en el apartado anterior. Calpurnia era hija de Lucio Calpurnio Pisón, cónsul el año 58 gracias a César, lo que fue objeto de las censuras de Catón. En efecto, gracias a estas bodas tuvo el apoyo de suegro y yerno para conseguir el gobierno de las Galias[37] y Catón, según Plutarco, protestó gritando que era intolerable la forma de prostitución en que se había convertido el gobierno con los matrimonios y el intercambiar unos con otros, por medio de mujeres, provincias, ejércitos y poder.[38] Y aún más habría podido protestar de haberse realizado los nuevos proyectos matrimoniales que se le ocurrieron a César a la muerte de Julia, según lo relata Suetonio.[39] Si esto fuera así, parece que no se preocupaba excesivamente por Calpurnia, cuyos sueños premonitorios ante los Idus de Marzo hablan de su implicación en la política del día[40] y a quien habría debido repudiar en tal caso. Por último, aunque no con los vínculos del matrimonio sino de la sangre, tampoco podemos dejar de mencionar la importancia decisiva de otra mujer, Aurelia, la madre de César, en la consecución de su carrera política, pues fue ella la que, en sus comienzos, logró para él el pontificado venciendo no pocas dificultades gracias a sus amigos políticos.[41] A la vista de sus matrimonios parece como si, en cierto modo, éstos de César estuvieran menos ligados a los intereses políticos que en el caso de Pompeyo. Sin embargo, si se observa más cuidadosamente no fue así. Su matrimonio con Cornelia fue producto de una elección política que resultó en un principio menos afortunada pero que, sin duda, se alineaba con sus pretensiones y también con las razones de apoyo por el parentesco. Más tarde, el propio Sila cedería concediéndole el perdón, no sin advertir a los que habían intercedido, todos ellos personas de alta con-

[36] Suetonio informa bastante sucintamente para sus gustos por el cotilleo (6.2) y Plutarco en cambio lo narra con bastante pormenor (9 y 10).
[37] Suetonio, *Caesar* 22.
[38] Plutarco, *Caesar* 14.
[39] Véase la sección dedicada a Pompeyo y n. 27.
[40] Plutarco, *Caesar* 63.6; Suetonio, *Caesar* 81.3.
[41] Weinstock (1971) 31; Keaveney (1982a) 154.

dición, que éste algún día causaría la ruina del partido de los *optimates*, porque en César había muchos Marios.[42] En su alianza con Pompeyo no estuvo en juego su boda sino la de su hija, pero de este modo consiguió el apoyo de un yerno situado en lo más alto del poder de aquel momento. Seguidamente su boda con Calpurnia le procuró la ayuda de un cónsul al siguiente año, manejable como suegro suyo que era. En definitiva, con diferentes perspectivas uno y otro, Pompeyo y César, no fueron muy distintos al buscar el poder político mediante la alianza matrimonial.

Catón el Joven (95–46 a. C.)

Con Catón nos hemos ido encontrando en diferentes ocasiones en su relación con nuestros otros dos personajes. Habría heredado seguramente algo del carácter de su antepasado el Censor quien se opuso a la derogación de la *lex Oppia*,[43] con la idea de que toda la población femenina siguiera vistiendo y viviendo sobriamente como en los tiempos de las guerras púnicas. Su figura reviste, con todo, una mayor dignidad que la de los personajes precedentes y su altura moral se subrayaría con su suicidio en Útica. Con todo, a la hora de considerar su política matrimonial, tampoco él se ve libre de un comportamiento bastante parecido, aunque condenara los arreglos que hacían César y Pompeyo. Por otra parte, no tuvo demasiada suerte con la conducta de las mujeres de su familia. Su hermanastra Servilia, la madre de Bruto, fue amante de César y una sobrina, que se llamaba asimismo Servilia y que era la esposa de Lúculo,[44] fue repudiada por éste por sus costumbres licenciosas. En cuanto a él, su primera mujer, Atilia también fue repudiada por el mismo motivo.[45] Parece, sin embargo, que antes habría sentido una atracción más personal por Lépida, prometida

[42] Suetonio, *Caesar*, 1. 2–3.

[43] Véase el discurso de Catón en el Capitolio en Tito Livio 34.1–5, cuyo contenido misógino evoca los yambos semonídeos. Sin embargo, no hay seguridad de que reproduzca contenidos auténticos. Sobre ello véase Scullard (1951) 257, quien opina que este discurso no procede del discurso pronunciado por Catón el Censor, porque no revela rasgos del estilo original y además presenta anacronismos.

[44] Véase Münzer (1953) 294–295 y 346. En las primeras páginas citadas habla del origen familiar, en la última se refiere al gusto por los arreglos matrimoniales de las mujeres de la familia de los Servilios.

[45] Plutarco, *Cato Minor* 24.1–6.

de Metelo Escipión,[46] pero cuyo compromiso después fue abandonado por éste mismo. Quizá luego, al ver el interés de Catón, volvió aquél a pretender a su antigua prometida y se casó con ella.[47] Catón lleno de cólera descargó su despecho en yambos dignos de Arquíloco, pero sin obscenidades ni puerilidad, subraya Plutarco.[48] Entonces encontró otro matrimonio conveniente, con la mencionada Atilia, de la familia de los Serranos también antigua y pudiente, y ésta fue su primera mujer, pero no la única, como con cierta censura hacia su personaje subraya Plutarco comparándolo con Lelio, el amigo de Escipión que sólo conoció a una sola mujer, su primera y única esposa. Aunque en los primeros tiempos Atilia llorara la marcha de su marido a Macedonia, más adelante, tras haberle dado dos hijos, puso a Catón en la necesidad de repudiarla por su mala conducta, sin que sepamos a ciencia cierta en qué consistió tal cosa. Plutarco comenta esa circunstancia como lo más vergonzoso todavía, añadido a la desvergüenza de sus otras familiares, sin explicar nada más.[49] Se casó enseguida, nos informa el Queronense, con Marcia,[50] que parecía una mujer honesta. Sin embargo y fiándose de fuentes totalmente fidedignas a su juicio, Plutarco no puede callar las extrañas circunstancias que envolvieron este matrimonio, matrimonio que se desarrollaría en dos fases, por decirlo de algún modo. Según su relato,[51] el orador Quinto Hortensio, gran admirador y amigo de Catón, quería relacionarse con él con lazos más profundos que la mera amistad y así le solicitó casarse con su hija Porcia, casada ya con Bíbulo y madre de dos hijos. Precisamente en esta fertilidad de Por-

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[46] Quinto Cecilio Metelo Pío Escipión había sido adoptado por Q. Cecilio Metelo Pío, pero pertenecía a la familia de los Escipiones por su nacimiento. Su nombre primitivo era Publio Cornelio Escipión Nasica. Sobre este personaje véase Ross Taylor (1968) 34–35.

[47] Ross Taylor (1968) 35 opina respecto a Lépida que "whom (i.e. Catón) she jilted for Nasica". Véase también Münzer (1953) 331.

[48] Plutarco, *Cato Minor* 7.2. Ross Taylor (1968) 150 comenta de Catón refiriéndose a la boda de Pompeyo con Cornelia: "He decided not to accept. Caesar's proposal … but instead married the widow of Crassus's son, daughter of the noblest man of Rome, Metellus Scipio, a man who had been in Crassus' orbit, a personal enemy of Cato." Se comprende tal enemistad por la competición de ambos respecto a Lépida.

[49] Plutarco, *Cato Minor* 24.6.

[50] Hija de L. Marco Filipo. Dio tres hijos a Catón. Sobre ella *RE* 24, 2, nº 115.

[51] Plutarco, *Cato Minor* 25. Sus fuentes remontan a P. Clodio Trasea Peto, biógrafo de Catón, quien a su vez las derivaba de las memorias de Munacio, amigo personal de aquél. Pero como hace nota Babut (1969) 173: "Il n'en reste moins que toute cette histoire le choque visiblement, …", aunque Plutarco se indigne con las acusaciones de avaricia de los enemigos de Catón. Véase también Münzer (1963) 343–345 sobre la cronología de estos hechos.

cia se apoyaba Hortensio para su petición, contando con que también él podría tener hijos de ella. Le parecía una desgracia que arruinara a su actual familia llenándola de una numerosa descendencia que la empobrecería, mientras que, casándose sucesivamente con hombres de mérito, enriquecería incluso a la misma ciudad con su virtud. Por lo demás estaba dispuesto a devolverla a Bíbulo tras haberla hecho madre de sus hijos, si es que Porcia no quería continuar después su unión con él. De ese modo estarían unidos los tres, Bíbulo, Catón y el propio Hortensio por esta relación y por la comunidad de hijos. Parece ser que a Catón este plan le resultó extraño, pero más extrañamente aún cedió ante la nueva petición de Hortensio que, ante la negativa, repetía la misma pretensión, ahora con Marcia, la mujer de Catón. Catón sometió esta solicitud a la aprobación de Filipo,[52] el padre de Marcia, quien estuvo de acuerdo, y de este modo pasó Marcia, al parecer encinta, a ser la esposa de Hortensio hasta la muerte de éste, lo que hizo mucho más rico a Catón, ya que aquél había dejado a su viuda como heredera de considerables riquezas.[53] César, enemigo visceral de Catón, aprovechó esta historia en su réplica al *Cato* de Cicerón con un *Anticato* en el que presentaba a Catón como excesivamente aficionado al vino y también como un avaro que había cedido al divorcio de Marcia pensando en una nueva boda posterior cuando regresara como una viuda rica.[54] Pero las relaciones de Catón con las mujeres de su familia ocupan buena parte del interés del Queronense, quizá porque no quiera ocultar esta faceta más debil y humana del estoico. Así, tanto en esta biografía como en las de Pompeyo y de César, donde ya se subrayó, se vuelve a contar el rechazo de Catón a las proposiciones matrimoniales de Pompeyo y sus comentarios negativos al manejo político de la ciudad por obra de mujeres.[55] En ésta dedica un capítulo completo (el

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[52] Sobre este Filipo se puede consultar *RE* 34, 2. Es el nº 76.

[53] Plutarco *Cato Minor* 52.5–9. Parece que esta boda fue el 56 y que Hortensio murió el 50. Marcia tendría al casarse con él unos veinticinco años. Véase Flacelière (1964–1983), *Vie de Caton*, 95 n. 1.

[54] Plutarco también alude a las acusaciones de César a Catón por su avaricia de dinero y la venta de su mujer en el c. 52, donde parece citar el *Anticato*. Véase también Suetonio, *Caesar* 56 y Apiano, *Bella Civilia* 2.99. Ross Taylor (1968) 170–171 comenta toda esta historia y cómo, finalmente, este panfleto de César sirvió por el contrario para contribuir a "the revival of republicanism at Rome".

[55] El término que emplea Plutarco no es realmente "mujeres" sino "mujercillas" con un sentido indudablemente despectivo (*Caesar* 14). De estas bodas también habla en *Pompeius* 44.2–3, donde pasa por ello más por encima, aunque dice que Catón sospechaba que con ello buscaba corromperle.

30) a las propuestas de Pompeyo, quien tras volver de su campaña en Asia quería casar a su hijo con una de las sobrinas de Catón, la más joven, mientras él haría lo propio con la mayor. Para ello se sirvió de Munacio, amigo de Catón, que presentó la petición al mismo Catón, a su mujer y a sus hermanas, las cuales estaban encantadas por la grandeza del parentesco que contraerían. Pero Catón ordenó a su amigo que le contestase que no se le podía comprar a cambio de las mujeres y que en modo alguno entregaría para gloria de Pompeyo rehenes contra su patria.[56] Los amigos de Catón juzgaron esta respuesta descortés y soberbia. Las mujeres de la familia se quedaron desoladas, pero más tarde, ante el curso de los acontecimientos, tal como Catón les hizo ver la conducta de Pompeyo, se convencieron de haber decidido lo mejor. Sin embargo, Plutarco termina el relato censurando la conducta de Catón, quien con este rechazo entregó a Pompeyo a los brazos de César, al darle éste a su hija Julia en matrimonio lo que finalmente trastornaría la política de Roma y arruinaría la República. Por temor de las pequeñas faltas de Pompeyo, recalca, dejó de ver lo más grave como sería el añadir él mismo poder al otro, esto es, a César.[57]

Es también en la familia de Catón donde encuentra un autor moderno, Münzer, el paradigma de la influencia, a veces decisiva dice, de esposas, madres, hermanas e hijas en la vida de los varones. Pero después de repasar las distintas representantes femeninas, su prometida no lograda, sus dos mujeres y su hija, la figura paradigmática por excelencia resulta ser su media hermana mayor, Servilia. Ésta es, a su juicio, un ejemplo del inmiscuirse de las mujeres en la lucha de los partidos, de la política casera de las nobles damas que trabajaban con medios femeninos, pero que no quedaban a la zaga de los varones ambiciosos frente a la búsqueda de los más altos fines.[58] Por su modo de manejar las vidas del único hijo de su primer matrimonio, Marco Bruto y de las tres hijas del segundo, así como las de sus nietos, como instrumentos de sus elevados planes para restaurar la grandeza perdida de su casa paterna, Servilia resultaría ser la figura más significativa de entre las mujeres de la antigua Roma.[59] No extraña, entonces, pensamos nosotros, el afán

[56] 30.5: "a cambio del gineceo" es la expresión que usa, más despectiva, sin duda. Greenhalgh (1980) 191 le llama a este respecto "the adamantine Cato".

[57] Véase Babut (1969) 175. Concluye el estudioso francés que la simpatía de Plutarco por Catón: "n'exclut pas certaines réserves et laisse transparaître certaines critiques des idées stoïciennes".

[58] Münzer (1963) 426–427.

[59] Münzer (1963) 427 pone en parangón a esta mujer de la familia albana de los

de Catón en dominar todo este entorno femenino que, tal como nos cuenta Plutarco,—quien concede bastante espacio a la narración de tantas pequeñas intrigas y deseos—, probablemente le abrumaba. Sin embargo, parece extraerse como consecuencia a partir de estas historias domésticas que no fue el estoico excesivamente afortunado en el manejo de sus asuntos familiares.

Conclusión

Como conclusión, podría decirse que el papel relevante de la mujer en la política romana se explica a través de datos como estos que siguen. Como la edad establecida para el casamiento de la mujer era la de los catorce años aproximadamente y la diferencia con la edad del marido era casi siempre notable—el Africano Mayor tenía veinte años más que Emilia y el Africano Menor treinta más que Sempronia—y como, de otra parte, eran estos maridos hombres al servicio del estado que se gastaban pronto y que vivían sólo un promedio de cincuenta años y otros, además, como consecuencia de las guerras civiles, podían morir prematuramente de forma violenta, fueron entonces las mujeres quienes debieron criar a hijos y nietos en muchos casos.[60] Ellas eran, por tanto, las que educaban a sus hijos varones y podían influir en consecuencia en las alianzas políticas mediante las alianzas matrimoniales.

En algunos casos resulta más decisiva aún la intervención de la mujer cuando pudo darse en situaciones de mayor peligro. Así ocurre con Mucia, madre de Sexto Pompeyo y de Emilio Escauro por su segundo matrimonio tras el divorcio de Pompeyo. Como en Roma se carecía de aprovisionamiento por el bloqueo de los pompeyanos intercedió, al parecer, ante el primero de sus hijos haciendo de mediadora de Octavio para hacer la paz (39 A.C.).[61] Más tarde, después de Accio, intervino también a favor de su hijo Emilio que no se había alineado en el bando vencedor.[62]

Servilios con el también albano César, de la familia Julia, el mayor hijo del pueblo romano. Ambos serían, a su juicio, los paradigmas más significativos en sus géneros correspondientes.

60 Münzer (1963) 105.

61 Apiano, *Bella Civilia* 5.69.

62 Dión Casio, 51.2 y 56.38. Era hijo de M. Emilio Escauro, lugarteniente de Pompeyo en Oriente y ése, a su vez, hermano de su segunda mujer, Emilia, y por tanto también cuñado de Pompeyo.

Esta fue en gran medida el papel de la mujer durante la República y en especial en sus últimos tiempos. Pero el Estado romano de la nueva era quería moralizar la sociedad y asumir las responsabilidades que habían cumplido imperfectamente padres y maridos. En cierto sentido era un progreso que el Estado asumiera la protección de la familia, lo que hasta entonces había estado relegado a una autoridad privada. De este modo, sin embargo, la libertad de intervención de la mujer recibiría un fuerte retroceso con la legislación de Octavio para impedir los adulterios y fomentar el matrimonio y la natalidad. Así a las viudas sólo se les concedía doce meses para salir de su estado y a las divorciadas aún menos, seis meses, bajo pena de pagar un impuesto especial hasta encontrar otro marido. También se aligeraban estas penalizaciones al tener el primer hijo y sucesivamente hasta un tercero y, de otra parte, a los varones, padres de más hijos, se les premiaba con la preferencia para cargos entre los candidatos. Estas leyes[63] no resultarían tan eficaces como pretendía Octavio, aunque debieron de tener como consecuencia que se realizasen más matrimonios no deseados. No obstante, más tarde otra nueva legislación sobre plazos más dilatados para que divorciadas y viudas encontraran nuevos maridos la dulcificaría.[64]

[63] Fueron la *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* y la *lex Julia de adulteriis coercendis* promulgadas entre el 19–18 a. C y probablemente el 17 (véase *CAH* 10, 24, 441–456). Suetonio (*Divus Augustus* 34.1) informa de que la primera de ellas fue reformada poco después.

[64] La *lex Papia Poppaea* del 9. d. C. (véase *CAH* 10, 24, 441–456). Dión Casio (56.1.2; 7.3; 10.1–3) la explica como una concesión, ya que la *lex Julia* había sido suspendida por dos veces debido a las protestas que provocó.

I SOGGETTI POLITICI E I CONFLITTI CIVILI DEL 68/69 D.C. IN PLUTARCO

Maria Teresa Schettino

La morte di Nerone segnò l'inizio di un periodo travagliato e percorso da fermenti politico-militari e lotte intestine. Altri imperatori della casa Giulio-Claudia erano stati toccati da una fine ingloriosa, la morte di Nerone non rappresentava perciò un evento, per quanto grave, di per sé sconvolgente agli occhi dei contemporanei, ma palesava i motivi di crisi connessi con la precarietà dell'investitura e del potere imperiali e concludeva tragicamente il periodo di regno dei discendenti di Augusto. La fine della dinastia Giulio-Claudia coincise, infatti, con il primo conflitto civile di età imperiale, che vide la successione, nel giro di poco più di un anno, di ben quattro imperatori.[1]

È difficile determinare quale eco i fatti tumultuosi di quel periodo produssero presso gli abitanti delle diverse parti dell'impero. Se può valere da indizio il segno che quegli eventi lasciarono, la persistenza del rinvio alla drammatica sequenza che sancì il passaggio dai Giulio-Claudi ai Flavi suggerisce uno sconvolgimento che segnò le coscienze e manifestò in tutta la sua gravità la questione dell'investitura imperiale e il ruolo in essa assunto dagli eserciti.[2] Basti qui ricordare come Cassio Dione connetta, con richiami più o meno espliciti, gli accadimenti del 68/69 con quelli del 193, di cui egli fu testimone e che tanto peso ebbero sulla sua produzione storiografica,[3] poiché alla morte di

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[1] La scansione cronologica degli eventi è grosso modo la seguente: marzo del 68 rivolta di Vindice, 2 o 3 aprile del 68 acclamazione di Galba, fine aprile sconfitta di Vindice ad opera di Virginio Rufo, 10 gennaio del 69 adozione di Pisone da parte di Galba, 15 gennaio del 69 uccisione di Galba e Pisone, Otone imperatore, 3 gennaio del 69 acclamazione di Vitellio, 14 aprile 69 vittoria di Vitellio su Otone a Bedriaco. Per questa ricostruzione cfr. ora Scuderi (1995) 408.

[2] Sintomatico è il ben noto giudizio di Tacito in *Storie* 1.4: «La fine di Nerone, pur festeggiata nel primo impeto della pubblica esultanza, aveva tuttavia suscitato sentimenti diversi, non solo in Roma nei senatori o nel popolo o nelle milizie cittadine, ma in tutte le legioni e in tutti i comandanti, poiché era stato reso pubblico un segreto dell'impero: potersi creare un imperatore fuori di Roma».

[3] Sulle guerre civili come fattore determinante nella produzione di Cassio Dione cfr. ora Sordi (2000) 393–395.

Commodo si era riaperta una stagione di conflitti civili e, nell'arco di un anno, si erano succeduti quattro imperatori.[4]

Per Plutarco, nato intorno al 45 d.C.,[5] la fine di Nerone e le guerre intestine del 68/69 dovettero costituire il primo evento di rilievo di cui la sua età partecipava. Seppure, come sostiene Jones,[6] egli non visitò i luoghi che videro lo scontro tra Otoniani e Vitelliani per raccogliere materiale per le sue *Vite*, tuttavia le annotazioni in *Otone* 14.2 e 18.2[7] rilevano un interesse personale per le vicende lì trascorse, così come le conversazioni con conoscenti e amici, che furono in quelle vicende direttamente coinvolti.[8] La gravità dei fatti potrebbe aver contribuito alla scelta di Plutarco di rivolgere la propria attenzione al passato recente, per quanto nel solco di una tradizione biografica consolidata: le *Vitae Caesarum*, da Augusto a Vitellio,[9] non si chiudono sulla fine della dinastia Giulio-Claudia ma con l'anno dei «quattro imperatori» e, in tal modo, trovano il punto di approdo della prima fase dell'età imperiale proprio nelle guerre civili del 68/69.[10]

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[4] Sui richiami tra i due periodi cfr. Schettino (2000) 261–280. Si noti come ancora nell'*Historia Augusta* l'inizio dei conflitti civili nel 193 è presentato sulla falsariga di quelli del 68/69. Anzi, nella vita di Clodio Albino (1.1) si ricorre ad un'approssimazione cronologica per includere nella sequenza ormai classica dei «quattro imperatori» anche il protagonista della biografia (in realtà acclamato imperatore nel 195), individuando il punto di partenza non nella morte di Commodo ma di Pertinace: «Dopo Pertinace che fu ucciso per istigazione di Albino, furono proclamati pressochè contemporaneamente imperatori Giuliano a Roma dal senato, Settimio Severo in Illirico, Pescennio Nigro in Oriente e Clodio Albino in Gallia da parte dell'esercito».

[5] Jones (1971) 8 e 135.

[6] Jones (1971) 78, *contra* Theander (1951) 8.

[7] Plutarco, *Otone* 14.2–3: «Quando più tardi passai per quella piana, Mestrio Floro, un consolare di quelli che allora erano stati dalla parte di Otone, non per convinzione ma per necessità, mostrandomi un vecchio tempio mi raccontò di esser giunto là dopo la battaglia e di aver visto un cumulo di cadaveri tanto alto da toccare la sommità dei frontoni [...]». Il transito di Plutarco sarebbe avvennuto circa un anno dopo lo scontro: cfr. Wellesley (1989^2) 68. Plutarco, *Otone* 18.2: «Quando sono stato a Brescello, ho visto un modesto monumento, con una iscrizione che, tradotta, suona così: ‹in memoria di Marco Otone›».

[8] Cfr., ad esempio, *supra*, n. 7 la menzione di Mestrio Floro, allora tra gli Otoniani. Sulle fonti orali del *Galba* plutarcheo vd. Jones (1971) 75–76.

[9] Catologo di Lampria, n° 26, 27, 29–33: cfr. Ziegler (1965, trad. it.) 307.

[10] Jones (1971) 80 attenua l'interesse di Plutarco per eventi contemporanei; così anche Desideri (2001) 174–175, che sottolinea come le *Vitae Caesarum* siano contemporanee alle biografie di Arato e Artaserse: ciò mostra la convivenza di interesse per l'attualità e il passato in Plutarco.

La datazione delle otto biografie imperiali è incerta: si tende oggi a collocarla in età domizianea, ritenendole precedenti alle *Vite parallele*.[11] Delle *Vitae Caesarum* ci sono pervenute solo quelle di Galba e di Otone, dalle quali si evince —in base alle annotazioni esplicative di termini e usi romani di cui sono costellate[12]— che l'opera doveva essere destinata, pur in modo non esclusivo, a un pubblico greco. È già stato notato come le biografie di Galba e di Otone, insieme con la perduta *Vita* di Vitellio, costituissero un gruppo unitario, da leggere nell'insieme piuttosto che singolarmente, quale riflessione complessiva sul 68/69.[13]

Le due biografie rappresentano, dunque, un documento prezioso per chiarire alcuni aspetti del pensiero plutarcheo sulla storia contemporanea. Nelle *Vite parallele*, il rapporto con il presente si articola spesso in forma non diretta, ma sottesa, attraverso richiami simbolici e di carattere ideale.[14] In questo caso, invece, si tratta di una riflessione, a breve distanza, su eventi contemporanei in cui furono coinvolte personalità intrinseche dell'autore di Cheronea: gli accadimenti trascorsi costituivano una fase conclusa, che la crudezza delle guerre civili rendeva ancora vivida nella memoria e pressante nelle questioni di fondo.

Senza diffondersi in un esaustivo *status quaestionis*, è utile osservare almeno che le *Vite* di Galba e di Otone sono state finora studiate secondo tre prospettive principali di indagine:

1) la ricostruzione degli eventi del 68/69;[15]
2) la data di composizione e le fonti usate da Plutarco;[16]
3) la struttura delle due biografie, cioè il rapporto con le *Vite parallele* da un lato e con il genere storiografico dall'altro, nonché la rappresentazione dei protagonisti secondo il pervasivo schema virtù-vizi.[17]

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[11] Jones (1971) 72–73 (prima del 93); Scuderi (1995) 408; Bowersock (1998) 193–210; Desideri (2001) 174.

[12] Cfr., ad esempio, Plutarco, *Galba* 18.9 (spiegazione della cerimonia di giuramento in nome dell'imperatore); 24.1 (spiegazione dei termini *optio* «aiutante del centurione» e *tesserarius* «tesserario», «colui che riceve la parola d'ordine»). Jones (1971) 78 dubita che Plutarco intendesse rivolgersi in modo privilegiato a un pubblico greco.

[13] La *Vita di Otone* inizia continuando gli eventi narrati da quella di Galba (cfr. Scuderi [1995] 399); il prologo della *Vita di Galba* doveva perciò valere da introduzione a tutte le tre biografie (*Galba*, *Otone*, *Vitellio*: cfr. Duff (1999), 20.

[14] Vd. sull'argomento in ultimo Schettino (2003), 265–280.

[15] Scuderi (1995) 399–413 (dove bibliografia precedente).

[16] Jones (1971) 72–80.

[17] Bowersock (1998) 193–210; Desideri (2001) 174; Duff (1999) 20, 159–160.

Sulla base delle considerazioni che ho premesso circa l'impatto provocato dagli scontri civili del 68/69, vorrei soffermarmi su due aspetti, per proporre alcune suggestioni sulle caratteristiche dell'impianto plutarcheo:

a) il ruolo di motori degli eventi attribuito da Plutarco ad alcune figure che, in altre fonti, restano secondarie;
b) il confronto «mancato» con i conflitti civili di età repubblicana.

I «cattivi consiglieri»

Nelle *Vite parallele* vi è ampio spazio per l'età tormentata delle guerre civili tardo-repubblicane, delineata nell'ottica dei suoi protagonisti, fatta eccezione per Ottaviano.[18] Il ruolo che Plutarco attribuisce ai soggetti politici e alle forze sociali nel quadro della società romana della tarda repubblica è stato a più riprese oggetto di disamina. È stata messa in evidenza la visione sostanzialmente binaria, il cosiddetto «*boulê—dêmos* conflict»,[19] che caratterizza la ricostruzione plutarchea della politica romana della seconda metà del I secolo a.C. e a cui corrisponde una sorta di disattenzione verso soggetti politici quali gli *equites*, i *socii* italici, l'esercito professionale.[20]

Altre sono le questioni poste dai conflitti scoppiati nel 68/69, nel diverso contesto dell'età del principato: innanzitutto il problema dell'investitura imperiale[21] e il peso progressivamente maggiore svolto in tale ambito dai pretoriani e dagli eserciti provinciali.[22] L'intera *Vita di Galba* si articola proprio attorno al tema della precarietà della nomina imperiale. Vi si potrebbe individuare una struttura tripartita, resa coerente dal medesimo *Leit-motiv*.

1) Prima parte: morte di Nerone e acclamazioni di imperatori presso gli eserciti provinciali, prevalenza di Galba.[23]
2) Seconda parte: scelta del proprio successore da parte di Galba, possibili candidati, nomina di Pisone.[24]

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[18] L'eccezione si può ritenere compensata dalla biografia di Augusto nelle *Vitae Caesarum*.

[19] Pelling (1986) 159–178.

[20] Cfr. tra gli interventi più recenti Mazza (1995) 245–268.

[21] Scuderi (1995) 399–413.

[22] Jal (1962) 12–23; Jal (1963) 493–499.

[23] Plutarco, *Galba* 2–18.

[24] Plutarco, *Galba* 19–24.

3) Terza parte: uccisione di Galba e Pisone, causata dalle ambizioni frustrate di Otone e acclamazione di quest'ultimo.[25]

Il tema dell'investitura imperiale costituisce il punto di congiunzione tra la biografia di Galba e quella di Otone, dal momento che la mancata nomina alla successione è la ragione della ribellione di Otone: questa seconda biografia rappresenta dunque una sorta di epilogo della prima, più ampia ed articolata.

All'interno della *Vita* di Galba, accanto a figure individuali, più o meno salienti, identificate nominalmente da Plutarco,[26] agiscono protagonisti corali. Si tratta:

1) degli eserciti, pretoriano e provinciali, e di gran parte dei loro comandanti;[27]
2) del senato, il cui ruolo non riesce –nonostante i tentativi di Galba— a divenire determinante nelle vicende: ciò suggerisce un giudizio disincantato, ma netto sul senato del proprio tempo da parte di Plutarco;
3) del popolo, il cui peso è pressoché nullo, fatto salvo qualche episodio specifico.

Nei contributi più recenti sulla biografia galbiana è già stato ben rilevato come, a fronte della scarsa incidenza del senato negli eventi e nella determinazione della nomina imperiale, Plutarco sottolinei che il succedersi di quattro imperatori in un arco di tempo ristretto sia da attribuire all'avidità dei soldati. Sono questi ultimi, nel loro insieme, come gruppo o talora gruppi in contrapposizione, a detenere il potere di decisione e a muovere l'azione.[28] Non insisterò, perciò, su questo tema né sul giudizio favorevole che emerge nel biografo circa l'adozione di Pisone, quale anticipazione del principato adottivo, benché nel caso di Galba e Pisone si registri un insuccesso, da attribuire, secondo Plutarco, proprio allo strapotere dei militari e all'incapacità del senato.

Finora, non sono stati, invece, notati lo spazio e l'importanza che Plutarco attribuisce, nello svolgimento dei fatti, ad alcune figure, che

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[25] Plutarco, *Galba* 25–29.

[26] Oltre ai candidati all'impero, taluni comandanti provinciali, prefetti al pretorio, esponenti del senato, o intimi dell'imperatore nominato. Per una disamina dei sostenitori di Galba cfr. Syme (1982) 460–481; Murison (1993) 46–50.

[27] Anche i loro comandanti –salvo poche eccezioni (cfr. *infra*, nel testo)— sono presentati per gruppi «anonimi»: cfr., ad esempio, Plutarco, *Galba* 6.1.

[28] Cfr. in particolare Scuderi (1995) 405, 410 e n. 68. Sull'atteggiamento verso Galba dei vari gruppi della società romana vd. inoltre Murison (1993) 57–61.

ricoprono funzioni diverse all'interno della compagine romana, ma che sono accomunate dalla veste di consiglieri dell'imperatore in carica o del suo antagonista. Eppure, essi sono presentati in più di un caso come coloro che tirano le fila degli eventi e la loro presenza, in genere nefasta per le sorti del protagonista, caratterizza il racconto plutarcheo rispetto alle altre fonti e veicola una visione peculiare dei centri decisionali dell'impero.[29]

Su questo punto è illuminante il confronto con Tacito. Basti un esempio: in Plutarco, un ruolo determinante nelle vicende narrate all'inizio della *Vita di Galba* è svolto dal prefetto del pretorio C. Ninfidio Sabino, di cui Plutarco traccia un ampio ritratto a partire dalle umili origini.[30] È Ninfidio a convincere le truppe a proclamare Galba imperatore (Plutarco, *Galba* 1–2): egli diviene arbitro della politica in Roma, manovrando i pretoriani e il senato (Plutarco, *Galba* 8). In Tacito, il ruolo di Ninfidio è appena accennato. In *Storie* 1.5.1–2 la ribellione dei soldati contro Nerone è attribuita, in modo generico, ad intrighi e sobillazioni esterne: si allude a Ninfidio, ma il personaggio non viene nominato se non a conclusione del capitolo per chiarire che, insieme con altre ragioni, i pretoriani erano messi in scompiglio «dalla scelleraggine del ⟨loro⟩ comandante Ninfidio Sabino, mirante all'impero». Si intravede il ruolo di Ninfidio stesso, ma Tacito non vi insiste, anzi sottolinea che egli fu ben presto eliminato; le successive, poche, menzioni sono del tutto *en passant*.[31]

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[29] Un accenno a questa schiera di personaggi vi è in Jones (1971) 73–74, che sottolinea come sia un tratto caratteristico della produzione biografica di Plutarco l'opposizione tra «cattivi consiglieri» e «nobili protagonisti». Dubbi che, in relazione a Galba, si delinei come una peculiarità del solo racconto plutarcheo in Fabbricotti (1976) 30–31, ma si veda *infra*, nel testo.

[30] Su di lui si veda Stein (1937) 1605–1606; *PIR*^{2} V 3, n° 250; sul ruolo e i piani di Ninfidio cfr. anche Sancery (1983) 73–83. Gli esempi di personaggi intriganti, che, come Ninfidio, determinano le azioni dei protagonisti sono molteplici: cfr. *Galba* 4.7 dove è Tito Vinio a spingere Galba ad allearsi con Vindice; sulla nefasta influenza di Vinio vd. anche *Galba* 11.3–4; 12.5; 13.2 (Galba si lascia dirigere da Vinio e dal prefetto del pretorio Cornelio Lacone); 16.4–18.2.

[31] Cfr. Tacito, *Annali* 15.72; Svetonio, *Galba* 11.2. È vero che più ampio è lo spazio che Tacito concede ad altri «consiglieri»: ad esempio, di Vinio traccia un breve ma significativo ritratto (*Storie* 1.6), ne sottolinea il potere (*Storie* 1.13), così come il ruolo, insieme con altri, nella discussione sulla scelta del successore (*Storie* 1.13). Tuttavia, in Plutarco essi vengono a costituire una sorta di «categoria»: si noti che l'introduzione della biografia di Galba (*Galba* 1.9) si conclude con un giudizio negativo su questa schiera di personaggi, a cui si può apporre, in senso lato, l'etichetta di «consiglieri». Ancora nel medesimo senso va *Otone* 7.7 in cui Celso e Paolino sono caratterizzati proprio dall'essere «consiglieri»: «Quanto a Celso e Paolino, essi, senza avere nelle vicende politiche

A sostegno del peso che Plutarco attribuisce a tali figure tornano due osservazioni.

1) In *Galb.* 13.2 si riporta un episodio non menzionato nelle altre fonti: Ninfidio raduna gli ufficiali perché abbandonino Galba, nonostante il suo tentativo i pretoriani non defezionano. Se è vero che la circostanza dimostra il limite dell'azione di Ninfidio e, per analogia, dei personaggi assimilabili, tuttavia rivela anche come i veri motori delle guerre civili siano per Plutarco, ancor più degli eserciti, queste figure, dal passato, oltre che dal presente, fosco. L'episodio conferma peraltro come gli interlocutori, depositari del potere di nominare un imperatore, siano i militari, non il senato: gli eserciti detengono il potere di investitura, ma le circostanze in cui tale potere si esplica sono determinate, in più di un caso, dalle manovre dei «consiglieri» che attorniano l'imperatore o chi aspira a diventarlo.
2) La seconda considerazione consiste nel fatto che sono proprio i «consiglieri» nefasti a provocare la *metabolê* dell'imperatore designato, anche quando questi –come nel caso di Galba– rappresenti un candidato degno. Perfino Nerone viene ritenuto vittima delle trasformazioni indotte da Tigellino, che lo hanno mutato in tiranno, decretandone la morte: il tirannicidio è giustificato, ma il tiranno è tale anzitutto per opera del suo consigliere nefando.[32] Non è escluso da un simile quadro il monito all'imperatore in carica, forse da riconoscere in Domiziano.[33]

Il 68/69 e i conflitti civili di età repubblicana

Ulteriore differenza rispetto a Tacito è costituita dalla prospettiva in cui vengono inseriti i conflitti del 68/69: in Plutarco non vengono stabiliti collegamenti con le guerre civili di età repubblicana né ad esse si

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alcun potere o autorità, avevano soltanto il nome di consiglieri ed amici.» Lo stesso Svetonio, che pure, in linea con il genere biografico, sottolinea il ruolo nefasto su Galba di Vinio, Cornelio Lacone e Icelo, «pedagoghi» dell'imperatore (*Galba* 14), presenta un giudizio negativo di carattere individuale, non esteso alla categoria, su cui non esprime una riflessione specifica. Per un confronto tra la biografia plutarchea e quella svetoniana vd. Braun (1992) 90–102.

[32] Plutarco, *Galba* 17.4: «[…] Tigellino, che aveva reso Nerone degno della pena di morte […].».

[33] Per la datazione delle *Vitae Caesarum* all'epoca domizianea cfr. *supra*, p. 353.

fanno allusioni che valgano come parametro interpretativo.[34] La connessione è invece proposta in Tacito, a più riprese, in modo non marginale, tanto da rappresentare un punto di riferimento costante nella sua narrazione.[35] Ora, si ritiene generalmente che Plutarco e Tacito dipendano da una fonte comune:[36] il silenzio dell'uno a fronte degli espliciti paragoni con l'epoca repubblicana nell'altro sembra, perciò, rispondere a una scelta interpretativa.

Il collegamento con l'età repubblicana torna in Cassio Dione.[37] In questo storico, il richiamo ai precedenti repubblicani dipende, secondo un'ipotesi da me avanzata altrove, dal recupero operato da Settimio Severo delle figure di quell'età, in particolare di Silla.[38] Tuttavia, i riferimenti alle guerre civili del I secolo a.C. inseriti nel resoconto dioneo sottolineano come il motivo non fosse estraneo alla rappresentazione dei conflitti intestini di età imperiale.

Si potrebbe obiettare che l'inclusione delle biografie imperiali nella prima fase della produzione di Plutarco potrebbe dare ragione di taluni silenzi. È vero, però, che neppure *a posteriori* Plutarco sana la «lacuna». Nelle *Vite* dei protagonisti dei conflitti civili tardo-repubblicani non vi è mai accenno alle guerre del 68/69. Plutarco dà una lettura a sé stante dei due periodi, escludendo connessioni. Conferma in tal senso viene dalla menzione, in *Publ.* 15.2, del tempio distrutto dai Vitelliani e ricostruito da Vespasiano: l'autore ha presente l'attualità ma non vi ricorre per stipulare comparazioni.

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[34] Del tutto assenti nel *Galba*, due cursori ricordi vi sono in *Otone* 9.5 e 13.4. Nel secondo caso si tratta di un breve cenno nel contesto del discorso tenuto agli ufficiali dopo la sconfitta di Bedriaco da Mario Celso, che deplora la scelta di Catone e Metello Scipione dopo Farsalo. Il primo passo (*Otone* 9.5) riferisce il probabile pensiero dei soldati dei due contendenti, inclini a trovare un'intesa poiché era «cosa terribilmente odiosa dover sopportare allora le stesse sofferenze che un tempo i cittadini si erano inflitti a vicenda e avevano subito a causa di Silla e Mario, poi di Cesare e Pompeo [...]». Entrambe le allusioni, nella loro brevità, non vengono a costituire un tema della *Vita* né un elemento significativo di confronto per le vicende narrate.

[35] Si veda, ad esempio, *Storie* 1.50; 2.6; 2.37; 3.72; 3.83. Sulla influenza dei motivi repubblicani nella raffigurazione positiva di Galba in Tacito si veda Shochat (1981) 199–204.

[36] Cfr. Scuderi (1995) 407–409, ove bibliografia precedente. Sulle somiglianze tra le *Vite* plutarchee e il testo di Tacito vd. Flacelière (1980) 113–119. Non esclude che Tacito possa essersi servito delle biografie plutarchee Jones (1971) 74–76, che sottolinea l'apporto di fonti orali nella narrazione dell'autore di Cheronea.

[37] Cfr. *supra*, p. 351.

[38] Schettino (2001) 533–558. Cfr. inoltre *supra*, p. 352 n. 4.

Alla lettura nella prospettiva interna alla storia romana, Plutarco preferisce l'analogia con periodi e personaggi del mondo greco-orientale. L'inquadramento che egli dà delle vicende del 68/69 nell'introduzione alla *Vita di Galba* si basa, dunque, sulla storia greco-ellenistica più che sui precedenti offerti da Roma. Gli esempi iniziali, che sottolineano l'importanza della disciplina militare[39] sullo sfondo del pensiero politico di Platone, vertono su Ificrate, Emilio Paolo, Demade e Polifrone di Fere. Particolarmente significativa appare la menzione degli ultimi due statisti, in quanto Plutarco inserisce gli effetti provocati dalla morte di Nerone in una sequenza (*Galb.* 1.4–7) che connette direttamente l'età ellenistica (rappresentata appunto da Demade e Polifrone) con l'attualità. Il motivo dell'esercito non è, quindi, individuato quale elemento specifico delle vicende del 68/69: ma, se si possono cogliere affinità con episodi della Grecità in generale, è il rapporto con la prima età ellenistica ad imporsi. Questo rapporto sembra ribadito dal giudizio negativo sui «consiglieri nefasti», responsabili dei mali dei protagonisti, con cui si chiude l'introduzione al *Galba.* L' inquadramento introduttivo prepara il lettore al rilievo dato nel prosieguo della ricostruzione plutarchea, accanto alle forze emergenti costituite dagli eserciti, a quelli che in greco chiameremmo *philoi*, invece che ai gruppi caratterizzanti della società romana alto-imperiale (senato, popolo, burocrazia di corte).

Osservazioni conclusive

Dagli elementi messi in evidenza si ricavano due osservazioni conclusive circa l'interpretazione degli eventi del 68/69 data da Plutarco.

La prima: nel pensiero plutarcheo vi è una frattura tra età repubblicana e età imperiale. Gli eventi della prima non costituiscono punto di riferimento per quelli della seconda. Conferma indiretta è data da un lato dal rapporto privilegiato stabilito tra gli eventi del 68/69 e la prima età ellenistica, dall'altro dal valore allusivo di alcuni tratti dei personaggi delle *Vite parallele*, reinterpretati sullo sfondo di tematiche contemporanee: connessione non storica, ma articolata sul piano simbolico per far emergere, in controluce, i protagonisti del proprio tempo.[40]

La seconda: l'interpretazione dell'età imperiale è veicolata nelle biografie di Galba e Otone attraverso il modello delle corti dei *basileis* elle-

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[39] Cfr. Scuderi (1995) 405.

[40] Cfr. *supra*, p. 353.

nistici, attorniati da *philoi* e consiglieri. Plutarco coglie la differenza tra potere imperiale e regalità ellenistica: la seconda dinastica e di per sé legittimata, il primo soggetto a legittimazione da parte di una pluralità di soggetti politici spesso in conflitto. Il biografo dedica spazio considerevole all'adozione di Pisone da parte di Galba, cogliendone la novità. Tuttavia la «scelta del migliore» –egli deve constatarlo— non è sufficiente a garantire l'impero di Galba, anzi sarà il più immediato motivo della sua crisi e della precipitosa fine. Plutarco scrive il *Galba* quando è in vigore il criterio dinastico, e le sue pagine sembrano prendere atto dell'assenza di un'alternativa, sebbene egli saluterà positivamente la scelta dell' «ottimo principe» adottata nel caso di Traiano.[41]

Pur nella consapevolezza delle differenze delle procedure di legittimazione in età imperiale e in epoca ellenistica, l'assenza di una prospettiva romana, il ruolo determinante attribuito ai *philoi*, l'inquadramento dei fatti in un orizzonte greco-ellenistico proponevano ai lettori un'interpretazione delle dinamiche attive a Roma per analogia al modello costituito dalle corti ellenistiche. D'altra parte contemporanee delle *Vitae* imperiali sono le biografie di Arato e Artaserse.[42] A loro volta, queste ultime si muovono all'interno dell'orizzonte politico dell'età ellenistica. La *Vita di Arato*, notoriamente ben documentata sulle *Memorie* del protagonista,[43] ha tra i suoi temi proprio la funzione del «consigliere», in quanto il successo del personaggio si deve, fin dalle prime imprese, al dialogo con amici fidati. Nella seconda, la corte di Artaserse è modellata a ritroso sulle componenti orientali di quella di Alessandro Magno, al quale del resto erano già stati dedicati da Plutarco almeno i due trattatelli *de Alexandri fortuna aut virtute*.[44] La coincidenza cronologica tra queste *Vite* e quelle di Galba e Otone spiega la trasposizione di alcuni motivi ellenistici nella storia imperiale di Roma; ai fatti del 68/69 Plutarco non ritornò più: la sua riflessione sull'anno infausto si risolse nell'immediatezza degli eventi. Allora, quella di Plutarco non è ancora la visione di un greco che guarda al mondo romano per comporre i rapporti tra le due anime di cui è formato l'impero, la cui formulazione compiuta è nelle *Vite parallele*; piuttosto il biografo

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41 Schettino (2002), 201–212.

42 Cfr. *supra* p. 352 n. 10.

43 Plutarco, *Arato* 3.3.

44 Sono considerati opera giovanile, da collocare poco prima o poco dopo la frequentazione della scuola di Ammonio (ca. 65–69 d.C.), senz'altro anteriori alla *Vita di Alessandro*; per uno *status quaestionis* rinvio a D'Angelo (ed., 1998) 7–17; Cammarota (ed., 1988).

è un greco che guarda a Roma come luogo del potere politico, cerca di ricostruire la dinamica dei fatti, di coglierne i motori e gli attori, con occhio attento agli interessi, alle aspettative e all'orizzonte culturale dell'*élite* ellenizzata.

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